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Thesis Abstract 
The unprecedented degradation of freshwater ecosystems due to the rampant 
exploitation of water resources re-establishes the importance of preserving freshwater 
ecosystems in order to ensure their continued viability that supports the attainment of 
sustainable development. This concern is addressed in Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention that specifically provides for the preservation of ecosystems 
of international watercourses. 
However, the interpretation and the subsequent application of this obligation are 
complicated by the proliferation of international instruments concerning the 
environment, which leads to the fragmentation of international law. In response to the 
apprehension raised over the undesirable consequences of the fragmentation of 
international law, the potential of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention as an 
interpretative mechanism that enables the systemic integration of rules has come into 
the limelight.  
The objective of the present thesis, titled ‘Preservation of Ecosystems of International 
Watercourses and the Integration of Relevant Rules’ is to develop a interpretative 
framework for the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) that allows the full realisation 
of its potential as a tool of integration. A three-tier operationalisation framework that re-
interprets the salient features of Article 31(3)(c) through the prism of an interactional 
understanding of international law is developed and executed through Chapters Two to 
Eight, where Chapter Nine provides a general conclusion of the thesis.  
The reconstruction of existing interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) provides a new 
understanding of this Article, which enables the realisation of its systemic integration 
potential. The application of this framework of operationalisation in the interpretation of 
the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses stipulated under 
Article 20 reflects contemporaneous development in international environmental law, 
and enhances the normative content and scope of Article 20. 
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1 
Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1 Context: Environmental Protection of International Watercourses: A 
Review 
‘In the field of environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on 
account of the often irreversible character of damage to the environment and of the 
limitations inherent in the very mechanism of reparation of this type of damage.’1 
The degradation of freshwater ecosystems has heightened the need for an effective 
regime within the management of water resources, especially in the advent of climate 
change that has serious implications on water availability, thereby directly affecting the 
utilisation of watercourses.
2
 Scholars have described the global dimension of 
environmental degradation, especially of river ecosystems, as a matter of 
‘environmental security’3 where a significant amount of environmental degradation in 
transboundary watercourses is caused by mismanagement and over-exploitation.
4
  
                                               
1  Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (Judgment of 25 September 1997) [1997] ICJ 
Reports 7, at p 78, para 141 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf> accessed 24 August 2012 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/92/7375.pdf> accessed 24 August 2012 (hereinafter: ‘Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros’). This was reiterated in the recent pulp mills case between Argentina and Uruguay over the 
construction of two pulp mills along River Uruguay, Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay 
(Argentina v Uruguay) (Judgment of 20 April 2010) [2010] ICJ Reports 14 (hereafter: the ‘Pulp Mills’ 
case’), at p 76, para 185.  
2  UN, ‘International Decade for Action “Water For Life” 2005-2015’ (undated) 
<http://www.un.org/waterforlifedecade/quality.shtml> accessed 2 November 2012. The UN Secretary 
General stated that – ‘Our indispensable resources have proven themselves to be greatly resilient, but they 
are increasingly vulnerable and threatened. Our growing population’s need for water for food, raw 
materials and energy is increasingly competing with nature’s own demands for water to sustain already 
imperilled ecosystems and the services on which we depend … Clean water has become even scarcer 
with the onset of climate change’. In UNEP, ‘The UN-Water Status Report on the Application of 
Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management’ (UNEP, 2012) 
<http://www.unwater.org/downloads/UNW_status_report_Rio2012.pdf> accessed 3 November 2012. The 
UN-Water report stated, at p 3 that ‘as water is the principle medium through which climate change 
expresses itself, adaptation to climate change – and the need to build resilience – is increasingly being 
approached through water management initiatives’.  
3 See Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A Case for 
International Environmental Law’ (1994) 5 Yearbook of International Environmental Law 41 – 76, at 41 
– 52.  
4 Sandara Postel, Dividing the Waters: Food Security, Ecosystem Health, and the New Politics of Scarcity 
(Worldwatch Paper 132, Worldwatch Institute 1996) at pp 26 – 35. Stephen M Schwebel ‘Third Report 
on the Law of Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ (11 December 1981) [1982] II(1) 
Yearbook of International Law Commission 65 – 191, UN Doc A/CN.4/348 and Corr.1 (hereinafter: 
‘Schwebel 3rd Report’) at p 141. Selected summaries from the Global 2000 Report quoted extensively in 
the 3
rd
 Special Rapporteur’s report highlighted the increasingly critical state of earth’s water resources. 
Some of the statements are ‘water problems resulting from deforestation have appeared in 16 countries in 
the form of critical water shortages, and in 10 countries in the form of increased flooding. Some countries 
2 
 
The issue of environmental protection is a major concern in international water 
instruments, where the obligation to protect the environment is found in a plethora of 
water specific instruments
5
 such as the regional 1992 Helsinki Convention,
6
 and the 
1995 Agreement on the Mekong River Basin.
7
 The robust development of international 
law through the multiplication of international instruments on international 
watercourses has contributed to the emergence of a specialised regime known as 
international water law, or international law on water resources.
8
  
These international instruments inform the body of knowledge of the obligation to 
protect the international watercourses environment, where the incorporation of this 
obligation in water-specific international instruments leads to the crystallisation of this 
obligation in the international legal regime on international watercourses.
9
 The 
recognition of this specialised body of international law on the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses by the international community has culminated in the 
codification and progressive development of this area of law by the International Law 
Commission (ILC), subsequently adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 
(UNGA).
10
  
                                                                                                                                         
shared both drought and flooding’; and ‘the disruption of water systems is the most certain environmental 
consequence of forest elimination. Deforestation is most rapid in the very region where water systems are 
most vulnerable: the equatorial (tropical) belt … receives almost half the glove’s total terrestrial 
rainfall… and the rain is substantially more erosive than elsewhere in the world … Deforestation of this 
belt will have serious effects on the flows in the major river systems such as the Mekong, the Ganges, the 
Amazon, the Congo, and their tributaries’. In Ian R Calder, Blue Revolution: Integrated Land and Water 
Resources Management (2nd edn, Earthscan, UK and the USA, 2005) at p 5: ‘Soil degradation [due to 
removal of natural vegetation, overgrazing and etc] may in turn affect the quantity and quality of water as 
it infiltrates and moves through the soil profile, and thus alter the hydrological response of catchments 
and the hydrological cycle’. 
5 For examples of some water-specific international instruments, see infra n 66. 
6 See infra n 67. Art 2(d) provides that ‘the Parties [to prevent, control and reduce any transboundary 
impact] shall, in particularly, take all appropriate measures to ensure conservation and, where necessary, 
restoration of ecosystems’. 
7 Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin (Entered 
into Force 5 April 1995) 2069 UNTS I-35844 
<http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%202069/v2069.pdf> accessed 15 February 2013. 
Art 3 of the Mekong Agreement addresses the protection of the environment and ecological balance 
where it provides that ‘to protect the environment, natural resources, aquatic life and conditions, and 
ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from pollution or other harmful effects resulting from any 
development plans and uses of water and related resources in the Basin’.    
8 On structurisation of international law through interaction and interplay of norms, refer to infra Section 
1.2.3 and n 140. 
9  The structurisation of international water law will be elaborated in Sections 1.1.1 and 1.2.3, in 
particularly n 70 and n 141. Some international water instruments constituting the corpus of law on 
international watercourses are mentioned in supra n 66. 
10 UNGA, ‘99th Plenary Meeting’ (51st Session of the General Assembly, 21 May 1997). Refer to infra n 
41. 
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Apart from the multiplication of international water-specific instruments on the 
obligation to protect the environment, the obligation to protect the environment is a 
major concern of other non-water specific Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(MEAs),
11
 such as the Biodiversity Convention
12
 and the Ramsar Convention on 
Wetlands.
13
 The proliferation of international instruments on the environment and its 
protection, triggered by the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, which exist parallel to each 
other ‘without the benefit of consideration being given to potential conflicts with other 
agreements either during their negotiation or at a later stage of their existence’, has 
given rise to a situation known as ‘a multitude of parallel’.14  
Due to the interdependence of ecological processes, the parallel MEAs that substantially 
or partially overlap and collide with each other, in the absence of an overarching 
architecture of administration, lead to treaty congestion and conflicts that could have the 
undesirable effects of conflicts, contradictions, and the doubling of efforts that diminish 
the effectiveness of international environmental law.
15
 These conflicts, analysed by the 
ILC under the discourse of ‘fragmentation of international law’,16 recognise the familiar 
ways conflicts are dealt with in every legal order, such as the maxims of lex specialis or 
lex posterior known to most legal systems.
17
 
The ILC explained that ‘conflict-ascertainment and conflict-resolution are a part of [a 
purposive activity
18
 of] legal reasoning, that is, of the pragmatic process through which 
                                               
11  On examples of non-water specific international instruments on the protection of international 
watercourse environment, see infra n 52. 
12 Convention on Biological Diversity (entered into force 29 December 1993) 1760 UNTS 79; (1992) 31 
ILM 818 (hereinafter: ‘Biodiversity Convention’). 
13 Convention on Wetlands of International importance Especially as Waterfowl Habitat (entered into 
force 21 December 1975) 996 UNTS 245; TIAS 11084; (1972) 11 ILM 963 (hereinafter: ‘Ramsar 
Convention’). 
14  Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Springer-Verlag 
Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 2003) at p 2. The authors, at pp 2 – 3 commented that ‘The phenomenon 
of a multitude of parallel, substantially or partially overlapping and colliding agreements in international 
environmental law, exacerbated by the practice of negotiating ever more binding instruments, has been 
labelled “treaty congestion”’.  
15 Wolfrum and Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law, at pp 3 – 4. The problématique 
shrouding the fragmentation of international law is discussed in infra Section 1.2, n 107. 
16 The problems arising due to the fragmentation of international law is further elaborated in Section 1.2 
of the thesis. 
17 ILC, ‘Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission. Fragmentation of International 
Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (Fifty-eighth 
session, 1 May – 9 June and 3 July – 11 August 2006, Geneva, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi) (13 
April 2006) UN Doc A/CN.4/L.682 (hereafter: ‘Fragmentation Report’) at p 20, para 26. For further 
discussion on the fragmentation of international law see Section 1.2. 
18 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 23, para 34. 
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lawyers go about interpreting and applying formal law’, whereby legal rules are deemed 
to be in a relationship with each other
19
 within the ‘system’ of law.20 It is within this 
context that legal interpretation (where principles of interpretation are codified under 
Articles 31 – 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties),21 and thus 
legal reasoning, are crucial to the resolution of conflict posed by the multiplication of 
parallel norms, where interpretation ‘builds systemic relationships’ between norms that 
form ‘part of the human effort or purpose’.22  
The multitude of international instruments relating to the environmental protection of 
international watercourses could lead to the fragmentation of international law. The 
resolution of a situation of fragmented norms through legal reasoning entails either the 
determination of a relationship of interpretation that seeks to harmonise apparently 
conflicting standards; or in the event that harmonisation is inappropriate,
23
 the 
establishment of definite relationships of priority between conflicting norms where 
conflict-resolution techniques become useful.
24
 However, bearing in mind the 
ecological interdependencies of the environment, there is a need to seek harmonisation 
of parallel norms that operate simultaneously on states, where states are obliged to 
comply.  
From the perspective of resolving the undesirable consequences of the fragmentation of 
international law, there is a need to seek harmonisation of parallel norms through the 
legal mechanism of interpretation, where the fragmentation of norms could not be 
                                               
19 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 20, para 27. 
20 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 23, para 33. At p 25, para 36, the ILC stated that ‘Instead of a 
random collection of directives, the law  
begins to assume the shape of a purposive (legal) system’. 
21 ILC, in Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 25, para 37, stated that ‘In international law, there is a 
strong presumption against normative conflict. Treaty interpretation is diplomacy, and it is the business of 
diplomacy to avoid or mitigate conflict. This extends to adjudication as well’. The general rule of 
interpretation is codified under Articles 31 – 32 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
infra n 31. For a detailed elaboration of treaty interpretation, the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 
principles of legal interpretation of treaties, refer infra Section 1.6.1. 
22 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 24, para 35. 
23 Situations where harmonisation could be in appropriate in the resolution of fragmented norms include, 
a situation of ‘genuine conflicts’ (as stated by ILC in the Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 27, para 
42); or a situation where the relationship of lex generalis-lex specialis occurs and it is prudent to apply the 
lex specialis rule, where the specific rule is read and understood within the confines or against the 
background of the general standard (Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 35, para 56). The ILC is of 
the opinion that conflicts between general law and a particular law, which involves an unorthodox 
interpretation of general law (Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 30, para 47(a)), ‘falls strictly 
speaking outside the Commission study [on fragmentation of international law]’ by distinguishing this 
type of normative conflict from ‘genuine conflict’ that produces the undesirable consequences of a 
fragmentation of international law.  
24 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at pp 24 – 25, para 36. 
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addressed through the application of the lex specialis rule.
25
 Despite the multiplication 
of water-specific international instruments that impinges on the obligation to protect the 
environment, the problems arising from the fragmentation of international law are less 
likely to occur. This is because coherency would be observed through the application of 
the lex specialis rule, where lex specialis would be interpreted and applied within the 
confines of the lex generalis.
26
 However, conflicts might arise between the international 
water law regime and the multitude of MEAs that make up the regime of international 
environmental law, where states have simultaneous commitments to comply.
27
 
In this context, a strong presumption against normative conflict necessitates an 
integration of parallel rules that are relevant
28
 to the obligation to protect and preserve 
the environment of international watercourses, where legal interpretation is 
recommended as a means to ‘avoid or mitigate conflict’.29 In particular, the principle of 
systemic integration,
30
 which finds expression in Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention,
31
 is recognised as an interpretative mechanism to manage the 
fragmentation of international law due to the parallel existence of rules of international 
law in different areas of specialisation (i.e., water and non-water specific), in a legal-
professional way.
32
  
In light of the recognition of the conceptualisation of the environment as functional unit 
of ecological systems in international law, increasing importance is placed on the 
obligation to preserve as a measure of environment protection.
33
 Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention represents the international consensus of the obligation to 
preserve at the global level, where particular emphasis is placed on the preservation of 
the natural status of ecosystems of international watercourses through a special 
                                               
25 In reference to the discussion in supra n 23, the existence of regionalised and basin-specific 
international instruments on water resources would not be classified as ‘genuine conflict’ that brings forth 
the concerns due to the fragmentation of international law. 
26 On the complementary relationship of lex specialis-lex generalis within the international water law 
regime, refer to Section 1.4 of this thesis. 
27 Further justification is provided in Section 1.4 of this thesis. 
28 On the criteria for the establishment of a relationship of  ‘relevance’, refer to Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
29 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 25, para 37.  
30 The principle of systemic integration is elaborated by the ILC in Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 
137, para 271. The ILC stated that ‘relevant instruments should always be read as compatible with each 
other (i.e. the principle of systemic integration) within an overall obligation to cooperate’.  
31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted 23 May 1969, entered into force 27 January 1980) 
(hereafter ‘1969 Vienna Convention’) 1155 UNTS 331. On treaty interpretation and the 1969 Vienna 
Convention, see Section 1.6.1 of this thesis. 
32 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 15, para 17.  
33 On the obligation to preserve, refer to Section 1.1.1 and Chapter 2 of this thesis. 
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management regime.
34
 It provides a suitable foundation for the ascertainment of the 
normativity of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses, 
where the interpretation of this obligation provided under Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention is undertaken in light of other parallel relevant rules of 
international law within its normative environment.  
Hence, this thesis will focus on the interpretation of the obligation to preserve 
ecosystems of international watercourses provided under Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention
35
 and proposes a framework of interpretation that 
operationalises Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. This framework 
endeavours to realise the full potential of Article 31(3)(c) as an integration tool that 
expresses the principle of systemic integration. An integrated approach in the 
interpretation of a treaty provision is particularly crucial in light of the fragmentation of 
international law on the environment, especially in striking the balance between 
conservation and use, and between sustainability and development. These concerns, as 
reflected in the two introductory paragraphs, underlie the objective of this research and 
will be further developed throughout this thesis. 
In response to the need for ‘international water law [to] become aware of [the] covert 
hegemonic practices’, 36  the thesis acknowledges the political asymmetries and 
sensitivities inherent in the cooperation of states over the shared international 
watercourses, especially in the Nile, Jordan, Tigris and Euphrates river basins;
37
 and 
China’s hydro-supremacy in the Asian region. 38  The pivotal role that shared legal 
understanding (the implicit dimension underlying a rule of international law) plays in 
the conceptualisation of international law through an interactional perspective proposed 
                                               
34 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 190, para 518. Refer infra n 56 for an elaboration of the obligation 
to preserve. 
35 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (adopted 21 May 
1997, not yet entered into force) (hereafter: ‘1997 Watercourses Convention’) reprinted in (1997) 36 ILM 
700. 
36 Melvin Woodhouse and Mark Zeitoun, ‘Hydro-hegemony and International Water Law: Grappling 
with the Gaps of Power and Law’ (2008) 10 (supp 2) Water Policy 103 – 119, at p 103. 
37 Mark Zeitoun and Jeroen Warner, ‘Hydro-hegemony – A Framework for Analysis of Trans-boundary 
Water Conflicts’ (2006) 8(5) Water Policy 435 – 460.  
38
 Brahma Chellaney, ‘China’s Hydro-Hegemony’ (The Opinion Pages, The New York Times, New 
Delhi, 7 February 2013) <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/opinion/global/chinas-hydro-
hegemony.html?_r=0> accessed 16 February 2013. 
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in this thesis could serve as a platform to accommodate or even assist the cooperation of 
states, where willingness to cooperate is a major concern.
39
  
This chapter commences with the background of the topic of research and the problem it 
seeks to address, followed by the research title and research question developed for this 
thesis. Thereafter, the chapter proceeds to delimit the scope of, and presents the 
justifications for the research. The subsequent sections in this chapter will address the 
methodology engaged in this thesis, and the analytical framework developed to address 
the research question proposed in the chapter via the structure outlined in the final 
sections of this chapter.  
The next section introduces the legal status of the protection and preservation of 
ecosystems of international watercourses as codified in Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention, and elaborates how the obligation to protect and preserve has 
been applied to the recent Pulp Mills’ case. 
1.1.1 Article 20 of the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention 
The inability of piecemeal rules to address legal problems arising from conflict of 
competing uses of freshwater resources prompted the UNGA to request the ILC to look 
into the codification and progressive development of international watercourses law on 
the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. This took into account recent 
application in state practice and international adjudication of the law of international 
watercourses, and inter-governmental and non-governmental studies on the subject 
matter.
40
 The Draft Resolution A/51/L.72, which is now the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention, was adopted by the UNGA by 103 votes to three, with 27 abstentions 
(Resolution 51/229).
41
 
Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention provides that ‘Watercourses States 
shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the ecosystems 
of international watercourses’. 42  It sets forth the obligation to protect and preserve 
ecosystems of international watercourse states regardless of whether transboundary 
harm is caused, and imposes on states the initiative to act individually in the protection 
                                               
39 This aspect will be addressed further in Section 8.6 of this thesis. 
40 UNGA Res 2669 (XXV) (8 December 1970). 
41
 UNGA, ‘99th Plenary Meeting’ (51st Session of the General Assembly, 21 May 1997) A/51/PV.99, at p 
8 <http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/51/PV.99> accessed 18 August 2012.  
42 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Art 20. 
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and preservation of the ecosystem of an international watercourse, and cooperate with 
other states where appropriate.
43
  
The term ‘ecosystem’ was adopted as it was believed to have a ‘more precise scientific 
and legal meaning’ than the environment.44  It generally refers to ‘an ecological unit 
consisting of living and non-living components that are interdependent and function as a 
community’. 45  The acknowledgment of the conceptualisation of the environment in 
ecosystem terminology, together with the underlying context of Chapter IV of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention, implies that the surrounding areas, which form an ecological 
whole with the system concerned, are encompassed within the meaning of the 
‘ecosystems of international watercourses’.46 
The terms ‘protect’ and ‘preserve’ were qualified and explained in the 1994 Draft 
Articles and Commentaries where ‘protection’ of ecosystems of international 
watercourses, as stipulated in Article 5,
47
 requires the Watercourses States to shield the 
                                               
43  Chapter IV of the 1997 Watercourses Convention deals with the protection, preservation and 
management aspect of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses. Art 20 stated 
‘Watercourses States shall, individually and, where appropriate, jointly, protect and preserve the 
ecosystems of international watercourses’. 
44 It was defined in the 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, in reference to the work of the 
Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) as ‘a spatial unit of Nature in which living organisms and the 
non-living environment interact adaptively’. See ILC ‘Draft Articles on the Law of the Non-navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses and Commentaries thereto and Resolution on Transboundary 
Confined Groundwater’ (Report of the International Law Commission on the Works of Its Forty-sixth 
Session, 2 May – 22 July 1994, ORGA, Forty-ninth Session, Supplement No 10) UN Doc A/49/10 [1994] 
II(2) Yearbook of International Law Commission 1 – 182 (hereinafter: ‘1994 Draft Articles and 
Commentaries’) at p 118. It is stated in the commentaries to Art 20 that: ‘environment can be interpreted 
quite broadly to apply to areas surrounding the watercourses that have minimal bearing on the protection 
and preservation of the watercourse itself. Furthermore, the term has implication to areas outside the 
watercourse, which is not the intention of the Commission. For these reasons, the Commission preferred 
to utilise the term “ecosystem” which is believed to have a more precise scientific and legal meaning ... as 
the term generally refers to an ecological unit consisting of living and non-living components that are 
interdependent and function as a community’. Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 136, para 286. It is 
stated that ‘For some purposes, “environment” is described, or defined, as the “assemblage of material 
factors (internal and external) and conditions surrounding the living organism and its component parts”’. 
In the external environment, inanimate objects and the forces associated with them constitute the physical 
environment and the living things and their derivatives with which the animal may be associated 
constitute the organic environment. In modern practice, aesthetics and vegetation and even bacterial 
populations are embraced. Many industrial processes, and perhaps more significantly “human habitats”, 
involve substantial control of the environment, while in the field of environmental protection, preserving 
or restoring the free state of nature is the fundamental focus, plus the special feature of improving the 
“quality of life” for man’. 
45 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 118, para 2.  
46 ILC ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Thirty-fifth Session, 3 May – 22 
July 1983’ (Thirty-eighth Session, GAOR, Supplement No 10) UN Doc A/38/10 [1983] II(2) Yearbook 
of International Law Commission 1 – 91, at para 256.  
47 Art 5(1) of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, provides ‘international watercourse shall be 
used and developed … to attain optimal and sustainable utilisation and benefits … consistent with 
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watercourse from harm and damage, and imposes a duty to protect the watercourse from 
a significant threat of harm.
48
 The obligation to ‘preserve’, however, applies in 
particular to the protection of freshwater ecosystems in their ‘pristine and unspoilt 
condition’49 against harm and damage in order to maintain their natural state. 50  
The ILC explained that the purpose of the obligation imposed on watercourse states to 
protect and preserve the ‘aquatic ecosystems’ is to ensure the continued viability of the 
ecosystem to support life in attaining sustainable development.
51
 The ILC 
acknowledged that – 
‘in ecosystems, everything depends on everything else ... An external impact 
affecting one component of an ecosystem causes reactions among other 
components and may disturb the equilibrium of the entire ecosystem’.52  
The term ‘environment’ was removed and replaced with ‘ecosystems’ due to the 
concern of members of the ILC on the possible incorporation of terrestrial area.
53
 
However, if ecosystem is understood as a dynamic system, where everything is 
interdependent and in which an external impact affecting one component of an 
ecosystem will cause reactions among other components and may disturb the 
equilibrium of the entire ecosystem, the scope of ecosystem is not less expansive than 
                                                                                                                                         
adequate protection of the watercourse’ (author’s emphasis). Art 5(2) provides ‘participation includes … 
the duty to cooperate in the protection and development’. 
48  1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at para 3, p 119. The ILC stated that ‘The 
obligation to “protect” the ecosystem of international watercourses is a specific application of the 
requirement contained in Article 5 that watercourse States are to use and develop an international 
watercourse in a manner that is consistent with adequate protection thereof’.  See Attila Tanzi and 
Maurizio Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses. A 
Framework for Sharing (Kluwer Law International, London, The Hague, Boston, 2001) at p 245.  
49 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 119, paras 3 and  4.  
50 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 122, para 247. It is stated that ‘it is not possible to subsume all 
environmental problems under the rubric of pollution. … it may be said that, for watercourse systems, 
pollution involves the use of water by man … and the impact upon water of other activities for which man 
is responsible, with consequent detrimental effect. Whereas for environmental damage, commonly 
perceived, is harm to nature in a broader sense, more especially, perhaps, to biological complexes of 
myriad sorts. The impact of such damage upon man, while probable, even if in the very long run, may be 
highly indirect or not even ascertainable.’ He went on to elaborated that environmental protection 
involves much more than the quality of water. He stated that accounts must be taken of the ‘effect through 
water, on wildlife, including endangered species, on the flora of the area reached by waters, on the genetic 
resources and on the biotic potentials of the region’ although none of these constitute ‘use’ of the water. 
Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 136, para 285. 
51
 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 119, para 3. 
52 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 118, para 2. 
53 Refer supra n 44 on an elaboration on the replacement of the term ‘environment’ with ‘ecosystem’.  
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the term ‘environment’.54 This indicates the recognition of the Commission of the fact 
that freshwater ecosystems do not merely cover the aquatic component, but also other 
components (including terrestrial ecosystems) in the basin.
55
  
Schwebel observed that the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international 
watercourses is an important portion of environmental protection,
56
 as evidenced in the 
recent extension of the conservation movement in the designation of watercourses as 
wild or scenic rivers.
57
 This supports Schwebel’s assertion that –  
‘environmental damage measurable within the territory of a system State may 
arguably fall under international regulation because the legal presumption is that 
preservation of the environment in the large is a licit concern of all nations’.58  
The emphasis on the role of national boundaries to protect ecosystems is recognised in 
the recent Earth Summit 2012 where the Summit recognised the key role of ecosystems 
in the maintenance of water quantity and quality, and fully supported the actions of 
states within their respective national boundaries in the protection and management of 
these ecosystems.
59
 This explains the order of the provision where the obligation to 
protect and preserve ecosystems of international watercourses codified in the 1997 
Watercourses Convention imposes firstly that ‘watercourse States shall, individually, 
                                               
54 This is supported by the recognition of a basin approach by the ILC in reference to the medium-term 
plan of the United Nations for the period 1992-1997 that implies that the acknowledgment of the 
Commission of the fact that freshwater ecosystem does not merely covers the ‘aquatic ecosystem’ 
component, but also other components (including terrestrial ecosystem) in the basin as well. 1994 Draft 
Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 118, para 2. The ILC quoted ‘water basin development 
activities can have negative impacts leading to unsustainable development’ from the medium-term plan of 
the United Nations for the period 1992-1997. 
55 Apart from that, the ILC quoted the medium-term plan of the United Nations for the period 1992-1997 
that ‘water basin development activities can have negative impacts leading to unsustainable development’ 
to strengthen the assertion that all activities conducted on the basin (including the terrestrial area) will 
have an impact on the sustainable development of a watercourse. 1994 Draft Articles, at p 118, para 2. 
56 The preservation of the natural state of international watercourses will enable the maintenance of the 
ecological balance of the aquatic ecosystems of international watercourses. 1994 Draft Articles, at p 121, 
para 8. 
57 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 190, para 518. The Special Rapporteur explained that ‘while the 
creation and management of [national or international parks where the wildlife and scenery are removed 
from the operation of ordinary legislation and are reserved, under special regimes, for controlled, limited 
use as preserves] is a widely accepted practice of States, the protective designation of a watercourse as a 
wild or scenic river is a relatively recent extension of the conservation movement’. It is further 
commented, in para 521 that ‘Unspoiled and unmarred rivers have become as much as an endangered 
species [for] an untouched land that gives beauty and pleasure … [and forms a part of our heritage]’. 
58 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 123, para 247. 
59 UN, ‘The Future We Want’ (Rio+20 United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de 
Janeiro, Brazil, 20 -22 June 2012) (19 June 2012, reissued 22 June 2012) UN Doc A/CONF/206/L.1, at 
para 122 <http://www.stakeholderforum.org/fileadmin/files/FWWEnglish.pdf> accessed 21 July 2012 
(hereinafter: ‘The Future We Want’). 
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protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses’ (author’s 
emphasis).
60
 Only then, and where appropriate shall these watercourse states ‘jointly 
protect and preserve’ these ecosystems.61 
The codification of the obligation to preserve in the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
gave explicit recognition to the fact that environmental protection in the context of 
watercourse systems goes beyond the quality of water and the treatment of water 
pollution.
62
 It includes the effects on wildlife and the flora of the area reached by water, 
and the impacts on the genetic resources and biotic potentials of the region.
63
  
Article 20 was located in Chapter IV of the 1997 Watercourses Convention that deals 
with the protection, preservation and management aspect of non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses. It found its way into the 1997 Watercourses Convention as a 
reflection of the conviction of parties for a framework convention that ensure not only 
the utilisation and development of international watercourses, but also their 
conservation, management and protection to ensure optimal and sustainable 
utilisation.
64
 The obligation to preserve is an unusual aspect of environmental protection 
that has gradually generated international legal recognition, and will likely gain broader 
recognition in the governance and management of international or other transboundary 
watercourses in the immediate future.
65
 
In light of the development of the ecosystem approach in the scientific community and 
its increased recognition by the legal community, the most identifiable provision under 
the 1997 Watercourses Convention for the maintenance of the ecosystem integrity of 
international watercourses is found in Article 20. The obligation set forth under Article 
20 for the protection and preservation of the ecosystems of international watercourses 
suggested that the state parties agreed to adopt an ecosystem-oriented approach in the 
protection of the watercourses environment.  
                                               
60 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Art 20. 
61 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Art 20.  
62  Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 136, para 285. See Stephen C McCaffrey, ‘The Law of 
International Watercourses: Some Recent Development and Unanswered Questions’ (1989) 17 Denver 
Journal of International Law and Policy 505, at p 514. The author opined that environmental protection 
and preservation goes further than the ‘no appreciable harm’ rule even when no transboundary harm is 
caused by pollution to other States.  
63
 Schwebel 3
rd
 Report, supra n 4, at p 136, para 285. 
64 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Preamble. 
65 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 190, para 517. 
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The ILC traced the precedent of Article 20, from the initial imposition of an obligation 
to protect the environment, to the recent recognition of an ecosystem approach in the 
practice of states and international organisations.
66
 In particular, the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention gave explicit recognition to the adoption of an ecosystem approach in 
Article 3(1)(i). The parties are required to ‘develop, adopt, implement and, as far as 
possible, render compatible relevant legal, administrative, economic, financial and 
technical measures, in order to ensure that … sustainable water-resources management, 
including the application of the ecosystems approach, is promoted’ for the prevention, 
control and reduction of transboundary impact.
67
 
Robust development in the operationalisation of an ecosystem approach is undertaken 
by the UNECE within the treaty regime of the 1992 Helsinki Convention, evidenced in 
the development of guidelines on the application of the ecosystem approach in water 
                                               
66 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 119, para 5 et seq. International instruments 
concluded by states concerning the protection of the ecosystems of international watercourses, cited as 
example in para 6, include, the 1975 Statute of the Uruguay River; 1978 Convention Relating to the 
Status of the River Gambia; the 1963  Act Regarding Navigation and Economic Cooperation between the 
States of the Niger Basin; the 1978 Agreement on Great Lakes Water Quality between Canada and the 
United States. Early instruments are cited in para 7, including 1863 Final Act on the Delimitation of the 
International Frontier of the Pyrenees between France and Spain; 1887 Convention between Switzerland 
and the Grand Duchy of Baden and Alsace-Lorraine; 1906 Convention between Switzerland and Italy 
Establishing Provisions in Respect of Fishing in Frontier Waters; 1904 Convention between the French 
Republic and the Swiss Confederation for the Regulation of Fishing in Frontier Waters; 1958 Treaty 
between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan Concerning the Regime of the Soviet-Afghan State Frontier; 
and the 1956 Convention concerning the Canalisation of the Moselle between the Federal Republic of 
Germany, France and Luxembourg. The works of international organisations that recognises the need to 
protect and preserve ecosystems of international watercourses, listed in para 8, are the Act of Asunció 
adopted by the 4th Meeting of Foreign Ministers of the River Plate Basin States in 1971; and the United 
Nations Water Conference held at Mar del Plata in 1977. Para 9 cited other non-international 
watercourses instruments that address the protection and preservation of environment, and non-
watercourses ecosystems in general, such as African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and 
Natural Resources; 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources; 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea; Convention for Cooperation in the Protection and 
Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment of the West and Central African Region; the 
Convention for the Prevention of Marine Pollution from Land-based Sources; Convention on the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the Baltic Sea Area; Convention for the Protection of the 
Mediterranean Sea Against Pollution and its Protocol of 1980; and the Kuwait Regional Convention for 
Cooperation on the Protection of the Marine Environment from Pollution.  
67 Art 3(1)(i), Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International 
Lakes (done at Helsinki, 17 March 1992) (hereinafter: ‘1992 Helsinki Convention’). At the time of the 
revision of this thesis, the 1992 Helsinki Convention, initially negotiated as a regional instrument, has 
turned into a global legal framework for transboundary water cooperation by virtue of the entry into force 
of the 2003 amendment on 6 February 2013 that allows accession by all the United Nations Member 
States. It is expected that non-ECE countries will be able to join the Convention as of end of 2013. See 
UNECE, ‘The UNECE Water Convention, Helsinki, 17 March 1992’ (undated) 
<http://www.unece.org/env/water/> accessed 10 February 2013. See UNECE, ‘Amendment to Articles 25 
and 26 of the Convention’ (Meeting of the Parties to the Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, 12 January 2004) ECE/MP.WAT/14 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2004/wat/ece.mp.wat.14.e.pdf> accessed 10 
February 2013. 
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management in 1993.
68
 In particular, the 1993 UNECE guidelines recommend policies 
and strategies that aim at ‘furthering all measures and behaviours to maintain and 
improve conditions and functions of aquatic ecosystems including the conservation of 
aquatic biotic communities and the rehabilitation of damaged ecosystem components’.69 
The working group of the 1992 Helsinki Convention has drafted Recommendations on 
Payments for Ecosystem Services in Integrated Water Resources Management to 
facilitate the internalisation of environmental costs and benefits in decision making 
through the recognition of the true value of services supplied by water-related 
ecosystems in the form of payments for ecosystem services (PES).
70
 The recent 
adoption of the Guide to Implementing the 1992 Helsinki Convention by the parties to 
the Convention demonstrates the commitment of parties to conserve ecosystems via an 
ecosystem approach.
71
 
Despite a plurality of sources of law
72
 concerning watercourses’ utilisation and 
protection due to the ad hoc and sectoral nature of this legal order,
73
 there seems to be 
an emerging ’structurisation’ 74  of international water law. The concept of ‘the 
                                               
68 UNECE, ‘Part One Guidelines on the Ecosystem Approach in Water Management’ (December 1993) 
ECE/ENVWA/31 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/documents/Library/Old_documents_foun
d_library/ECE_ENVWA_31_eng.pdf> accessed 10 February 2013. 
69 UNECE, ‘Part One Guidelines on the Ecosystem Approach in Water Management’, supra n 68, at p 1, 
para (a).  
70 Foreword by Marek Belka, at p iii. UNECE, ‘Recommendations on Payments for Ecosystem Services 
in Integrated Water Resources Management’ (United Nations, New York and Geneva, 2007) 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/documents/PES_Recommendations_web.
pdf > accessed 10 February 2013. 
71 UNECE, ‘Integrated Management of Water and Related Ecosystems. Draft Guide to Implementing the 
Convention’ (Draft Guide by the Chairperson of the Legal Board, Meeting of the Parties to the 
Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes, Fifth 
Session, Geneva, 10 – 12 November 2009)  ECE/MP.WAT/2009/L.2 (31 August 2009) 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/documents/2009/Wat/MOP5/ECE.MP.WAT.2009.L.2_EN.p
df> accessed 10 February 2013 (hereinafter ‘Guide to Implementing the 1992 Helsinki Convention’). 
72 For a discussion on plurality of sources of law, and its subtle difference with legal pluralism, see 
William Twinning, ‘Normative and Legal Pluralism: A Global Perspective’ (Seventh Annual Herbert L 
Bernstein Memorial Lecture in International and Comparative Law, Duke University School of Law 7 
April 2009) at p 487 <http://scholarshiplaw.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1049&context=djcil> 
accessed 1 November 2012. See also Baudouin Dupret, ‘Legal Pluralism, Plurality of Laws, and Legal 
Practices: Theories, Critiques, and Praxiological Re-specification’, European Journal of Legal Studies: 
Issue 1 (An Open Access Initiative by EUI Legal Researchers) <http://halshs.archives-
ouvertes.fr/docs/00/17/84/22/PDF/2007EjlsLegPlur.pdf> accessed 1 November 2012. 
73 The sectoral nature of the legal order of international water law, which explains the plurality of sources 
of international water law, is found in the form of a multitude of bilateral, basin-wide or regional 
agreements on transboundary watercourses. Castro labelled the fragmented nature of international water 
law as normative bric- à-brac. See Paulo Canelas De Castro, The Future of International Water Law 
(Luso-American Foundation, Shared Water Systems and Transboundary Issues, with Special Emphasis on 
the Iberian Peninsula, Lisbon, Portugal, 2000) (hereinafter: ‘Castro, The Future of IWL’) at p 158.  
74 Castro, The Future of IWL, supra n 73, at p 158, para (e).  
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fundamental continuity of the legal universe’75 prevails where the normative bric-à-brac 
is starting to evolve into an emerging normative system akin to ‘an eclectic regulatory 
continuum … secured by principles that are common to other segments of the 
international law of natural resources and the environment’.76  
Schwebel argued that the normative principle of environmental protection in 
international water law is ‘born of sharpened awareness of the vast ramifications 
consequence upon man’s tampering with the intricate relationships among the elements 
and agents of nature’,77 which makes the protection of the environment a universal 
duty.
78
 Apart from committing themselves to the protection of freshwater ecosystems 
from pollution, the state parties did not contest the incorporation of the obligation to 
preserve pristine ecosystems of international watercourses.  
Article 20 re-affirmed the position of the international community through the 
recognition that there is an obligation to preserve the natural state of the environment  
against degradation as part of the effort to protect the ecosystem integrity of 
international watercourses in accordance with the ecosystem approach.
79
 The current 
development of the obligation to preserve since its codification in the 1997 
Watercourses Convention can be seen in the discussion of the Pulp Mills’ case in the 
next section. 
                                               
75 Castro, The Future of IWL, supra n 73, at p158, para (d),  
76 Castro, The Future of IWL, supra n 73, at p 158. 
77 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 123, para 246 
78 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at pp 120 – 121, para 8. The protection of ‘essential 
ecological processes’ is not novel and is evidenced in a number of declarations and resolutions 
concerning the preservation of the environment. This position can be seen in several instruments and 
work of international organisations, conferences and meetings concerning the protection and preservation 
of the ecosystems of international watercourses. 
79 For more, see Charles Odidi Okidi, ‘ “Preservation and Protection” Under the 1991 ILC Draft Articles 
on the Law of International Watercourses’ (1992) 3 Colorado Journal International Environmental Law 
and Policy 143- 174; Iris M Korhonen, ‘Riverine Ecosystems in International Law’ (1996) 36 Natural 
Resources Journal 481 – 519; Brunnée and Toope, ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: 
Ecosystem Regime Building’ supra n 3; Stephen C McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses 
(2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at pp 381 – 396; Joseph W Dellapenna, ‘Foreword: 
Bringing the Customary International Law of Transboundary Waters into the Era of Ecology’ (2001) 1 
International Journal of Global Environmental Issues 243 – 249;  Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of International Watercourses. A Framework for Sharing, supra n 48; Owen 
McIntyre, ‘The Emergence of an “Ecosystem Approach” to the Protection of International Watercourses 
under International Law’ (2004) 13 Review of European Community and International Environmental 
Law 1 – 14; Alistair S Rieu-Clarke, Patricia Wouters, Flavia Loures, ‘The Role and Relevance of the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses to the EU and Its 
Member States’ (UNESCO Centre for Water Law, Policy and Science, undated) 
<http://www.internationalwaterlaw.org/bibliography/WWF/RA_European_Union.pdf> accessed 25 
October 2010. 
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1.1.2 Current State of Environmental Protection in International Water Law: An 
Analysis of the Pulp Mills’ case 
The recent Pulp Mills’ case80 illustrates the development of international water law on 
the obligation to protect the environment through the adjudication of the bilateral 1975 
River Uruguay Treaty. The dispute is important in the context of the environmental 
protection of watercourses, especially the obligation to protect and preserve the riverine 
or freshwater ecosystem. This obligation to preserve is implicit in the assessment of 
whether the Parties complied with Articles 35, 36 and 41 of the River Uruguay Statute.  
Article 35 exhibits the most explicit recognition of the ecosystem approach where the 
River Uruguay Statute acknowledges the interdependence and impact of terrestrial 
ecosystems and land-use activities on the ‘regime of the river’ and water quality. A 
breach of Article 35 required evidentiary support that a ‘deleterious relationship’ existed 
between the major eucalyptus planting operations and the quality of the water of the 
river, of which the Court concluded that ‘Argentina has not established its contention on 
this matter’.81 However, it is important to note that the application of the ecosystem 
approach in Article 35 strengthens the emergence of this approach in international water 
law.  
The obligation to protect the environment against pollution, which includes the 
obligation to preserve, is further strengthened through the imposition of the obligation 
to coordinate through the Administrative Commission of the River Uruguay (CARU).
82
 
The promulgation of standards by CARU through Sections E3 and E4 of the CARU 
Digest, developed in accordance with Articles 36, 37, 38, and 39, aimed to ‘protect and 
preserve the water and its ecological balance’.83 The Court gave explicit recognition to 
the importance of the obligation to preserve where it enunciated that – 
                                               
80 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at para 65.  
81 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 54, paras 180 and 185. 
82 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 55, para 183. 
83 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 55, para 184. Owen McIntyre, ‘The Proceduralisation and Growing 
Maturity of International Water Law. Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. 
Uruguay), ICJ, 20 April 2010’ [2010] 22(3) Journal of Environmental Law 475 – 497. At p 480, the 
author reflects that the ‘due diligence nature of the substantive obligations contained [in the obligation to 
prevent transboundary harm in Art 7 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention] requires that this obligation 
must be made normatively operational by means of a number of procedural requirements’. The concept of 
due diligence in the implementation of the substantive obligations of the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
will be further elaborated in Chapter Seven. Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law 
of International Watercourses. A Framework for Sharing, supra n 48, at pp 152, 154 and 246. At p 246, 
Arcari remarked on the standard of responsibility involved in the obligation to protect and preserve the 
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‘This vigilance and prevention [to exercise due diligence in acting through the 
Commission for the necessary measures to preserve the ecological balance of the 
river] is all the more important in the preservation of the ecological balance, since 
the negative impact of human activities on the waters of the river may affect other 
components of the ecosystem of the watercourse such as its flora, fauna, and 
soil’.84  
Apart from an implicit acknowledgement of the need to preserve the water of River 
Uruguay and its ecological balance in light of the recognition of the ecosystem approach, 
the obligation to preserve is implicit in Article 41 of the River Uruguay Statute.
85
 The 
Court opined that the parties have a duty to protect the fauna and flora of the river ‘as 
part of their obligation to preserve the aquatic environment’.86 Moreover, the Court 
highlighted the need for an integrated approach in the interpretation of Article 41. It is 
of the opinion that – 
‘the rules and measures which they have to adopt under Article 41 should also 
reflect their international undertakings in respect of biodiversity and habitat 
protection, in addition to the other standards on water quality and discharges of 
effluent’.87  
The adjudication of the compliance of Uruguay with its obligations under Articles 35, 
36, and 41 contributes towards the development of the normative content of the 
obligation to protect the environment. The application of an ecosystem approach 
highlighted the importance to preserve the ecological balance of the water of River 
Uruguay. The jurisprudence that develops as a result of the Court’s assessment of 
whether the operation of the pulp mills contravenes these Articles strengthens the 
normativity of the obligation to preserve the aquatic ecosystems of River Uruguay.  
                                                                                                                                         
ecosystems of international watercourses that ‘Although no express indication is provided either in Art 20, 
or in the relevant ILC commentary, it may be excluded that this obligation is one of an absolute character. 
As pointed out by McCaffrey, this is rather an obligation to exercise due diligence to protect and preserve 
river ecosystems. This conclusion is corroborated by a passage of the 1994 Draft Articles and 
Commentaries to draft Article 21(2) according to which: as with the obligation to “protect” ecosystem 
under Article 20, the obligation to prevent pollution that may cause significant harm includes the duty to 
exercise due diligence to prevent the threat of such harm’.  
84 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 56, paras 187 – 188.  
85
 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at pp 56 – 75, paras 190 – 266, especially para 195.  
86 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 74, para 262.  
87 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 74, para 262 
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Such development at the bilateral level contributes toward the emergence of the 
obligation to protect the environment of international watercourses in general through 
the structurisation of international water law. In particularly, the explicit reference to the 
need to preserve aquatic ecosystem of international watercourses emphasises the 
significance and importance of not just the protection, but also the preservation of 
ecosystems of international watercourses.
88
 The Court enunciated the need to interpret 
the 1975 River Uruguay Statute in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention, where measures adopted under Article 41 should ‘reflect their international 
undertakings in respect of biodiversity and habitat protection’. 89  However, it has 
decisively rejected the contention submitted by Argentina, that it should take into 
account recent developments in international law on biodiversity and habitat protection 
for the adjudication of Uruguay’s compliance with Article 41 of the River Uruguay 
Statute.
90
  
The Pulp Mills’ case is not only important in the illustration of the emergence of the 
obligation of environmental protection of international watercourses, it is instrumental 
in indicating the need for an integrated approach in the interpretation and application of 
the obligation stipulated under the 1975 Statute. The problem of fragmentation in terms 
of the existence of multiple regimes relevant to the dispute at hand paves the foundation 
for the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention.
91
 This Article is 
deemed to express the principle of systemic integration, and has the potential to inform 
the interpretation of a treaty provision in the light of the multiplicity of treaties 
addressing the same subject matter.  
                                               
88 The Court explicitly stated that ‘as part of their obligation to preserve the aquatic environment, the 
Parties have a duty to protect the fauna and flora of the river. The rules and measures which they have to 
adopt under Article 41 should also reflect their international undertakings in respect of biodiversity and 
habitat protection, in addition to the other standards on water quality and discharges of effluent’. Pulp 
Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 74, para 262.  
89 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 74, para 262. 
90 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at pp 29 – 30, paras 64 – 66. At p 30, para 66, the Court concluded that – 
the rules of general international law or contained in multilateral conventions to which the two States are 
parties, nevertheless has no bearing on the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court under Article 
60 of the 1975 Statute, which remains confined to disputes concerning the interpretation or application of 
the Statute’. 
91 This issue is dealt with more specifically in the subsequent Section 1.4 of this thesis. 
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The complications due to the fragmentation of international law as a result of the 
multiplication of multilateral environmental treaties will be addressed below via the 
discourse on fragmentation of international law.
92
   
1.2 Problématique: Fragmentation of International Law  
The rise of new and special types of law, known as ‘self-contained regimes’93 and 
geographically or functionally limited treaty-systems,
94
 known as ‘functional 
differentiation’95 developed as distinctive bodies of law armed with their own respective 
principles and institutions peculiar to that particular regime.
96
 The emergence of 
‘specialised and relatively autonomous spheres of social action and structure’97 due to 
their extensive expansion in an uncoordinated fashion and their problem-solving 
orientation leads to the fragmentation of international law. The phenomena of increased 
legal pluralism leading to the creation of competing multi-sourced equivalent norms 
regulating the same situation or fact presents another facet of fragmentation.
98
  
Although the fragmented state of international law, leading to increased normative 
density and intensity in international relations
99
 is part of the process of globalisation,
100
 
                                               
92  The issue of fragmentation and the need for an integrated approach in the interpretation of the 
obligation to protect the environment as highlighted in the Pulp Mills’ case will be further developed in 
Section 1.4 of this chapter. 
93 Examples of self-contained regimes are the environmental regime, trade regime or a natural resource 
regime. 
94 Regimes seen as geographically or functionally limited include treaty regimes that are applicable to a 
certain river basin, or part of it; or certain region, such as the United Nations Economic Council of 
Europe (UNECE); or for the utilisation of watercourses, human rights, the wetlands, the forests, the 
biological diversity, components of the environment or the climate etc. 
95 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at para 204 
96 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 22, para 31. See Alexander Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction 
between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: Fragmentation, Conflict, Parallelism, or Convergence?’ 
(2008) 19(1) The European Journal of International Law 161 – 182, at p 162. These separate systems 
includes ‘trade law’, ‘human rights law’, ‘environmental law’, ‘law of the sea’, ‘European law’, 
‘investment law’, and ‘international refugee law’. Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 11, para 8. See 
also UNGA ‘Report of the International Law Commission of Its Fifty-fourth Session (29 April – 7 June 
and 22 July – 16 August 2002)’ UN GAOR 57th Session Supp No 10 UN Doc A/57/10, at paras 492 – 494. 
UNGA, ‘Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion 
of International Law’ (Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission, Fifty-Eighth 
Session, Geneva, 1 May – 9 June and 3 July – 11 August 2006) A/CN.4/L.702 (18 July 2006) (hereafter: 
‘Report of ILC’) at p 1, para 1. 
97 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at para5. 
98 Miguel Poiares Maduro, ‘Foreword’, in Tomer Broude and Yuval Shany, Multi-Sourced Equivalent 
Norms in International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2011), at p vii. The author 
further stated that the multiplication of legal regimes and adjudication fora, conflicting jurisdictions 
among different legal orders that generate interpretative competition and adjudication giving rise to 
possible externalities, are constructed as being the origin of fragmentation in international law. 
99
 Yuval Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award: The Need to Harmonize Competing Environmental 
Regimes and Dispute Settlement Procedures’, (2004) 17 Leiden Journal of International Law 815 – 827, 
at p 823. Yuval Shany and Tomer Broude, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced 
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it embeds a latent risk. There is a danger in the creation of ‘conflicting and incompatible 
rules, principles, rule-systems and institutional practices’ 101  despite the positive 
implications resulting from the ‘pluralisation and expansion of international law-
making’.102 Such a development entails several theoretical and practical challenges in 
law and legal policy, and leads to more problems than solutions.
103
 It is capable of 
undermining the coherence and uniformity of international law,
 104
 and thus justifies the 
need to provide a framework ‘through which the fragmentation may be assessed and 
managed in a legal professional way’.105 
The successful conclusion of a large number of international environmental 
instruments
106
 that sought to address various environmental problems leads to the 
                                                                                                                                         
Equivalent Norms’ pp 1 – 15 in Shany and Broude (eds) Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in 
International Law, supra n 98, at p 3. 
100 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law (Cambridge Studies in International 
and Comparative Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at pp 19 – 20. 
101 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at p 5, para 9. 
102 José E Alvarez, ‘The New Treaty Makers’ (Keynote Address in a Symposium at Boston College law 
School, given in honour of Professor Cynthia Lichtenstein, 2 November 2001) 
<http://www.bc.edu/dam/files/schools/law/lawreviews/journals/bciclr/25_2/03_FMS.htm> accessed 24 
August 2012. The pluralisation and expansion of international law-making has positive implications in 
light of the ‘ever-rising movements of people, goods, and capital across borders’ and to regulate the 
‘positive and negative externalities, [especially the threat to the global commons], that arises from such a 
flow’. 
103 Shany and Broude (ed) Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law, supra n 98, at pp 3 - 4. 
See also Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award’, supra n 99, at p 823. 
104 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at p 5. See also Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, 
supra n 100. Interestingly, Margaret A Young commented in her article, ‘Fragmentation or Interaction: 
the WTO, Fisheries Subsidies, and International Law’ (2009) 8 World Trade Review 477 – 515 that there 
is a need for ‘greater analysis of the notion and operation of “regimes”… there is much scope for 
international lawyers to contribute understanding and ideas about collaboration and cohesion in rule 
making within regimes as there is a focus on ex post rules determining priority in later disputes’. At p 481, 
it stated that ‘an analysis of regime interplay during rule making may even contribute to a different 
understanding of conflicting norms and of the way regimes interact after rules are made’. Report of ILC, 
supra n 96, at p 3 recognised that the expansion in international legal regulation has been accompanied by 
the emergence of specialised rules, legal institutions and (semi)-autonomous field of operations, inter alia, 
‘environmental law’, ‘law of the sea’ (and probably, international law on shared watercourses). The ILC, 
at p 4 recognised at the outset that fragmentation does raise both institutional and substantive problems. It 
is noted in Jörg Kammerhofer, ‘Systemic Integration, Legal Theory and the ILC’ (2008) 19 Finnish 
Yearbook of International Law 157 – 182; <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1534086> 
(29 November 2009), at p 174 that: ‘In taking up the topic of “fragmentation of international law”, the 
ILC has forayed into the realm of legal theory. The questions to be discussed were the relationship of 
norms in a legal system and the cognition of legal norms’. 
105 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at p 6, para 12. 
106 Harro van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at the 
Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’ (2012) 44 International Law and Politics 1205 – 
1278, at p 1208. The International Environmental Agreements (IEA) Database Project revealed, in the 
Annual Count of Agreements in the IEA Database, the numbers of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements from 1950 to 2012 amounts to a total of 1077 treaties. Ronald B Mitchell, ‘Annual Count of 
Agreements in the IEA Database. Multilateral Environmental Agreements 1950 – 2012’ (2002 – 2012) 
<http://iea.uoregon.edu/page.php?query=summarize_by_year&yearstart=1950&yearend=2012&inclusion
=MEA> accessed 2 November 2012. See Data from Ronald B Mitchell, ‘International Environmental 
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expansion of international law on the environment. The limited resources and capacity 
of the international community shadow the positive implication of such diversification 
of international law, where the problem of treaty congestion leads to operational 
inefficiency.
107
 The lack of cooperation on the issues of environment and sustainable 
development, despite the successful establishment of a modern international 
environmental law regime is most pronounced in the failure of Rio+5.
108
  
The need for reform was clearly enunciated by the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations (UN) who commented that ‘a major challenge to policy-makers is to develop a 
more integrated approach, identifying the natural synergies between different aspects of 
our environment and exploring the potential for more effective policy coordination’.109 
A comprehensive approach that harmonises international rights and obligations 
regulating the same subject matter is necessary, and it would better serve the coherence, 
effectiveness and perceived legitimacy of international law.
110
  
This section will explore the phenomenon of the fragmentation of international law 
through three perspectives: (1) The approach adopted by international courts and 
tribunals; (2) The phenomenon of fragmentation through the lens of treaty congestion; 
and (3) The interaction of treaty regimes due to fragmentation of international law, 
which results in treaty congestion. 
                                                                                                                                         
Agreements Database Project (Version 2012.1)’ (2002-2012) <http://iea.uoregon.edu/> accessed 2 
November 2012. 
107 Edith Brown-Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law: Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a 
New World Order’, (1993) 81 Georgetown Law Journal 675 – 710, at pp 697 – 702. Donald K Anton, 
‘“Treaty Congestion” in Contemporary International Environmental Law’ pp 651 – 665, in Shawkat 
Alam, Md Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareq MR Chowdhury and Erika J Techera (eds) Routledge Handbook 
of International Environmental Law (Routledge, London and New York, 2013) at pp 653 – 657. This 
point will be taken further in  Section 1.2.2 of this Chapter.  
108 W Bradnee Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
(United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2008) at p 3. The author commented that ‘by 1997, the failure 
of Rio+5 [which refers to the Fifth Anniversary of the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1992] showed the ugly side of the lack of cooperation on 
issues of environment and sustainable development’. 
109 Quoted in Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
supra n 108, at p 3. Kofi Annan, the United Nations Secretary-General gave a speech on the occasion of 
the 1999 UNU Conference on Synergies and Coordination among Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements, which is on file with the author. 
110 Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award’, supra n 99, at p 823.  
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1.2.1 Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals 
Although the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is sometimes 
‘infuriatingly transactional’ 111  in nature, it is extremely important to observe the 
convergence of jurisprudence on the adjudication of environmental litigation. It is 
important for the determination of the normative strength of environmental protection in 
international law, be it international environmental law, or international watercourses 
law, of which their ‘categorisation is in some cases a matter only of choice and 
perspective’.112 Thus, it is increasingly important that the resolution of international 
environmental problems, however categorised, ‘entails the application of international 
law as a whole, in an integrated manner’.113  
The MOX plant
114
 and the Bluefin Tuna
115
 disputes demonstrated the difficulties that 
arise due to the parallelism of treaties and the multiple but coexisting international 
judicial fora with overlapping jurisdiction. As each regime is constituted by its own 
‘principles, its own form of expertise and its own “ethos”’116 that is not all the time 
similar to the other regimes, the jurisprudence of each specialisation will naturally 
diverge from each other in their aim to  attain their own respective, specific objectives, 
seen from their respective perspective of specialisation. This outcome is apparent in the 
                                               
111 See Bruno Simma, ‘Universality of International Law from the Perspective of a Practitioner’, (2009) 
20 European Journal of International Law 265 – 297.   
112 See Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle and Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, (3rd 
edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2009) at p 3. The authors, at pp 2 – 3 elaborated that ‘the 
expression “international environmental law” is thus used simply as a convenient way to encompass the 
entire corpus of international law, public and private, relevant to environmental problems … Used in this 
sense, “international environmental law” is of course different from international human-rights law, the 
law of the sea, natural resources law, or international economic law, inter alia, but there are significant 
overlaps and interactions with these categories, and the categorization is in some cases a matter only of 
choice and perspective’.  
113 See Birnie, Boyle and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 112, pp 2 – 4.  
114 The Mixed Oxide Fuel (MOX) Plant dispute arises under three substantive conventional regimes that 
resulted in jurisdictional overlap, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); 
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (OSPAR) and 
the Treaty establishing the European Community. See Volker Röben, ‘The Order of the UNCLOS Annex 
VII Arbitral Tribunal to Suspend Proceedings in the Case of the MOX Plant at Sellafield: How Much 
Jurisdictional Subsidiarity’ (2004) 73 Nordic Journal of International Law 223 – 245, at p 223.  
115 Cesare Romano, ‘The Southern Bluefin Tuna Dispute: Hints of a World to Come ... Like It or Not’ 
(2001) 32 Ocean Development and International Law 313 – 348. At p 317, Cesare noted that the dispute 
on the unilateral actions of Japan could be brought to at least three fora: an ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal 
constituted under Art 16 of the 1993 Convention, the International Court of Justice (ICJ), or the dispute 
settlement procedures of the UNCLOS. 
116 Report of ILC, supra n 96, para 10. See also Martti Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Between 
Fragmentation and Constitutionalism’ (Paper presented at the Australia National University, Canberra, 27 
November 2006) <http://www.helsinki.fi/eci/Publications/Koskenniemi/MCanberra-06c.pdf> accessed 9 
November 2012. 
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trade and environment conundrum, where the aspiration for consistency in the WTO 
regime is sought at the cost of the consistency of international law.
 117
 
There is an inclination towards a normative harmonisation in the construction of 
substantive provisions applied by specialised international tribunals and courts in their 
decisions
118
 in light of all relevant international norms on the matter in accordance with 
Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
119
 Indeed, a harmonious approach 
should be adopted in order to sustain the coherence of international law and reduce the 
tensions associated with special regimes.  
The Bluefin Tuna arbitral tribunal award in 2000
120
 and the arbitral panel in the 
UNCLOS MOX Plant case in June 2003,
121
 evidenced the favourable inclination of the 
                                               
117 Koskenniemi, ‘International Law: Between Fragmentation and Constitutionalism’, supra n 116, at p 6, 
para 11. This is seen in the case of WTO, EC – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products 
(Hormones) – Report of the Appellate Body (adopted 16 January 1998) WT/DS26/AB/R and 
WT/DS48/AB/R (hereinafter: ‘EC – Hormones’). The Appellate Body (AB) found that ‘It was 
unnecessary, and probably imprudent to take a position on the important, but abstract question of whether 
the precautionary principle constitutes customary international law whereby the status of the 
precautionary principle beyond the field of international environmental law, still “awaits authoritative 
formulation”’. The AB concluded that the status of the precautionary principle gained in the 
environmental sphere is not binding on the WTO is the ultimate illustration of the existence of these 
separate ‘boxes’ that international law comes in, (at para 123). This approach is repeated in the case of 
WTO, European Communities: Measures Affecting the Approval and Marketing of Biotech Products – 
Report of the Panel (29 September 2006) WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, and WT/DS293/R (hereafter: ‘EC 
– Biotech’). The Panel refused to adjudicate the dispute under the Cartagena Protocol on the ground that 
one of the Parties in dispute is not a party to the Protocol concerned.  
118 These decisions include WTO, US – Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline – Report 
of the Appellate Body (29 April 1996) WT/DS2/AB/R (hereinafter: ‘US – Gasoline’) at p 621 where it is 
stated that: ‘The General Agreement is not to be read in clinical isolation from public international law’; 
and the dissenting opinion of Mr. Gavan Griffith, PCA, Dispute Concerning Access to Information under 
Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention, (Ireland v UK and Northern Ireland) (Final Award, 2 July 2003) < 
http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXIII/59-151.pdf> accessed 4 March 2013 (hereinafter: 
‘OSPAR Proceeding’) at p 73, para 23. Mr. Griffith argued that Art 9 should be construed in the light of 
the relevant EC directives and the case law of the ECJ regarding their application as: ‘the ordinary 
principles of comity and interpretation may here be invoked to suggest that the same State parties broadly 
may be assumed to understand similarly or identically worded obligations in the same way’.  
119 See Philippe Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, (1998) 1 Yale 
Human Rights and Development Law Journal 85 – 105.  
120  Southern Bluefin Tuna case (Australia and New Zealand/Japan) (Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 4 August 2000) (2004) XXIII UNRIAA 1 (hereinafter: ‘Bluefin Tuna’ case) 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewA
nnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=7_10.pdf> accessed 9 November 2012. It is 
cited at p 42, para 54 that: ‘To find that, in this case, there is a dispute actually arising under UNCLOS 
which is distinct from the dispute that arose under the CCSBT [1993 Convention on the Conservation of 
Southern Bluefin Tuna] would be artificial’. 
121 PCA, Arbitral Tribunal Constituted Pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of Annex VII, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the Dispute concerning the MOX Plant, International 
Movements of Radioactive Materials, and the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Irish Sea 
(Ireland v United Kingdom) Order No 3 (24 June 2003) (hereinafter: ‘UNCLOS MOX Plant’ case). A 
compatible view was expressed by the Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to Art 287, and Art 1 of 
Annex VII of UNCLOS. It is stated, at p 8, para 26 that: ‘There is no certainty that any such provisions 
would in fact give rise to a self-contained and distinct dispute capable of being resolved by the Tribunal’. 
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tribunals towards a harmonious construction of international conventions as a more 
acceptable method of regulating interaction between overlapping norms.
122
 The 
UNCLOS Tribunal in the MOX Plant case seemed to take cognisance of such systemic 
concerns and decided that a procedure that might result in two conflicting decisions on 
the same issue would not be helpful to the resolution of the dispute between the 
parties.
123
   
Despite the problems of coordination, the risk of incompatible decisions, and the 
damaging possibility of a ‘procedural battle of injunctions’ 124  between various 
international courts and tribunals addressing the same dispute, the self-contained regime 
approach taken by the World Trade Organisation (WTO) Dispute Settlement Bodies is 
echoed in several recent international tribunal decisions.
125
 The rejection of certain 
international courts and tribunals of adopting a system-sensitive harmonious approach 
neglects the risk generated by contemporaneous related proceedings, including 
unnecessary litigation, opening the door for manipulation of the international legal 
process, and inconsistent judicial decisions that threaten the coherency of the 
international legal order.
126
  
In realisation of the complications that arise from conflicting jurisprudence, judicial 
bodies are increasingly urged to promote the integration and coordination between 
different legal orders through interpretation of rules of a particular international legal 
regime into another international legal regime.
127
   
At an operational level, the administration of the obligations committed by parties will 
be encumbered by the conclusion of a multitude of treaty regimes. The fragmentation of 
international law on the environment, where each component of the environment, the 
management responses in addressing the problems and the feedback on environmental 
due to management intervention are interlinked, will result in normative overlap known 
as the phenomenon of treaty congestion. The next section will elaborate on the resulting 
                                               
122 Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award’, supra n 99, at p 824. 
123 UNCLOS MOX Plant, at p 9, para 28. See Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award’, supra n 99, at p 825. 
124 Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award’, supra n 99, at p 825. 
125 See for example Czech Republic v. CME, SVEA Court of Appeals, (2003) 42 International Legal 
Materials 919, at pp 953 – 954. Thomas Wälde, ‘Introductory Note to Svea Court of Appeals: Czech 
Republic v CME Czech Republic BV’ (2003) 42 International Legal Materials 915. 
126 Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award’, supra n 99, at pp 826 – 827. 
127 Maduro, ‘Foreword’, supra n 98, at p viii.  
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treaty congestion as in inevitable consequence of the proliferation of treaty regimes on 
subject matter relating to the environment. 
1.2.2 Treaty Congestion 
In light of the intricate connections between freshwater resources and the related 
component of the environment due to indivisible unitary nature of the environment,
128
 
one may observe various interrelationships between the water law regime and the 
environmental law regimes. Complications arise when the international law on the 
environment is in a state of fragmentation
129
 and ‘congestion’,130  as a result of the 
proliferation of environmental treaties addressing the environment. Environmental 
treaties were concluded without taking into consideration the interconnectedness of all 
components of ecosystems and their relationships as a whole in the environment.
 131
 
Given these circumstances, it is not unusual to witness some degree of normative 
interaction and overlap that requires an integrated effort in terms of coordination and 
synergies on their interpretation and application.  
The fragmentation of the international legal order had overlooked the need to attain 
uniformity and legal unity,
132
 and might bring about the dreaded ‘erosion of 
                                               
128 Xue Hanqin, ‘Commentary. Relativity in International Water Law’ (1992) 3 Colorado Journal of 
International Environmental Law and Policy 45 – 57, at p 47. 
129 See further Chambers, Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental Agreement, 
supra n 108; Tim Stephens, ‘Multiple International Courts and the “Fragmentation” of International 
Environmental Law’ (Legal Studies Research Paper No. 07/14, Sydney Law School, The University of 
Sydney, March 2007); and Konrad von Moltke, Whither MEAs? The Role of International Environmental 
Management in the Trade and Environment Agenda (International Institute for Sustainable Development 
Canada, 2001). 
130 For problems caused by treaty congestion, see Edith Brown-Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law: 
Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order’, supra n 107, at pp 697 – 702. Harro 
van Asselt notes the phenomenon of treaty congestion in ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International 
Environmental Law: Forests at the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’, supra n 106, at 
pp 1209 – 1210. The author reiterated the possible consequences that could be resulted from the treaty 
congestion in international environmental law due not only to the substantive incompatibilities among 
different environmental treaties, but also to the operational inefficiency being one of the key problems. 
See also the comments of Bethany Lukitsch Hicks, ‘Treaty Congestion in International Environmental 
Law: The Need for Greater International Coordination’ (1998-1999) 32 University of Richmond Law 
Review 1643 – 1675. 
131 There are rapid legal developments in the field of international environmental law, with approximately 
900 treaties (binding and non-binding) that have provisions substantively addressing the environment. See 
Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law’ at p 679. Harro van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of 
International Environmental Law: Forests at the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’ 
(2012) 44 International Law and Politics 1205 – 1278, supra n 106, at p 1208. The author noted the 
emergence of environmental treaties in a piecemeal fashion led to a multiplication of multilateral, 
regional and bilateral treaties in the field, with some estimates of almost 3,000 environmental treaties 
adopted.   
132 See Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity: International Law as a Universe of Inter-
Connected Islands’ (2004) 25 Michigan Journal of International Law 903 – 916, at pp 915 - 916. It is 
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international law, emergence of conflicting jurisprudence and forum shopping that 
generally threaten legal security’.133 In order to seek an answer to the question on how 
different norms of international law interact with each other in situations, and what is to 
be expected in the event of conflict, the issue of management of the fragmented state of 
international law is increasingly important.
134
 
However, the ILC is confident that legal techniques are able to resolve these conflicts 
posed by the existence of different specialised branches of law where it stated that – 
‘The very effort to canvass a coherent legal professional technique on a 
fragmented world expresses the conviction that conflicts between specialised 
regimes may be overcome by law. Even though the law may not go much further 
than to require a willingness to listen to others, [it will] take their points of view 
into account and to find a reasoned resolution at the end’.135 
Despite a sombreness of the situation, there arises opportunity for robust interaction 
between the treaty regimes that promotes synergies and coordination, which will be 
illustrated in the next section.  
1.2.3 Interaction of Treaty Regimes 
Rieu-Clarke has suggested that –  
‘Central to this analysis [of linkages between treaty provisions, but also the 
relationship between treaties at various governance levels] is a greater 
understanding of the role that global conventions, … and regional conventions … 
                                                                                                                                         
stated that ‘Because it is largely consent-based, international law is fragmented. A wide range of different 
treaty regimes and courts and tribunals exist. This is not necessarily a bad thing. Crucially, however, these 
different islands of international law must be inter-connected and considered in unison through the prism 
of general international law. […] Especially before a particular court or tribunal, it is important to include 
all international law binding between the parties as part of the applicable law, even if the jurisdiction of 
the adjudicator is limited to a given treaty. If all courts and tribunals follow this approach, it would mean 
that, although they may have jurisdiction to examine different claims, in so doing they would apply the 
same law. Hence, in theory, no conflict should arise. […] Thinking of international law in this way, as a 
universe of inter-connected islands, should go a long way toward bridging the conflicting realities of both 
fragmentation and unity in modern international law. ” 
133 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at p 8, para 7. The UN Security Council has to deal with human rights and 
war crimes. The World Bank needs to address environmental sustainability in their developmental 
projects. The World Health Organisation (WHO) must now be mindful of environmental concerns in the 
negotiation of a treaty regulating the sale of tobacco products. See Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public 
International Law, supra n 100, at p 2. 
134  There is a need to develop new technique for the coordination of the negotiation, and the 
implementation of related agreements, in particularly the administrative, monitoring and financial 
provisions. Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law’, at pp 678-679. 
135 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 246, para 487.  
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have at basin or sub-basin level. Similarly, when conducting basin level analyses, 
the impact of non-water specific treaties at various levels on basin practice … 
should be noted. A range of national laws will also affect state behaviour at the 
(international) basin level.’136 
The acute need for integration has been phrased in policy terms in recognition of the 
looming ecological crisis of many dimensions that could ‘jeopardise the globe’s life-
support systems’.137 The InterAction Council reiterated the need for an integrated and 
holistic approach in addressing environmental problems because ‘environmental 
problems are multi- dimensional and can only be solved by multi-dimensional 
measures’.138  
The InterAction Council went further to state that the ‘ongoing dilution of ideological 
divides may facilitate the emergence of a one-world-conscience and improve prospects 
for effective environmental action at all levels towards a sustainable economy and 
development’. 139  This can be translated to mean that the de-fragmentation in 
environmental governance ideologies will be able to improve efforts aiming at resolving 
environmental problems. 
The recognition of the need for a systematic interpretation of the universal, regional and 
basin level laws applicable in the area of international freshwater resources ‘because 
each of them forms part of the international legal system and they function and interact 
in the context of the system as a whole’140 supports the assertion of a structurisation of 
international water law.
141
 More specifically, the UNECE Task Force on Legal and 
                                               
136 Alistair Rieu-Clarke, ‘The Role of Treaties in Building International Watercourse Regimes: A Legal 
Perspective on Existing Knowledge’, (2010) 12 Water Policy 822 – 831, at p 829. The author suggested 
that existing knowledge and understanding from various perspectives provides useful insights into the 
role of treaties in managing conflict and enhance cooperation over international watercourses. 
137 InterAction Council, ‘Ecology and the Global Economy’ (Chaired by Miguel de la Madrid, Hurtado, 
10 – 11 February 1990, Amsterdam, Netherlands) at para 1 <http://www.interactioncouncil.org/node/77> 
accessed 12 September 2012. 
138 InterAction Council, ‘Ecology and the Global Economy’, supra n 137, at para 3.  
139 InterAction Council, ‘Ecology and the Global Economy’, supra n 137, at para 3. The InterAction 
Council further this point, in para 6 that ‘The challenge of the decade of the 1990s is to integrate 
environmental policies into economic policies and to make traditional social-economic policy objectives 
compatible with environment policy objectives’.  
140  Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, ‘Freshwater and International Law: The Interplay between 
Universal, Regional and Basin Perspectives’ (The United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, 
United Nations World Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World, Insights, UNESCO, 
UN-Water, 2009) <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001850/185080E.pdf> accessed 10 February 
2013. 
141 Refer supra n 74 on structurisation of international water law. For the emergence of regional and basin 
level laws applicable in the area of international freshwater resources, see in general Section 1.1.1. See de 
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Administrative Aspects prepared a comprehensive report on the relationship between 
the 1992 Helsinki Convention and the 1997 Watercourses Convention where the two 
Conventions are compared and differentiated.
142
 It is asserted that the two instruments 
are complementary in their mutual relationship, and would contribute towards the 
crystallisation and consolidation of norms on international water law in the ongoing 
process of an emergence of international customary law.  
The obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses in the overall 
context of their protection has also been addressed in non-water specific international 
instruments on the environment.
143
 A study conducted on the interaction between 
Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs) and water resources management 
revealed that the ecological inter-dependence of different components of environment 
specifically addressed in each agreement rendered the resulting normative overlap 
compatible and complementary, where a coordinated approach in their implementation 
promotes synergies and improves efficiency.  
Several attempts at striking interlinkages
144
 between the MEAs are initiated by the 
Biodiversity Convention, but all failed to provide concrete solutions to the problem 
                                                                                                                                         
Chazournes, ‘Freshwater and International Law: The Interplay between Universal, Regional and Basin 
Perspectives’, supra n 140. See also Salman MA Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses 
Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on International Water Law’ (2007) 23(4) Water 
Resources Development 625 – 640 on a study of interactions between different instruments that purport to 
state the rules of international water law. 
142 Attila Tanzi, ‘The Relationship between the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’ (Report of the UNECE Task Force on Legal and 
Administrative Aspects, Geneva, February 2000) 
<http://www.unece.org/fileadmin/DAM/env/water/publications/documents/conventiontotal.pdf> accessed 
10 February 2013. 
143 See McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, supra n 79, p 393. Also Birnie, Boyle and 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 112, p 561; Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, 
‘Eaux internationals et droit international’, at p 41; Korhonen, ‘Riverine Ecosystems in International 
Law’, supra n 79, at p 489. The Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development 
(FIELD) conducted a detailed study in 2005 on the implementation of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements (MEAs) for Efficient Water Management in determining the extent of overlap and conflicts 
of various MEAs in the efficient management of water. FIELD, ‘Implementation of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements for Efficient Water Management’ (April 2005) (on file with author). See also 
Ramsar Convention, ‘Synergies with Other Environment-Related Conventions and Organisations’ (4 
September 2009) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-about-synergy/main/ramsar/1-36-192_4000_0__> 
accessed 20 May 2010. 
144  See W Bradnee Chambers, ‘Interlinkages and the Effectiveness of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements; UNU, Inter-Linkages. Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’ (UNU, Tokyo, 1999) <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/docs/UNUReport.PDF> 
accessed 25 September 2012; Sálvano Briceño, ‘Institutional Linkages among Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements: An Organizational and Educational Development Perspective’ (Prepared for ‘“Interlinkages” 
International Conference on Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, 
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posed.
145
 The fragmentation of international law on the environment that leads to treaty 
congestion arises from the lack of synergy between these treaty agreements,
146
 hence 
the need for increased coordination and cooperation between different regime 
institutions.
147
 In addition to that, the disparity of commitments amongst parties to one 
                                                                                                                                         
14 – 16 July 1999, UNU Tokyo) <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/docs/Briceno.PDF> 
accessed 25 September 2012. 
 Lee A Kimball, ‘Institutional Linkages among Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Structured 
Approach Based on Scale and Function’ (Prepared for ‘Interlinkages’ International Conference on 
Synergies and Coordination between Multilateral Environmental Agreements, UNU Tokyo, 14 – 16 July 
1999) <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/1999/docs/Kimball.pdf> accessed 25 September 2012; Jacob 
D Werksman, ‘Formal Linkages and Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (Background Paper 
prepared for the International Conference on Synergies and Co-ordination between Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements, UNU Tokyo 14 – 16 July 1999) <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-
linkages/1999/docs/jake.PDF> accessed 25 September 2012. Jerry Velasquez, ‘UNU “Interlinkages 
Initiative” Aims at Coherent Sustainable Development’ (Environment and Development: A Three-Decade 
Timeline, UNU Tokyo, 1999) <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/docs/Articles/Diplomat_times.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 2012.  
145 CBD, ‘Annex 1. Recommendations of the SBSTTA at Its 3rd Meeting’ at p 30 para I(b). Ramsar 
Convention, ‘Memorandum of Cooperation between The Bureau of the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat and The Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’ (19 January 1996) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-mous-
memorandum-of/main/ramsar/1-31-115%5E16060_4000_0__> accessed 25 September 2012 . For more 
institutional coordination between MEAs see in general UNEP, ‘Guideline 34. International Cooperation 
and Coordination’ (Manual on Compliance with and Enforcement of Multilateral Environmental 
Agreement, Division of Environmental Law and Conventions, UNEP) 
<http://www.uneporg/dec/onlinemanual/Compliance/InternationalCooperation/tabid/415/Default.aspx> 
accessed 25 September 2012; and UNEP, ‘Synergies between the Ramsar Convention and Other MEAs’ 
<http://www.uneporg/delc/> accessed 25 September 2012. See Sabine Brels, David Coates, Flavia Loures, 
Transboundary Water Resources Management: the Role of International Watercourse Agreements in 
Implementation of the CBD (CBD Technical Series No 40, Secretariat of the CBD, Montreal, Canada 
2008); S Blumenfeld, C Lu, T Chistophersen, and D Coates, Waters, Wetlands and Forests. A Review of 
Ecological, Economic and Policy Linkages (CBD Technical Series No 47, Secretariat of the CBD and 
Secretariat of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands, Montreal and Gland 2009); and CBD, ‘In-Depth 
Review of the Programme of Work on the Biological Diversity of Inland Water ecosystems. Draft 
Recommendation Submitted by the Chair of Working Group I’ (Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical 
and Technological Advice, Fourteenth Meeting, 10 – 21 May 2010 Nairobi, Working Group I, Agenda 
Item 3.1.2) (11 May 2010) UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/14/WG.1/CRP3. 
146 FIELD, ‘Implementation of Multilateral Environmental Agreements for Efficient Water Management’, 
at pp 25 – 26.  
147 It is foresee that there is a need for integration of the environmental regime when ‘at no time has the 
entire structure of international environmental management ever been reviewed with the goal of 
developing optimum architecture’. Moltke, Whither MEAs? supra n 129, at p 15. Different approaches 
towards coordination were explored through an institutional perspective of the establishment of a world 
environment organisation, world environmental court and the clustering of MEAs. See Steve Charnovitz, 
‘A World Environment Organization’ (UNU Institute of Advanced Studies Project on International 
Environmental Governance Reform, UNU Tokyo, 2002) <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-
linkages/docs/IEG/Charnovitz.pdf> accessed 25 September 2012; Ellen Hey, Reflections on an 
International Environmental Court (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, The Netherlands, 2000); and 
Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Clustering of Multilateral Environmental Agreements: Potentials and Limitations’ 
(UNU Institute of Advanced Studies Project on International Environmental Governance Reform, UNU 
Tokyo, 2002) <http://archive.unu.edu/inter-linkages/docs/IEG/Oberthur.pdf> accessed 25 September 
2012. 
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or more international environmental treaties is a fact that is impossible to be ignored in 
the contemplation of the interpretation and application of these treaties.
148
 
The effectiveness of such efforts in addressing the protection and preservation of 
freshwater ecosystems, despite the mushrooming of interlinkages projects implemented 
via clustering of programmes under different themes, or institutional cooperation 
predicated on synergies, is still extremely vague.
149
 It is obvious that the overlapping of 
objectives and requirements of various MEAs, and the interlinkages effort initiated by 
various MEAs under different themes, could lead to a duplication of efforts, where the 
possibility of operational conflicts could arise.  
Various international legal scholars have dealt at length more generally on the 
normative interactions, or regime-collisions caused by the fragmentation of international 
law, and most of these scholars undertook an extensive overview of all possible 
methods and mechanisms for the management of fragmentation.
150
 The ILC compiled 
and studied an extensive range of scholarship on the issue of fragmentation, summarised 
the existing body of knowledge on this pressing issue, and explored the legal means and 
methods in tackling this phenomenon inevitably caused by the diversification and 
expansion of international law.
151
 The focus of these international scholars in the 
normative fragmentation scholarship was mostly on the various legal mechanisms that 
dealt with situations of conflict or interpretation regarding the substance of the law ex 
post the making of the law.
152
 
As opposed to the more ex post approach as a means to address the problem of 
fragmentation in international law, the discussions on the management of the 
                                               
148 See Duncan French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’ (2006) 55 
International Comparative Law Quarterly 281 – 314, 307. Moreover, Principle 7 of Rio Declaration stated 
that States have common but differentiated responsibility in their cooperation to conserve, protect and 
restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 Jun 1992), ‘Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (1 
Jan 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol I) (hereinafter: ‘Rio Declaration’). This in turn, will 
compound the difficulty of a harmonised integration of MEAs.  
149  Karen N Scott, ‘International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation through 
Institutional Connection’ (2011) 12 Melbourne Journal of International Law 1 – 40, at pp 14 – 35. 
150 Pauwelyn frames the normative interaction in international law through a conceptual lens of conflict. 
Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, supra n 100. 
151 ILC, ‘Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the Fragmentations of International Law: 
Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law’ (adopted by ILC at its 
59th Session and submitted to the General Assembly as part of the Commission’s report, 2006) UN Doc 
A/61/10, para 251 <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf> 
accessed 2 November 2012.  
152 Margaret A Young, ‘Fragmentation or Interaction: The WTO, Fisheries Subsidies, and International 
Law’, supra n 104, at p 481. 
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fragmentation of international law on the environment have also adopted an ex ante 
approach, which is influenced by the need to increase the effectiveness of 
environmental governance. Scholars have advocated various methodologies that 
increase interactions and cooperation between treaty regimes, which complement the 
interlinkages initiatives taken at the institutional level by the treaty bodies.
153
 After the 
evaluation of existing ex ante approaches proposed by scholars, van Asselt concluded 
that autonomous institutional actions are the most fruitful approach aimed at enhancing 
synergies between the conflicting regimes.
154
 Institutional reforms are advocated 
through the diversification of institutional arrangements based on networks of 
partnerships between state, public and private stakeholders in addressing the disconnect 
                                               
153 Elizabeth Kirk proposed the mechanism of ‘cross-referencing of reports and information between 
regimes and organisations and a continued exchange of information between autopoietic regimes’ in order 
to sustainably manage a sectoral marine regime plagued by problems created by the expansion of 
maritime jurisdiction she called ‘creeping jurisdiction’. Elizabeth Kirk, ‘Maritime Zones and the 
Ecosystem Approach: A Mismatch?’ (1999) 8(1) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 67 – 72, at p 70. Moltke, Whither MEAs? supra n 129, at p 16 went a step further in 
recommending for more structural interactions as compared to the more administrative interchange 
suggested by Kirk. He explicated the desirability of the institutional clustering of international 
environmental regime to improve effectiveness that strengthens international environmental governance, 
and proposed the strengthening of regime institutions through organisational change. Proceeding on the 
same theme on institutional interactions and linkages, Oberthür elaborated on the potential, problems and 
limitation of multilateral environmental agreements clustering in the attempt to improve the effectiveness 
of the environmental governance regimes, and expanded his research to look at the interactions between 
international and European Union policies. See Sebastian Oberthür, ‘Clustering of Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements: Potentials and Limitations’ (United Nations University Institute of Advanced 
Studies Project on International Environmental Governance Reform, 2002) http://archive.unu.edu/inter-
linkages/docs/IEG/Oberthur.pdf accessed 14 December 2011. Other similar publications by the same 
author include Sebastian Oberthür, Thomas Gehring, and Oran R Young (eds), Institutional Interaction in 
Global Environmental Governance: Synergy and Conflict among International and EU Policies (MIT 
Press, Cambridge, 2006); and Sebastian Oberthür and Olav Schram Stokke (eds), Managing Institutional 
Complexity: Regime Interplay and Global Environmental Change (MIT Press, Cambridge, 2011).  
Moltke’s proposal was reiterated in greater depth and detail 10 years later where Scott proposed the 
engagement of institutional cooperation and integration for the management of fragmentation that 
exploits the overlaps and synergies existed between multilateral environmental treaties, in Scott, 
‘International Environmental Governance: Managing Fragmentation through Institutional Connection’, 
supra n 149. Young introduced a different aspect of regime interactions by advocating for a participatory 
approach in the interactions of institutional that can pre-empt further legal fragmentation. Young, 
‘Fragmentation or Interaction: The WTO, Fisheries Subsidies, and International Law’, supra n 104, at p 
513. Young furthered her proposal for alternative responses via regime interaction through a research 
agenda that focuses on the institutional and normative interplay of the governance of climate change, in 
Margaret A Young, ‘Climate Change Law and Regime Interaction' (2011) 2 Carbon and Climate Law 
Review’ 147 – 157. 
154 Harro van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at the 
Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’ (7 February 2011). New York University Journal 
of International Law and Politics (JILP) (forthcoming) <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1703186> accessed 12 
December 2011, pp 42 – 46. Now published as Harro van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of 
International Environmental Law: Forests at the Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’, 
supra n 106, at pp 1212, and 1268 – 1274. Fragmentation of international law, regime interactions and 
climate change governance are recurring themes of discussion for van Asselt, see Harro van Asselt, 
Francesco Sindico, and Michael A Mehling, ‘Global Climate Change and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’ (2008) 30(4) Law and Policy 423.  
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between the current system of environmental governance and the effective application 
of the ecosystem approach.
155
 Such arrangements are deemed more flexible, resilient, 
and capable of providing the required multi-functional landscapes for the application of 
an ecosystem approach.
156
  
The quest to solve the problems posed by the fragmentation of law, whether it be from a 
traditional school of international law that engages existing legal mechanisms to deal 
with the problem, or from a more revolutionary approach that promotes the 
development of regime towards institutional interactions and cooperation, has raised a 
pertinent issue concerning the interpretation and application of rules. The two 
approaches are not mutually exclusive because a more interactive law-making process 
will strengthen the common understanding of a law, and enable a more integrative 
interpretation of the law that is less prone to conflict. 
In light of the fragmentation of international law concerning the environment, and the 
proliferation of a multitude of international watercourses instruments, it is increasingly 
important to ensure some form of uniformity, consistency and unity in the international 
legal order,
157
 which ‘provides the international players a secure framework to work 
on’.158 A systemically integrated approach is of paramount importance in achieving the 
                                               
155 Alison R Holt, Jasmin A Godbold, Piran CL White, Anne-Michelle Slater, Eduardo G Pereira and 
Martin Solan, ‘Mismatches between Legislative Frameworks and Benefits Restrict the Implementation of 
the Ecosystem Approach in Coastal Environments’ (2011) 434 Marine Ecology Progress Series 213 – 228, 
at p 215. 
156  Alison R Holt et al, ‘Mismatches between Legislative Frameworks and Benefits Restrict the 
Implementation of the Ecosystem Approach in Coastal Environments’, supra n 155, at p 224. 
157 Initiative by Gerhard Hafner, ‘Risk Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’, ILC, ‘Report 
on the Work of its 52nd Session 1 May – 9 June and 10 July – 18 August 2000’ (Annex of GAOR 55th 
Session Supplement No 10 ) UN Doc A/58/10, (2000) II(2) Yearbook of the International Law 
Commission, at p 149. It is stated that: “In light of the growing factual integration of world community on 
the one hand, and the proliferation of subsystems on the other, it is to be expected that the need to take 
measures to ensure the unity of the international legal order will increase”. 
158  Gilbert Guillaume, ‘The Proliferation of International Judicial Bodies: The Outlook for the 
International Legal Order’ (Speech by His Excellency Judge Gilbert Guillaume, President of the ICJ to 
the Sixth Committee of the UNGA, 27 October 2000) <http://www.icj-
cij.org/court/index.php?pr=85&pt=3&p1=1&p2=3&p3=1> accessed 27 January 2011. It is stated, at p 4  
that ‘Certainly, international law must adapt itself to the variety of fields with which it has to deal, as 
national law has done. It must also adapt itself to local and regional requirements. Nonetheless, it must 
preserve its unity and provide the players on the international stage with a secure framework’. Some 
initiatives on interlinkages and synergies have been undertaken by the Biodiversity Convention. See Brels, 
Coates, and Loures, Transboundary Water Resources Management: the Role of International 
Watercourse Agreements in Implementation of the CBD, supra n 145, and Blumenfeld, Lu, Chistophersen, 
and Coates, Waters, Wetlands and Forests. A Review of Ecological, Economic and Policy Linkages, 
supra n 145. See also CBD, ‘Decision VII/4 Biological Diversity of Inland Water Ecosystems’ (Seventh 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Kuala Lumpur, 9 – 
20 and 27 February 2004) UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/4 (13 April 2004) 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-07/cop-07-dec-04-en.pdf> accessed 31 July 2012. 
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ultimate aim of maintaining a continued and sustainable provision of ecosystem 
services.
159
 
Schwebel observed the interdependence of an international watercourse within its 
system, which necessitates the formation of general rules of international law that foster 
the essential cooperation needed for a broad approach to the rational management of 
international water resources.
160
 Agenda 21 of the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992 called for the adoption of a holistic 
approach in the conservation and use of water resources.
161
 Thus, it is extremely 
important that the interaction of regimes that have an impact on the protection and 
preservation of freshwater ecosystems should be looked at in a comprehensive way.  
An integrated approach in the rational management of international water resources 
could be realised through an integrated interpretation of the obligation of protection and 
preservation of freshwater ecosystems, where a coherent interpretation of obligation 
enables the fostering of essential cooperation. This thesis seeks to address the 
challenges faced by the interpreter in the management of the fragmented and congested 
state of rules applicable to the preservation of freshwater ecosystems through a nuanced 
analysis of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. The actual and potential 
application of this article as an expression of the principle of systemic integration is 
explored in this research in the context of the preservation of freshwater ecosystem. 
This serves to offer a prospect in the promotion of coherence within and among the 
‘impressive federation of special areas’162, especially in the aversion of apparent conflict 
of norms and to achieve harmonisation of rules of international law. 
In light of the difficulties arising from the fragmentation of international law on the 
environment as elaborated in the previous sections, the next section lays out the title 
                                               
159  Alan E Boyle, ‘Relationship between International Environmental Law and Other Branches of 
International Law’ 125 – 146, in Daniel Bodansky and others (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) at pp 127 – 128. It stated that ‘What 
then matters is that the regulation of international environmental concerns, however categorised, 
generally entails the application of international law as a whole. The sometimes difficult question is how 
to do so in an integrated and coherent manner.’ 
160 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at para 311. 
161 Agenda 21, UNCED (Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 Jun 1992), ‘Agenda 21: A Programme for Action for 
Sustainable Development’ (1 Jan 1993) UN Doc A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol I) (hereinafter: ‘Agenda 21’) 
Chapter 18. 
162  Campbell McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention’, (2005) 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279 – 230, at p 318. 
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describing this research, and the question to be answered in this research, and 
subsequently the scope and justification for the research. 
1.3 Research Title and Research Question 
The title of this thesis is ‘Preservation of Ecosystems of International Watercourses and 
the Integration of Relevant Rules’. The research question posed is ‘how could Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention be operationalised as an integration tool that 
better reflects the principle of systemic integration in the context of the preservation of 
ecosystems of international watercourses?’. The research intends to provide a 
framework for the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
in order to manifest the actual and potential contribution of this Article in addressing the 
fragmentation of international law and the congestion of treaties. The framework of 
operation developed in this thesis for Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention – 
deemed to reflect the principle of systemic integration – could be useful in guiding the 
integration of relevant rules in its systemic environment through the legal technique of 
interpretation. 
It is extremely crucial that the application of rules is linked to their legal environment 
and that adjoining rules are considered, especially for the critical and constructive 
development of international and national institutions with law applying tasks, because 
such an outcome normally articulates the institution’s legal-institutional environment - 
its substantive preferences, distributionary choices and political objectives.
163
 
1.4 Scope and Justification of Research 
‘If we have a right to benefit from the earth’s bounty, then we have the obligation to 
respect, care for and restore the earth and its natural resources’164 
With increased knowledge on the interconnectedness of the environment, and the need 
to take a holistic approach to conservation and protection of the environment, 
environmental agreements directed to this effort must strive to conserve the 
                                               
163 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 244, para 480. 
164 InterAction Council, ‘A Universal Declaration of Human Responsibility’ (Report on the Conclusions 
and Recommendations by a High-Level Expert Group Meeting Chaired by Helmut Schmidt, 20 – 22 
April 1997, Vienna, Austria) at p 4 <http://interactioncouncil.org/sites/default/files/1997%20UDHR.pdf> 
accessed 12 September 2012. Oscar Arias Sanchez, ‘Some Contributions to a Universal Declaration of 
Human Obligations’ (April 1997) <http://interactioncouncil.org/some-contributions-universal-
declaration-human-obligations> accessed 12 September 2012. 
34 
 
environment as a whole.
165
 A narrow focus on pollution control, or a targeted species 
approach, is no longer the best possible means in the interpretation and implementation 
of these environmental agreements. Such insight has been evident in the adoption of the 
‘system approach’ or the ‘ecosystem approach’ in recent international environmental 
agreements.
166
  
Schwebel stated in his Third Special Rapporteur Report in 1982 that not all 
environmental problems can be ‘subsumed under the rubric of pollution’.167 The field of 
environmental protection and improvement ‘is not exhausted with treatment of the 
standard situations of pollution’; but instead, should encompass ‘all relationships 
between man and the earth’s ecosystems’.168  Furthermore, the customary status of the 
obligation not to cause transboundary harm has been sufficiently established after the 
Trail Smelter case
169
 and made explicit in Principle 2 of Rio Declaration that states have 
the responsibility to ‘ensure activities within their jurisdiction does not cause damage to 
the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction’.170 
Hence, there is a need to address the protection and preservation of freshwater 
ecosystems not just against pollution, but also against environmental degradation in its 
various manifestations. The focus of this research aims to address the gap in this aspect 
of environmental protection of freshwater ecosystems, especially of adverse, but 
indirect effect caused by inappropriate land use that does not take into consideration the 
                                               
165 However, in most cases, the connectivity between the terrestrial ecosystem and the aquatic ecosystem 
is neglected. See 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, for the commentary on Art 20. See 
also McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, supra n 79, for a range of international water 
instrument that specify the protection of ‘aquatic ecosystem’. See also Agenda 21, supra n 161, at para 
18.38. It stated that the maintenance of ecosystem integrity in accordance with the management principle 
of preserving aquatic ecosystems from any form of degradation on a drainage basin. 
166 Examples includes the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(adopted at Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1985); the Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
‘The Ecosystem Approach (CBD Guidelines)’ (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
Montreal, 2004); and also the 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra n 67. 
167 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at para 247: ‘Pollution involves the use of water by man and the 
impact upon water of other activities for which man is responsible, with consequent detrimental effect. 
Commonly perceived, environmental damage is harm to nature in the broader sense, more especially, 
perhaps, to biological complexes of myriad sorts. The impact of such damage upon man, while probable, 
even if in the very long run, may be highly indirect or not even ascertainable’. 
168 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 122, para 244. See Helsinki Rules on the Uses of the Waters of 
International Rivers, (adopted by the International Law Association at the fifty-second conference, 
August 1966) Chapter 3. For a detailed account on the development of international environmental law on 
the prevention against pollution, see Edith Brown-Weiss, ‘International Environmental Law: 
Contemporary Issues and the Emergence of a New World Order’, supra n 107. 
169 Trail Smelter Case (United States, Canada) (Award of 16 April 1938 and 11 March 1941) (1941) III 
Reports of International Arbitral Awards 1905 – 1982 <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_III/1905-
1982.pdf> accessed 14 November 2012.  
170 1992 Rio Declaration, supra n 148, Principle 2.  
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interdependence of the environment as a whole. Schwebel proposed articles regarding 
protection and preservation of freshwater ecosystems that comprehends but 
distinguishes between the concern against pollution and against environmental damage, 
by tracing the differences thereof.
171
 
The term ‘protection’ in the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention was contextualise to 
reflect the specific application of the requirement in Article 5 that watercourse States 
are to use and develop an international watercourse in a manner that is consistent with 
adequate protection.
172
 This requires that watercourse states shield the ecosystems of 
international watercourse from harm or damage, including the duty to protect 
ecosystems from a significant threat of harm.
173
  
The Special Rapporteur’s assertion that ‘not all environmental problems are pollution174 
is further elaborated through the insertion of the obligation to preserve in the same 
article. The term ‘preservation’ is defined to address the particular circumstance of 
transboundary freshwater ecosystems ‘that are in a pristine or unspoiled condition’, 
which requires a protection approach that ‘maintain their condition as much as possible 
in their natural state’.175 In this respect, the normative content and scope of the term 
‘preservation’ seems to indicate a specific protection approach that seeks to maintain the 
condition of freshwater ecosystems that are still in its natural state.  
                                               
171 Environmental damage has been defined as ‘harm to nature’ in Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at para 
247, p 123. The distinction between ‘protection’ and ‘preservation’ is explained the 1994 Draft Articles 
and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 119, para 3. It explained that ‘The obligation to ‘protect’ the 
ecosystems of international watercourses is a specific application of the requirement contained in Art 5 
that watercourse States are to use and develop an international watercourse in a manner that is consistent 
with adequate protection thereof. In essence, it requires that watercourse States shield the ecosystems of 
international watercourses from harm or damage. It thus includes the duty to protect those ecosystems 
from a significant threat of harm … Together, protection and preservation of aquatic ecosystems help to 
ensure their continued viability as life support systems, thus providing an essential basis for sustainable 
development’.  
172 Art 5(1) provides that ‘Watercourse States shall in their respective territories utilize an international 
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner. In particularly, an international watercourse shall be 
used and developed by watercourse States with a view to attaining optimal utilization thereof and benefits 
therefrom consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse’. It is explained the 1994 Draft Articles 
and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 97, paras 3 and 4 that ‘the expression “adequate protection” is meant 
to cover not only measures such as those relating to conservation, security and water-related disease, but 
also measures of “control” in the technical, hydrological sense of the term’. The attainment of optimal 
utilisation and benefits consistent with adequate protection, ‘while primarily referring to measures 
undertaken by individual States, does not exclude cooperative measures, works or activities undertaken 
by States jointly’. 
173 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 119, para 3. 
174
 Schwebel 3
rd
 Report, supra n 4 and n 167, at para 247. 
175 Both quotes are paraphrased from the 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 119, 
para 3. 
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Explicit recognition on the importance of the obligation to preserve resurfaced in light 
of the rising concern on ecosystem degradation in the advent of the ecosystem approach. 
This approach highlights the importance of safeguarding and maintaining the structure 
and functioning of ecosystems to ensure ecosystem integrity.
176
 The InterAction 
Council highlighted the importance of the need to preserve natural resources in the 
broad context (and not just the preservation of freshwater ecosystems) where the 
Council enunciated that ‘people’s participation in the management and preservation of a 
country’s resources will be decisive for the sustainability of development efforts’.177  
Although the obligation to protect and preserve is intrinsically linked conceptually, 
there is still a fine difference between the obligation to protect and the obligation to 
preserve that warrants a separate research into the obligation to preserve. A focussed 
interpretation of the obligation of preserve does not purport to negate the nuanced 
relationship between protection and preservation, nor does it attempt to nullify the 
importance of protection. Instead, it seeks to complement the current body of 
knowledge on the obligation to protect phrased mostly in pollution control and 
prevention terms by exploring the less-researched aspect of preservation as a means of 
protection. An interpretation of the obligation to preserve will contribute towards the 
emergence of the universal duty to protect the environment in the broader sense.  
The obligation to preserve is a widely accepted practice of states.
178
 This research 
focuses on Article 20’s obligation to preserve freshwater ecosystems of international 
watercourses in its natural state,
 179
 to the exclusion of other protection measures that 
address prevention of harm, including measures relating to security, water-related 
                                               
176 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen Toope, ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A Case for 
International Ecosystem Law’, supra n 3; J Fischer, D Lindenmayer, and A Manning, ‘Biodiversity, 
Ecosystem Function, and Resilience: Ten Guiding Principles for Commodity Production Landscapes’ 
(2006) 4(2) Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 80 – 86.  
177 InterAction Council, ‘Ecology and the Global Economy’, supra n 137, at para 9. This importance is 
highlighted in response to the earlier reference of the Council to the statement by Pope John Paul II, in 
para 5 that ‘The new industrialised States cannot, for example, be asked to apply restrictive environmental 
standards to their emerging industries unless the industrialised States first apply them, within their own 
boundaries. At the same time, countries in the process of industrialisation are not morally free to repeat 
the errors made in the past by others, and recklessly continue to damage the environment through 
industrial pollutants, radical deforestation or unlimited exploitation of non-renewable resources’.  
178 Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 190, para 518.  
179 Refer supra n 49 and n 50. 
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disease, measures relating to the technical and hydrological control of watercourses, and 
other measures on the protection of watercourses.
180
  
The increased recognition of the preservation of ecosystems,
181
 under a broader context 
of the maintenance of ecosystems integrity, necessitates a systemic integration of rules 
available under a plethora of MEAs that provides for the establishment of protected 
areas for the preservation and conservation of ecosystems, habitats and the natural 
surroundings of viable population of species. The underpinning principle engaged in 
this research is the principle of systemic integration to achieve harmonisation of rules of 
international law,
182
 as expressed under Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, 
which provides the foundation of the analytical framework.  
Aust enunciated that ‘just as construing legislation is the constant concern of the 
domestic practitioner, treaty interpretation forms a significant part of the day-to-day 
work of a foreign ministry legal adviser’.183 In the analysis of the definitional scope and 
the normative content of the obligation to preserve the ecosystems of international 
watercourses as provided under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, there 
is a need to take into account any relevant rules applicable for the interpretation of the 
terms of this Convention.
184
  
This thesis endeavours to assist water practitioners in their administrative and 
adjudicative capacities to resolve difficulties arising from the congestion of treaties 
                                               
180 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 97, para 4. The ‘control’ measures in the 
technical, hydrological sense are those taken to regulate flow, to control floods, pollution and erosion, to 
mitigate drought and to control saline intrusion. Other measures do not exclude cooperative measures, 
works or activities undertaken by States jointly. On the issue of prevention of harm, including harm 
caused by pollution, the general duty of prevention of significant transboundary harm under customary 
international law, as endorsed in Art 7 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Principle 2 of 
the Rio Declaration, supra n 148, and the 2001 Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities. International Law Commission, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention of transboundary 
harm from hazardous activities’ (Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-
third Session, UNGAOR, Supp (No. 10)) UN Doc A/56/10 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/9_7_2001.pdf> accessed 6 
November 2012.  
181 Bruce Pardy, ‘Changing Nature: The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosystem Management’ (2003) 20 
Pace Environmental Law Review 675 – 692, at p 676. Pardy commented that ‘there are many reasons to 
desire a natural state in ecosystems. Some reasons are philosophical: “deep ecologists”, for example 
contend that a state of nature is inherently more valuable than one designed by humans. Some are 
pragmatic: there are risks that ecosystems changed by human action will not function as well as systems 
in a natural state’. Leopold stressed that ‘A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, 
and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise’. See Aldo Leopold, A Sand 
County Almanac and Sketches Here and There (Oxford University Press, 1949) at ‘The Outlook’ (p 2).  
182
 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 318. 
183 Anthony Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice (2nd edn, Cambridge University Press, 2007) at p 230. 
184 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 31(3)(c). 
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through interpretative means, and to operationalise Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention, deemed to express the principle of systemic integration, to manage this 
problem in a legal-professional way. Thus, although the water-specific international 
instruments discussed above are capable of informing the interpretation of the 
obligation to preserve, they are not crucial to the problem of fragmentation of 
international law. This is because these instruments could not demonstrate the 
significant role of Article 31(3)(c) as an integration tool that enables the systemic 
integration of parallel and relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties, amidst a fragmented international legal order. 
Hence, the thesis excludes taking into account other water-specific international 
instruments at the regional and basin level, due to the cogent reason that these 
instruments are within the regime of international water law
185
 where the legal maxim 
of lex specialis derogat lege generali, could be applied.
186
 The lex specialis maxim 
provides that ‘priority falls on the provision which is “special”’ 187  where the more 
specific rule should take precedence over a general standard.
188
 An application of the lex 
                                               
185 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 130, para 255. The structurisation of an international water 
regime is elaborated in general Section 1.1.1, and n 74 and n 141. 
186 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 34, para 56. As stated in p 36, para 58, a relationship of 
specific vs general law would be provided by a relationship between a territorially limited general regime 
and a universal treaty on some specific subject, where ‘the specific rule should be read and understood 
within the confines or against the background of the general standard’ (at p 35, para 56). At p 35, para 57, 
the Fragmentation Report explained that the lex specialis maxim does not operate as a conflict-solution 
technique as the situation where ‘two legal provisions that are both valid and applicable, are in no express 
hierarchical relationship, and provide incompatible direction on how to deal with the same sets of facts’ 
does not exist. The UNECE Task Force on Legal and Administrative Aspects stated that ‘there is no 
denying that, basically, the two Conventions bear on the same subject-matter’. See Tanzi, ‘The 
Relationship between the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary 
Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the Non Navigational 
Uses of International Watercourses’, supra n  142, at p 53.  
187 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 35, para 57. 
188 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 35, para 56. A specific rule, is explained in p 35, para 57, as 
‘the rule with a more precisely delimited scope of application’. The ILC further elaborated, at pp 36 – 37, 
para 60 that – ‘A special rule is more to the point (“approaches most nearly to the subject in hand”) than a 
general one and it regulates the matter more effectively (“are ordinarily more effective”) than general 
rules … [S]pecial rules are better able to take account of particular circumstances. The need to comply 
with them is felt more acutely than is the case with general rules They have greater clarity and 
definiteness and are thus often felt “harder” or more “binding” than general rules which may stay in the 
background and be applied only rarely. Moreover, lex specialis may also seem useful as it may provide 
better access to what the parties may have willed’. It also appears that, where there is no coincidence 
between the contents of the rules of the two Conventions on the same issue, those of the ECE 92 
Convention are generally more stringent than those of the UN 97 Convention. This applies to their 
material and, even more so, to their procedural rules. As to the substantive rules, the ECE 92 Convention 
sets out more precise guidelines and advanced standards of conduct for the prevention of transboundary 
impact … From a substantive point of view, we have seen that the differences between the two 
Conventions with regard to specific rules on the same subject-matter are hardly ever a matter of 
conflicting prescriptions, but one of more, or less, stringency or detailed character of such prescriptions.’ 
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specialis maxim is supported in the report prepared by the UNECE Task Force on Legal 
and Administrative Aspects where it expresses that ‘as a matter of policy, it is only 
natural that the law-making process at the universal level yields to lower common 
denominators than in the less heterogeneous context of the ECE’.189  
The acknowledgement of the 1992 Helsinki Convention seems to be implied where the 
UNECE Task Force on Legal and Administrative Aspects report concluded that –  
‘the lex posterior derogat priori rule cannot operate invalidating the ECE 92 
Convention due to subsequent ratification, acceptance, approval, or accession to 
the UN 97 Convention’ in light of the ‘crystal clear language of art 3, para 1 of the 
UN 97 Convention’.190 
The aim of this research is to study the issue of fragmentation of international law 
through the prism of interpretation via Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 
The relationship of lex specialis and lex generalis between other water-specific 
instruments such as the 1992 Helsinki Convention and the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention where the lex specialis rule applies renders the water-specific instruments 
unsuitable for the purpose of this research. However, the exclusion of water-specific 
international instruments in this research does not in any way undermine the usefulness 
of these instruments to inform state practice in their execution of the obligation to 
preserve ecosystems of international watercourses. The normative content expressed in 
these instruments forms part of the corpus of knowledge embodied in Article 20 of the 
1997 Watercourses Convention. 
                                                                                                                                         
See Tanzi, ‘The Relationship between the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, supra n  142,  at p 53.  
189  Tanzi, ‘The Relationship between the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, supra n  142,  at p 54. 
190  Tanzi, ‘The Relationship between the 1992 UNECE Convention on the Protection and Use of 
Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes and the 1997 UN Convention on the Law of the 
Non Navigational Uses of International Watercourses’, supra n  142,  at p 54. The ascertainment of the 
general vs special relationship could be clearly observed in Art 3 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
where deference is given to prior agreements in force for a watercourse state, even though Art 3(2)  
invokes the consideration for the harmonisation of agreements in Art 3(1) where necessary with the basic 
principles of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. Art 3(3) supports the general nature of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention where watercourse states are permitted to enter into agreements that apply and 
adjust the provisions of the 1997 Watercourses Convention to fit the characteristics and uses of a 
particular international watercourse.  
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Notwithstanding the application of the lex specialis rule, it is noted that even though the 
1992 Helsinki Convention provides for the conservation of water resources
191
 and their 
ecosystems,
192
 it does not specifically provide for the preservation of natural freshwater 
ecosystems. The Guide Implementing the 1992 Helsinki Convention defines ecosystem 
conservation to comprise ‘measures to maintain viable structures, functions and species 
compositions within an ecosystem’193 that often requires pollution prevention.194 The 
primary aim for the prevention, control and reduction of transboundary impact is 
reiterated in the promotion of the application of an ecosystem approach in Article 3(1)(j) 
to ensure sustainable water-resources management.
195
 In this respect, the pivotal feature 
that Schwebel used to distinguish the obligation to prevent and the obligation to 
preserve is not emphasised in the 1992 Helsinki Convention, which makes it less useful 
in informing the interpretation of the obligation to preserve under Article 20. 
It is reiterated that the focus of the research is to address the fragmentation of 
international law caused by parallel and equivalent norms through the operationalisation 
of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. If it is argued that the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention is useful in illustrating the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c),  there is a 
need to determine whether Article 3(1)(j) of the 1992 Helsinki Convention is parallel 
and equivalent. The regional character in which the 1992 Helsinki Convention is 
developed vitiates its representativeness of the common intention and shared 
understanding of all state parties
196
 of the UN, as opposed to the quasi-universal 
adoption of the 1997 Watercourses Convention by the UNGA.
197
 Due to the 
regionalised and relatively limited membership of the 1992 Helsinki Convention, there 
is a need to ascertain whether the relevant provisions under the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention represent statements of customary international law and not regional 
customary law.
198
 The ascertainment of whether Article 3(1)(j) of the 1992 Helsinki 
                                               
191 Art 2(2)(b), 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra n 67. 
192 Art 2(2)(d), 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra n 67. 
193 Guide to Implementing the 1992 Helsinki Convention’, supra n 71, at p 36, para 111. 
194 Guide to Implementing the 1992 Helsinki Convention’, supra n 71, at p 36, para 112. 
195 Art 3(1), 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra n 67. 
196 The development of shared understanding of all UN members towards the representativeness of the 
1992 Helsinki Convention of the shared understanding of the quasi universal understanding of UN 
members is undertaken after their accession to the 1992 Helsinki Convention, and not at the point of the 
entry into force of the 2003 amendment that allows the accession of all UN members. See supra n 67. 
197 UNGA, ‘99th Plenary Meeting’, supra n 41. 
198
 It is recognised by the ICJ where allowance is made for the concept of regional and local custom at p 
96, footnote 364. See GJH van Hoof, Rethinking the Sources of International Law (Kluwer Law and 
Taxation Publishers, Deventer, The Netherlands, 1983). The author listed the Asylum case, ICJ Reports 
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Convention represents the shared understanding of the international community goes 
beyond the scope of the thesis. All the above reasons render the 1992 Helsinki 
Convention unsuitable for the purpose of this research in view of its scope and 
limitation.  
The phenomenon of the fragmentation of international law on the environment is fully 
exhibited in the proliferation of MEAs on the environment.
199
 In light of the fragmented 
nature of international instruments concerning the environment, where states have the 
simultaneous obligation to undertake the obligations committed under these MEAs, 
there is a need to explore the relevant rules provided under various treaty regimes for a 
coherent and consistent interpretation of Article 20 on the preservation of freshwater 
ecosystems of international watercourses, in accordance with the principle of systemic 
integration.  
The World Heritage Convention provides the protection of natural heritage that can be 
interpreted to include freshwater, habitats and ecosystems.
200
 The World Heritage 
Convention uses terms such as ‘natural features consisting of physical and biological 
formations or groups of such formations’; ‘geological and physiographical formations’; 
and ‘habitat of threatened species’.201 Although they relate to the same subject matter of 
                                                                                                                                         
(1950), pp 266 – 389; the Right of Passage case, ICJ Reports (1960), pp 6 – 144; the separate opinion of 
Judge Gros and Judge Ammoun in the Barcelona Traction case, ICJ Reports (1970), pp 3 – 357. The 
author stated that ‘Instead of regional or local custom it would be preferable to employ the term special or 
specific custom because the common characteristic of the limited number of States to which this type of 
custom is applicable is not necessarily to be found in geographical criteria but may also be one or more 
other special circumstances distinguishing them from other States’. 
199 At least six major related agreements are identified, namely (1) Convention Concerning the Protection 
of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage (entered into force 17 December 1975) 1037 UNTS 151; 27 
United States Treaties and other International Agreements (UST) 37; (1972) 11 ILM 1358 (hereinafter: 
‘World Heritage Convention’); (2) Convention on International trade in Endangered Species of Wild 
Fauna and Flora 1973 (entered into force 1 July 1975) 27 UST 1087; TIAS 82249; 993 UNTS 243; (1973) 
12 ILM 1088 (hereinafter: ‘CITES’); (3) Convention to Combat Desertification in Those countries 
Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification Particularly in Africa (entered into force 26 
December 1996) 1954 UNTS 3; (1994) 33 ILM 1328 (hereinafter: ‘CCD’); (4) The Convention on the 
Conservation of Migratory Species of Wild Animals 1979 (CMS); and (5) The Biodiversity Convention, 
supra n 12; and (6) Ramsar Convention, supra n 13. Douglas E Fisher, ‘Freshwater, Habitats, and 
Ecosystems’, 227 – 242, in Shawkat Alam and others (eds), Routledge Handbook of International 
Environmental Law (Routledge 2013) at p 234. 
200 Art 4 of the World Heritage Convention, supra n 199, provides the duty of each state party to ensure 
‘the identification, protection, conservation, presentation and transmission to future generations of the 
cultural and natural heritage situated in its territory, belongs primarily to that State’. Art 2 defines ‘natural 
heritage’ to consider ‘natural features consisting of physical and biological formations or groups of much 
formations, which are of outstanding universal value from the aesthetic or scientific point of view; 
geological and physiographical formations and precisely delineated areas which constitute the habitat of 
threatened species of animals and plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science 
or conservation’.  
201 World Heritage Convention, supra n 199, Art 2, definition of ‘natural heritage’. 
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the environment, and possibly ecosystem (due to the expansive meaning of both natural 
heritage and ecosystem), these phrases do not specifically inform the interpretation of 
ecosystems and the indication of the application of an ecosystem approach. 
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora 
(CITES) recognises the irreplaceable role played by wild fauna and flora in the natural 
earth systems, but the objective of the Convention is to regulate the over-exploitation of 
these fauna and flora through international trade.
 202
 Despite being cognate on the areas 
of environment, its specific species-focus is less useful in informing the interpretation of 
Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. 
The Convention on Migratory Species (CMS) similarly recognises the irreplaceable role 
of wild animals that constitutes earth’s natural system that necessitates their 
conservation
203
 where conservation effort should be taken to pay ‘special attention to 
migratory species the conservation status of which is unfavourable, and taking 
individually or in cooperation appropriate and necessary steps to conserve such species 
and their habitat’. 204  The indirect reference to only the biotic component of the 
ecosystem, and the restriction imposes by ‘unfavourable status of conservation’, are not 
particularly relevant to the interpretation of Article 20, especially when the invocation 
of this Article is not contingent on the conservation status of the ecosystems.  
The objective of the Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) is to ‘combat 
desertification and mitigate the effects of drought in countries experiencing serious 
drought and/or desertification’.205 Although Article 3(c) calls for better understandings 
of the nature and value of land and scare water resources in affected areas, which 
indicates some relation to a possible recognition of an ecosystem concept, the problem-
centric approach that aspires towards sustainable use
206
 is less useful in informing the 
interpretation of the obligation to preserve under Article 20.  
Apart from the World Heritage Convention that concerns the conservation of natural 
heritage, including freshwater ecosystems, the other cited conventions undertake to 
conserve in order to address an environmental problem. Moreover, CITES addresses 
                                               
202 CITES, supra n 199, preamble. 
203 CMS, supra n 199, preamble.  
204
 CMS, supra n 199, Art II.1. 
205 CCD, supra n 199, Art 2.1.  
206 CCD, supra n 199, Art 3(c). 
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over-exploitation of endangered species through trade-related measures, which concerns 
the environment in general and has implications on the biotic component of the 
ecosystem, its provisions are less relevant for the interpretation of salient features of 
Article 20.  
Drawing a distinction with the MEAs mentioned above, the Ramsar Convention and the 
Biodiversity Convention do not only specifically deal with freshwater ecosystems; they 
also address the conservation, including the preservation, aspect of ecosystem 
management. The use of ‘wetlands’ in Ramsar Convention and the specific emphasis on 
inland water of the Biodiversity Convention heightened the relevance of these 
Conventions in the interpretation of Article 20. Furthermore, Article 31(3)(c) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention stipulates for the taking into account of ‘any relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ instead of ‘all relevant 
rules’ (author’s emphasis), this indicates some measure of discretion exercisable by the 
interpreter undertaking the interpretation.  
Based on these reasons, and due to the limitation of this thesis, the scope of the present 
research limits itself to the identification of rules under the Ramsar Convention and the 
Biodiversity Convention.
207
 However, in light of the current focus on the advent of 
climate change, and the predominant influence of the climate change regime
208
 in 
international environmental law discourse, this thesis outlines the possible implications 
of the climate change regime on the obligation to preserve addressed in this research. 
The role played by the relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties in the interpretative process is illustrated by Orakhelashvili’s 
general comment on Article 31(3)(c). He noted that ‘the purpose of interpreting by 
reference to ‘relevant rules’ is, normally, not to defer the provisions being interpreted to 
the scope and effect of those ‘relevant rules’, but to clarify the content of the former by 
referring to the latter’.209 This is found in the Navigational and Related Rights case210 
                                               
207 The relevance of the two Conventions will be further elaborated in Section 2.3 of this thesis. 
208  The climate change regime is consisted of two major instruments, namely the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (concluded 9 March 1992, entered into force 29 December 
1992) (1992) 31 ILM 822 (hereinafter: ‘UNFCCC’); and the Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, UN Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1 (concluded 10 December 1997, 
entered into force 16 February 2005) (1998) 37 ILM 22 (hereinafter: ‘Kyoto Protocol’). 
209  Alexander Orakhelashvili ‘Restrictive Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties in the Recent 
Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2003) 14(3) European Journal Of International 
Law 529 – 568, at p 537. It is noted however that the difference between law and non-law (which is 
relevant for the interpretation of a subject matter) is in law’s ability to ‘steer the outcome or to alter or 
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where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) presumed that the parties must have the 
intention to allow the meaning or content of terms used, or at least some of them, to 
include developments in international law.
 211
 The ICJ arrived at this presumption when 
generic term like ‘comercio’ in Article VI of the 1858 Treaty are used by the parties in 
the treaty;
212
 and that the 1858 Treaty ‘was entered into for an unlimited duration, which 
from the outset, was intended to create a legal regime characterised by its perpetuity’.213  
The ICJ in Pulp Mills illustrated the need for an interpretation of a treaty provision that 
takes into account subsequent development in international law. The Court is of the 
view that the rules and measures adopted under Article 41 of the River Uruguay Statute 
should reflect the parties’ international undertakings in respect of biodiversity and 
habitat protection as part of their obligation to preserve the aquatic environment.
214
 
However, the ICJ rejected Argentina’s contention to take into account the Ramsar and 
the Biodiversity Conventions based on the reason that these Conventions have ‘no 
bearing on the scope of the jurisdiction conferred on the Court under Article 60 of the 
                                                                                                                                         
influence what the law mandates’ in an application in an adjudication. Joost Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International 
Law or Not, and Does It Even Matter?’ (26 February 2012). Forthcoming in Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses 
Wessel and Jan Wouters (eds) Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press, 2012) 
<SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1950068> or <http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1950068> accessed 11 
September 2012. The author, at p 36, stated that there are other views that ‘see legal and other norms not 
as sealed-off compartments and takes the view that non-law may have a whole range of possible effects 
on what is law and how it should be interpreted and applied’. See further in Joost Pauwelyn, See Ramses 
A Wessel, and Jan Wouters (eds) Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press Oxford 
2012) at pp 153 – 155. Alan E Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’ 
(1999) 48 International Comparative Law Quarterly 901 – 912. The author, at p 901 noted that ‘Once soft 
law begins to interact with binding treaties its non-binding character may be lost or altered’. Pauwelyn 
suggested that ‘International law, if it falls within international law, will no doubt be applied, as such to 
support a claim of violation or legal defence by influencing the enforcement of other treaties or the 
settlement of other disputes through legal interpretation (as referred to in Article 31.3(c) as relevant rules 
of international law applicable [in the relations] between the parties’.   
210 Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v Nicaragua) (Judgment, 13 July 
2009) {2009] ICJ Reports 213 (hereinafter: ‘Navigational and Related Rights’ case’) at p 242 para 64 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/133/15321.pdf> accessed 1 January 2011. 
211 Navigational and Related Rights’ case, supra n 210, at p 244, para 70. The Court concludes that ‘the 
terms by which the extent of Costa Rica’s right of free navigation has been defined, including in 
particularly the term ‘comercio’, must be understood to have the meaning they bear on each occasion on 
which the Treaty is to be applied, and not necessarily their original meaning. Thus, even assuming that 
the notion of ‘commerce’ does not have the same meaning today as it did in the mid-nineteenth century, it 
is the present meaning which must be accepted for purposes of applying the Treaty’. 
212 Navigational and Related Rights’ case, supra n 210, at p 243, paras 66 and 67.  
213 Navigational and Related Rights’ case, supra n 210, at p 243, para 67. 
214  Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 74, para 262. The Court, at pp 60 – 61 opined that the obligation to 
protect and preserve aquatic environment under Art 41(a) and (b) of the River Uruguay Statute has to be 
interpreted – ‘in accordance with a practice, which in recent years has gained so much acceptance among 
States that it may now be considered a requirement under general international law to undertake an 
environmental impact assessment where there is a risk that the proposed industrial activity may have a 
significant adverse impact in a transboundary context, in particularly, on a shared resource’.  
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1975 Statute, which remains confined to disputes concerning the interpretation or 
application of the Statute’.215  
Despite suggesting the need to interpret a treaty provision in accordance with the 
development of international law, the Court has not showed clearly how a recent 
development of international law is incorporated or used in the interpretation of a treaty 
provision. The shortcoming as noted in the case of Pulp Mills confirms the need to 
provide a necessary mechanism that guides how an external rule of international law 
developed subsequent to the conclusion of a treaty can be incorporated, or in aid of the 
interpretation of the terms of a treaty.  
In order to undertake the research as described in the preceding paragraphs, the next 
section presents the methodology undertaken in this research.  
1.5 Methodology 
A doctrinal study on a rule of interpretation is adopted in this research. The focus of 
research is the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) and its application in the systemic 
integration of rules of international law relevant to the obligation to preserve 
ecosystems of international watercourses expressed in Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention through the technique of interpretation.
216
 The analytical 
framework engages the interpretive technique as a tool of integration in order to address 
the fragmented and congested state of environmental protection treaties.  
This research complements the existing initiatives to enhance synergies and promote 
coordination in the governance of the environment; and reinforces the interlinkages 
struck between MEAs. The outcome of this research is desirous of extending the 
procedural interlinkages in operation to the substantive integration of rules of 
international law through the technique of interpretation.  
                                               
215 Pulp Mills’ case, supra n 1, at p 30, para 66. This point is elaborated in Section 1.1.2 of this thesis. 
216 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 207, para 411: ‘[In order not to render a treaty duly adopted or 
a custom followed by States to become in some respect altogether without legal effect], this has been 
achieved in particularly through two techniques. First is the effort to harmonise the apparently conflicting 
norms by interpreting them so as to render them compatible. Second is the technique whereby the 
question of validity has been replaced by a question of priority. The norm that will be set aside will 
remain as it were “in the background”, continuing to influence the interpretation and application of the 
norm to which priority has been given’. 
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The fragmentation of international law related to the protection and preservation of 
freshwater ecosystem is examined through an analysis of two key areas of regime 
overlap: 
1. The relationship between the MEAs under the international environmental law 
regime, bearing in mind the fragmentation of international law within the regime 
itself whereby although these MEAs operates under the aegis and overarching 
umbrella of international environmental law, the objectives and purposes of each 
treaty regime are different; and  
2. The interactions between the environmental protection regime of international 
environmental law and the utilisation of natural resource regime of international 
water law. 
The methodology engaged in the thesis is tiered, and carefully developed through the 
analytical framework established in this research. The three stages of the methodology 
developed are – 
1. Identification of relevant rules of international law. An ecosystem approach will 
be undertaken to identify the components of ecosystem in the environment that 
are related to the protection and preservation of freshwater resources, and the 
components of the environment that will be affected by the utilisation of the 
waters. The relevant provisions related to the protection and preservation of the 
environment or the freshwater ecosystem in particularly will be identified and 
elaborated. Article 38 of the Statute of International Court of Justice on the 
determination of source of international law will be used in the determination of 
what constitute the sources of ‘law’.  
2. An interactional understanding of law for the determination of the corpus of 
interpretation of ‘rules of international law’ and their ‘applicability’ in the 
relations between ‘the parties’. The relationship between the core text of the 
treaty instruments used and the accompanying ‘peripheral’ rules declared in the 
Conference of Parties or decisions of Commissions will be studied. This stage 
also determines the normative content of these soft laws in the interpretation and 
application of the applicable law. 
3. Systemic integration. This stage is crucial in illustrating the extent to which 
systemic integration is permissible under Article 31(3)(c), and the limits 
imposed by the terms of Article 31(3)(c). The context of the interpreted treaty 
qualifies and delimits the extent to which external treaties could be incorporated 
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in the interpretation of the interpreted treaty terms or provisions, whereby the 
normative weight of incorporation is set at the level of ‘shall be taken into 
account’. The compulsory nature is evident in the term ‘shall’, where ‘account’ 
denotes a level less than displacement of original term of interpretation. It will 
be interesting to note the contribution of this process of integrative interpretation 
on the progressive development of these general principles of international 
law.
217
 
The methodology developed informs the establishment of the analytical framework in 
the next section that provides the structure in which the research questions, developed in 
this thesis will be investigated and ultimately answered.  
1.6 Analytical Framework  
There is a need to adopt a system-sensitive, harmonious approach on the obligation to 
preserve in order to address these problems caused by the fragmentation and congestion 
of treaties, and promotes and facilitates integration and coordination of rules that 
originate from different legal orders or treaty regimes.
218
 The engagement of the legal 
mechanism of treaty interpretation that directs an interpretation of a treaty provision in 
its normative environment is one such approach in order to attain a systemic integration 
of rules relevant to the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses.  
The analytical framework for this research is built on Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 
Vienna Convention, which expressed the general principle of treaty interpretation, 
namely that of ‘systemic integration’ within the international legal system. 219  This 
principle deals with the plurality of rules and principles in the context of treaty 
interpretation whereby international obligations ‘are interpreted by reference to their 
normative environment (“system”)’.220  
                                               
217 The importance of the effect of other international treaties or regimes on the interpretation of another 
treaty regime is highlighted in Rieu-Clarke, ‘The Role of Treaties in Building International Watercourse 
Regimes’, supra n 136, at p 829. Quoting the author: ‘Last and closely related to the need for more multi-
level legal analysis is to a call to understand better the influence of law, not only in articulating the 
collective interests of states, but also in, “establishing what counts as persuasive argument or rhetoric”.’ 
The author raised some questions that this research strived to answer. The questions are: ‘can global or 
regional agreements influence the negotiation of basin-specific treaties and if so how and to what extent? 
Also, how does the particular process or content of a treaty affect its compliance pull?’ 
218
 The importance of the issues raised is explored in Maduro, ‘Foreword’, supra n 98. 
219 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 280. 
220 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 208, para 413. 
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The next section provides a preliminary review of the existing interpretation of the 
salient aspects of Article 31(3)(c), where the prevailing construction of the 
interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) will be the starting point of analysis presented in 
subsequent chapters. 
1.6.1 Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: 
Preliminary Review 
The international law of treaties comes into operation after a state has made the decision 
to be bound by a treaty as a legal instrument of public international law that takes effect 
on the international level, where a breach will give rise to an instance of international 
responsibility.
221
 The Preamble of the 1969 Vienna Convention, which was signed at 
Vienna, 23 May 1969 and entered into force on 27 January 1980, recalls the 
fundamental role of treaties as a source of international law. It is a treaty on treaties that 
could be said to recapitulate the principal rules of public international law ‘applicable to 
treaties between states, and to the mutual relations of states based upon treaties between 
them’.222 
Part III of the 1969 Vienna Convention deals with the issue of observance, application 
and interpretation of treaties that intends to demonstrate the basic principle of pacta sunt 
servanda underpinning the whole law of treaties. Articles 31 – 33 of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention set out the major rules of treaty interpretation for the interpretation of 
international treaties ‘in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning of its terms 
in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the treaty’.223 
‘Despite the care lavished on drafting, and accumulated experience, there is no treaty 
which cannot raise some question of interpretation’. 224  The International Law 
Commission (ILC) asserted that rules appear to be compatible or in conflict ‘as a result 
of interpretation’.225 The jurisdiction of the ICJ ‘has been most frequently invoked for 
the purpose of interpreting treaties’.226 The practical necessity of the ‘imperfections of 
language and the ineffable quality of human interaction’ has thus dictated the 
                                               
221 Shabtai Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law (Oceana Publications, London, Rome, 
New York, 1984) at p 27. 
222 Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at p 30.  
223 Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at p 33. 
224 Aust, Modern Treaty Law and Practice, supra n 183, at p 230. 
225
 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 207. 
226 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Vol I, 9th edn, Longman, 
Essex, 1992) at p 26.  
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importance not of interpretation stricto sensu, ‘but in what the interpretation requires: 
the application of law according to an the lucid adage of “Il n'y a pas d'application sans 
interpretation”’,227 in the resolution of differences in international adjudications over the 
meaning of treaty provisions.
228
  
Interpretation releases ‘the exact meaning and the content of the rule of law that is 
applicable to a given situation … [as] a sort of “logique au service du droit” concretised 
by an intellectual operation aiming to extract the legal solution that stands out at a given 
moment in time’.229 However, interpretation is ‘an art, not an exact science’,230 and 
‘appeals to the artistic rather than the scientific qualities of a lawyer’.231 It is ‘a process 
involving the deployment of analytical and other skills [that] cannot be reduced to a few 
propositions capable of purely automatic application in all circumstances’.232 French 
observed that the issue of treaty interpretation has remained a ‘deeply obscure and 
subjective process’.233 It was the obscurity and subjectivity in treaty interpretation that 
drove Lord McNair to observe that ‘there is no part of the law of treaties which the text-
writer approaches with more trepidation than the question of interpretation’.234 
The principles of treaty interpretation, as reflected in Articles 31 to 33 of the 1969 
Vienna Convention, are in many respects considered as a codification of existing 
customary international law.
235
 In particularly, Article 31 sets out, in four paragraphs, 
the overall logic of a progression of legal reasoning through concentric circles
236
 
characteristic of an interpretative process. The ILC concluded that Draft Article 27 [now 
Article 31], when read as a whole, could not be ‘regarded as laying down a legal 
                                               
227  Olivier Corten and Pierre Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A 
Commentary (Oxford University Press, Oxford, New York, 2011) at p 806. 
228 J Romesh Weeramantry, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2012) at p 1.  
229 Corten and Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, supra n 227, 
at p 806. 
230 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’ (Text as adopted by the ILC at its 18th 
Session) [1966] II Yearbook of International Law Commission 187 – 274, at p 218, para 4 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/1_1_1966.pdf> accessed 14 February 
2013. 
231 Corten and Klein (eds.), The Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, supra n 227, 
at pp 806 – 807. 
232 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n 272, at p 153.  
233 French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’, supra n 148, at 281. 
234 Ian McNair, The Law of Treaties (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1961) at p 364.  
235 Richard Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2008) at p 14. See also 
Mark E Villiger, Customary International Law and Treaties: A Study of Their Interactions and 
Interrelations with Special Consideration of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1985) especially at pp 342 – 343.  
236 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 233, para 463. 
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hierarchy of norms for the interpretation of treaties … [but] considerations of logic’.237 
It is a matter of logic to start the process of interpretation with the meaning of the text 
where  – 
‘“the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose” should be the first element to be mentioned, 
followed by elements comprised in the “context” since they form part of or are 
intimately related to the text’.238  
Elements extrinsic to the text and the context but obligatory in character, such as 
subsequent agreement regarding the interpretation; subsequent practice establishing the 
understanding of the parties on the interpretation; and relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties; should follow and not precede the text 
and the context. However, by the very nature of the obligatory character of these norms 
of interpretation, they could not be considered ‘norms of interpretation in any way 
inferior to those which precede them’.239 
In light of the logical order of arrangement of these interpretative norms by the ILC, the 
present text sets out the architecture for the process of interpretation in Draft Article 27 
[now Article 31] that represents a unity. Provisions of this Article ‘form a single, 
closely integrated rule’ where ‘all the various elements … would be thrown into the 
crucible, and their interaction would give the legally relevant interpretation’.240 Article 
31(1) provides the interpretation of a treaty in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning given to the terms of the treaty in their context, as elaborated in 
Article 31(2), and in the light of its object and purpose.  
Article 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention addresses the insufficiency of the context 
of a treaty in the interpretation of a treaty provision, where it requires that account shall 
be taken, together with the context, subsequent interpretative agreements, subsequent 
practice of parties, and any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties.
241
 The insertion of the phrase ‘together with the context’ in Article 
                                               
237 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’, supra n 230, at p 220, para 9. 
238 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’, supra n 230, at p 220, para 9. 
239 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’, supra n 230, at p 220, para 9. 
240 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with Commentaries’, supra n 230, at pp 219 – 220, para 8. 
241
 The ILC observed that ‘there is no reason to separate these techniques (of the interpretative process 
listed in Articles 31 – 32 that represents an effective sequence) too sharply from each other … as 
sometimes external sources may usefully clarify the ordinary meaning of treaty words, or their object and 
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31(3) emphasised that subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, and any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties do not form part 
of the ‘context’ of a treaty. 242  
An analysis into the subparagraphs of Article 31(3) of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
reveals that even though subsequent agreement, subsequent practice and relevant rules 
of international law do not form part of the context as defined under Article 31(2), 
subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 31(3) are more closely related to the treaty as 
compared to subparagraph (c) of Article 31(3). The phrases of ‘any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provision’ in Article 31(3)(a), and ‘any subsequent practice in the 
application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation’, are more closely related to the context of the treaty if compared to 
Article 31(3)(c).  
Recourse is had to ‘subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the 
interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provision’ (author’s own emphasis) 
as stipulated in Article 31(3)(a) for the clarification of the interpretation of a treaty term 
or provision. The subsequent agreement between the parties is concluded by the same 
parties to the treaty being interpreted, on the interpretation of the text of the treaty 
provision. In this situation, the subsequent agreement could be said to be ‘“quasi context” 
(context latissimo sensu)’243 as it seeks to clarify the interpretation of a treaty provision 
of the treaty that is being interpreted, whereby the text forms part of the context of a 
treaty as stated in Article 31(2). 
                                                                                                                                         
purpose’. Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 216, para 248.  However, Corten and Klein (eds.), The 
Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties: A Commentary, supra n 227, observed, at p 817 that ‘the 
separation from the means codified in Art 32 implies that the supplementary means are first and foremost 
subsidiary’. Corten and Klein further observed, at pp 836 – 837 that the absence of hierarchy in the 
application of the rule of treaty interpretation codified under Articles 31 (and 32) of the Vienna 
Convention in the complex operation that constitutes treaty interpretation allows the exercise of creativity 
by interpreters where the ultimate difference is not the manner of interpretation but the competence of the 
interpreter. The relationship between subpara(c) of Art 31(3) and other subparagraphs of Art 31(3) is 
further explored in Section 3.2.2 of this thesis.  
242 ‘Context’ is limited to the text of a treaty, including its preamble and annexes, and any agreement or 
instruments accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty made in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty as stated in Article 31(2)(a) and (b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. A 
detailed analysis of the ‘context’ is undertaken in Section 7.2 of the thesis. 
243 This phrase is borrowed from Michael Waibel, ‘Demystifying the Art of Interpretation’ (2011) 22(2) 
The European Journal of International Law 571 – 588, at p 577. 
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Similarly, ‘subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the 
agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’ (author’s own emphasis) as stated 
in Article 31(3)(b) could be said to be quasi-contextual. This is because the subsequent 
practice is executed by the parties in accordance with the agreement established by the 
parties regarding the interpretation of a treaty provision, in the course of the application 
of the treaty.
244
 Although subsequent practice undertaken by the parties is deemed 
quasi-contextual because it does not form part of the ‘context’ as defined under Article 
31(2), it is still closely related to the context. This is due to the reason that the 
subsequent practice concretises the agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation 
of a treaty provision (which forms part of the text of a treaty) in practice.  
The same could not be said for Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The 
phrase ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ has no direct or indirect reference to the text of the treaty being interpreted. 
These relevant rules of international law have their own text, preamble and annexes, as 
well as agreements or instruments made in connection with the conclusion of these rules 
of international law. The determination of the normative scope of the provision of these 
relevant rules of international law through the interpretation these rules requires the 
performance of all the principles of interpretation codified in Articles 31 – 32 of the 
1969 Vienna Convention. This is because these relevant rules of international law are 
completely extrinsic to the treaty being interpreted, as opposed to the quasi-contextual 
nature of subparagraphs (a) and (b) of Article 31(3).
245
  
                                               
244 For further discussion on ‘subsequent practice’, see Section 4.4.3 of the thesis.  
245 In this regard, the author would like to differ from the position adopted by Isabelle van Damme, Treaty 
Interpretation by the WTO Appellate Body (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009). The author is of the 
opinion, at p 366 that ‘other principles of treaty interpretation might justify the same result’ in her 
comment on the limited value of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The author justified her 
stance by stating, at p 382 that ‘Panels and the Appellate Body have interpreted the WTO covered 
agreements in the light of the wider corpus of international law, with or (mostly) without Article 31(3)(c) 
VCLT’. On this point, it is earlier raised by the ILC in the Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at pp 212 – 
213. The ILC, at p 212, para 422, commented that ‘if that (other techniques provide sufficiently the need 
to take into account the normative environment where customary law, general principles of law and 
general treaty provisions forming the interpretative background for specific treaty provisions) were all 
article 31(3)(c) covered, it would have been unnecessary [to refer to article 31(3)(c)]’. However, the ILC 
asserted, at p 212, para 422 that the wording of Art 31(3)(c) ‘is not restricted to general international law, 
but extends to any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’. This 
implies that Art 31(3)(c) provides for situation where other techniques are insufficient to attain systemic 
integration. The ILC elaborated, at p 212, para 423 that ‘if … all international law exists in systemic 
relationship with other law, no such application can take place without situating the relevant jurisdiction-
endowing instrument in its normative environment. This means that although a tribunal may only have 
jurisdiction in regard to a particular instrument, it must always interpret and apply that instrument in its 
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The uniqueness of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention that makes it the focus of 
this study lies in the fact that this Article enables the taking into account of any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, which are 
extrinsic to a contextual interpretation of a treaty provision. Its systemic integration 
potential goes beyond a contextual interpretation that could be informed by the quasi-
contextual elements of subsequent agreement, subsequent practice, or the prescription of 
a special meaning to a treaty term by the parties. Article 31(3)(c) is the ‘clearest formal 
expression of the systemic nature of international law’ where it is suggested that ‘the 
Article operates as a ‘“master key” to the house of international law [i]n the case [of] a 
systemic problem … and no other interpretative means provides a resolution’.246 The 
systemic integration potential expressed in Article 31(3)(c) provides an aperture through 
which the difficulties arising from the fragmentation of international law that results in 
‘a multitude of parallel’ could be addressed.247 The ILC opined that – 
‘if the article is merely the expression … of “systemic integration” – and if that 
principle, again, expresses a reasonable or even necessary aspect of the practice of 
legal reasoning, then a discussion of its actual and potential uses would constitute 
a useful contribution to the study of the alleged fragmentation (or diversification) 
of international law’.248 
The explicit reference to other rules of international law in Article 31(3)(c) enables the 
incorporation of treaty obligations beyond the context of a treaty, but relevant and 
applicable between the parties in the interpretation of a treaty provision. This capacity is 
crucial for the purpose of this thesis, which seeks to study the role of interpretation as a 
mechanism that enables a reasoned resolution of the difficulties of the fragmentation of 
international law. This is so in light of the need to maintain the ‘perceived purposes or 
functions of the legal system as a whole’ 249  that strongly favours the presumption 
against normative conflict.
250
  
The actual and latent potential of Article 31(3)(c) have been studied extensively by the 
ILC due to the ‘flowering of case law’ that refers to Article 31(3)(c), which initially, 
                                                                                                                                         
relationship to its normative environment – that is to say “other” international law. This is the principle of 
systemic integration to which article 31(3)(c) VCLT gives expression’.  
246 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 211, para 420. 
247 Refer supra n 14. 
248
 Fragmentation Report, supra n 16, at p 213, para 423.  
249 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 25, para 36.  
250 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 25, para 37.  
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was meant to address the issue of inter-temporal law.
251
 However, it has shown to  have 
the capacity to become applicable in a greater variety of circumstances than its origins 
would suggest, especially amidst the apprehension over the undesirable effect of a 
fragmented international legal order as a result of the diversification of international law, 
and the need to manage the fragmentation in a legal-professional way.  
Article 31(3)(c) provides that ‘there shall be taken into account, together with the 
context … any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’. This provision was said to codify, or at least, to reflect the principle of systemic 
integration.
252
 A textual analysis of the article reveals five aspects of emphasis:
253
 
1. ‘Relevant’  
The rules all appear to address the same facts, or concerning the subject matter of the 
treaty term at issue;
254
 or ‘chains of treaties that grapple with the same type of problem 
at different levels or from particular (technical, geographical) points of view’.255 The 
existence of rules that address the same facts or grapple with the same type of problem, 
although the relevance might be obscured by the different level or technical perspective 
these rules address,
256
 creates what is known as a ‘parallelism of treaties’257 where the 
need to coordinate the reading of these instruments in ‘mutually supportive light’ is 
exceedingly important.
258
 
2. ‘Rules’ 
The ‘rules’ of international law referred to must be rules of law, and not broader 
principles or considerations which may not be firmly established as rules. Such rules 
cover all the sources of international law,
259
 including custom, general principles, and 
                                               
251 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 251.  
252  McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162.  See also French, ‘Treaty 
Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’, supra n 148. 
253 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 290. Also Fragmentation Report, 
supra n 17, at p 214, para 426. 
254 Mark E Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 2009) at p 433, para 24. 
255 See Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at pp 209 -210, para 416. 
256 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at pp 209 -210, para 416. 
257 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at para 52 
258 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 210, para 417 
259
 Sources of law includes that the sources identified under Art 38(1) of the Statute of the International 
Court of Justice (1945) 29 American Journal of International Law Supp 215; 3 Bevans 1179; 59 Stat 1031; 
TS 993. 
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where applicable other treaties, and also, subject to Article 59 of the ICJ Statute, judicial 
decisions and the teaching of the most highly qualified publicists. 
3. ‘Applicable in the relations between the parties’  
Further research is needed to determine what the context for ‘applicable’ is and who the 
parties are.
260
 Preliminary research shows that for the rules to be ‘applicable’, they must 
be binding.
261
 McGrady suggested that the ‘applicability’ of the ‘rule of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties’, by reference to the definition of ‘the 
party’ in Article 1(g) of the 1969 Vienna Convention262, refers to questions of scope – 
of whether the extraneous rule applies to the circumstance under consideration.
263
 
Interpretation of ‘the parties’ attracted more controversy with the most restrictive view 
adopted by the panel in the EC-Biotech case.
264
  
4. ‘Shall be taken into account’ 
Customary law and general principles external to the treaty exist as lex generalis in 
relation to any particular agreements. Although they are rarely specifically mentioned, 
these customary law and general principles are applied alongside particular treaties.
265
 
Special reference to the use of Article 31(3)(c) arises in the circumstance whereby 
recourse to ‘rules that exist at the same level of generality and binding force as the 
treaty to be interpreted’266 are made in the interpretation of the treaty to be applied. The 
                                               
260 See Benn McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law or “Systemic Integration” of Treaty Regimes: 
EC-Biotech Products and the Proper Interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties’, (2008) 42 Journal of World Trade 589 – 618. See a contrary account by Ulf Linderfalk, 
‘Who are ‘The Parties’? Article 31, Paragraph 3(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the ‘Principle of 
Systemic Integration’ Revisited’, (2008) 55 (3) Netherlands International Law Review 343 – 364. 
261 Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 VCLT, supra n 254, at p 433, para 24. 
262 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 1(g). ‘Party’ was defined in Art 1(g) to mean ‘a State which 
has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the treaty is in force’. 
263 McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260, at p 612. It is further elaborated in pp 
612 - 613 that, ‘in adopting this approach (where applicability is a question of scope), the question of 
applicability is distinct from the question of relevance. Relevance concerns the question of whether an 
extraneous treaty can influence interpretation, whereas applicability concerns whether the relevant rules 
extends to the circumstances at hand’. 
264 EC- Biotech, supra n 117, at pp 299-300, paras, 7.68  7.70, quoted in the Fragmentation Report, 
supra n 17, at p 237, para 471. McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International law’, supra n 260. McGrady 
suggested three approaches for the interpretation of ‘the parties’, and the merits and possible implications 
of these approaches. The three approaches suggested are, the restrictive approach, the divergent approach 
and the broad approach. For more on ‘restrictive approach’, see Joost Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public 
International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 
535 – 578; and McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162. 
265 See Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 233, para 462, first limb. 
266 See Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 233, para 462, second limb. 
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significance of ‘taking into account the relevant rules’267 lies in ‘its performance of a 
systemic function in the international legal order, linking specialized parts to each other 
and to universal principles’.268 Analysis is on the normative weight to be given to a 
particular right and obligation under the rules applicable in the balancing process of 
‘taking into account’. However, this question can only be addressed by a ‘case-by-case 
basis’, with the aim not to triumph one norm over another, but to seek the 
accommodation of values.
269
  
5. The element of temporality 
Inter-temporal law made a short-lived appearance at the initial stage in the form of 
Article 56 of the 1969 Vienna Convention in Sir Waldock’s third Special Rapporteur 
Report,
270
 where extensive reference was made to the inter-temporal law formulated by 
Judge Huber in the Island Palmas Case.
271
 It was designed originally to address the 
                                               
267 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 31(3)(c). 
268 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at pp 239 – 240, para 473. 
269 Adapted from the Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 240, para 474, in reference to the Case 
Concerning the Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium) [2002] 
ICJ Reports 3 (hereinafter: ‘Arrest Warrant case’) <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/121/8126.pdf> 
accessed 9 April 2012. Joint separate opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijimans and Burgenthal, at pp 86 – 
87, para 79.  
270 ILC ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Sir Humphrey Waldock, Special Rapporteur’ (3 March, 9 
June, 12 June and 7 July 1964) UN Doc A/CN.4/167 and Add. 1-3, (1964) II(1) Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 5 – 65 (hereafter: ‘Waldock’s 3rd Report’) at p 9 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_167.pdf> last accessed 26 January 2011. Art 56 
provides that: 
Art 56 – The Inter-temporal law  
1.  A treaty is to be interpreted in the light of the law in force at the time when the treaty was drawn up 
2. Subject to paragraph 1, the application of a treaty shall be governed by the rules of international law in 
force at the time when the treaty is applied. 
271 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands, USA) (Award of 4 April 1928) (1928) II Reports of International 
Arbitral Awards 829 – 871 <http://www.pca-
cpa.org/upload/files/Island%20of%20Palmas%20award%20only%20+%20TOC.pdf> accessed 26 
January 2011 (hereinafter: ‘Island Palmas case’). The main elements of the inter-temporal law is firstly, 
the principle of contemporaneity, where ‘a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law 
contemporary with it, and not of the law in force at the time when a dispute in regard to it arises or falls to 
be settled’. Island Palmas case, p 845. The principle of contemporaneity is defined in Waldock 3rd Report, 
at p 56, para 12, by reference to Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s formulation based on the jurisprudence of the 
World Court, as ‘the terms of a treaty must be interpreted according to the meaning which they possessed, 
or which would have been attributed to them, and in the light of current linguistic usage, at the time when 
the treaty was originally concluded’. Secondly, the second limb, and also the more controversial limb, is 
the so-called ‘extension’ of the doctrine, ‘which subjects the act creative of a right arises, demands that 
the existence of the right, in other words its continued manifestation, shall follow the conditions required 
by the evolution of the law’. Waldock 3rd Report, at p 9, para 4, quoted Judge Huber in the Island Palmas 
case, at p 845. Judge Huber emphasized that “a distinction must be made between the creation of rights 
and the existence of rights”, at p 845. This extension of the doctrine was criticised on grounds of 
instability resulting from such extension, for more see Philip C Jessup, ‘The Palmas Island Arbitration’, 
(1928) 22 American Journal of International Law 735 – 752; and Anthony D’Amato, ‘International Law, 
Intertemporal Problems’ in (1992) Encyclopedia of Public International Law 1234-1236, p 1235 where it 
is stated that: ‘Huber’s “extension” of the doctrine of inter-temporal law, therefore, has not been generally 
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temporal aspect of treaty interpretation to reflect the general principle that ‘a juridical 
fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it’.272 However, the 
Commission decided to omit the phrase ‘in force at the time of its conclusion’ because it 
was deemed inadequate to address the problem of the effect of an evolution of the law 
on the interpretation of legal terms in a treaty.
273
 This provision was subsequently 
inserted to the current position of paragraph 3 to Article 27 [now Article 31(3)(c)] that 
is ‘extrinsic both to the text and to the “context” as defined in paragraph 2’.274 
The debate in the ILC over the issue of inter-temporality has remained inconclusive.
275
 
The importance of the inter-temporal aspect to all treaties dealing with projects that 
impact on the environment is firmly emphasised in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case by 
Judge Weeramantry, where the Judge lamented the failure of article 31(3)(c) of 1969 
Vienna Convention, which ‘scarcely covers this aspect with the degree of clarity 
requisite to so important a matter’.276 The lacuna is exceptionally pronounced in the 
environmental regime where environmental concerns are live and continuing concerns 
regardless of the date of the treaty is concluded, which necessitates the application of 
                                                                                                                                         
accepted. If it were not for the prominence of the Palmas Island case, there would probably be no 
confusion regarding the general principle that, with respect to title and treaty questions arising in the 
distant past, the rules of international law that are applicable are those contemporaneous with the acts in 
question’. However, criticism seems to emphasise the need for care in the application of the rule, see Ian 
Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) at p 
125. It is stated that: ‘In any case the principle cannot operate in a vacuum: its theoretical extent will in 
practice be reduced by the effect of recognition, acquiescence, estoppels, prescription, the rule that 
abandonment is not to be presumed, and the general condition of the pleadings and evidence’. 
272 Ian Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (2nd edn, Manchester University Press, 
Manchester, 1984) at pp 138 - 139. At p 139, Sir Sinclair elaborated that ‘Reference to ‘relevant rules of 
international law’ means, ‘every treaty provision must be read not only in its context, but in the wider 
context of general international law, whether conventional or customary’. He commented that ‘there is 
some evidence that the evolution and development of international law may exercise a decisive influence 
on the meaning to be given to expressions incorporated in a treaty, particularly if these expressions 
themselves denote relative or evolving notions such as “public policy” or “the protection of morals”’. 
273 Sir Arthur Watt, The International Law Commission, 1949 – 1998 (vol. II, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1999) at p 690. Sir Arthur Watts recounted the decision of the ILC to remove the phrase since it 
considers that ‘the relevance of rules of international law for the interpretation of treaties in any given 
case was dependent on the intentions of the parties, and that to attempt to formulate a rule covering 
comprehensively the temporal element would present difficulties. It further considered that correct 
application of the temporal element would normally be indicated by interpretation of the term in good 
faith’. See also Shabtai Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties, 1945 – 1986 (Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge, 1989) at pp 76 – 79.  
274
 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 220, para 9.  
275 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 293. 
276 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra n 1, at p 114. 
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relevant environmental standards at the time of interpretation, and ‘not limited to the 
rules of international law applicable at the time the treaty was concluded’.277 
In relation to the issue of temporality, it is recognised that the application of external 
rules of international law via Article 31(3)(c) is a risky issue, especially in terms of the 
‘formal legitimacy’ of rules. 278  It is argued that application of an external rule is 
justified in a situation where the said rule has risen to the level of a ‘contemporary 
concern of the community of nations’; ‘a widely recognised principle’ or a ‘broad-based 
recognition of a particular need’.279 
The ICJ renders support for the need to interpret and apply certain provisions of a treaty 
in the light of international law as it has evolved since the conclusion of the treaty, 
albeit with caution where limits are carefully prescribed. In the case of Namibia, the 
Court concluded that the parties to the Covenant must have accepted the evolutionary 
character of the concepts adopted in the treaty provision.
280
 The Court opined that the 
provision should then be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation, which ‘takes into consideration 
the changes occurred through the subsequent development of law’.281 
                                               
277 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra n 1, Separate Opinion of the Vice-President Weeramantry, at p 114. 
Judge Weeramantry substantiated his observation on the inter-temporality aspect by reference to the case 
of Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971) 
[1971] ICJ Reports 16, at p 31, para 53 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/53/5595.pdf> accessed 26 
January 2011.  
278 This concern is addressed in Donald K Anton, ‘“Treaty Congestion” in Contemporary International 
Environmental Law’, supra n 107, at p 664. The author noted that ‘cross-fertilisation in the international 
legal system must account for the consensual nature of international law. This makes borrowing and 
applying rules of decision outside of consent more difficult’.  
279 Malgosia Fitzmaurice, Olufemi Elias, and Panos Merkouris (eds) Treaty Interpretation and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties: 30 Years on (Queen Mary Studies in International Law, Martinus 
Nijhoff, 2010) at p 237.  
280  Namibia case, supra n 277, at p 31, para 53. The Court is mindful of the primary necessity of 
interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion, but 
it is ‘bound to take into account the fact that the concepts embodied in Art 22 of the Covenant – “the 
strenuous conditions of the modern world” and “the well-being and development” of the peoples 
concerned – were not static, but were by definition evolutionary, as also, therefore, was the concept of the 
“sacred trust”’. The parties to the Covenant must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such. 
That is why, viewing the institutions of 1919, the Court must take into consideration the changes which 
have occurred in the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the 
subsequent development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. 
Moreover, an international instrument ahs to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire 
legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’. 
281 The Court, in the Namibia case, supra n 277, at p 31, para 53, enunciated that ‘Mindful as it is of the 
primary necessity of interpreting an instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time 
of its conclusion, the Court is bound to take into account that concepts embodied in Art 22 … were not 
static, but were by definition evolutionary … The parties must consequently be deemed to have accepted 
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Reconciliation between the two assertions, of the application of the principle of 
contemporaneity and the application of the extension of the principle of 
contemporaneity that allows evolutionary interpretation of a treaty term at the point of 
interpretation, is difficult and very much depends on the nature of the treaty interpreted. 
The nature of the treaty interpreted is indicated by the intention of the parties, which is 
the determining factor in the application of second limb of the inter-temporal law that 
allows for evolutionary interpretation.
282
 An evolutionary interpretation is permissible 
in ‘interpreting certain terms in a treaty which are by their very nature expressed in such 
general terms as to lend themselves to an evolutionary interpretation’283 to the extent 
that such interpretation is not contrary to the intentions and expectations of the 
parties.
284
 The issue of inter-temporality will be addressed in later chapters in the 
ascertainment of the common intentions of the parties. 
The preliminary review of current scholarship on the interpretations the five salient 
features of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention demonstrates the potential 
of this Article as a tool of integration. As illustrated in the foregoing section, the 
provision is worded in such a way that permits an integrated approach to be adopted in 
the interpretation of a treaty term or provision in the light of its normative environment. 
The systemic integration potential of the Article that could assume the role of an 
integration tool is further discussed in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                         
them as such. That is why … the Court must take into consideration the changes which have occurred in 
the supervening half-century, and its interpretation cannot remain unaffected by the subsequent 
development of law, through the Charter of the United Nations and by way of customary law. Moreover, 
an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the entire legal 
system prevailing at the time of the interpretation’.  
282 This conclusion is arrived by the Court in the Namibia case, supra n 277, at p 31, para 53: ‘the parties 
must consequently be deemed to have accepted them as such’. This is reiterated in the case of 
Navigational and Related Rights, supra n 210, at p 242, para 64: ‘there are situations in which the parties’ 
intent upon conclusion of the treaty was, or may be presumed to have been to give the terms used – or 
some of them – a meaning or content capable of evolving, not one fixed once and for all, so as to make 
allowance for, among other things, developments in international law’; further elaboration found at p 243, 
para 66: ‘where the parties have used generic terms in a treaty, the parties necessarily having been aware 
that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time, and where the treaty has been entered into 
for a very long period or is ‘of continuing duration’, the parties must be presumed, as a general rule, to 
have intended those terms to have an evolving meaning’.    
283 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n 272, at p 140. 
284 Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1960-1989: Part Three’ 
(1991) 62 British Yearbook of International Law 1 – 75, at p 57: ‘where it can be established that it was 
the intention of the parties that the meaning or scope of a term or expression used in the treaty should 
follow the development of the law, the treaty must be interpreted so as to give effect to that intention’. 
Thirlway employed the term ‘intertemporal renvoi’ to describe the situation that arises when the intention 
of the parties is deemed to have been ‘to subject the legal relations created to such law as might from time 
to time thereafter become effective’. Hugh Thirlway, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court 
of Justice: 1960-1989, Part One’ (1989) 60 British Yearbook of International Law 1 – 157, at p 135.  
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1.6.2 The Potential of Article 31(3)(c) as an Integration Tool 
The principle of systemic integration,
285
 said to be codified or reflected in Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, indicates the potential of this provision as an 
integration tool
286
 that plays a bridging role between a rule and its normative system 
‘whereby international obligations are interpreted by reference to their normative 
environment’.287 This is reiterated by the Appellate Body (AB) in the recent WTO case 
of EC – Aircraft where the AB noted that – 
‘We recognize that a proper interpretation of the term “the parties” must also take 
account of the fact that Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention is 
considered an expression of the ‘principle of systemic integration’. [It] seeks to 
ensure that ‘international obligations are interpreted by reference to their 
normative environment in a manner that gives ‘coherence and meaningfulness’ to 
the process of legal interpretation’.288 
In addressing the potential conflict between norms of different specialised regimes, the 
ILC suggested to take recourse to the interpretative tools provided in the 1969 Vienna 
                                               
285 Systemic integration is defined to mean ‘the integration in the system of principles and presumptions 
that underlie the idea of an inter-State legal order and provide its argumentative materials’. See 
Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 234, para 465. The two presumptions mentioned are: (a) Positive. 
Parties are taken ‘to refer to general principles of international law for all questions which [the treaty] 
does not itself resolve in express terms or in a different way’ (Georges Pinson (France v. United Mexican 
States) (Award of 13 April 1928) (1928) V Reports of International Arbitral Awards 327 – 466) at p 422; 
and (b) Negative. In entering into treaty obligations, the parties intend not to act inconsistently with 
generally recognize principles of international law or with previous treaty obligations towards third States. 
(Case Concerning the Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Portugal v India) (Preliminary Objections 
Judgment of 26 November 1957) [1957] ICJ Reports 125 (hereinafter: ‘Right of Passage case’) at p 142, 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/32/2231.pdf> accessed 26 January 2011). See Vassilis P Tzevelekos, 
‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT in the Case Law of the ECtHR: An Effective Anti-
Fragmentation Tool or  A Selective Loophole for the Reinforcement of Human Rights Teleology? 
Between Evolution and Systemic Integration’ (2010) 31 Michigan Journal of International Law 621 – 690. 
At p 633, it is stated: ‘Systemic integration has two implications. In addition to implying that special 
international law is, by means of interpretation, harmonically integrated within the general system, it also 
suggests that the process of harmonious integration enables the system of international law to become 
more complete, firm, compact and uniform –or, in a word, integrated’.  
286  Interpretation is an important approach in seeking integration of different legal regimes. For 
interpretation as tools of integration, see Boyle, ‘Relationship’, supra n 159, at pp 128 – 132. 
287  Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, paras 410 – 480, in particularly para 413. This method of 
interpretation accords that ‘each instrumentum of international law must be interpreted and applied in a 
manner that safeguards harmony within the broader normative environment – that is, the international 
legal order’. Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c)’, supra n 285. At p 280, the author commented that 
‘Treaties are creatures of international law and despite its diverse subject matter, it should be ‘applied and 
interpreted against the background of the general international law’. 
288
 WTO, European Communities and Certain Member States – Measures Affecting Trade in Large Civil 
Aircraft (Appellate Body Report, 18 May 2011) WT/DS316/AB/R (hereinafter: ‘EC – Aircraft’), at p 363, 
para 845.  
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Convention, especially Article 31(3)(c), where ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ in the adjudication of the dispute.289 By 
taking into account other treaties or legal norms in the interpretation and application of a 
treaty term or provision, this legal technique will assist in conflict avoidance between 
agreed norms (prior to the formation of a ‘conflict’), or in the event of conflict, in 
dispute resolution. Properly employed, Article 31(3)(c) will feature greatly as a useful 
tool for treaty integration,
290
 where a dynamic approach to interpretation that allows the 
harmonious interpretation of relevant rules enables evolution of rules enshrined in 
treaties, to change over time and in accordance with new relevant rules of international 
law’.291 This enables the reconciliation of the plurality of norms that apply to the same 
subject matter, and leads to the harmonisation of environmental treaties and enhances 
the conformity of the international legal system.  
In view of the systemic integration potential intrinsic to Article 31(3)(c), this thesis 
proposes a re-interpretation of salient features of the Article in order to realise its 
potential, which is currently heatedly contested. The next section lays out the overall 
structure of this thesis.  
1.7 Structure 
Chapter 1 has given a brief overview of the problématique arising from the 
fragmentation of international law, which forms the context of the research, introduced 
                                               
289 See Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity’, supra n 132, at pp 906 – 907. It is stated that 
‘when a treaty leaves room for interpretation, an attempt must be made to read it in a way harmonious 
with other treaties. This is called for explicitly in Art 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties: when interpreting a treaty, one must take account of “any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’. ILC ‘Conclusions of the Work of the Study Group on the 
Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of 
International Law’ (adopted by the International Law Commission at Its Fifty-eighth Session 1 May – 9 
June and 3 July – 11 August 2006, Geneva) UNGAOR 61st Session Supp No 10 UN Doc A/61/10, at p 1, 
para 251 <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft%20articles/1_9_2006.pdf> accessed 2 
November 2012  (hereinafter: ‘Conclusion on Fragmentation’). 
290 See Tzevelekos, ‘The Use of Article 31(3)(c)’, supra n 285. The author stated that: ‘Article 31(3)(c) is 
much more than an apparatus enabling the interpreter of a special instrumentum of international law to 
read its norms in light of third (that is to say, extraneous) relevant sources – stemming from both general 
and inter-subjective or special international law. While definitely offering this option, Art 31(3)(c) does 
so in a broader, inter-temporal frame. Hence, the interpretation of a treaty “cannot remain unaffected by 
the subsequent development of law” and “has to be interpreted and applied within the framework of the 
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation”. Again, a treaty “is not static, and is open 
to adapt to emerging norms of international law”’. 
291
 Rüdiger Wolfrum and Nele Matz, Conflicts in International Environmental Law (Max-Planck-Institut 
für Ausländisches Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, Springer-Verlag Berlin, Heidelberg, New York, 
2003) at p 145. 
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the core elements of the thesis, and set out the methodology, the analytical framework, 
and the structure of the thesis.  
Following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2 illuminates the emergence of the 
ecosystem approach in international law and policy, where it sets out the criteria for the 
identification of rules of international law that are ‘relevant’ for the interpretation of the 
obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses. The emergence of the 
ecosystem approach frames the protection of environment in ecosystem language, 
where the goal of protection is to maintain the integrity of an ecosystem that enables the 
continuous supply of ecosystem services.  
Chapter 3 provides research and discussion of the existing scholarship on how 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ is to be interpreted, and concludes that 
the effective operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) cannot be attained if the existing 
construction of the Article is maintained.  
Chapter 4 proposes an interpretation of “rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties” that is informed and guided by the interactional theory of 
law. The theory posits that law emerges when shared understanding become fused with 
a ‘practice of legality’ through a continuous process of mutual engagement and robust 
interaction, rooted in Lon Fuller’s eight criteria of legality and embraced by a 
community of legal practice that adheres to these criteria in day-to-day decision-making. 
This chapter concludes that the phrase ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ 
should be interpreted in relation to the ‘rules of international law’. The applicability of 
the rules of international law in the relations between the parties is dependent on the 
shared legal understanding achieved by the parties in the process of the making of that 
rule of international law. This approach diverges from the existing interpretation of this 
Article where scholars defined ‘relevant’, ‘rules of international law’, ‘applicable’ and 
‘the parties’ separately. It re-assesses existing interpretations that the applicability of the 
rules of international law is contingent on the rules being formally binding on the 
parties, by pointing out that this reading of ‘applicable’ is neither supported by the 
interpretation of ‘the parties’ nor the context of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 
jurisprudence. The theoretical framework developed for the interpretation of ‘rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ through an interactional 
understanding of law will be illustrated through the subsequent two chapters. 
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Chapters 5 and 6 are the two operative parts that apply the framework developed in 
Chapter 4, in the case studies of the Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity 
Convention. First, the substantive content and the applicability of the relevant rules of 
international law identified in Chapter 2 in the relations between the parties are 
ascertained through the prism of an interactional understanding of law. Second, it 
operationalises the interactional framework of the conceptualisation of international law 
whereby the shared understanding undertaken in a practice of legality by the parties of 
both Conventions is assessed against the criteria of legality.  
Chapter 7 explores the extent to which relevant rules of international law relevant to the 
interpretation of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses 
shall be taken into account. This chapter proposes a structure for the systemic 
integration of relevant rules of international law constructed in reference to the approach 
undertaken in international court and tribunal.  
Chapter 8 focuses on the operationalisation of the analytical framework developed in 
this research for the interpretation of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of 
international watercourses provided under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention in light of its systemic environment proffered by the Ramsar Convention 
and the Biodiversity Convention. It provides an abridged compendium of empirical 
research of existing jurisprudence in the illustration of the normative weight to be given 
to the external rules in the interpretation of a treaty term or regime in order to identify 
the extent and scope of ‘shall be taken into account’. 
Chapter 9 provides a general conclusion and reflection of the analytical framework 
developed for the interpretation of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international 
watercourses in the systemic environment provided by the relevant rules of international 
law in the form of Ramsar Convention and Biodiversity Convention. It concludes on 
how Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention could be operationalised for the 
systemic integration of the obligation to preserve under Art 20 through the legal 
technique of interpretation.  
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2 
Chapter 2. Relevant: Preservation of Ecosystems of International Watercourses – 
An Ecosystem Approach  
This chapter interprets the term ‘relevant’, and identifies the threshold to be satisfied for 
a rule to be considered ‘relevant’ to the interpretation of the obligation to preserve 
ecosystems of international watercourses stipulated under Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention. The chapter starts firstly with the interpretation of the 
concept of ecosystem and the emergence of the ecosystem approach in legal scholarship, 
pivotal in the identification of rules relevant to the interpretation of the obligation to 
preserve ecosystem under Article 20. Then, the interpretation of ‘relevance’ is explored 
through the concepts of doctrine in pari materia; normative parallelism and the 
parallelism of treaty; and multi-sourced equivalent norms (MSENs). Next, the thesis 
explores how Articles 2.1 and 4.1 under the Ramsar Convention and Article 8(a) and (d) 
of the Biodiversity Convention, as informed by the concept of ecosystem and the 
application of the ecosystem approach is relevant to the obligation to preserve under 
Article 20. Finally, the thesis discusses the implication of the climate change regime on 
the obligation to preserve, in particularly on the prima facie incompatibility of the 
climate change regime with the obligation to preserve under Article 20.  
2.1 The Emergence of an Ecosystem Approach 
An ecosystem is an entirely human-defined construct
292
 developed in scientific literature 
during the 1930s and 1940s.
293
 The modern definition of ‘ecosystem’ emphasised its 
                                               
292 Hugo Tremblay, ‘An Analytical Framework for Legal Regimes Applicable to Freshwater Ecosystems’ 
(2010) 20 Journal of Water Law 152 – 164, at p 152, quoting Michael Dobson and Chris Frid, Ecology of 
Aquatic Systems, (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009), at p 277.  
293 McIntyre, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 79, at p 1. For example, AG Tansley, ‘The Use and Abuse 
of Vegetational Concepts and Terms’ (1935) 16(3) Ecology 284 − 307, at p 299 
<http://karljaspers.org/files/tansley.pdf> accessed 22 June 2011 defined an ecosystem as 'the whole 
system including not only the organism-complex, but also the whole complex of physical factors forming 
what we call the environment of the biome – the habitat factors in the widest sense'. Raymond Lindeman, 
in ‘The Trophic-Dynamic Aspect of Ecology’, (1942) 23(4) Ecology 399 – 417,  defined ecosystem, at p 
400: “The system may be formally defined as the system composed of physical-chemical-biological 
processes active within a space-time unit of any magnitude, ie, the biotic community plus its abiotic 
environment’. Both were quoted in Ved P Nanda, ‘The Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses: Draft Articles on Protection and Preservation of Ecosystems, Harmful Conditions and 
Emergency Situations, and Protection of Water Installations’ (1992) 3 Colorado Journal of International 
Environmental Law and Policy 175 – 207, at pp 177 – 178, in the clarification of the term ‘ecosystem’ 
used in the 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, on the protection and preservation of 
ecosystems.  
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position as a functional unit that includes both biotic and abiotic elements.
294
 Science 
generally defines ecosystem as a biological community of interdependent plants, 
animals, and microorganisms that occurs in a specific place associated with particular 
soils, temperatures, and disturbance patterns and the physical and chemical factors that 
make up that community’s abiotic, non-living environment.295  
Despite the wealth of literature surrounding the concept of ecosystems, it has been 
proven to be difficult to define the concept in a simple manner,
296
 as the ecosystem is 
characterised by its composition, structure, and function
297
 whereas the concept, 
depending on its characterisation is said to be ‘dimensionless’.298 
2.1.1 The River Basin as an Ecosystem  
The river basin has been proposed as a natural unit, initially for pollution control, and 
gradually for ecosystem management.
299
 The realisation that there are interactions 
                                               
294  Ludwik A Teclaff and Eileen Teclaff, ‘International Control of Cross-Media Pollution – An 
Ecosystem Approach’, (1987) 27 Natural Resources Journal 21 – 53. The authors referred to the 
definition of ecosystem as stated by PR Ehrlich, AH Ehrlich, and JP Holdren, Ecoscience: Population, 
Resources, Environment (WH Freeman and Company, San Francisco, CA, 1977) at p 97: ‘The 
interdependence that characterizes the physical and biological elements of the environment has led 
ecologists to coin the term ecosystem (shot for ecological system) for the functional unit that includes 
both biotic (living) and abiotic (non-living) elements’.  
295 Dan Tarlock, ‘Ecosystems’, Chapter 24, in Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Ellen Hey (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of International Environmental Law, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007) at p 576. 
Ecosystem was viewed as a subset of nature’s global economy, a local or regional system of plants, 
microorganisms, and animals working together to survive from an ecologist’s traditional approach to 
nature. Nature is understood as a series of overlapping but integrated biological systems or ecosystems, a 
web of life intricately organized, a world of living things, constantly busy in discernible patterns 
producing goods and services essential for one another, services upon which life on earth depends, and 
also vital to human existence. Birnie, Boyle, Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 
112, at p 585. 
296 CBD Guidelines, supra n 166, at p 3.   
297 Dale D Goble, ‘What are Slugs Good For? Ecosystem Services and the Conservation of Biodiversity’ 
(2007) 22 Journal of Land Use and Environmental Law 411 – 440, at p 419.  
298 William A Reiners, ‘Complementary Models for Ecosystems’, (1986) 127(1) The American Naturalist 
59 – 73, at p 59. The difficulties of the conceptualisation of the ecosystem are due to: 1. The enormous 
range of possible scales due to the positive attribute that lend generality to the properties of ecosystem at 
all size scales; 2. the relative intangibility of ecosystems as compared with organelles, cells, and 
individual organisms, due to the lack of boundary integrity or behavioural cohesion. Henceforth, 
confusion concerning ecological properties that fall into the ecosystem domain arises. CBD, ‘Decision 
V/6. Ecosystem Approach’ (Fifth Ordinary meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Nairobi, Kenya, 15 – 26 May 2000) at Annex, p 104, para 3 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-05/full/cop-05-dec-en.pdf> accessed 14 November 2012. It is 
stated in the decision adopted by the COP that the definition of ecosystem ‘does not specify any particular 
spatial unit or scale, and can refer to any functioning unit at any scale. Indeed, the scale of analysis and 
action should be determined by the problems being addressed. It could be a grain of soil, a pond, a forest, 
a biome or the entire biosphere’.  
299
 See Teclaff and Teclaff, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 294, at pp 30 – 33. Initially, the concept of 
drainage basin was advocated as the best areal unit for national and international water management. 
Teclaff, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 294, at p 30. For the evolution of drainage basin in national and 
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between water and its environment within the drainage basin was explicitly expressed in 
the two articles adopted by the International Law Association in the Belgrade 
conference in 1980.
300
 The Great Lakes Agreement 1978
301
 gave authoritative legal 
force to the concept of drainage basin as an ecosystem,
302
 which acknowledges the 
appropriateness of drainage basin as the functional unit for the protection of ecological 
integrity and sustainability of aquatic environment found expression in the Berlin Rules 
on Water Resources.
303
 Despite the recognition of an ecosystem approach in the 
environmental protection of international watercourses in the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention, a considerably more conservative approach was taken.
304
  
                                                                                                                                         
international water law, see Ludwik A Teclaff, ‘Evolution of the River Basin Concept in National and 
International Water Law’ (1996) 36 Natural Resources Journal 359 – 391. 
300 ILA, ‘Articles on the Relationship between Water, Other Natural Resources and the Environment’ 
(Report of the Committee on International Water Resources Law 17 – 18, Belgrade Conference, 1980).  
Art 1(a) reiterated the obligation of states to prevent transboundary pollution. It provides for States to 
ensure that they do not cause substantial injury to the environment of other states, or of areas beyond the 
limits of national jurisdiction. It made explicit the connections between water resource and its 
environment by providing, in para 1(b) that the management of states’ natural resources (other than water) 
and other environmental elements located within their own boundaries does not cause substantial injury to 
the water resources of other states. 
301 Protocol Amending the 1978 Agreement between the United States of America and Canada on Great 
Lakes Water Quality (as amended on 16 October  1993). Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement of 1978, 
United States-Canada, 30 UST 1383, TIAS No. 9257 (hereinafter: the ‘Great Lakes Agreement’). It is 
defined in Art 1 of the Great Lakes Agreement that the 'Great Lakes Basin Ecosystem' means the 
interacting components of air, land, water and living organisms, including humans, within the drainage 
basin of the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from the point at which this river becomes the 
international boundary between Canada and the United States. 
302 Art I(g) defined the Great Lakes Ecosystem as ‘the interacting components of air, land, water and 
living organisms, including man, within the drainage basin of the St. Lawrence River at or upstream from 
the point at which that river becomes the international boundary between Canada and the United 
States…’.   
303This gives explicit recognition to the ecosystem approach. ILA, ‘Report of the Conference on Water 
Resources Law’ (Berlin, August 2004) (hereinafter: ‘Berlin Rules’) <http://www.cawater-
info.net/library/eng/l/berlin_rules.pdf> accessed 24 June 2011. Art 22, Chapter V on the protection of the 
aquatic environments provides that: 'States shall take all appropriate measures to protect the ecological 
integrity necessary to sustain ecosystems dependent on particular waters'. Art 1 provides that: 'These 
(Berlin) Rules express international law applicable to the management of the waters of international 
drainage basins and applicable to all waters, as appropriate'. 
304 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Art 20. The implicit acceptance of application of the 
ecosystem approach, which means ecosystem-based management approach, is found in the immediate 
and overall context of Art 20, introduced in Chapter One, and more specifically in the determination of 
‘relevant’ in subsequent section of this chapter; and Chapter Seven. The use of the term ‘ecosystems’ in 
Art 20 and the related provisions under Chapter IV indicates the recognition of the ecological dynamics 
within and beyond  the functional unit of an ecological systems of the environment. In addition, the 
explicit reference to the management of the environment of international watercourses in the preamble 
and the title of Chapter IV for on the protection, preservation and management of ecosystems support the 
application of the ecosystem approach in the interpretation and application of the relevant provisions 
under Chapter IV of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. The concept of ecosystem and the ecosystem 
approach is elaborated in depth in subsequent sections in this chapter.  
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2.1.2 The Ecosystem Approach in International Policy 
The idea of an ecological and systemic approach to managing natural resources is not 
new.
305
  An ecosystem approach in the protection of the integrity of the environment 
was adopted in the 1992 Rio Declaration where the Preamble indicated the 
Declaration’s goal to work towards an international agreement that ‘protects the 
integrity of the environmental and developmental system’.306 The States are called on to 
                                               
305 Richard Haeuber, ‘Setting the Environmental Policy Agenda: The Case of Ecosystem Management’, 
(1996) 36 Natural Resources Journal 1 – 28, at pp 3 – 4. Victor E Shelford, ‘The Preservation of Natural 
Biotic Communities’, (1933) 14(2) Ecology 240 − 245, at pp 240 − 241 stated that ‘[Many] believes that 
such areas [national parks of Canada and the United States] are examples of primeval nature with the 
animal life essentially complete. The national parks of both countries doubtless represent the least 
disturbed series of areas .. Yet many have been surprised to learn of the large amount of modification 
which has gone on in times past within these park areas, both before and in some cases perhaps after they 
were set aside … The whole trend of research and education is toward specialisation on particular objects 
or particular organisms. These are stressed while the assemblage to which they belong is ignored or 
forgotten, together with the fact that they are to be regarded as integral parts of the system of nature. 
Perhaps one reason why nature study has been unsuccessful is because too often it is not the study of 
nature but of single natural objects or groups of objects which constitute a small part of any natural 
aggregation … Biologists are beginning to realise that it is dangerous to tamper with nature … the 
unmodified assemblage of organisms is commonly more valuable than the isolated rare species. However, 
because the significance of the unmodified assemblage is popularly ignored, the whole is commonly 
sacrificed in the supposed interest of the rare species. To the ecologist, it is the entire series of plants and 
animals which live together in any community which is of primary interest.’ At pp 241 – 245, Shelford 
commented that the Ecological Society of America’s Committee for the Study of Plant and Animal 
Communities has recognised the importance of viewing the environment from an ecological perspective 
in the early 1930s. The Committee factored in and incorporated natural disturbance regimes and the 
natural area protection with core reserve/buffer zone design approach into management schemes. Harold 
W Wood, Jr, ‘The United Nations World Charter for Nature: The Developing Nations’ Initiative to 
Establish Protections for the Environment’, (1985) 12 Ecology Law Quarterly 977 – 996 at p 991. See 
also Peter Jackson, ‘A World Charter for Nature’ (1983) 12 AMBIO 133.  UNESCO, ‘Man and the 
Biosphere Programme’ <http://www.unesco.org/new/en/natural-sciences/environment/ecological-
sciences/man-and-biosphere-programme/> accessed 9 August 2011. Similarly, the biosphere reserves 
approach of the UNESCO’s Man and the Biosphere Programme in the 1970s resembles the inner core 
reserve/buffer zone approach proposed by the Ecological Society of America Committee on Plant and 
Animal Communities. UNGA, ‘World Charter for Nature’ (48th Plenary Meeting, 28 October 1982) UN 
Doc A/RES/37/7 <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/37/a37r007.htm> accessed 22 June 2011. 
Recalling UNGA, ‘Draft World Charter for Nature’ (Resolution 35/7, 49th Plenary Meeting, 30 October 
1980) where it stated that the General Assembly is ‘conscious that life on earth is part of nature and 
depends on the uninterrupted functioning of natural systems, and is persuaded that the benefits which can 
be obtained from nature depend on the maintenance of natural processes and on the diversity of life-forms 
and that those benefits are jeopardized by the excessive exploitation and the destruction of natural 
habitats’. See UNGA, ‘Draft World Charter for Nature’, (41st Plenary Meeting, 27 October 1981) UN 
Doc A/RES/36/6 <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r006.htm> accessed 22 June 2011. 
Evidence of the recognition by states of the necessity to protect essential ecological processes can be 
found in numerous declarations and resolutions concerning the preservation of the environment, as noted 
by the ILC in 1994 Draft Articles and Commentaries, supra n 44, at pp 120 – 121, para 9. They include 
Stockholm Declaration; General Assembly Res 37/7 on the World Charter for Nature; 1989 Amazon 
Declaration; 1989 Draft American Declaration on the Environment; 1988 ECE Declaration on 
Conservation of Flora, Fauna and Their Habitats; 1990 Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable 
Development in the ECE Region; the Hague Declaration on the Environment of 11 March 1989; the work 
of the World Commission on Environment and Development and its Experts Group on Environmental 
Law. 
306 3rd preambular para of 1992 Rio Declaration, supra n 148. The paragraph reads ‘Working towards 
international agreements which respect the interests of all and protect the integrity of the global 
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cooperate to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s 
ecosystem, and beware of their responsibilities towards environmental degradation.
307
  
Agenda 21 is a comprehensive and dynamic plan of action that reflects a global 
consensus and political commitment at the highest level on development and 
environment cooperation
308
. It is replete with references to ‘integrated approaches’ 
where the functional unit employed is ecosystem.
309
 A strong endorsement of the 
ecosystem approach at the global policy level is also found in the Plan of 
Implementation adopted at the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development.
310
 
2.1.3 The Ecosystem Approach in International Law 
It has been commented that there are overlapping, historical, conceptual, and 
institutional reasons for the amorphous and ultimately marginal legal status of 
ecosystems in international law,
311
 where the ecosystem approach has so far been 
confined to non-legally binding instruments.
312
  
The extent of ecosystem protection adopted in the Great Lakes Agreement, as specified 
in Article II, is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity 
of the waters of the Great Lakes Basin Ecosystems”. 313  The preamble to the 1985 
                                                                                                                                         
environmental and developmental system’. The phrase ‘environmental and development system’, 
indicated in the adopted Principles 2 and 11, means the governance system, especially the policy and 
legislative aspects, of environmental conservation and economic development of a United Nations state. 
307 1992 Rio Declaration, supra n 148, Principle 7. 
308 Agenda 21, supra n 161, Preamble, at para 1.3. 
309 Agenda 21, supra n 161 was expressed in ecosystem terms, in particularly paras 1.1; 9.6; 10.1; 12.1; 
15.2; 17.86; and 18.8. See Chs 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22 of the Agenda 21. 
310 Arie Trouwborst, ‘The Precautionary Principle and the Ecosystem Approach in International Law: 
Differences, Similarities and Linkages’, (2009) 18(1) Review of European Community and International 
Environmental Law 26 – 37, at p 30. World Summit on Sustainable Development, ‘Plan of 
Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development’ (Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 
August – 4 September 2002) UN Doc A/Conf.199/20 
<http://www.johannesburgsummit.org/html/documents/documents.html> accessed 14 November 2012. 
The Plan encourages the application by 2010 of the ecosystem approach in the integrated management of 
oceans, seas, islands and coastal areas. See paras 30; 44(e) and 70(b).  
311 Tarlock, ‘Ecosystems’, supra n 295, at p 577. At pp 576 – 577, the author elaborated that the reasons 
include the indistinctive and undifferentiated components of the environment within national territory that 
generates no distinctive legal status. Apart from that, ecosystem function impairment does not fit well into 
the traditional conceptualisation of environmental liability where the basic principles of international 
environmental law, developed prior to the emergence of ecosystem approach, where state responsibility 
was only triggered by harm and injury that pose immediate threat to human health or life. In addition, the 
lack of a single national or international conservation regime that enforces the protection of ecosystems 
leads to the weak legal status of ecosystem. 
312 Trouwborst, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 310, at p 30. 
313 Great Lakes Agreement, supra n 301, Art II – Purpose.   
69 
 
Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
314
 recognises the 
interdependence of living resources within the ecosystems of which the natural 
resources are a part.
 315
   
The Helsinki Convention 1992 stipulated that sustainable water resources management, 
where the application of an ecosystem approach is intrinsic to such management, should 
be promoted.
316
 In the 1997 Convention, the specific adoption of the terminology of 
‘ecosystem’ indicates the clear intention to embrace an ecosystem approach in the 
management of the ecosystems of international watercourses where the functional unit 
for the protection and preservation of the environment of international watercourses is 
the ecosystem of these international watercourses.
317
  
2.1.4 The Ecosystem Approach and Its Normative Standard  
The conceptualisation of the ecosystem as a functional unit emphasised the 
interconnectedness and the interdependence of a biological community with its abiotic 
environment. Pollution caused by human activities, due to the use of water in rivers, 
lakes and underground that is in permanent contact with other environmental 
components, will lead to deterioration of natural ecosystems.
318
 It is now recognised 
that the uses of watercourses can both affect and be affected by processes related to 
other natural elements, such as soil degradation and desertification, deforestation and 
climate change,
319
 where the artificial distinctions between water and associated land 
                                               
314 The functional unit of protection explicit in the Agreement is the ecosystem and the inter-relationship 
between ecosystems. See ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources 
(adopted at Kuala Lumpur on 9 July 1985).  
315 1985 ASEAN Agreement, Arts 4(b) and (d), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12(1), 13, and 14. The conservation and 
sustainable use of species and ecosystems include maintaining the ecological relationship of living 
resources within an ecosystem and minimises risk of changes in the ecosystem. Specific attention in the 
management of ecosystems is drawn to the vegetation and forest cover, soil, water, and air in the 
functioning of natural ecosystems that indicates the adoption of the ecosystem approach in the 
conservation of nature and natural resources aimed to conserve the ecological processes. The 
incorporation of an ecosystem approach is implied in the requirement to integrate environmental 
conservation into land use planning process, establishment of protected areas, and undertaking assessment 
and incorporating the result of such assessment in decision making for proposals prior to their adoption.   
316 The 1992 Helsinki Convention, supra n 67, required the Parties to take all appropriate measures to 
ensure the conservation, and where necessary, restoration of ecosystems, especially in the prevention, 
control and reduction of transboundary impact. See Arts 2(d) and 3, especially 3.1(i),  
317 1997 Watercourses Convention , supra n 35, Art 20.  
318 McIntyre, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 79, at p 5. 
319 Maurizio Arcari, ‘Chapter 1. Theoretical Background and Genesis of the Convention’, in Tanzi and 
Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for 
Sharing, supra n 48, at pp 8 – 9. See also George Francis, ‘Ecosystem Management’ (1993) 33 Natural 
Resources Journal 315 – 345; and Teclaff and Teclaff, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 294.  
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use and water management are eroded.
320
 This induced the scientific community to 
adopt the ecosystem approach that proposed a less economic-oriented criterion for the 
management of freshwater resources.
321
  
The operationalisation of the ecosystem approach for the attainment of the overall 
purpose of sustaining ecosystem integrity includes the maintenance of viable 
populations of all native species in situ that is representative of all native species across 
their natural range of variation within the protected areas. It involves the maintenance of 
evolutionary and ecological processes such as the disturbance regimes within the 
ecosystems, the hydrological processes and the nutrient cycles over a long-term 
temporal scale, while accommodating human use within these constraints.
322
 The 
maintenance of ecosystem integrity necessitates the maintenance of (native) diversity at 
the genetic, population, species and ecosystem levels, as well as the ecological patterns 
and processes sustaining that diversity within an adaptive framework of management.
323
 
The Ecosystem Approach Guideline under the Biodiversity Convention presents the 
most tangible normative guideline for the application of the ecosystem approach where 
the core elements of application are stipulated in concrete principles with annotations 
and guidelines for implementation. The Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and 
Technological Advice (SBSTTA) of the Biodiversity Convention endorses parameters 
of the ecosystem approach, comprising its description, the five points of operational 
guidance,
324
 and 12 principles of application in the attempt to operationalise this 
concept.  
                                               
320 Dan Tarlock, ‘International Water Law and the Protection of River Ecosystem Integrity’ (1996) 10 
Brigham Young University Journal of Public Law 181 – 211, at p 208.  
321 McIntyre, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 79, at p 2. 
322 R Edward Grumbine, ‘What is Ecosystem Management?’ (1994) 8(1) Conservation Biology 27 – 38, 
at p 31 <http://www8.nau.edu/envsci/ENV330website/ENV330/downloads/GrumbineEcosystemmngt.pdf> 
accessed 5 August 2011.  
323 Trouwborst, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 310, at p 28. 
324 CBD, Decision V/6, supra n 298. The five points include focus on the functional relationships and 
processes within ecosystems; enhance benefit sharing; the use of adaptive management practices; 
undertaking management action at an appropriate scale and to decentralise to the lowest level as 
appropriate; and to ensure inter-sectoral cooperation. Apart from these five points of guidance, there are 
three important considerations to be incorporated in the application of the ecosystem approach. The 
management of living components must be considered alongside economic and social considerations at 
the ecosystem level of organisation. An integrated management of land, water and living resources in 
equitable ways within their natural limits of the functioning of ecosystems are needed for it to be 
sustainable. Ecosystem management is a social process where management decisions should be obtained 
through efficient and effective structures and processes for decision making and management that involve 
interested communities. CBD Guidelines, supra n 166, Annex II Further Guidance on the Implementation 
of the Ecosystem Approach Principle, at p 34, para 3 (a), (b), and (c). 
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The Ecosystem Approach Guidelines describe the ecosystem approach as ‘a strategy for 
the integrated management of land, water and living resources that promotes 
conservation and sustainable use in an equitable way’,325 which is consistent with the 
definition of ecosystem provided in Article 2 of the Biodiversity Convention.
326
 The 
Ecosystem Approach Guideline requires an adaptive management approach to deal with 
the complex and dynamic nature of the ecosystem despite the lack of complete 
comprehension of the functioning of the ecosystem.
327
  
Principle 3 of the ecosystem approach illustrates the need for a broad-based, spatial 
approach that acknowledges the interconnectedness of the biosphere where effects on 
the ecosystem functioning on one ecosystem are seldom confined to the point of impact, 
or only to one system, especially in view of the non-linear outcome compounded by the 
time-lags effect.
328
 The priority target of the ecosystem approach is the conservation of 
ecosystem structure and functioning in order to maintain ecosystem services,
329
 where 
the management of ecosystems must be conducted in consideration of the 
environmental conditions that limit natural productivity, ecosystem structure, 
functioning and diversity.
330
 
                                               
325 CBD Guidelines, supra n 166, at p 6, para 1, extracted from section A of Decision CBD, Decision V/6, 
supra n 298. 
326 Art 2 of the Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12 defined ‘ecosystem’ as ‘a dynamic complex of plant, 
animal and microorganism communities and their non-living environment interacting as a functional unit’. 
327 The difficulty in acquiring complete understanding of ecosystem functions and processes is due to the 
non-linear outcome often caused by time-lags, contributing to the uncertainty and discontinuities in the 
outcome. See the Ecosystem Approach Guideline, p 6, para 3. Hence, the ecosystem approach 
necessitates an adaptive management framework in order to factor in the uncertainties and to “learn by 
doing” that does not preclude other management and conservation approaches in dealing with such 
complex situations. Other methodologies not precluded are: biosphere reserves, protected areas, and 
single species conservation programmes, as well as other approaches carried out under existing national 
policy and legislative frameworks. See the Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, at p 6, paras 4 
and 5. 
328  This recognition involves spatial connections, such as the adjacent ecosystem or the downstream 
ecosystems, but extends to other form of connections, such as network connected through migratory 
species as well. Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, at pp 12 – 13. 
329 Principle 5, Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, at pp 16 – 17. Management focus must be 
on the maintenance and restoration of the key structures and ecological processes (eg hydrological 
systems, pollination systems, habitats and food webs) given the complexity of the structure, functioning, 
resilience and interrelationship among composition of natural ecosystems, in particularly the human 
interaction, needs and values; conservation management of biodiversity and environmental quality, 
integrity and vitality. The implementation guideline for this principle advocates for the development and 
application of instruments that contribute towards the achievement of conservation management goals 
through a combination of managing protected area networks, ecological networks and areas outside of 
such networks. . At para 5.8, Principle 5, Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, at p 17. 
330  Principle 6, Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, at pp 18 - 19. The application of the 
ecosystem approach is bounded by appropriate spatial and temporal scales depending on the objective of 
management, with regards to connectivity between areas based on the hierarchical nature of biological 
diversity characterized by dynamic interaction and integration of genes, species and ecosystems across 
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The uncertainty in the management of an ecosystem due to its non-linear outcome, time 
lag characteristics, and the lack of comprehensive understanding of the ecosystem 
processes, necessitates an adaptive approach to the framework of management.
 331
 
Conservation and use of ecosystems should be seen as a continuum from strictly 
protected to human-made ecosystems where the balance between, and integration of, 
conservation and use can be struck.
332
  
The existing approach in the international environmental legal regimes focuses more on 
the prevention against harm caused by uses, pollution and invasive alien species,
333
 with 
less consideration of the ecosystem in its entirety, especially the ecological structure, 
processes, functioning, and the intangible benefits of ecosystem services. The duty to 
prevent harm and the obligation not to cause harm, especially transboundary harm, are 
deemed the cornerstones of international environmental law.
334
 States are obliged to 
take all necessary measures in accordance with the doctrine of sic utere tuo ut alienum 
non laedas.  
                                                                                                                                         
space, time and quality. Principle 7, Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, pp 20 – 21. In 
particularly, management objectives should be set at a long-term basis in recognition of the varying 
temporal scales and lag-effects that characterize ecosystem processes. Principle 8, Ecosystem Approach 
Guideline, supra n 324, at pp 22 – 23. 
331 In view of the dynamics, the management approach should acknowledge that change is inevitable. The 
adaptive management should anticipate and cater for changes, and consider mitigating measures in order 
to cope with such changes. Principle 9, Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324,  at pp 24 – 25. 
332 Principle 10, Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, at pp 26 – 27. In this regard, in view of the 
ultimate objective of attaining ecosystem integrity, the application of ecosystem approach should consider 
all forms of relevant information, including scientific, indigenous, and local knowledge, innovations and 
practices and involve all relevant sectors of society and scientific disciplines as appropriate. Principles 11 
and 12, Ecosystem Approach Guideline, supra n 324, at pp 28 – 31. 
333 The existing MEAs that adopted a tangible harm-based approach, to name a few: Convention on Long-
Range Transboundary Air Pollution (concluded 13 November 1979, entered into force 16 March 1983) 
TIAS 10541, 1302 UNTS 217, (1979) 18 ILM 1442, and its eight Protocols; Convention for the 
Protection of the Ozone Layer (concluded 22 March 1985, entered into force 22 September 1988) TIAS 
No11097, 1513 UNTS 323, (1987) 26 ILM 1529, and its Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer (concluded 16 September 1987, entered into force 1 January 1989) 1522 UNTS 3; (1987) 
26 ILM 1550; Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants (concluded 22 May 2001, entered 
into force 17 May 2004) 2256 UNTS 119, (2001) 40 ILM 532; and Basel Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (concluded 22 March 1989, entered 
into force 5 May 1992) 1673 UNTS 126, (1989) 28 ILM 657. See also ILC, ‘Draft Articles on Prevention 
of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous Activities’ (Report of the International Law Commission on the 
Work of its Fifty-third Session) UNGAOR Supp No 10, UN Doc A/56/10.  
334  1992 Rio Declaration, supra n 148, Principle 21. Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘The Ireland v United 
Kingdom (Mox Plant) Case: Applying the Doctrine of Treaty Parallelism’, (2003) 18 International Journal 
of Marine and Coastal Law 1 – 58, at pp 41 – 42. Corfu Channel Case (Great Britain v. Albania) 
(Judgment of 9 April 1949) [1949] ICJ Report 4, at pp 22 – 23 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/1/1645.pdf> accessed 14 November 2012; Nuclear Test Case (New Zealand v. France) 
(Judgment of 20 December 1974) (1974) ICJ Report 457, at paras 63 – 64 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/59/6159.pdf> accessed 14 November 2012; and reaffirmed in Legality of the Threat or 
Use of Nuclear Weapons, (Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996) [1996] ICJ Report 226, at paras 30, 32 and 
243 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/95/7495.pdf> accessed 14 November 2012. See also Trail 
Smelter Case, supra n 169.  
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The traditional approach to the watercourses’ environmental protection addressed in 
most international watercourses treaties relates mainly to the prevention against harm 
caused by pollution and invasive species.  The increasing tension over the use and 
regulation of water, driven by a systemic state of water shortages, underscores the 
fundamental conflict that exists between consumptive use and users in-situ (water as a 
medium of ecological processes).
335
  
Recent developments in international environmental law, in light of the emergence and 
advancement of the ecosystem approach, raise concerns over the implications of 
environmental degradation, for example biodiversity lost, and climate change, that 
influence the extent and scope of ‘protection and preservation of freshwater ecosystems 
of international watercourses’ under international watercourses treaties. The decreased 
availability of freshwater due to the reduction in renewable freshwater runoff on Earth; 
the expansion of unsustainable pattern of human consumption;
336
 mounting pollution to 
waterways;
337
 and the degradation of freshwater ecosystems; set the stage for a global 
water crisis.
338
 This development has prompted the field of international watercourses 
law to treat the maintenance of ecological integrity as a point of concern in the 
regulation of uses.
339
  
Various factors that lead to biodiversity loss and climate change have been uncovered 
and identified by scientists, which include, inter alia, land use and land-use change.
340
 
                                               
335 See Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Climate Change, Regulatory Fragmentation, and Water Triage’ (2008) 79 
University Colorado Law Review 825 – 927.  
336 MA, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis (Island Press, Washington DC, 2005) at pp 106 – 
107. 
337 Charles Vörösmarty et al (Coordinating Lead Authors); Rober Bos et al (Lead Authors); and Frank 
Rijsberman et al (Review Editors), ‘Chapter 7. Fresh Water’ in MA, Global Assessment Reports (Vol 1: 
Current State & Trends, Island Press, Washington DC, 2005) at pp 165 – 207 
<http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.276.aspx.pdf>  accessed 14 November 
2012.   
338 David Dudgeon, Angela H Arthington, Mark O Gessner, Zen-Ichiro Kawabata, Duncan J Knowler, 
Christian Lévêque, Robert J Naiman, Anne-Hélène Prieur-Richard, Doris Soto, Melanie LJ Stiassny, and 
Caroline A Sullivan, ‘Freshwater Biodiversity: Importance, Threats, Status and Conservation Challenges’ 
(2006) 81 Biological Review 163 – 182, at pp 165 – 167.  
339  For the emergence of the ecosystem approach in the field of international law concerning water 
resources, see in general Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater 
Resources: A Case for International Ecosystem Law’, supra n 3; and McIntyre, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, 
supra n 79. 
340 See further Richard T Kingsford, ‘Conservation Management of Rivers and Wetlands under Climate 
Change – A Synthesis’, (2011) 62 Marine and Freshwater Research 217 – 222 
<http://www.publish.csiro.au/?act=view_file&file_id=MF11029.pdf> accessed 30 March 2011. It is 
stated, at p 221 that: ‘There are many factors degrading rivers and wetlands; however, the most pervasive 
and deleterious is alteration of flow regimes, primarily driven by appropriation of freshwater for human 
use, considerably exceeding any effects of climate change on flow regimes’. 
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The most notable and much debated consequence of the loss of biodiversity and climate 
change is the impaired provision of ecosystem services, and water scarcity. Apart from 
the protection of freshwater ecosystems against environmental harm under the rubric of 
pollution or invasive species, the extent and scope of this protection must necessarily 
address environmental degradation that is not subsumed under the two categories 
mentioned above.  
In reflection of Brunnée’s sentiment that aside from engineering ‘a shift in the 
predominant focus on transboundary pollution to a conceptual framework with much 
broader [or global] outlook’,341 the focus of this research seeks to address mainly the 
aspect of environment protection traditionally neglected in the international 
watercourses regime. International water treaties substantively address issues regarding 
the non-navigational uses of water and its allocation. The concern on the quality and 
quantity of the water is raised only to the extent whether the waters are of such quality 
and quantity that the intended usage by parties of that particular water treaty is not 
affected. The environmental needs of the freshwater ecosystems are greatly neglected, 
and no regard will be paid to the maintenance of the integrity of the freshwater 
ecosystems until the threshold for self-organisation of these ecosystems has been 
exceeded to a point of no return, where the damage done is irreversible.
 342
  
                                               
341 Chidi Oguamanam, ‘Biological Diversity’ in Shawkat Alam, Md Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Tareq MR 
Chowdhury and Erika J Techera (eds) Routledge Handbook of International Environmental Law 
(Routledge, London and New York, 2013) at p 220. Quoted Jutta Brunnée, ‘The Stockholm Declaration 
and the Structure and Process of International Environmental Law’, pp 41 – 62, in Aldo Chircop, Ted L 
McDorman and Susan J Rolston (eds) The Future of Ocean Regime Building: Essays in Tribute to 
Douglas M Johnston (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2009) at p 44.  
342 Bruce Pardy, ‘Changing Nature: The Myth of the Inevitability of Ecosystem Management’ (2003) 20 
Pace Environmental Law Review 675 – 692, at p 691. Pardy analogises the point of no return in 
ecosystems to that of a Rubik’s Cube. Pardy stated that ‘the point of no return is reached when all the 
colours are hopelessly mixed up, when the cube is so changed that it does not resemble the cube in its 
original organisation, and it is not possible to put the cube back into its pristine state … One danger of 
ecosystem management is that it allows and encourages ecosystems is changed, the closer to the real point 
of no return it becomes’. Anwar et al raises that the over-exploitation of the common resources can bring 
the ecosystem to the point of no return. See Sk Morshed Anwar, Cédric A Jeanneret, Lael Parrott, and 
Danielle J Marceau, ‘Conceptualization and Implementation of a Multi-agent Model to Simulate Whale-
watching Tours in the St Lawrence Estuary in Quebec, Canada’ (2007) 22 Environmental Modelling and 
Software 1775 – 1787, at p 1777. There are ample examples that raised deep concern in the global 
community, and the degradation of the Aral Sea Basin is one of them. Brunnée and Toope, 
‘Environmental Security, supra n 3, at p 55. The authors further elaborated that: ‘an ecosystem’s capacity 
to ‘self-organise’ allows it to regenerate or to adapt to stresses, that is, to maintain or regain integrity’. 
The exploration of protection that goes into the level of ‘ecosystem integrity’ is an incorporation of the 
ecosystem approach, as employed by the Biodiversity Convention regime, noted by the Ramsar 
Convention where the concept of wise use in the Ramsar regime is updated in the reflection of the 
emergence of the ecosystem approach. 
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There is sufficient scholarship to urge the global community to treat maintenance of 
ecosystem integrity as the main objective in environmental protection. The minimal 
management approach they propose to safeguard the ecological structure, processes and 
functions, as one of the better means
343
 to achieve ecosystem integrity, is reflected in 
existing legal obligations under international law on the environment, and manifested in 
legal terminologies such as ‘preservation’, or even ‘conservation’, which has a broader 
connotation.  
The subsequent sections will be directed to the identification of rules that impose 
obligations to preserve freshwater ecosystems of international watercourses. The 
Ecosystem Approach, which aims to guide the management of ecosystems to achieve 
integrity of the systems, by ensuring that the ecological structure, processes and 
functions remain intact, underpins this analysis.   
2.2 ‘Relevant’ Rules 
Relevance relates to the subject matter where the extraneous rule must be related in 
some way to the treaty being interpreted.
344
 The ‘relevancy’ of rules suggests that 
external rules, to be applicable in the interpretation process under Article 31(3)(c), 
should ‘primarily focus on rules in cognate areas’.345  
A recent WTO case at the AB level illustrated the depth of detail needed for an external 
rule of international law to be considered ‘relevant’ for the purpose of interpretation 
under Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. In the EC – Aircraft case,346 the 
European Union argued that Article 4 of the 1992 Agreement
347
 is relevant to the 
                                               
343 See Joern Fischer, David B Lindenmayer, and Adrian D Manning, ‘Biodiversity, Ecosystem Function, 
and Resilience: Ten Guiding Principles for Commodity Production Landscapes’ (2006) 4 Frontiers in 
Ecology and the Environment 80 – 86; and Adrian Phillips (ed) Economic Values of Protected Areas. 
Guidelines for Protected Area Managers (Best Practice Protected Area Guidelines Series No 2, IUCN, 
1998) <http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/PAG-002.pdf> accessed 9 September 2012. 
344 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 102. 
345 Thomas W Wälde, ‘Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples’ pp 724 – 781 in 
Christian Binder, Ursula Kriebaum, August Reinisch, and Stephen Wittich (eds) International Investment 
Law for the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer (Oxford University Press, 2009) at p 
775. Gardiner commented that: ‘It seems reasonable to take the ordinary meaning of “relevant” rules of 
international law as referring to those touching on the same subject matter as the treaty provisions being 
interpreted or which in any way affect that interpretation’. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235,  
at p 260.   
346 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288. 
347
 The 1992 Agreement between the European Economic Community and the Government of the United 
States of America Concerning the Application of the GATT Agreement on Trade in Civil Aircraft on 
Trade in Large Civil Aircraft, was concluded in furtherance of the 1979 Agreement Trade in Civil 
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interpretation of ‘benefit’ in two ways.348 The AB observed that the subject matter of 
the 1992 Agreement might be ‘relevant’ in the context of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 
Vienna Convention as it relates closely to issues germane to the dispute especially the 
measures taken by the European Communities in the area of civil aircraft that the United 
Sates challenges under the [Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement (SCM 
Agreement)].
349
   
The first argument proposed by the European Union was, the reference to ‘support’ and 
the thresholds applied in Article 4 of the 1992 Agreement ‘speak to the existence of 
“benefit” and thus to the existence of a subsidy and the obligation for the government 
not to exceed such a ceiling when providing development support’.350 The European 
Union contended that Article 4 of the 1992 Agreement ‘informs the meaning of “benefit” 
provided under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement as well as the benefit analysis 
under the provision’.351 In this regard, the AB considered that Article 4 of the 1992 
Agreement is not relevant to the ‘specific question that must be examined under Article 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement’.352 
Alternatively, European Union argued that the ‘existence and operation of Article 4 [are] 
part of the facts to establish the relevant market benchmark
353
 at the time the launch aid 
or member state financing (known as ‘LA/MSF’ throughout the AB’s decision) was 
granted’.354 The AB commented that Article 4 has no direct bearing on the specific 
financial market,
355
 and they were not convinced that the ‘existence and operation of 
                                                                                                                                         
Aircraft against a background of differences between the EEC and the US over support measures to their 
respective large civil aircraft industries.  
348 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 40, para 83. 
349 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 363, para 847. 
350 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 366, para 850. 
351 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 366, para 850. At para 851, relating to the first argument, the AB 
noted that Art 4 addresses the concern of financial contribution component of the definition of subsidy in 
Art 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. However, it does not distinguish between government support that places 
the recipient in a more advantageous position inherent in a definition of subsidy that makes the recipient 
‘better-off’, and government support that is neutral where recipient could have obtained similar terms on 
the market. 
352 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 366, para 851. The question to be examined is: whether the amount to 
be paid by the recipient of the government loan is lower than the amount that would be paid for a 
comparable commercial loan. See Art 1.1 of the SCM Agreement. 
353 The AB has noted that one of the accepted definition of ‘market’ is ‘the area of economic activity in 
which buyers and sellers come together and the forces of supply and demand affect prices’. See fn 1932, 
EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 367, para 853.  
354 The European Union emphasised that ‘the existence of benefit requires an examination of the specific 
market conditions existing at the time the financial contribution is granted’. EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at 
p 367, para 852.  
355 Financial market is defined by the interaction between the economic agents that are willing to provide 
funds and those that seek to obtain funds. EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 367, para 853. 
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Article 4 is relevant as part of the facts to establish the relevant market benchmark for 
assessing benefit at the time LA/MSF was granted’.356  
For the foregoing reasons, the AB found that Article 4 does not distinguish between 
LA/MSF that is advantageous to the recipient and that is not, and that the existence and 
operation of Article 4 have no bearing on the determination of ‘benefit’.  It then 
concluded that Article 4 is not a ‘relevant’ rule of international law application in the 
relations between the parties within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) that informs the 
interpretation of ‘benefit’ under Article 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement. The Article was 
found not to form part of the facts to establish the relevant market benchmark.   
The EC – Aircraft case illustrated that even if the external rule appears to address the 
same subject matter, it might not be sufficient if the rule of international law addresses 
or concerns the subject matter of the provision at issue. To be ‘relevant’, the external 
rule must be either ‘relevant’ for the interpretation of the provision of the interpreted 
treaty, or ‘relevant’ for the establishment of facts in the interpretative process of an 
interpreted treaty.
357
  
In the interpretation of what ‘relevant’ means under Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention, the general rule is, the rules that are ‘relevant’ must all appear to address 
the same facts, or concern the subject matter of the treaty term at issue.
358
 Relevant rules 
may also be in the form of ‘chains of treaties that grapple with the same type of problem 
at different levels or from particular (technical, geographical) points of view’.359 The 
impressive normative development in the international regulation of the environment 
gives rise to a growing amount of normative equivalence between rules in different 
                                               
356 The AB is of the opinion that Art 4 of the 1992 Agreement may have influenced the relationship 
between the member States and Airbus because it determined how much support was provided by the 
member States, and how Airbus was expected to pay it back. However, Art 4 has no direct bearing on the 
financial market that is meant to be used as the benchmark to determine benefit. EC – Aircraft, supra n 
288, at p 367, para 853. 
357 Although the Art 4 of the 1992 Agreement prima facie relates to issues germane to the dispute that 
revolves on the area of the development support of civil aircraft challenged by the United States under Art 
1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement, the AB found that it is neither ‘relevant’ for the determination of ‘benefit’, 
nor ‘relevant’ as part of a fact that establishes the relevant market benchmark for the determination of 
‘benefit’. EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 368, para 855. See further Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 
VCLT, supra n 254, at p 433. 
358 Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 VCLT, supra n 254, at p 433, para 24. 
359 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at pp 209 – 210, para 416. 
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treaty regimes. Such situation creates ‘parallelism of treaties’,360 and the existence of 
‘Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’ (MSENs).361  
The rules of international law are ‘relevant’ to the interpretation of a particular treaty 
because treaties, no matter how wide their subject matter is, are themselves a creature of 
international law predicated for their existence and operation on being part of the 
international law system, and as such are limited in scope.
362
  The treaties must be 
‘applied and interpreted against the background of the general principles of international 
law’ whereby this ‘background’ and the ‘general principles of international law’ are 
deemed relevant for the purpose of Article 31(3)(c).
363
 In addition to that, the scope of 
‘relevance’ encompasses rules and principles that address questions, which the treaties 
do not ‘resolve expressly and in a different way’.364  
For an external rule to play a role in the interpretative process, certain conditions must 
be fulfilled.
365
 Rules that are relevant must at least impinge on the same subject matter 
(in pari materia); rules that form part of a ‘chain of treaties’ that grapple with the same 
or similar problems albeit from different perspectives; or rules that are similar but 
arising in multiple treaties (normative pluralism or parallelism of treaties). Relevant 
rules also include situation where norms are multi-sourced, but equivalent (MSENs). 
Furthermore, relevant rules include general international law, the interpretation of which 
affects the treaty to be interpreted; or law that completes the picture; fills the lacunae; 
and reflects the subsequent evolution and development of international law that resolves 
the temporal issues.  
                                               
360 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at para 52.  
361 Broude and Shany, Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law, supra n 98. 
362 Conclusion on Fragmentation, supra n 289, at para 17.  
363 McNair, The Law of Treaties, supra n 234, at p 466. 
364 P Verzij, Georges Pinson Case (1927 – 1928) AD No 292 quoted in McLachlan, ‘The Principle of 
Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at pp 279 – 280. Hence, apart from the logical adoption of the 
meaning of relevant to be rules directly relevant to the subject matter or the interpretation of rules that 
affects the treaty being interpreted as iterated above, relevant rules also encompass within their ambit 
general principles of international law in the background for all questions not addressed by the treaty to 
be interpreted. In particularly, these ‘relevant’ rules to be taken into account together with the context as 
stipulate under Art 31(3)(c) have the functions of: (a)resolving the issue of further or subsequent 
development in the law (including the application of the inter-temporal law); (b) completing the legal 
picture, or filling gaps, in a treaty by reference to general international law; (c) deriving guidance from 
parallel treaty provisions; and (d) resolving conflicting obligations arising under different treaties. See 
Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, p 260. 
365 An extrapolation of the outcome of analysis in the WTO regime revealed that these conditions are – 
the interpreted term must be broad and ambiguous in order to justify taking into account of external rules; 
and the external rules must be of assistance in the determination of the meaning of the interpreted rule. 
See Fitzmaurice, Elias, and Merkouris (eds) Treaty Interpretation and the VCLT, supra n 279, at p 234.  
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2.2.1. Doctrine In Pari Materia 
‘Statutes in pari materia are to be construed together; each legislative act is to be 
interpreted with reference to other acts relating to the same matter or subject’.366 In 
further deliberation of what are rules that appear to address the ‘same’ facts, ‘similar’ 
facts, or ‘concerning the subject matter of the treaty term at issue’, the rule on 
interpretation for statutes in pari materia will be able to provide guidance in such 
interpretation and analysis. The doctrine of in pari materia is  applicable to international 
law, especially if the subject matter is identical,
367
 despite its origin as a rule of statutory 
interpretation in the domestic legal sphere.
368
 The idea of uniformity that underpins this 
doctrine is equally applicable for advising the interpretation of ‘relevant’ at the 
international legal sphere.
369
     
The rule of interpreting statutes in pari materia necessitates the consideration of all 
previous acts of legislation relating to the same matters in order to construe the 
legislative act in hand.
370
 In order for the statute to be in pari materia in aid of 
                                               
366 Henry Campbell Black, MA, Handbook on the Construction and Interpretation of the Laws (The 
Lawbook Exchange, New Jersey, 2008) at p 204. 
367 Hans Aufricht, ‘Supersession of Treaties in International Law’ (1952) 37 Cornell Law Quarterly 655 – 
700, at p 656. Despite recognising that the doctrine of in pari materia is applicable to international law, it 
does not entailed that the doctrine is ‘a necessary corollary to the rule that the later law supersedes the 
earlier law’, as stated by the author.  
368 This doctrine of in pari materia is referred to for multi-sourced norms at the international law in the 
interpretation investment protection rules at the international level. See Martins Paparinskis, ‘Sources of 
Law and Arbitral Interpretations of Pari Materia Investment Protection Rules’ (8 October 2010) in Ole K 
Fauchald and André Nollkaemper (eds) The Practice of International and National Courts and the (De-
)Fragmentation of International Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford, 2012) 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1697835> accessed 7 September 2012.  
369 See Hersch Lauterpacht, ‘Decisions of Municipal Courts as A Source of International Law’ (1929) 10 
British Yearbook of International Law 65 – 95, at pp 85 – 86. Lauterpacht proposed a thesis that 
‘decisions of the municipal courts, when forming a link in a chain of concordant decision in pari materia 
on the part of courts of several states, participate in the creation of a customary rules of international law. 
When the decision in question originate from courts of a large number of states and relate to a matter 
which lies within the particular province of those states, they will create customary international law 
binding also upon such states as had no occasion to signify their adherence to this rule. It is submitted that 
the true sedes materiae of uniform decisions of municipal courts in their cumulative effect as international 
custom is in the second paragraph of Article 38’. It is elaborated earlier in p  85 that ‘uniform municipal 
case law on questions of international law may well be regarded as forming part of “international custom 
as evidence of a general practice accepted as law” referred to in the second paragraph of Article 38 of the 
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice’. 
370 Henry Campbell Black, Interpretation Handbook, supra n 366, at p 205. For example, when a term in 
a statute is used with a certain meaning, the subsequent uses of the same word in regulations on the same 
subject matter will be understood as implying the same meaning, unless indicated otherwise. At pp 205 – 
207, it is further elaborated that ‘statutes are in pari materia when they relate to the same person or thing, 
or to the same class of persons or things’. Examples quoted include: ‘English laws concerning paupers 
and their bankrupt acts are to be construed together, as if they were one statute and as forming a united 
system … such laws are in pari materia. All the statutes of the same state relating to the property rights 
and contracts of married women, removing their common law disabilities, authorizing them to manage 
their separate estates, to engage in business, etc., are to be read and construed together as constituting one 
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interpretation, explicit stipulation in the latter to refer to the former is not necessary; nor 
it is necessary that the former should still continue to be in force. It is emphasised that 
contemporaneous legislation of a similar nature, although not precisely in pari materia, 
is within the reason of the rule, and may be referred to for the same purpose.
371
  
2.2.2 Normative Parallelism and the Parallelism of Treaty 
Parallelism of norms commonplace in the national legal system is regarded as attributed 
to the normative unity and institutional ‘integrativity’ of domestic legal systems. 372 
However, normative parallelism entails a different effect in the international legal order 
due to the absence of a central authority and the lack of institutional integration.
373
  
The notion of parallelisms of treaty surfaced in Australia and New Zealand’s argument 
against Japan’s reliance on the principle of lex posterior and lex specialis in the Bluefin 
Tuna case that the 1993 Convention for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
prevailed substantively and procedurally over the 1982 UNCLOS. The Arbitral Award 
elucidated the doctrine of parallelism in addressing dispute that arises within the 
framework of the umbrella UNCLOS and many compatible special treaties such as the 
1993 Convention.
374
  
In the dispute, Australia and New Zealand argued that Japan’s interpretation that relies 
on the principle of lex posterior and lex specialis was misplaced because the principles 
are applicable only if there are conflicts or actual inconsistencies
375
 between two legal 
instruments. Furthermore, Article 311 of UNCLOS evidenced its mandate to regulate 
                                                                                                                                         
system. Though they may have been passed at different times, successively advancing to a standard the 
opposite of that of the common law, they are all strictly in pari materia, and any doubt or ambiguity in 
one should be cleared up by reference to the terms, the purpose, and the policy of the rest. An act 
authorising married women to dispose of their property by will is in pari materia with the general statute 
relating to the execution and proof of wills. A statute in relation to attachments against steamboats for 
debt is in pari material with the general attachment law of the state, and hence, in so far as the special law 
is silent as to the modes of proceeding in the execution and return of writs issued under it, they must be 
regulated by the general rules prescribed by the general law. [This rules] is especially applicable in the 
case of revenue laws, though made up of independent enactments, are regarded as one system, in which 
the construction of any separate act may be aided by the examination of other provisions which compose 
the system. An act providing for a homestead and exemption for families of minor children is in pari 
materia with the laws allowing dower to the widow and minor children of a decedent … All the laws 
relating to the subject of the regulation of liquor-traffic, are in pari materia.’ 
371 Black, Interpretation Handbook, supra n 366, at p 209. 
372 Broude and Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’, supra n 
99, at p 3. 
373 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 33, para 52.  
374
 Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘Southern Bluefin Tuna’ (2001) 95 American Journal of International Law 162 
– 171, at p 169.  
375 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at p 35, para 41(k). 
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relationships with implementing conventions such as the 1993 Convention, whereby 
UNCLOS could not be said to be in conflict or inconsistent with the 1993 
Convention.
376
 The Tribunal concluded that the dispute between Australia and New 
Zealand, on the one hand, and Japan on the other, over Japan’s role in the management 
of Bluefin Tuna stocks and particularly its unilateral experimental fishing programme, 
while centred in the 1993 Convention, also arises under the UNCLOS.
377
  
The Tribunal rejected Japan’s argument and reaffirmed their recognition that parallelism 
of treaty, substantively or procedurally, including provision for settlement of dispute, is 
commonplace,
378
 longstanding and widespread
379
 in international law and State practice. 
The Tribunal further stated that in the present case, it would be artificial for the Tribunal 
to find a dispute arising under UNCLOS that is distinct from the 1993 Convention, as 
the same Parties grapple with not two separate disputes but in fact a single dispute 
arising under both Conventions.
380
  
The award of the Tribunal in the Bluefin Tuna case indicates that the parallelism of 
treaty means there is ‘more than one treaty to bear upon a particular dispute’ where a 
violation of a certain obligation could be found ‘under more than one treaty’.381 It is 
noted that increased normative density will necessarily result in the occurrence of 
parallel legal regimes that regulate the same subject matter.
382
 The arguments of 
Australia and New Zealand substantiated the content of ‘parallelism’ by stating that 
even if the 1993 Convention ‘completely covered’ all relevant obligations of UNCLOS, 
it is only a situation of parallelism of obligations, and emphasised that such a situation 
is not unusual in international practice.
383
  
The existing international legal regime is a product of ‘a process of accretion and 
cumulation’ where the conclusion of an implementing convention does not necessarily 
obliterate the obligations imposed by the framework convention (UNCLOS) upon the 
parties to the implementing convention.
384
 The parallel and overlapping existence of 
                                               
376 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at pp 33 – 34, para 41(g). 
377 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at p 41, para 52. 
378 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at p 40, para 52. 
379 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, Separate Opinion of Justice Sir Kenneth Keith, at p 51, para 11. 
380 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at p 42 , para 54. See also Barbara Kwiatkowska, ‘MOX Plant’, supra 
n 334, at pp 4 and 28.  
381 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at p 40, para 52. 
382
 Shany, ‘The First MOX Plant Award’, supra n 99, at p 823. 
383 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at p 35, para 41(k). 
384 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, at p 40, para 52. 
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obligations arising under one treaty has not excluded or in any relevant way prejudiced 
the other.
385
  
A parallelism of laws is said to exist when there may be two distinct sets of rules 
applicable to a particular situation, such as the possible (simultaneous) applicability of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law.
386
 The UN Report 
on the Situation concerning the Detainees in Guantánamo Bay supports the 
complementary application of international humanitarian law and international human 
rights law.
 387
  
The Court in the Palestine Wall case considered that – 
‘Protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case of armed 
conflict, save through the effect of provisions for derogation of this kind to be 
found in Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights … 
The Court will have to take into consideration both these branches of international 
law, namely human rights law and, as lex specialis, international humanitarian 
law’.388  
In Congo v Uganda, the ICJ had decided that the acts of killing, torture and other forms 
of inhumane treatment of the civilian population, and other acts contrary to human 
rights and international humanitarian law committed by the Uganda People’s Defence 
                                               
385 Bluefin Tuna case, supra n 120, Separate Opinion of Justice Sir Kenneth Keith, at p 49, para 1. 
386 European Union Guidelines on Promoting Compliance with International Humanitarian Law [2005] 
OJ C327/04 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2005:327:0004:0007:EN:PDF>, accessed 16 
September 2011, at para 12. It is stated that: ‘It is important to distinguish between international human 
rights law and international humanitarian law. They are distinct bodies of law and, while both are 
principally aimed at protecting individuals, there are important differences between them. In particularly 
international humanitarian law is applicable in time of armed conflict and occupation. Conversely, human 
rights law is applicable to everyone within the jurisdiction of the State concerned in time of peace as well 
as in time of armed conflict. Thus while distinct, the two sets of rules may both be applicable to a 
particular situation and it is therefore sometimes necessary to consider the relationship between them’. 
387 The Report reiterated General Comment No. 31 (2004) by the Human Rights Committee, and stated, 
‘The Covenant [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)] applies in 
situations of armed conflict to which the rules of international humanitarian law are applicable.’ UN, 
‘Situation of Detainees at Guantánamo Bay’, Report of the Commission on Human Rights, Sixty-second 
Session, (27 February 2006) UN Doc E/CN.4/2006/120, at p 7, para 15 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,UNCHR,,CUB,,45377b0b0,0.html> accessed 11 August 2011. 
388
 Legal Consequences of the Construction of A Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory (Advisory 
Opinion of 9 July 2004) [2004] ICJ Reports 136, at p 46, para 106 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf> accessed 11 August 2011 (hereinafter: ‘Palestine Wall’ case).  
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Force (UPDF) troops in the occupied territories, were attributable to Uganda.
389
 
Subsequently, the Court turned to examine whether such conduct constituted a breach of 
Uganda’s international obligations under international human rights law and 
international humanitarian law relevant for this purpose.
390
 The Court concluded that 
Uganda is internationally responsible for the violations of their obligations under both 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law in the occupied 
territory.
391
  
The equal applicability of both international humanitarian law and human rights law in 
situations of belligerent occupation are recognised by international courts, because these 
rules as deemed relevant in the given situation, especially when they also outlaw the 
same conduct. The parallel rules are applicable simultaneously even if the protection in 
one branch of law is found to be less than the protection in the other branches of law.
392
 
The International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) expounded the 
reason for the recourse to international human rights law in the case of Kunarac and 
stated that ‘in certain aspects, international humanitarian law can be said to have fused 
with human rights law’.393  
The parallelism of treaties occurs where parallel norms of similar content are found to 
be applicable and relevant to a particular context. The norms can said to be relevant due 
to the similarity of content, dealing with the same matter, outlawing the same matter, or 
the resemblance between them, in terms of goals, values and terminology.
394
 
                                               
389  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda) 
(Judgment of 19 December 2005) [2005] ICJ Reports 168, at pp 241 – 242, paras 211 – 213 (hereinafter: 
‘Congo v Uganda’ case) <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/116/10455.pdf> accessed 12 August 2011. 
390 The Palestinian Wall case, supra n 388 (at p 178, para 106) was quoted in Congo v Uganda, supra n 
389, at pp 242 - 243, paras 215 – 216 to lend support to the applicability of both branches of law in case 
of armed conflict, unless there is a proviso for the derogation of such kind to be found in Art 4 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Court commented that in the Palestinian Wall 
case, it had the occasion to address the issues of the relationship between international humanitarian law 
and international human rights law. It decided that some rights might be exclusive to the respective 
regimes of human rights law and humanitarian law, ‘yet others may be matters of both of these branches 
of international law’. This indicates the cognisance of the Court of the existence of the parallelism of laws 
due to the parallelism of treaty. See Congo v Uganda, supra n 389, at pp 242 - 243, paras 215 – 216. 
391 Congo v. Uganda, supra n 389, at p 245, para220. 
392 Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction between Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, supra n 96, at p 163. 
393  ICTY, Prosecutor v. Dragoljub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac and Zoran Vukovic (Judgment of 22 
February 2001) (Case No.: IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1T) at p 158, para 467 (hereinafter: ‘Kunarac’ case) 
<http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf> accessed 12 August 2011.  
394 Kunarac case, supra n 393, at p 158, para 467. See also Orakhelashvili, ‘The Interaction between 
Human Rights and Humanitarian Law’, supra n 96, at p 182.  
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2.2.3 Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms (MSENs) 
The fragmentation of international law produced a growing amount of normative 
equivalence between rules in different fields of international law, leading to the creation 
of what has been known as parallel or equivalent international norms that ‘point in the 
same direction’.395 Equivalent norms that point in the same direction must necessarily 
be considered relevant within the purview of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention in the interpretation of a treaty provision. 
The background for the discussion of MSENs is the phenomenon of increased legal 
pluralism that promotes cross-fertilisation of legal concepts fed by two competing 
forces in pluralism, one towards differentiation and the other towards harmonisation.
396
  
The broad definition adopted for MSENs represents the nucleus of equivalence amongst 
these multi-sourced norms. This definition allows the study group to tease out the 
conflicting aspects through specific lenses, in order to determine whether there exists a 
unifying characteristic that cuts across the specific normative systems from which these 
MSENs are derived.
397
  
The Proceeding on the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the 
North-East Atlantic (OSPAR),
398
 which forms part of the MOX Plant dispute, is useful 
as a case study for the identification of the existence of the relevant MSENS relating to 
                                               
395 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 52, para 93. Broude and Shany, ‘The International Law and 
Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’, supra n 99, at pp 4-5.  
396  Maduro, ‘Foreword’, supra n 98, at p viii. The study group funded by the Davis Institute for 
International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem took up this research project to explore 
situations where distinct international legal rules direct similar or identical behaviour, where MSENs 
were defined as: ‘Two or more norms which are (1) binding upon the same international legal subjects; (2) 
similar or identical in their normative content; and (3) have been established through different 
international instruments or ‘legislative’ procedures or are applicable in different substantive areas of the 
law’. Broude and Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’, supra n 
99, at p 5. The result of the research is presented in Broude and Shany, Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms 
in International Law, supra n 98. 
397 Broude and Shany, ‘The International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’, supra n 
99, at pp 4 – 7.  The conflictual qualities of norms deemed equivalent are explored through the lens of the 
various legal sources that give rise to their normative parallelism, which are influenced by the different 
underlying principles and rules depending on their different institutional framework laid out by the 
various specific normative regimes. Examples of these MSENs are - the obligation to prevent 
transboundary pollution; the legal defence of necessity; the general laws of state responsibility; the 
prohibition of the use of force and the self-defence exception thereto; national treatment obligations that 
might overlap with non-discrimination norms applicable to foreign labourers under human rights law and 
certain provisions of international investment law; and the prohibition of torture. Broude and Shany, ‘The 
International Law and Policy of Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms’, supra n 99, at pp 5 – 6. 
398 OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118.    
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the right of access to environmental information.
399
 The OSPAR Convention, the 
EURATOM, the EC Directives, and the Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters 
(Aarhus Convention) formed the relevant MSENs that provided the analytical 
framework for the right to access to information in this case study.
400
  
These instruments were viewed as relevant to the Proceeding because from the facts of 
the case, it was apparent that the basis of Ireland’s claim of the right to access to 
information could be found in the instruments as mentioned above. Although the right 
to access to information, as provided under these various instruments, are all binding on 
the United Kingdom and Ireland, albeit to varying degrees, they were deemed 
equivalent for the purpose of the study of MSENs only because their normative content 
met the specified criteria for the qualification of these norms as MSENs. The right to 
access information as provided under the various sources, with subtle differences, all 
pointed towards a right to access to the economic information relevant to the protection 
of the environment, which meets the criteria for a MSEN case study (original 
emphasis).
401
 
The study on MSENs gave a contemporaneous interpretation of ‘relevant’ in Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, defining the criteria for 
the qualification of norms as multi-sourced but equivalent. In this instance, apart from 
having identical or similar facts as a basis for relevance, ‘relevant’ rules could also be 
rules that are multi-sourced and equivalent; in other words, rules that have similar or 
identical normative content, or at least point in the same direction.
402
  
In general, there are various approaches employed by interpreters, especially judges and 
scholars, which enrich the jurisprudence on the interpretation of ‘relevant’. The analysis 
explores how judicial decisions, the doctrine of in pari materia, the phenomenon of 
normative and treaty parallelism, and the recent study on multi-sourced equivalent 
norms, inform the process of identification of relevant rules for the purpose of 
interpretation as provided under Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
                                               
399 Nikolaos Lavranos, ‘The OSPAR Convention, the Aarhus Convention and EC Law: Normative and 
Institutional Fragmentation on the Right of Access to Environmental Information’, pp 143 – 169 in 
Broude and Shany, Multi-Sourced Equivalent Norms in International Law, supra n 98.  
400
 Lavranos, ‘Right of Access to Environmental Information’, supra n 399, at p 148.  
401 Lavranos, ‘Right of Access to Environmental Information’, supra n 399, at p 158.  
402 Lavranos, ‘Right of Access to Environmental Information’, supra n 399, at p 148. 
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 ‘Relevant’ rules include rules that address the same facts, similar facts or concerning 
the subject matter of the terminology of the treaty at issue. Rules that are related to the 
same person or thing, or to the same class of persons or things, or contemporaneous 
rules of a similar nature, can be considered “relevant”. In addition to that, multi-sourced 
rules that have similar or identical normative content pointing in the same direction are 
considered as ‘relevant’ for the purpose of this research.    
There is a general scientific consensus that minimal interference with/in the natural state 
of the environment is the best approach in the maintenance of the integrity of an 
ecosystem.
403
 The aim of the present research is to seek integration of rules that are 
relevant to the preservation of freshwater ecosystems via the interpretative framework 
provided under Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
The subsequent section of this chapter will seek to identify relevant rules through the 
assessment criteria established for the interpretation of ‘relevant’ for an interpretation of 
the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses, provided under 
Article 20 against its normative system. 
2.3 Relevant as Informed by the Ecosystem Approach 
The emergence of the ecosystem approach in international water law is evident in the 
explicit recognition of ‘ecosystems’ in Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, 
and in light of the overall context of the protection, preservation and management of the 
international watercourses undertaken in the Convention. This approach is further 
supported by the advancement in scientific and technological knowledge and know-
how,
404
 and the expansive interpretation of ‘international watercourses’ adopted by 
eminent scholars in the field.
405
 
                                               
403  This approach has been reflected in the obligations stipulated under multilateral environmental 
agreements (MEAs) that are instituted in response to the need for a holistic system of ecosystem 
governance and management, including the use of their services and the regulation of human activities 
that have impact on ecosystems. W Bradnee Chambers et al., ‘Typology of Responses’, in Kanchan 
Chopra et al., eds., Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Policy Responses, (Volume 3 - Findings of the 
Responses Working Group of the MA, Island Press, Washington, 2005) 
<http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.307.aspx.pdf> accessed 13 September 2011, at p 41. 
404 Scientific evidence was heavily relied on in Schwebel’s 3rd Report, supra n 4. A careful reading of the 
Commentary to the Convention seems to indicate that the careful choice of the Commission in adopting 
the specific terminology of ‘ecosystem’ does not seem to confine the potential scope of the obligation 
stated in Art 20. The Commission adopted the general definition of ecosystem – believed to have a more 
precise scientific and legal meaning, which is: ‘an ecological unit consisting of living and non-living 
components that are interdependent and function as a community’. See 1994 Draft Articles and 
Commentaries, supra n 44, at p 118 para 2. The Commission further elaborated, at p 118 para 2 that ‘… 
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The 1997 Watercourses Convention imposes firstly that ‘watercourse States shall, 
individually, protect and preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses’ (own 
emphasis).
406
 Only then, and where appropriate shall these watercourse States 
‘jointly … preserve’ these ecosystems.407 
Environmental instruments that cater to the protection of watercourse ecosystems are 
already in existence even though they do not address international watercourses per 
se.
408
 In the analysis of the obligation to preserve freshwater ecosystems of international 
watercourses, all relevant rules applicable to the interpretation of this obligation have to 
be taken into account.  
                                                                                                                                         
where in the ecosystem, everything depends on everything else and nothing is really wasted … Thus, an 
external impact affecting one component of an ecosystem causes reactions among other components and 
may disturb the equilibrium of the entire ecosystem’. The interdependencies, the interrelations, and the 
interactions within the ecosystem inherent and intrinsic to the term ‘ecosystem’, explicated and clarified 
by the definition attached to this terminology as adopted by the Commission appear to belie the intention 
of the Commission to apply an overly restrictive interpretation that negates the land-water nexus. 
405 Korhonen lamented the shortcoming of the ILC where land and water is treated as separate entity 
where the definition of watercourse ‘relies solely on the aquatic element without addressing the 
interdependencies that riverine systems have with the terrestrial environment’. Korhonen, ‘Riverine 
Ecosystems in International Law’, supra n 79, at p 482. The author adopted the definition for ‘riverine 
ecosystem’ to include the entire river network, including tributaries, side channels, sloughs, intermittent 
streams. However, a broad understanding to the term of ‘ecosystems’ would invariably include ‘not only 
the flora and fauna in and immediately adjacent to a watercourse, but also the natural features within its 
catchment that have an influence on, or whose degradation could influent, the watercourse’. See 
McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, supra n 79, at p 459. This sentiment resonated with 
the view held by Tanzi and Arcari where they pointed out that: ‘… since the concept of ecosystem 
encompasses a dynamic interrelationship between flora, fauna and the geographical elements which 
sustain them, inclusive of land areas, one cannot discard a priori the territorial implications of this 
concept in relation to the duty of protection of international watercourses … [I]f the reach of an 
ecosystem is to be assessed in relation to the physical reactions among its components which are caused 
by an external factor, it is inevitable that the scope of the ecosystem is to cover also those land areas 
whose use may affect a watercourse, more or less directly’. See Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations 
Convention on the Law of International Watercourses: A Framework for Sharing, supra n 48, at pp 240 – 
241. Sohn eloquently asserted that the attempt of the Commission to exclude territorial implication in a 
restrictive interpretation of the term ‘ecosystem’ to confine only to areas that are water-covered is 
imprudent and should be avoided where he stated that: ‘It is important, however, to consider also the 
adjoining land area, regardless of some purists who would like to confine the idea of watercourse 
ecosystems to water-covered areas … Water provides life-support not only to flora and fauna living in the 
water but also to all on land who need it for drinking or for industries on which the livelihood of many 
depends. In turn, the ecosystems of the watercourses are affected by activities on land, not only in the 
immediate vicinity but often far away from the river valleys and neighbouring mountain ranges.’ Louis B 
Sohn, ‘Commentary. Articles 20-25 and 29’ (1992) 3 Colorado Journal of International Environmental 
Law and Policy 215 – 223, at p 216. 
406 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Art 20. 
407 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Art 20. 
408 McCaffrey, The Law of International Watercourses, supra n supra n 79, at p 393. Other treaty regimes 
that directly and indirectly affect freshwater ecosystem are identified in The Implementation of 
Multilateral environment Agreements for Efficient Water Management, a paper prepared by The 
Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD), April 2005 (on file with 
author).                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
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The adoption of the term ‘preservation’ by the Commission reflected the intention of the 
Commission to impose an obligation to keep the pristine state of the environment.
409
 
This is supported further by Schwebel’s statement in his Third Special Rapporteur 
Report that the preservation entails the creation and management of national or 
international parks where the wildlife and scenery are ‘removed from the operation of 
ordinary legislation and are reserved, under special regimes, for controlled, limited use 
as preserves’. 410  The employment of the term ‘ecosystems’ in the protection, 
preservation and management of international watercourses
411
 under the 1997 
Watercourses Convention indicates the recognition of the watercourse states of the 
concept of ecosystems and the application of the ecosystem approach in the 
ascertainment of the standard of protection and preservation imposed under Article 20. 
Relevant rules must be within cognate areas of the ‘ecosystems of international 
watercourses’, which touches on the watercourses’ states’ obligation to ‘preserve’. Thus, 
a preliminary identification of relevant rules includes rules that impinge on the states’ 
obligations to preserve freshwater ecosystems.
412
 MEAs that may possibly fit the 
interpretation of ‘relevant’ are found in the biodiversity conservation cluster. Due to the 
limitation of a three-year research, the two most robust conventions from the 
biodiversity cluster, namely the Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity Convention 
are selected for analysis.
413
   
                                               
409 1994 Draft Articles with Commentaries, para3, p 119. 
410 Schwebel’s 3rd Report, , supra n 4, at p 190, para 518. 
411 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, Preamble and Chapter IV.  
412 A recent AB decision in the World Trade Organisation demonstrated the level of detail necessary for 
an external rule of international law to be considered relevant for the purpose of interpretation under Art 
31(3)(c). EC – Aircraft, supra n 288. The AB, at p 363, para 847, observed that the subject matter of the 
external rules has to be closely related to the issues germane to the dispute, namely measures taken by the 
European Communities in the area of civil aircraft. Furthermore, at pp 363 – 367, paras 847 – 853, it must 
also be relevant to the ascertainment of the interpretation of ‘benefit’ provided in Art 1.1(b) of the SCM 
Agreement or relevant as part of a fact that establishes the relevant market benchmark for the 
determination of ‘benefit’. 
413  The biodiversity-related conventions and treaties includes Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12; 
CITES, supra n 199 supra n 199; CMS; International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and 
Agriculture (FAO Conference at Its Thirty-first Session) (concluded 3 November 2001, entered into force 
29 June 2004) Registered with the UN on 13 December 2006, I-43345 
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/011/i0510e/i0510e.pdf> accessed 15 November 2012; Ramsar Convention, 
supra n 13; and the World Heritage Convention, supra n 199. UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring 
Centre, ‘Promoting Synergies within the Cluster of Biodiversity-related Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements Summary Report’ (April 2012) <http://www.unep-
wcmc.org/medialibrary/2012/04/27/ff1a00f0/MEA_synergies_summary_for_web_cover_27April2012.pd
f> accessed 27 September 2012. See UNEP-World Conservation Monitoring Centre, ‘Report by UNEP-
WCMC on “Promoting Synergies within the Cluster of Biodiversity-related Multilateral Environmental 
Agreements’ (2012) <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/report-by-unep-wcmc-on-promoting-synergies-within-
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Both conventions can be said to be ‘grappling with the same type of problem’, which is 
the protection of ecosystems, including the designation of an area that is pristine and 
near natural for protection, albeit from the different perspectives of wetlands and 
biodiversity. These conventions presented themselves as appropriate candidates for the 
identification of rules within these treaty instruments that are relevant for the 
interpretation of the obligation to preserve under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention.  
2.3.1 The 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
The Ramsar Convention is an intergovernmental treaty concluded for the maintenance 
of the ecological functions of wetlands, as regulators of water regimes and as habitats 
supporting a characteristic flora and fauna, especially waterfowl.
414
 Despite not being 
affiliated with other MEAs under the United Nations system, it works closely with other 
treaties and agreements under the biodiversity-cluster.
415
 
The recognition of the ecosystem is explicit in the definition of ‘wise use’, which is the 
central philosophy of the Ramsar Convention.
416
 Subsequent development in field of 
international environmental law, such as the introduction of the concepts of ‘sustainable 
development’, 417  ‘ecosystems’, ‘ecosystem approach’ and ‘ecosystems services’ 418 
prompted a revision of the definition.
 419
  
                                                                                                                                         
the-cluster-of-biodiversity-related-multilateral-environmental-agreements_866.html> accessed 27 
September 2012. See also Chidi Oguamanam, ‘Biological Diversity’, supra n 341, at p 218; and supra n 
199. 
414 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, supra n 112, at p 666.  
415  See Ramsar Secretariat, ‘About the Ramsar Convention’ <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-
about-about-ramsar/main/ramsar/1-36%5E7687_4000_0__> accessed 13 September 2011. 
416  A definition of ‘wise use’ was first adopted by Contracting Parties at COP 3 in 1987, Ramsar 
Convention, ‘Recommendation 3.3: Wise Use of Wetlands’ (3rd Meeting of the Conference of the 
Contracting Parties, Regina, Canada 27 May – 5 June 1987) 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/rec/key_rec_3.03e.pdf> accessed 15 November 2012. The principles of 
‘wise use’ and the maintenance of ‘ecological character’ of wetlands lie at the very heart of the Ramsar 
Convention. Maintaining the ecological character of wetlands designated as Wetlands of International 
Importance (Ramsar sites) and securing, as far as possible, the wise use of the wetlands in their territory, 
is recognized in the text of the Convention adopted in 1971 as amongst the key outcomes of the 
implementation of the Convention by its Contracting Parties. Recommendation 3.3 defined ‘wise use’ as 
‘the maintenance of their ecological character, achieved through the implementation of ecosystem 
approaches, within the context of sustainable development’ (Definition updated in Resolution IX.1, 
Annex A, 2005). See Ramsar Convention Secretariat, The Ramsar Convention Manual: A Guide to the 
Convention on Wetlands (6th edn, Ramsar Convention Secretariat, Gland, Switzerland, 2013) at p 102 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/lib/manual6-2013-e.pdf> accessed 17 February 2013. 
417  Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future, 
transmitted to the General Assembly as an Annex to document A/42/427 – Development and 
International Co-operation: Environment <http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm> accessed 13 
September 2011. 
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The important components of the ‘wise use’ concept are amended in light of subsequent 
development in the field of environmental governance at the international level. The 
amendment takes into account the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment’s (MA) 
terminology,
420
 the concepts of the ecosystem approach and sustainable use applied by 
the Biodiversity Convention,
421
 and the definition of sustainable development adopted 
by the 1987 Brundtland Commission. The ‘wise use’ concept is amended, in reflection 
of such developments, to ‘the  maintenance of their ecological character, achieved 
                                                                                                                                         
418 MA, ‘Guide to the Millennium Assessment Reports’ (2005) <http://www.maweb.org/en/index.aspx> 
accessed 13 September 2011. 
419 Foreword, Ramsar Convention Secretariat, Ramsar Handbooks for the Wise Use of Wetlands (3rd edn, 
Ramsar Convention Secretariat, Gland, Switzerland, 2007) at p 4 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/lib/lib_handbooks2006_e01.pdf> accessed 12 May 2011. An updated 
definition adopted for “ecological character” in view of the terminologies adopted in Biodiversity 
Convention and MA is ‘the combination of the ecosystem components, processes and benefits/services 
that characterise the wetland at a given point in time’. Consistent with the updated definition of 
‘ecological character’, the updated definition of ‘change in ecological character of wetlands’, for the 
purposes of implementation of Art 3.2, is: ‘the human-induced adverse alteration of any ecosystem 
component, process, and/or ecosystem benefit/service’. 
420  Within the MA terminology, ‘ecosystems’ are described as the complex of living communities 
(including human communities) and non-living environment (ecosystem components) interacting 
(through ecological Process) as a functional unit which provides inter alia a variety of benefits to people 
(ecosystem services). In the context of the Ramsar Convention, ecosystem services refer to products, 
functions and attributes as defined in Resolution VI.1 and expanded to include both material and non-
material cultural values, benefits and functions as outlined in COP 8 DOC.15 ‘cultural aspects of 
wetlands’, Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution IX.1 Annex A. A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of 
Wetlands and the Maintenance of Their Ecological Character’, infra n 422. For further information, see 
Synthesis Report prepared by the MA for the Ramsar Convention, CM Finlayson, R D’Cruz, NC 
Davidson, Wetlands and Water: Ecosystem Services and Human Well-Being (World Resources Institute, 
Washington DC, 2005). Under the MA framework, ‘wise use’ equates to the maintenance of ecosystem 
benefits/services to ensure long term maintenance of biodiversity as well as human well-being and 
poverty alleviation. 
421 ‘Ecosystem approach’ is defined in CBD, Decision V/6, supra n 298, as ‘a strategy for the integrated 
management of land, water and living resources that promotes conservation and sustainable use in an 
equitable way. The ecosystem approach is based on the application of appropriate scientific 
methodologies focused on levels of biological organisation, which encompass the essential structure, 
processes, functions and interactions among organisms and their environment. It recognises that humans, 
with their cultural diversity, are an integral component of many ecosystems’. This focus on structure, 
processes, functions and interactions within the ecosystem as a functional unit, without any specification 
of any particular spatial unit or scale, is consistent with the definition of ‘ecosystem’ provided in Art 2 of 
Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12. It is interesting to note the flexibility of the application of the 
ecosystem approach. Decision V/6 stated that: ‘the ecosystem approach does not preclude other 
management and conservation approaches, such as biosphere reserves, protected areas, and single-species 
conservation programmes, as well as other approaches carried out under existing national policy and 
legislative frameworks, but could, rather, integrate all these approaches and other methodologies to deal 
with complex situations. There is no single way to implement the ecosystem approach, as it depends on 
local, provincial, national, regional or global conditions. Indeed, there are many ways in which ecosystem 
approaches may be used as the framework for delivering the objectives of the Convention (CBD) in 
practice’.   
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through the implementation of ecosystem approaches, within the context of sustainable 
development’.422   
The obligation to preserve is explicit in the Ramsar Convention. Article 2.1 provides for 
the designation of wetlands for inclusion in the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance.
423
 This reinforces the obligation to conserve wetlands situated within the 
territory of the Contracting Parties, especially concerning designated wetlands of 
international importance.  
The obligation to conserve wetlands is not limited to the designation of Listed sites. 
Article 4 stipulates that the promotion of the conservation of wetlands and waterfowl 
shall be undertaken through the establishment of nature reserves on wetlands, regardless 
of whether these wetlands are to be included in the List.
424
 The obligation to conserve 
wetlands are treated as an obligation of conduct, whereby the removal of conservation 
sites entails compensation in the form of the creation of additional natural reserves for 
waterfowl and for the protection of an adequate portion of the original habitat.
425
  
The adoption of an ecosystem approach is explicit in the Ramsar Convention where 
wetlands have been acknowledged as an ecosystem under the Ramsar Convention.
426
 
                                               
422  Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution IX.1 Annex A. A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of 
Wetlands and the Maintenance of Their Ecological Character’ (9th Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) Kampala, Uganda, 8 – 15 November 2005) 
<http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-resol-resolution-ix-1-annex-a/main/ramsar/1-31-
107%5E23536_4000_0__> accessed 14 November 2012. At paras 23 – 24, it is agreed that within the 
context of ecosystem approaches, planning processes for the promotion of wetland ecosystem 
benefits/services delivery should be formulated and implemented in the view of the maintenance or 
enhancement (as appropriate), of wetland ecological character at appropriate spatial and temporal scales, 
in order to attain sustainable development. The phrase ‘in the context of sustainable development’ as 
stated in the updated definition of ‘wise use’ is intended to qualify that – although it is ‘recognised that 
whilst some wetland development is inevitable and that many developments have important benefits to 
society, developments can be facilitated in sustainable ways by approaches elaborated under the 
Convention, and it is not appropriate to imply that “development” is an objective for every wetland’.  
423 Ramsar Convention, supra n 13, Art 2.1, 2.6, and 3.1. 
424 Ramsar Convention, supra n 13, Art 4.1.  
425 Ramsar Convention, supra n 13, Art 4.2 provides that in the event of ‘urgent national interest’ that the 
Listed wetlands are to be deleted or to have their boundaries restricted, the Contracting Party should 
endeavour to compensate for any loss of wetland resources. Compensation should be in the form of 
creating additional natural reserves for waterfowl and for the protection of an adequate portion of the 
original habitat in either the same area or elsewhere. 
426 The vision for the List of Wetlands of International Importance amended by Resolution IX.1 Annex B, 
2005 had explicitly recognised that the development and maintenance of an international network of 
wetlands for the conservation of global biodiversity and human life sustenance are undertaken through the 
maintenance of their (ie, the wetlands’) ecosystem components, processes and benefits/services. Ramsar 
Convention, ‘Strategic Framework and Guidelines for the Future Development of the List of Wetlands of 
International Importance of the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971)’ (3rd edn, as adopted by 
Resolution VII.11 (COP 7, 1999) and has been amended by Resolutions VII.13 (1999), VIII.11 and 
VIII.33 (COP8, 2002), IX.1 Annexes A and B (COP 9, 2005), and X.20 (COP10, 2008) 2009) at p 2, para 
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The description of wetlands that requires submission of information on ecological 
processes and services provision reflects the application of the ecosystem approach, as 
reiterated subsequently in the 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines that stressed 
the importance of wetlands ‘as rich centres of biological diversity and productivity and 
as life support systems for human populations’.427 
The Ramsar Convention, further refined in the most recent Strategic Framework and 
Guidelines for the implementation of the twin pillars of the Convention, i.e., 
conservation and wise use of wetlands, expressly recognises the transboundary nature of 
wetland ecosystems. The 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines gave a broad 
definition to ‘wetland’ for an application on a biogeographic region. 428  The 
biogeographic regionalisation of the application of the Ramsar Convention, especially 
in the determination of the regions through scientifically rigorous biological and 
physical parameters, will entail a transboundary management of biogeographic regions 
that requires collaboration between countries of the determined biogeographic region.
429
 
Despite the different perspective of freshwater ecosystems adopted in the Ramsar 
Convention (wetlands) and the 1997 Watercourses Convention (watercourses), the 
obligation to conserve wetlands of international importance under Articles 2.1 and 4.1 
of the Ramsar Convention addresses the protection of freshwater ecosystems through 
designation of reserved sites for protection that maintains the natural condition of the 
site.  
The designation of wetland nature reserves based on the ecological character, 
functioning and ecosystem services provided by the reserves within a biogeographic 
                                                                                                                                         
6 <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/key_guide_list2009_e.pdf> accessed 23 July 2012 (hereinafter: ‘2009 
Strategic Framework and Guidelines’). Most notably is the requirement to descript the general ecological 
features of the wetlands under the Guidance on information to provide in each numbered section of the 
Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS) section, where Contracting Parties are required to provide a 
description of ‘the wetland ecosystem with its main habitats, wetland and vegetation types, describing any 
zonation, seasonal variations, and long-term changes.’ See ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for 
Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, at pp 50 – 63, in ‘Appendix A. 
Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands’, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and 
Guidelines’, at p 58, para 20. Information provided should include a brief description of – ‘ecological 
processes which maintain the wetland and the ecosystem services that characterise the wetland and the 
benefits derived from these services; [and] a brief not on habitats and vegetation types in adjacent areas, 
and more importantly, information on specific food chains’. See also ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines 
for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, p 58, para 20. 
427 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 5, para 21. 
428
 ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, 
Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 7, para 31. 
429 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 7, para 32. 
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region required under Articles 2.1 and 4.1, render the two provisions in pari materia 
with and equivalent to Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. These 
provisions are parallel in the sense that both impinge on the subject matter of the 
individual obligation of state parties on the ‘preservation’ of ‘international or 
transboundary freshwater ecosystems’, especially the character, functioning and 
services provided within a biogeographic region in light of the ecosystem approach.  
An assessment of both obligations against the criteria for the ascertainment of rules that 
are ‘relevant’ confirmed the relevance of Articles 2.1 and 4.1 in the interpretation of the 
obligation to preserve freshwater ecosystem of international watercourses under Article 
20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention.  
2.3.2 The 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
The Convention on Biological Diversity entered into force on 29 December 1993 after 
the 30
th
 ratification.
430
 Unlike other treaties, the Biodiversity Convention placed the 
main decision-making at the national level where provisions are mostly expressed as 
overall goals and policies rather than precise binding rules.
431
 The adoption and the 
subsequent coming into force of this Convention reflect the recognition of the need
432
 
for an international instrument for the institutionalisation
433
 of effort in the conservation, 
and sustainable, fair and equitable use, of biodiversity and its components. The intrinsic 
value and the importance of biodiversity, gradually recognised as a common concern of 
                                               
430 CBD Secretariat, ‘History of the Convention’ <http://www.cbd.int/history/> accessed 12 September 
2011. The Convention evinced a major breakthrough in the area of biodiversity conservation, while 
ensuring the sustainable use of biological components and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits 
arising from the use of genetic resources. The scope of the Convention encompasses diverse issues such 
as access to technology, including biotechnology that goes beyond conservation of biological diversity 
per se. See Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 112, at p 612. 
431  Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Art 6. It emphasises the common but differentiated 
responsibilities that differentiate between capabilities of developed and developing country. See Lyle 
Glowka, Françoise Burhenne-Guilmin, Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity 
(IUCN, Gland and Cambridge, 1994) at p 4. 
432  The concern on the dire state of biodiversity was raised in the Preamble of the Biodiversity 
Convention, supra n 12, using terminologies such as ‘Concerned that biological diversity is being 
significantly reduced by certain human activities …’; and ‘Noting also that where there is a threat of 
significant reduction or loss of biological diversity …’. 
433 Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Preamble. It states, inter alia, that: ‘Stressing the importance of, 
and the need to promote international, regional and global cooperation among States and 
intergovernmental organisations and the non-governmental sector for the conservation of biological 
diversity and the sustainable use of its components’ whereby having an institution for a biodiversity 
conservation and use believed to promote such cooperation. Apart from that, the objective as stated in the 
Preamble, for the ‘provision of new and additional financial resources and appropriate access to relevant 
technologies’ and the ‘substantial investments required to conserve biological diversity’ will be better 
achieved with the establishment of a governance architecture.     
94 
 
humankind for the evolution and the maintenance of life sustaining systems of the 
biosphere - are highlighted in the Preamble of the Convention.
434
  
The Biodiversity Convention has three objectives. It aims to conserve biological 
diversity, the sustainable use of its components and the fair and equitable sharing of the 
benefits arising out of the utilisation of genetic resources,
435
 and for the benefit of 
present and future generations.
436
 Biological diversity is defined in Article 2 to mean the 
variability among living organisms from all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, 
marine and other aquatic ecosystems and the ecological complexes of which they are 
part: this includes diversity within species, between species and of ecosystems. 
Biodiversity Convention reinforced and reaffirmed the legal status of the conservation 
of biodiversity as a common concern of mankind, although the Preamble of the 
Convention conceded an anthropocentric approach to such concern by stating that the 
intrinsic value of biodiversity lies in its critical importance in meeting food, health and 
other needs of the growing world population.
437
  
Even so, the attention drawn to the importance of the conservation of biodiversity will 
necessarily lead to the conservation of ecosystems. The all-encompassing definition of 
biodiversity indeed covers, and necessarily has an impact on, all ecosystems, including 
the ecosystem of freshwater. Article 8 obligations are framed in policy-oriented goals 
concerning effective on-site conservation of biodiversity, that Parties may act on in line 
with their own policies and internal laws.
438
  
The Biodiversity  Convention reflects the need for Contracting Parties to conserve the 
natural state of the environment, in order to ensure the integrity of the ecosystem 
                                               
434 Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Preamble, at paras 1 and 2. 
435 Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Art 1. It is reaffirmed in CBD, ‘Decision II/8. Preliminary 
Consideration of Components of Biological Diversity Particularly Under Threat and Action which could 
be Taken under the Convention’ (Second Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Jakarta, Indonesia, 6 – 17 November 1995) UN Doc 
UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19, at p 12, para 1 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-02/full/cop-02-dec-en.pdf> 
accessed 23 March 2011. It states: ‘The conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity and its 
components should be addressed in a holistic manner, taking into account the three levels of biological 
diversity and fully considering socio-economic and cultural factors. However, the ecosystem approach 
should be the primary framework of action to be taken under the Convention’.  
436 The Preamble of the Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, states that the Contracting Parties are: 
“Determined to conserve and sustainably use biological diversity for the benefit of present and future 
generations”. 
437
 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 112, at pp 618 - 619. 
438 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin, and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
supra n 431, at p 1. 
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through the conservation of biodiversity. According to Article 8, the Contracting Parties 
shall, as far as possible and as appropriate: 
(a) Establish a system of protected areas or areas where special measures need to be 
taken to conserve biological diversity; and 
(d) Promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of 
viable populations of species in natural surroundings. 
The emphasis on a ‘system of protected areas’ implies the intention of the Contracting 
Parties to designate these protected areas in a logical way to form a network.
439
 The 
subsequent paragraphs are laid out under Article 8(b) – (l) for the operationalisation of 
the system of protected areas for the conservation of biodiversity.
440
 In-situ 
conservation of biodiversity involves a firm legal base where the Contracting Parties are 
required to develop guidelines for the selection, establishment and management of the 
protected areas.
441
 The tension between conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity 
and its components is addressed in Article 8(i).
442
 The conditions for a compromise over 
present uses and conservation are left to be determined by the Contracting Party.  
In drawing out the relevance of the obligation to conserve biodiversity in-situ as 
provided under the Biodiversity Convention, the definition given to ‘conservation’ is of 
particular interest. According to the references to various treaties on the use of 
‘conservation’, it is found that the concept of ‘conservation’ includes both the ‘“classic” 
elements of protection and preservation, including restoration, and the safeguarding of 
ecological processes and genetic diversity beside management of natural resources, in 
order to ensure their maintenance by sustainable utilisation’.443  
The ordinary meaning of ‘conservation’, or ‘to conserve’, used prevalently in 
international environmental law indicates a higher standard of care compared to the 
                                               
439 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin, and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
supra n 431, at p 39. 
440 Art 8(b) – (l), the Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12. 
441 Article 8(b) of the Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12. 
442 Article 8(i) of the Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12. It provides that: ‘Each Contracting Party shall, 
as far as possible and as appropriate … [e]ndeavour to provide the conditions needed for compatibility 
between present uses and the conservation of biological diversity and the sustainable use of its 
components’. 
443  Pieter van Heijnsbergen, International Legal Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora (IOS Press, 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands, 1997), at pp 45 – 52, at pp 51 – 52. 
96 
 
term ‘protection’.444 However, it is noteworthy that ‘conservation’ is consistently used 
in distinction with the phrase ‘sustainable use’, which highlights that the Biodiversity 
Convention intends to differentiate ‘conserve’ with  ‘use’, and hence, emphasises the 
protectionist objectives. 
Article 8(a) and (d) provides for the conservation of biodiversity-rich areas in their 
natural state to the extent possible, where establishment of a system of protected areas 
of national parks, nature reserves, wilderness areas and heritage sites are stipulated.
445
 
This approach reflects the initial methodology in the implementation of the ecosystem 
approach in the 1930s.
446
  
The in-situ conservation of freshwater ecosystems is specifically developed in the 
inland water biodiversity programme of work pursuant to the recommendation of the 
Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA).
447  
It is 
pertinent to note that the definition of ‘inland water ecosystems’ under the Biodiversity 
                                               
444 Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 112, at p 589. Quoting 
the author, the ordinary meaning of ‘conservation’ includes ‘to keep in safety or from harm, decay or loss; 
to preserve in being; to keep alive’ or now, more usually, ‘to preserve in its existing state from destruction 
or change’, or from ‘destructive influences, decay or waste’ or ‘in being and health’.  
445 Glowka, Burhenne-Guilmin, and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 
supra n 431, at p 39.   
446 See Shelford, ‘The Preservation of Natural Biotic Communities’, supra n 305.  
447 ‘Annex. Programme of Work on Protected Areas’, at p 6, to CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas 
(Articles 8(a) to (e))’ (Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, Kuala Lumpur, 9 – 20 and 27 February 2004) UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/28 (13 April 2004) 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-07/cop-07-dec-28-en.pdf> accessed 31 July 2012. ‘Inland waters’ 
are defined as aquatic-influenced environments located within land boundaries, including those located in 
coastal areas, adjacent to marine environment. Inland water systems can be fresh, saline or a mix of the 
two (brackish water). Coastal aquatic habitats are considered as the lower sections of river basins, while 
estuaries are considered transitional zones between rivers and the sea although in practice, inland waters 
tend to focus on freshwater. Inland waters include lakes, rivers, ponds, streams, groundwater, springs, 
cave waters, floodplains, as well as bogs, marshes and swamps traditionally grouped as inland wetlands 
The adoption of the definition of wetlands of the Ramsar Convention under the aegis of the CBD 
encompasses all possible kinds of inland water body or ecosystem or components thereof, including 
groundwater. See CBD, ‘Inland Waters Biodiversity – What is It?’ (undated) 
<http://www.cbd.int/waters/inland-waters/> accessed 31 July 2012. CBD, ‘Inland Waters Biodiversity – 
Background’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/waters/background/> accessed 31 July 2012. 
Recommendation III/1 recognised the importance of inland water ecosystems for global biodiversity and 
human welfare and their vulnerability to human actions; and proposed to the COP a work plan developed 
for the SBSTTA be developed in cooperation with relevant organisations that builds on the ongoing 
efforts in inland water ecosystem conservation. See ‘Recommendation III/1’ in CBD-SBSTTA, at p 30, in 
CBD, ‘Annex 1. Recommendations of the SBSTTA at Its Third Meeting’ (Third Meeting of the SBTTA, 
1 – 5 September 1997, Montreal, Canada) UNEP/CBD/COP/4/2 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/recommendations/sbstta-03/full/sbstta-03-rec-en.pdf>  accessed 31 July 2012. 
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Convention includes land that is influenced directly by inland aquatic habitats,
448
 which 
makes explicit the adoption of an ecosystem approach.
449
  
The Programme of Work recognises the need for Parties to implement the programme 
of work on protected areas in the context of their nationally determined priorities, 
capacities and needs, while at the same time, expressly including transboundary inland 
waters, and seeks transboundary cooperation for the sustainable management of these 
inland waters through the appropriate mechanisms.
450
  
The obligation imposed onto the state contracting parties of the Biodiversity Convention 
through Article 8(a) and (d) to conserve biodiversity under the Biodiversity Convention, 
via the establishment of a network of protected areas on (transboundary) inland waters, 
is relevant to the interpretation of the obligation to preserve freshwater ecosystems 
stipulated under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. Article 8(a) and (d) 
stipulates the individual obligation of state contracting parties to designate areas of 
protection, whereby ecosystems are conserved to maintain their near-natural conditions, 
in accordance with the ecosystem approach. Although the Biodiversity Convention does 
not specifically mention international watercourses, transboundary river basins are 
within the definition of transboundary inland water ecosystems, the conservation of 
which is specifically developed in the Programme of Work on Inland Water 
Biodiversity.  
From the preceding, it is affirmed that Article 8(a) and (d) is relevant for the 
interpretation of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses 
                                               
448 CBD, ‘Inland Waters Biodiversity – What is It?’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/waters/inland-waters/> 
accessed 31 July 2012. It is emphasised that ‘from the ecological hydrological, environmental and socio-
economic perspective, all land is an integral part of an inland water ecosystem because fresh water 
(usually from rain) runs off it into rivers, lakes and wetlands. For example, the vegetation near water 
bodies (in the riparian zone), even if never submerged, is influenced greatly by proximity to water. The 
clearest example of land-water interactions is with seasonally flooded areas, eg, river floodplains, which 
may be dry or submerged depending on flood conditions. Inland water ecosystems are ecologically 
dynamic. They are not amenable to artificial conceptual boundaries. They are best considered from the 
landscape or ecosystem perspective’. 
449 CBD, ‘Decision VII/11 Ecosystem Approach’ (Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity, Kuala Lumpur, 9 – 20 and 27 February 2004) 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/VII/11 (13 April 2004) at p 1, para 2 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-
07/cop-07-dec-11-en.pdf> accessed 31 July 2012.  
450 CBD, ‘Decision IV/4 Status and Trends of the Biological Diversity of Inland Water Ecosystems and 
Options for Conservation and Sustainable Use’ (Fourth Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 4 – 15 May 1998, Bratislava, Slovakia) at p 15, para 7; and pp 
21 and 24, paras 9(k) and 18 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-04/full/cop-04-dec-en.pdf> accessed 
31 July 2012. Also CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at para 5 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-07/cop-07-dec-28-en.pdf> accessed 31 July 2012. 
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under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, where the criteria laid out for in 
the determination of ‘relevant’ is satisfied.  
2.4 A Discussion on the Implication of the Climate Change Regime 
Climate change has been identified and recognised as a ‘cross-cutting and persistent 
crisis [where the] scale and gravity of the impacts of climate change affect all countries 
and undermine the ability of all countries to achieve sustainable development, the 
Millennium Development Goals, and threaten the viability and survival of nations’.451 
The Secretary-General of the United Nations emphasised that ‘Climate change is real, 
and it is accelerating in a dangerous manner. It not only exacerbates threats to 
international peace and security, it is a threat to international peace and security’.452 A 
research conducted by Brazil’s environmental protection agency found out that 
ecosystem of the Amazon will cease to function at a certain point of warming, and this 
has implication on the ‘entire hydrological cycles of significant parts of South America 
that depend on the systems of the Amazon function’.453 
The Rio+20 Outcome Document pronounced the common intention of the international 
community to combat climate change with urgent and ambitious action ‘in accordance 
with the principles and provisions of the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change’ (UNFCCC).454 Hence, there is a need to comment and reflect on the 
prevailing climate change regime that dictates current trend of environmental 
governance.  
Climate change is a main concern and features heavily in the effort to conserve land, 
water, biodiversity and ecosystems, where resilience to climate change to ensure 
sustainability of natural ecological processes is of the utmost necessity in attaining 
sustainable development.
455
 In this respect, the climate change regime was underscored 
as the pivotal vehicle in the protection of the climate system ‘for the present and future 
generations of humankind on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common 
                                               
451 The Future We Want, supra n 59, at para 25.  
452 UNSC, ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Impact of Climate Change’ (6587th Meeting, 
20 July 2011, New York) S/PV.6587 at p 2 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6587> accessed 12 September 2012. 
453 UNSC, ‘Maintenance of International Peace and Security. Impact of Climate Change’, supra n 452, at 
p 5.  
454 The Future We Want, supra n 451, at p 6, para 25. 
455 The Future We Want, supra n 451, at p 23, para 111.  
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but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’.456 The Parties to both the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol were urged to ‘fully implement their commitments, as 
well as decisions adopted under those agreements [and] build upon the progress 
achieved [in the Conferences of the Parties to the Convention]’.457 
The important influence of the climate change regime in the efforts and initiative in the 
conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems, especially in the context of this research – 
the preservation of ecosystems of international watercourses – cannot be ignored. More 
so as the importance of the full implementation of commitments under the climate 
change regime is recognised and affirmed by the international community as evidenced 
in the Rio+20 Outcome Document.
458
 In particularly, the complexity of the climate 
change regulatory regimes encumbers and hinders the coordination between the 
multilateral environmental treaty regimes, which leads to ‘hasty and erroneous 
interpretations and conclusions as to the relationship between different regulatory 
systems’.459  
The coordination of the implementation of mitigation measures under the climate 
change regime with other conventions, such as the Biodiversity Convention, will lead to 
‘a practically unfeasible and inextricably fragmented regulatory regime for climate 
change’. 460  The reality of the fragmentation of international law caused by the 
proliferation of treaties necessitates ‘a careful analysis of their reciprocal relationships 
in order to avoid erroneous interpretations that might have very relevant practical 
consequences’.461 This realisation paves the way for a cursory review of the climate 
change regime, and identifies the possible point of compatibility that enables the 
coordination and synergies between the climate change regime, and the MEAs under the 
biodiversity-conservation cluster. 
2.4.1 Climate Change Regime – Its Aims, Objectives and Context  
Negotiations on the need for a regime to address the need for the reduction of carbon 
dioxide and other greenhouse gases were initiated in 1990 by virtue of the UNGA 
                                               
456 The Future We Want, supra n 451, at para 191. 
457 The Future We Want, supra n 451, at p 37, para 192.  
458 The Future We Want, supra n 451, at p 3, para 17. 
459  Ottavio Quirico, ‘Disentangling Climate Change Governance: A Legal Perspective’ (2012) 21(2) 
Review of European Community and International Environmental Law 92 – 101, at p 100. 
460 Quirico, ‘Disentangling Climate Change Governance: A Legal Perspective’, supra n 459, at p 101. 
461 Quirico, ‘Disentangling Climate Change Governance: A Legal Perspective’, supra n 459, at p 101. 
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Resolution 45/212.
462
 The climate change negotiation was concluded in 1992 with the 
adoption of a Framework Convention on Climate Change at the 1992 Rio 
Conference.
463
 The Convention aims to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations caused 
by anthropogenic interferences, at a level and within a certain temporal scope that 
allows ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, in order to ensure sustainable 
food production and economic development.
464
  
Article 4 deals principally with the commitments agreed by all parties on matters related 
to the establishment of national anthropogenic emission inventories.
465
 The Parties are 
required to provide planning for climate change mitigation and adaptation measures, to 
cooperate in the preparation for adaptation to climate change impacts, and to develop 
and elaborate appropriate and integrated plans.
466
 Cooperation is proposed for the 
development, application and diffusion of technologies, practices and processes that 
control, reduce, or prevent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases.
467
  
2.4.2 Climate Change Regime and the Obligation to Preserve 
2.4.2.1 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
Article 4(1)(d) of UNFCCC seems to relate to the subject matter of the obligation to 
preserve. The general commitments in Article 4(1), despite neglecting freshwater 
ecosystems totally, still reflect the acknowledgment and incorporation of the ecosystem 
approach where the Parties are obliged to promote and to cooperate in the conservation 
of all greenhouse gases sinks and reservoirs.  
The mention of various types of ecosystems as possible sinks and reservoirs crucial for 
the stabilisation of carbon dioxide (CO2) and other greenhouse gases, indicates the 
recognition of ecosystem as a unit for the satisfaction of the obligation as stipulated 
under Article 4(1)(d). This explicit view is supported by the Preamble of the UNFCCC 
where the Parties made clear their awareness of the role and importance of terrestrial 
and marine ecosystems as sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. 
                                               
462 UNGA, ‘Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind’ (Report of the 
71st Plenary Meeting, 21 December 1990) UN Doc A/RES/45/212 
<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r212.htm> accessed 14 September 2011. Birnie, Boyle, and 
Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 112, at p 356. 
463 UNFCCC, supra n 208.  
464 Art 2, UNFCCC, supra n 208.  
465
 UNFCCC, supra n 208, Art 1(a). 
466 UNFCCC, supra n 208, Art 1(b). 
467 UNFCCC, supra n 208, Art 1(c). 
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Stricter commitment standards are applied to developed country Parties and other 
Annex I parties, where these Parties committed themselves to adopt and communicate 
national policies and corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change, 
through limitation of greenhouse gases emissions and the enhancement of greenhouse 
gas sinks and reservoirs.
468
 
The first Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report indicated that even 
with the stabilisation of greenhouse gas emissions at current levels, atmospheric 
concentrations would continue to rise for the next two centuries.
469
 The obligation to 
conserve greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs are further strengthened by a more 
rigorous regime (i.e., the 1997 Kyoto Protocol) where fixed targets are laid out in order 
to achieve the objective of the Convention. In the study of the obligation to conserve 
greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs as laid out under Article 4(1)(d), and the various 
steps required from the Annex I Parties for the achievement of emissions target, it is 
important to look into the Kyoto Protocol.   
2.4.2.2 1997 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change 
The objective of the Kyoto Protocol is the pursuit of the ultimate objective of the 
Convention as stated in Article 2, guided by Article 3 and pursuant to the Berlin 
                                               
468 Art 4(2)(a) and (b) UNFCCC. The provision strives to modify longer-term trends in anthropogenic 
emissions by returning the present level of anthropogenic emission of carbon dioxide and other green 
house gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol to earlier levels (ie 1990 levels) by the end of the 
decade (ie year 2000). The indeterminacy of the extent of commitments prevails in language used such as 
‘taking into account the differences in the Parties’ starting points and approaches, economic structures 
and resource bases’; their ‘need to maintain strong and sustainable economic growth’, ‘available 
technologies and other individual circumstances’; and the ‘need for equitable and appropriate 
contributions’. However, this shortcoming is somewhat overcome by the power of the COP to review the 
adequacy of the national policies adopted and communicated by the developed country Parties and other 
Parties in Annex I as stipulated under Art 4(2)(a) and (b). See Article 4(2)(d) of the UNFCCC, supra n 
208. 
469 The IPCC reported that there is a dire need for the ‘immediate reductions of over 60% in the net 
(sources minus sinks) emissions from human activities of long-lived gases would achieve stabilisation of 
concentration at today’s levels’. IPCC, ‘First Assessment Report Overview Chapter’ (1990) 
<http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/1992%20IPCC%20Supplement/IPCC_1990_and_1992_Assessments/En
glish/ipcc_90_92_assessments_far_overview.pdf> accessed 15 September 2011. It is accepted that the 
commitments stipulated under the UNFCCC are inadequate and the Parties negotiated a new, more 
rigorous obligation that eventually becomes the 1997 Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208. It is clear from the 
outset that the Parties recognised that commitment should be strengthened in light of new scientific 
information, which necessitates the need for continuous reporting and assessments. The review process 
will be carried out in the light of the best available scientific information on climate change and its impact, 
including the reports of the IPCC. See Art 4(1)(j), Art 4(2)(b) and (d), the UNFCCC. Also UNFCCC, 
‘Report of the Conference of the Parties on Its First Session’ (First Session of the Conference of the 
Parties of the, Berlin, 28 March – 7 April 1995) (16 June 1995) UN Doc FCCC/CP/1995/7/Add.1, at p 6, 
para 3 <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop1/07a01.pdf> accessed 15 September 2011. 
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Mandate.
470
 It sets binding targets for 37 industrialised countries and the European 
Community for the reduction of greenhouse gases to an average of 5 per cent against 
1990 levels over a five-year period (2008 – 2012).471 As opposed to the less stringent 
obligations laid out under the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol stipulated quantified 
emission limitation or reduction commitments in plain numerical forms as committed to 
by Annex I parties.
472
 
Article 2 stipulated the obligations to be undertaken by the Annex I parties in achieving 
their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments of at least 5 per cent 
below 1990 levels, in order to promote sustainable development.
473
 Apart from meeting 
their targets primarily through national measures, the 1997 Kyoto Protocol also 
established three additional ‘flexibility mechanisms’ by which the Annex I Parties may 
employ to achieve their emissions reductions.
474
 These mechanisms are joint 
implementation (Article 6), clean development mechanism (CDM) (Article 12), and 
emission trading (known as ‘carbon market or carbon trading’) (Article 17).475 
Joint implementation, as explicated in Article 6 allows Annex B Parties to transfer to, or 
acquire from, any other such party, emission reduction units resulting from projects 
aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic 
removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy. CDM is provided 
                                               
470 Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208, Preamble. The Berlin Mandate is adopted by Decision 1/CP1 of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its first session. UNFCCC, ‘Report of the Conference of 
the Parties on Its First Session’, supra n 469. The Berlin Mandate review the adequacy of Art 4(2)(a) and 
(b) of the UNFCCC, including proposals related to a protocol (Kyoto Protocol) and decisions on follow-
up.  
471  UNFCCC, ‘Kyoto Protocol’ <http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/items/2830.php> accessed 15 
September 2011.  
472 Art 3(1), Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208. See also Annex B, Kyoto Protocol, at p 20. The monitoring and 
review mechanisms in place are stricter, where the methodologies used for the estimation of 
anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks, of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol, shall be those accepted by the IPCC and agreed upon by the Conference of the parties. 
The IPCC and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice will render advice in the 
review and revision of proposed methodologies of Annex I Parties at the Meeting of the Parties for the 
Protocol. Article 5(2), Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208. 
473  The obligations include implementation and elaborate policies and measures in accordance with 
national circumstances; the protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases, in 
view of its commitments under relevant international environmental agreements, promotion of sustainable 
forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation. Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208, Art 2(1)(a)(ii); 
2(1)(a)(iii); 2(3); and 3(3).  
474 UNFCCC, ‘The Kyoto Protocol’, supra n 471. Also Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International Law 
and the Environment, supra n 112, at p 361. 
475 Annex B Parties in this context are Annex I Parties with quantified emission limitation or reduction 
commitment stipulated in the Annex B of Kyoto Protocol. See Art 6(1) of Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208. 
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in Article 12 of the Kyoto Protocol.
476
 Under the CDM, projects implemented in 
developing countries under the Mechanism entitled Annex B Party to earn saleable 
certified emission reduction (CER) credits, which can be counted towards meeting 
Kyoto emission reduction targets committed by the Party.
477
 Article 17 explicated the 
third mechanism that facilitates Annex I Parties to meet their emission targets. Annex I 
countries may participate in emissions trading in fulfilment of their commitments under 
Article 3, which should be supplemental to domestic actions in order to meet the 
quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.
478
 
The meaning of the phrase ‘direct human-induced land-use change and forestry 
activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation’ is further clarified in 
the First Meeting of the Parties for Kyoto Protocol in 2005.
479
 The First Meeting of the 
Parties emphasised that the implementation of land use, land-use change and forestry 
activities that are eligible to offset emission targets must be ‘direct human-induced’ 
afforestation, reforestation and/or deforestation activities that meet the requirements as 
set forth in the Annex of 16/CMP.1.
480
 From the standpoint of striving towards 
                                               
476 According to Art 12(2) of Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208: ‘The purpose of the clean development 
mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in 
contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties include in Annex I in 
achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Art 3. 
477  See UNFCCC, ‘Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)’ 
<http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php> accessed 
3 March 2011. It is stated that: ‘The mechanism is seen by many as a trailblazer. It is the first global, 
environmental investment and credit scheme of its kind, providing standardised emission offset 
instruments, CERs. A CDM project activity might involve, for example, a rural electrification project 
using solar panels or the installation of more energy-efficient boilers. The mechanism stimulates 
sustainable development and emission reductions, while giving industrialized countries some flexibility in 
how they meet their emission reduction or limitation targets’. See in general UNFCCC, ‘Decisions 2 – 
6/CMP.1’ (Report of the Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto 
Protocol on its First Session, Montreal, Canada, 28 November – 10 December 2005, 30 March 2006) 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8Add.1 <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a01.pdf> accessed 15 
November 2012.   
478 Art17 Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208, provides that: ‘The Conference of the Parties shall define the 
relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particularly for verification, reporting and 
accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions 
trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be 
supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction 
commitments under that Article’. 
479 Annex to UNFCCC, ‘Decision 16/CMP.1 Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry’ (Report of the 
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, 
Montreal, Canada, 28 November – 10 December 2005, 30 March 2006) FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.3, at 
p 5 <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2005/cmp1/eng/08a03.pdf> accessed 15 September 2011.  
480 Annex to UNFCCC, ‘Decision 16/CMP.1 Land Use, Land-use Change and Forestry’, supra n 479, at p 
6. The implementations of land use, land-use change and forestry included under the provisions of the 
Kyoto Protocol shall be consistent with the objectives and principles of, and decisions taken, under the 
UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. See UNFCCC, ‘Decision 16/CMP.1’, supra n 479, at p 3. At p 6, other 
additional land-use, land-use change other than afforestation, reforestation and deforestation as mentioned 
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maintaining ecosystem integrity through minimal interference with the environment, 
and the preservation of pristine environment, the fact that “deforestation” is treated as a 
means to achieve emissions targets is disconcerting.
481
  
This sparks an interesting observation in the further analysis of Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Kyoto Protocol. The two articles seemed to propose different approaches in achieving 
the objectives of the UNFCCC to stabilise greenhouse gases concentration in the 
atmosphere. Article 2 proposed for the implementation and/or further elaboration of 
policies and measures in accordance with Parties’ national circumstances, or to 
cooperate and coordinate the implementation of such policies and measures as the 
Conference of Parties deemed fit.
482
 Article 3 laid down an actual standard for emission 
reduction, which is different from the obligations stipulated under Article 2. Article 2 
seemed to aim for a longer-term goal of achieving sustainable development, while 
Article 3 strived to set out a rule of result to be complied with within a set timeframe.  
The two different approaches might be relevant to rationalise the fact that the obligation 
of the Parties under Article 2 to implement and/or further elaborate policies and 
measures that promote sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and 
reforestation did not include deforestation even though Article 3 allowed for 
deforestation in order for Annex I Parties to meet their reduction targets.
483
 The fact that 
deforestation is not stipulated in Article 2 must necessarily indicate the consensus of the 
Parties that deforestation is a mere short-term measure to meet the emission reduction 
targets.  
Based on the assumption that the omission of ‘deforestation’ in Article 2 is not 
unintentional, it can be deduced that deforestation is not considered to be a long-term 
measure to be promoted in the implementation and elaboration of policies and measures 
for the reduction of greenhouse gases emission. It can be inferred that the omission of 
‘deforestation’ in Article 2 is considered counterproductive in achieving the ultimate 
                                                                                                                                         
under Art 3(4) of the Framework Convention are suggested. They include revegetation, forest 
management, cropland management and grazing land management. 
481 Annex, to UNFCCC, ‘Decision 16/CMP.1’, supra n 479, at p 5, para 1(d). Similar sentiment shared by 
Harro van Asselt, ‘Managing the Fragmentation of International Environmental Law: Forests at the 
Intersection of the Climate and Biodiversity Regimes’, supra n 106, at p 1211. The author noted that ‘the 
emphasis so far has been on conflicts or potential conflicts between the two [climate change and 
biodiversity] regimes, particularly following decisions on the use of forest carbon sinks in the Kyoto 
Protocol’. 
482 Art 2(1)(a), (3), and (4), Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208. 
483 Arts 2(1)(a)(ii) and 3(3), Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208. 
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objective of the UNFCCC to promote sustainable development. This assertion is further 
supported by the fact the ‘deforestation’ is not an eligible activity under Article 12 of 
the Kyoto Protocol on CDM, which seek to assist non-Annex I Parties to achieve 
sustainable development.
484
 
2.4.3 Compatibility of the Climate Change Regime with the Obligation to 
Preserve 
For the purpose of this research on the identification of rules relevant to the 
interpretation of the obligation to preserve freshwater ecosystems, the most salient 
features of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol are the commitment of the Annex I 
Parties under Article 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC and Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of Kyoto Protocol. 
Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of the Kyoto Protocol strengthened the obligation of Annex I Parties 
to ‘protect and enhance greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs’ (Article 4(2)(a)) by 
imposing a duty onto the Parties to implement and/or further elaborate policies and 
measures to protect and enhance sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases. The 
implementation of the Annex I parties’ commitments under the Kyoto Protocol must 
take into account their commitments under relevant international environmental 
agreements, and to promote sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and 
reforestation.
485
  
The reason for the use of ‘protection’ in the Article 4(2)(a) and subsequently in Article 
2(1)(a)(ii) of the Kyoto Protocol instead of “conservation” used in Article 4(1)(d) 
regarding the same subject matter is unclear. But what is more certain is, the concept of 
‘protection’ has come to have its own meaning and the distinctive meaning this concept 
of ‘protection’ commands could be significant for the legal scope of this provision.486 
‘Protection’ is said to be the most neutral term if compared to other similar terms used 
in international environmental law, namely, ‘preservation’ and ‘conservation’; and often 
expresses an ‘incidental protective action to prevent damage to the protected object, 
without necessarily implying any duration or clearly developed policy for the future’.487  
Despite the seemingly more neutral ‘protection’ concept used in the language of the 
climate change regime, it does not negate the fact that the regime attempts to protect the 
                                               
484 Annex, to UNFCCC, ‘Decision 16/CMP.1’, supra n 479, at p 7. 
485
 Art 2(1)(a)(ii), Kyoto Protocol, supra n 208.  
486 Heijnsbergen, International Legal Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora, supra n 443, at p 43. 
487 Heijnsbergen, International Legal Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora, supra n 443, at p 43. 
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greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. In fact, the emphasised and repetitive use of this 
term in the Preamble of UNFCCC
488
 and throughout the Framework Convention, 
declared the commitment and seriousness of the Parties to protect greenhouse gas sinks 
and reservoirs. This interpretation can be supported by the use of ‘protection’ in Article 
4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC, which is meant for Annex I Parties with more stringent 
reduction commitments imposed on them.
489
 
Article 4(1)(a) of the UNFCCC obliges all Contracting Parties to promote and cooperate 
in the conservation of sinks and reservoirs of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the 
Montreal Protocol, including biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, 
coastal and marine ecosystems.
490
  
Although greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs are not separately defined under Article 
4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC, and in the subsequent Article 2(1)(a)(ii) of Kyoto Protocol, the 
common understanding of the term as used in the Preamble and Article 4(1)(d) of the 
UNFCCC should be adopted. Thus, the greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs include 
biomass, forests and oceans as well as other terrestrial, coastal and marine ecosystems. 
According to the analysis of the above provisions, there exists a general obligation 
under the climate change regime to protect terrestrial and marine ecosystems by virtue 
of their importance as greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. 
In the determination of whether these obligations are inimical to the obligation to 
preserve freshwater ecosystems, it is important to note the linkages between freshwater 
resources and other components in the environment, as advocated by the ecosystem 
approach.
491
 An ecosystem approach focuses on the interaction and interconnectedness 
between different sub-systems and the responses to stresses resulting from human 
                                               
488 For example, ‘the Parties to this Convention is “determined to protect the climate system for present 
and future generations”’. 
489 Heijnsbergen, International Legal Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora, supra n 443, at p 43. This 
seems to support the scholarship that ‘protection’ may have an ethical connotation that implies the 
protection of the weak against the strong. 
490 Art 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC applies more specifically to Annex I Parties where these Parties are 
obliged to adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change 
by, inter alia, protecting and enhancing its greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs. Art 2(1)(a)(ii) of the 
Kyoto Protocol further the commitments under Art 4(2)(a) of the UNFCCC by requiring Annex I Parties 
to implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures to protect sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse 
gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account their commitments under relevant 
international environmental agreements. 
491 McIntyre, ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 79, at p 5. 
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activity.
492
 By conserving and protecting terrestrial and marine ecosystems that are 
closely connected to wetlands and freshwater ecosystems, by virtue of the physical 
unity of the environment as greenhouse gas sinks and reservoirs, it can be asserted that 
such conservation and protection will definitely affect, and hence are relevant to, the 
preservation of freshwater ecosystems.  
In addition to that, scientific evidence had shown that continental hydrologic networks 
(watercourses systems) themselves play a crucial role as sinks and reservoirs in the 
carbon cycle where the aquatic systems act as accumulators of sedimentary organic 
matter, otherwise known as ‘carbon storage’. 493  Freshwater ecosystems, apart from 
being closely connected to the terrestrial and marine ecosystems that act as greenhouse 
gas sinks and reservoirs, are themselves active players in the carbon cycle. By virtue of 
their capacity as greenhouse gas sinks or reservoirs, the obligation under the UNFCCC 
and the subsequent Kyoto Protocol to protect these sinks and reservoirs must 
necessarily encompass freshwater ecosystems.  
From this perspective, the provisions under the climate change regime are not only 
pointing towards a similar direction as the preservation of freshwater ecosystems under 
the 1997 Convention, but actually concern the same subject matter. This strengthens the 
position that the obligations identified above are not intrinsically incompatible with the 
preservation/conservation objectives. These obligations share similarities, whereby they 
not only address similar components in the environment and move in a similar direction 
towards maintaining the integrity of ecosystems, they are also not in an irreconcilable 
conflicting relationship with the obligation to preserve freshwater ecosystems. 
Although the provisions of the climate change regime might not be ‘relevant’ for the 
interpretation of the obligation to preserve or conserve within the meaning of Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention,
494
 an interpretation that is compatible for a 
coordinated implementation of the climate change regime and regimes under the 
biodiversity cluster is not impossible.  
This conclusion can be drawn despite the fact that the UNFCCC and the 1997 Kyoto 
Protocol establish a distinct regime with its own objective and scope, and does not 
                                               
492McIntyre, ‘ ‘Ecosystem Approach’, supra n 79, at p 1. 
493
 JJ Cole et al, ‘Plumbing the Global Carbon Cycle: Integrating Inland Waters into the Terrestrial 
Carbon Budget’ (2007) 10 Ecosystems 171 – 184, at pp 178 – 179. 
494 ‘Relevance’ as established in Section 2.2. 
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address freshwater ecosystems specifically. The obligation to conserve greenhouses 
gases sinks and reservoirs, which include various ecosystems, will directly or indirectly 
affect freshwater ecosystems. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The emerging ecosystem approach exercises its influences in today’s conceptualisation 
of environmental protection. Environmental protection, apart from the obligation to 
prevent harm, or the obligation not to cause harm, has now gradually embraced a 
previously neglected component of preservation. This obligation serves to maintain the 
environment in its natural state to the extent possible, through the establishment of 
designated areas of protection or nature reserves.  
This approach is seen by the scientific communities to be one of the better means to 
maintain the ecological structure, processes and functions essential to the provision of 
ecological services. The maintenance of ecosystem integrity through the preservation of 
ecosystems and other components of the environment, have been codified in various 
international instruments on the environment.  
The dominion of climate change discourse in international environmental law 
necessitates the discussion on the possible discordance between the Biodiversity 
Convention, and the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol, in particularly on the use of direct 
human-induced land-use change and forestry activities as a means to offset carbon 
emissions. However, the discussion above
495
 shows that the underlying ethos of the 
regime is not irreconcilably in conflict with the general objective to maintain ecosystem 
integrity, where the simultaneous application of both regimes is possible.  
In the context of the present research, the obligation to preserve the ecosystems of 
international watercourses is codified under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention. Similar expressions of this obligation have been found in other 
international environmental agreements. The provisions identified to be relevant are 
Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention and Article 8(a) and (d) of the 
Biodiversity Convention. The relevant rules deal with the same facts and the same 
subject matter of preservation of transboundary freshwater ecosystems, where the 
obligation is placed primarily on individual state parties. All these aspects satisfy the 
                                               
495 In particular, Section 2 of this thesis. 
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criteria laid out for rules to be ‘relevant’ for the purpose of interpreting the obligation to 
preserve ecosystems of international watercourses as provided under Article 20 of the 
1997 Watercourses Convention. It can be concluded that the provisions cited above are 
rules relevant for the interpretation of Article 20 obligation to preserve the ecosystems 
of international watercourses of the 1997 Watercourses Convention.  
The next chapter will determine whether these rules, identified to be relevant to the 
interpretation of Article 20, are ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ within 
the meaning of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
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 3  
Chapter 3. Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relations between the 
Parties: A Review of Existing Interpretation 
This chapter will proceed firstly to give an extensive review of the existing approach in 
the interpretation of this pertinent phrase of ‘rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. It seeks to discover whether the prevalent structure of 
interpretation of the Article is capable of elucidating its true potential in the systemic 
integration of a rule of law through an interpretative mechanism. This chapter intends to 
show that the term ‘applicable’ does not requires that rules of international law need be 
binding on the parties in order to be considered as ‘applicable in the relations between 
the parties’. The reasoning for this proposition is undertaken through a review of 
existing scholarship on the interpretation of ‘applicable’ and ‘the parties’ that constitute 
the current interpretative landscape of Article 31(3)(c). A critical analysis of the 
prevailing scholarship of the subject matter is the foundation on which grounds for re-
interpretation of the salient features of the Article are proposed.  
3.1 ‘Rules of International Law’ 
It is stated that the external rules referred to in an interpretative process via Article 
31(3)(c) ‘must be rules of international law, and not to broader principles or 
considerations which may not be firmly established as rules’.496 Accordingly, Article 
31(3)(c) is said to impose the requirement of legality where rules that are applicable in 
the interpretative process must be rules of international law. 
Law is the product of many acts of law-making processes that are ‘far from displaying 
coherent design’ over long stretches of time, contributed to by various entities pursuing 
divergent, even conflicting ends and possibly, only partially aware of each other.
497
 The 
law, taken as a whole, consists of legal rules, which are obtained through law-making 
activities, including legislation, and the rendering of judgments that are considered as 
supplementary sources of international law.
498
  
                                               
496 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 214, para 426(a).  
497
 Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation. On the Theory of Law and Practical Reason 
(Oxford University Press 2009) at p 5. 
498 Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation, supra n 497, at p 5. 
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International law, ‘sometimes referred to as public international law … is the body of 
rules which are legally binding on states in their intercourse with each other’, and arises 
from the juxtaposition of states.
499
 It is distinguishable from private international law, or 
‘conflict of laws’500  where it ‘governs the relations of states and other subjects of 
international law amongst themselves’ instead of ‘rules developed by states as part of 
their domestic law to resolve the problems which involve a foreign element in cases 
between private persons’.501 International law has been regarded as ‘rules that restrain, 
or as a common language; or as a normative guidance in the making of decisions.
502
  
The unqualified use of international law by the ILC, as a United Nations body, to refer 
to public international law, is supported by the context of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
that intended to promote treaty as a source of legal obligations between states in the 
development of friendly relations and the achievement of cooperation among nations.
503
 
The applicability of the 1969 Vienna Convention on ‘treaties between states’504 and the 
definition of ‘treaty’ to mean ‘an international agreement concluded between states and 
governed by international law’ 505  emphasised that ‘international law’ means ‘public 
international law’ for the purpose of this Convention. In light of the common reference 
of international law as public international law nowadays, the term ‘international law’, 
‘without adjectival qualification, denotes public international law’.506  
                                               
499 Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (Vol I, 9th edn, Longman, 
Essex, 1992) at pp 4 – 6.     
500 Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (5th edn, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003) at p 1. 
501 Jennings and Watts (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law, supra n 499, at p 6. 
502 Rosalyn Higgins, ‘Reflections from the International Court’ pp 1 – 10 in Malcolm D Evans (ed) 
International Law (2nd edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2006) at p 5.  
503 Preamble of the 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31. The Preamble speaks of ‘Recognising the ever-
increasing importance of treaties as a source of international law and as a means of developing peaceful 
cooperation among nations… [and] Believing that the codification and progressive development of the 
law of treaties achieved in the present convention will promote the purposes of the United Nations set 
forth in the Charter …’. The reference of ‘international law’ as ‘public international law’ is apparent in 
the engagement of this term throughout the Convention, eg, Arts 1, 3, 4, 38, 43, 52, 53, 64, and 71. The 
repetitive reference to ‘cooperation among nations’, peoples of the United Nations’, and ‘sovereign 
equality and independence of all states’ supported the contention that ‘international law’ refers to public 
international law where the actors are primarily states. This assertion is further supported by the final 
decision to include the phrase ‘governed by international law’ in Article 2(1)(a) by the International Law 
Commission. Some members opined that such reference is not necessary due to the nature of the 
contracting parties of the Convention (states), which at any rate in the first instance, are subjected to 
international law. Dietrich Rauschning, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Alfred Metzner 
Verlag, Frankfurt, 1978) at p 77, para 6.   
504
 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 1. 
505 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 2. 
506 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 261. 
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According to the Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘rule’ is generally defined as ‘an established 
and authoritative standard or principle; a general norm mandating or guiding conduct or 
action in a given type of situation.’507 The Dictionary of Legal Theory defines rule as ‘a 
standard meant to guide behaviour’. It must necessarily include principles, standards, 
practices, concepts and procedures considered as legal grounds for the assertion of 
rights and obligations.
508
 It is found that the terms of ‘rule’, ‘norm’, 509  ‘principle’, 
‘standards’ and ‘prescription’ are frequently used interchangeably.510 Scholars comment 
that a broad approach needs to be adopted in defining ‘rules’. A rule – a prescribed 
guide for conduct or action, includes ‘the whole range of rules as there are many sorts of 
action, many kinds of guidance, and many different ways of prescribing’,511  which 
necessitates a broad conceptualisation.  
Twining and Miers developed this definition of rules where they adopted a similar 
broad formulation of ‘rules’ to denote general norms mandating or guiding conduct or 
action in a given type of situation.
512
 They highlighted the particular attention to be 
drawn to four aspects of a broad formulation of ‘rule’ 513  and emphasised that a 
prescriptive definition of rules (such as Dworkin’s ‘all-or-nothingness’ approach) 
obscures distinctive characteristics and nature of rules, which they termed ‘separate 
ideas of rules’, not to mention that the distinction between rules and principles is 
artificially sharp.
514
  
                                               
507 Bryan A Garner (ed) Black’s Law Dictionary (8th edn, Thomson, USA, 2004) at p 1357. 
508 The broad interpretation of ‘rules’ is adopted in Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and 
Practice (Vol 13 Developments in International law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, Boston, 
London, 1991) at p 10.  
509  See Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty. Compliance with 
International Regulatory Agreement (2nd edn, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Massachusetts, 
London England, 1998) at p 113. Interestingly, scholars defined norms as ‘a generic reference to a broad 
class of generalised prescriptive statements, namely principles, standards, rules, both procedural and 
substantive where all of them are prescriptions for action in situations of choice, carrying a sense of 
obligation, a sense that they ought to be followed.’ (Original emphasis). 
510 Brian H Bix, A Dictionary of Legal Theory (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004) at pp 192 and 193. 
511 Newton Garver, ‘Rules’, pp 231 – 233, in Paul Edwards (ed), Encyclopedia of Philosophy (vol. 7, 
Macmillan/Collier Macmillan, New York and London 1967) at p 231.  
512 William L Twinning and David Miers, How to Do Things with Rules: A Primer of Interpretation (4th 
edn Butterworths London 1999) at p 123. 
513 The four aspects of a broad formulation of rule are: (a) A rule is normative or prescriptive in relation to 
behaviour, rather than with factual description of behaviour. (b) A rule is general, concerning types of 
behaviour in types of situation or circumstances. (c) Rules both guide and serve as standards for human 
behaviour. (d) Rules provide the justification or reason for decision or action. Twinning and Miers, How 
to Do Things with Rules, supra n 512, at pp 123 – 126. 
514
 The three separate ideas are: the level of generality or particularity of a prescription; its precision or 
vagueness; and its status or force in dictating, guiding or influencing a result. Twinning and Miers, How 
to Do Things with Rules, supra n 512, at p 126. See Ronald M Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 
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As suggested above, some theorists seek to distinguish them in various ways in the 
course of making points about the nature of law or the nature of practical reasoning.
515
 
Most commonly a distinction between ‘rules’ and ‘principles’ or other normative 
considerations are drawn, where theorists confine rules to standards that are conclusive, 
or that have a canonical formulation, or that are relatively specific.
516
 In particularly, 
jurists opine that there is normative significance to the distinction between rules and 
principles, where rules tend to be highly prescriptive whereas principles serves as 
guidelines and operate at a higher level of generality that does not impose concrete 
obligations.
517
 However, it is doubtful if there are benefits derivable from attempting a 
comprehensive taxonomy of types of rules in view of the richness and complexity of 
material of law that is ‘so shot through with fine gradations’,518 especially in the context 
of the present research.
519
  
‘Rules’, although not specifically defined in the 1969 Vienna Convention, do not 
merely refer to treaty law and customary international law. The sources of international 
law stipulated in Article 38(1) of the Statute of International Court of Justice support 
giving generic scope to the definition of rules.
520
 The sources of international law, from 
where rules of international law can be derived, include treaty laws, customary laws and 
also general principles of law. A broad definition of ‘rules’ that does not distinguish 
between ‘rules’, ‘standards’ or other normative considerations can be seen in the 
observation and proposal of the Special Rapporteur, where the ILC deemed it desirable 
                                                                                                                                         
(Duckworth London 1977) especially pp 22 – 25. According to Dworkin, at p 24, ‘The difference 
between legal principles and legal rules is a logical distinction. Both sets of standards point to particular 
decisions about legal obligation in particular circumstance, but they differ in the character of the direction 
they give. Rules are applicable in an all-or-nothing fashion. If the facts a rule stipulates are given, then 
either the rule is valid, in which case the answer it supplies must be accepted, or it is not, in which case it 
contributes nothing to the decision’. 
515 Bix, A Dictionary of Legal Theory, supra n 510, at pp 192 and 193. 
516 Bix, A Dictionary of Legal Theory, supra n 510, at pp 192 and 193. See also Daniel Bodansky, ‘Rules 
vs Standards in International Environmental Law’ (2004) 98 American Society International Law 
Proceeding 275 – 280. Bodansky raised the importance of the distinction between rules and standards, 
especially in the design of international regimes, and highlighted the need for further study on the 
distinctions. 
517 Michael Leir, ‘Canadian Practice in International Law, 1998-99’ (1999) 37 Canadian Yearbook of 
International Law 317 – 349, at p 320.  
518 Twinning and Miers, How to Do Things with Rules, supra n 512, at p 127 
519  For a thorough analysis of ‘rules’, see John Rawls, ‘Two Concepts of Rules’ (1955) 54(1) The 
Philosophical Review 3 – 32; Joel Feinberg, ‘Supererogation and Rules’ (1961) 71 Ethics 276 – 288; 
Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Hutchinson London 1975); HLA Hart, The Concept of Law 
(2
nd
 edn Oxford University Press 1994) on Ch 3; and Anthony Dickey, ‘The Concept of Rules and the 
Concept of Law’ (1980) 25 American Journal of Jurisprudence 89 – 116;  
520 Supra n 259. 
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to formulate ‘any “principles” found by the Commission to be “rules”’. 521  The 
Commission went further to elaborate that ‘all “rules” of interpretation have the 
character of “guidelines”’.522 The Commission went on to support the codification of 
such ‘guidelines’ due to the importance of the role of treaty interpretation. Where 
recourse of the international community to adjudication depends on the will of the 
parties, ‘there may be particular value in codifying as rules such basic principles of 
interpretation as are found to be generally accepted as law’.523 It is observed that the 
Commission treated the codification of rules to include ‘guidelines and principles’ or 
any other forms of norms considered as, or equivalent to ‘rules’.  
The scope of ‘rules’ is not clearly indicated in the jurisprudence of international courts 
and tribunals, although a more extensive concept of law can fire the debate on whether 
non-‘binding’ international law (in the source-oriented formal sense) ‘may legitimately 
influence interpretation’.524 In the Iron Rhine case, it is noted that this debate extends to 
the concept of ‘rules’ where the Tribunal considers that –  
‘There is considerable debate as to what, within the field of environmental law, 
constitutes “rules” or “principles”; what is “soft law”; and which environmental 
treaty law or principles have contributed to the development of customary 
international law. Without entering further into those controversies, the Tribunal 
notes that in all of these categories, “environment” is broadly referred to as 
including air water, land, flora and fauna, natural ecosystems and sites, human 
health and safety, and climate. The emerging principles, whatever their current 
status, make reference to conservation, management, notions of prevention and of 
sustainable development, and protection for future generations…’525 
The European Court of Human Rights has invoked a wide range of international 
instruments in its decisions. This was recognised by the House of Lords in the context 
                                               
521 Dietrich Rauschining (ed), The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Travaux Préparatoires 
(Alfred Metzner Verlag, Frankfurt, 1978), at p 242.  
522 Rauschining (ed), The VCLT, supra n 521, at p 242.  
523 Rauschining (ed), The VCLT, supra n 521, at p 242. 
524  For a brief jurisprudential summary of the concepts of rules, principles, measures, etc see Leir, 
‘Canadian Practice in International Law, 1998-99’, supra n 517, at p 320; and more extensively Twinning 
and Miers, How to Do Things with Rules, supra n 512, at pp 113 - 204. 
525 Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine (‘Ijzeren Rijn’) Railway (Belgium/Netherlands) (Award of 24 
May 2005) at para 58 <http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_XXVII/35-125.pdf> accessed 15 
November 2012. The Arbitral Tribunal did not find it necessary to go far into the meaning of rules 
because it found that the duty of states to prevent or mitigate harm to the environment had become a 
principle of international law, at para 59.  
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of Article 31(3)(c) in the case of A and Others, where examples of the range of 
instruments used by the Human Rights court are conveniently cited
526
 although ‘some 
of those instruments do not appear to be binding in themselves’.527 The WTO Panel in 
the EC – Biotech case does not consider the precautionary principle as a rule of 
international law (own emphasis) if it had not become a general principle of 
international law, which the Panel found that it had not.
528
 What is clear from these 
cases is that the notion of a ‘rule’ cannot usefully be taken in isolation from 
‘international law’, and the phrase ‘rules of international law’ must be read together 
where ‘rules’ must be read with ‘international law’.529  
Despite the ‘anarchic nature of world affairs and the clash of competing sovereignties’ 
that might make ascertainment of rules of international law difficult, nevertheless, these 
rules are ascertainable from the available sources from which the rules may be extracted 
and analysed.
530
 In general, it is commented that ‘rules of international law’ as stated 
under Article 31(3)(c) of the1969 Vienna Convention refer to rules of international law 
that originated from all formal sources of international law.
531
 Shaw went on to 
comment that these sources of law operate within the legal system on a technical level 
and exclude such ‘ultimate sources’ such as reason or morality, or functional sources 
such as libraries and journals, as provided under Article 38(1) of the Statute of 
                                               
526 Per Lord Bingham, A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home Department (No 2) [2006] 1 All 
England Law Reports 575 at pp 604 – 606, paras 39 – 41. 
527 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 269. However the author conceded that the position 
is more complex because the range of instruments conveniently cited by the European Courts of Human 
Rights may amount to statements of customary international law or have other relevant aspects 
connecting them with the Vienna rules. 
528 EC- Biotech, supra n 117, at p 333, para 7.67. 
529 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 269. 
530 Shaw, International Law, supra n 500, at p 66. 
531 Martin Dixon, Textbook on International Law (6th edn, Oxford University Press 2007) at p 25. The 
author elaborated that ‘The procedures or methods by which rules become legally binding are formal 
sources of law. A formal source of law is a process by which a legal rule comes into existence: it is law 
creating’. See Linderfalk, ‘Who are ‘The Parties’?’, supra n 260, at p 344. Also, the Fragmentation 
Report, supra n 17, at para 426; McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 
290; Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, n 100, at p 254; Mark E Villiger, 
Customary International Law and Treaties: A Study of their Interactions and Interrelations with Special 
Consideration of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1985), 
at p 268; Gabrielle Marceau, ‘Conflict of Norms and Conflict of Jurisdictions: The Relationship between 
the WTO Agreement and MEAs and Other Treaties’, (2001) 35 Journal of World Trade 1081 – 1131, at 
1087; Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at pp 260 - 263; Georges Abi-Saab, ‘The Appellate 
Body and Treaty Interpretation’, in Giorgio Sacerdoti, Alan Yanovich and Jan Bohanes (eds) The WTO at 
Ten: The Contribution of the Dispute Settlement System (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2006) 
at p 463.  
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International Court of Justice.
532
 Questions are raised on whether the ‘rules of 
international law’ as stipulated in the 1969 Vienna Convention include treaty law, if 
treaties are opined to be ‘simply a source of obligation binding pursuant to international 
law’.533  
The records of the ILC support the inclusion of treaties in rules of general international 
law where Jiménez de Aréchaga welcomed the deletion of ‘general’ international law 
that has a narrower connotation.
534
 The qualification imposed in the insertion of the 
word ‘general’ in international law would exclude treaty law, and specific or regional 
rules of international law that might be relevant and applicable for the interpretation of a 
treaty obligation by providing the background for such interpretation.  
Reviewing the fine difference between the notions of ‘rules’ and ‘obligations’, where 
the former indicates an element of imposition whilst the latter expresses 
voluntariness,
535
 the further specification for the rules of international law to be 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ points towards the conclusion that treaty 
obligations are covered by Article 31(3)(c). It is clear that the Commission intended to 
include treaty obligation amongst the ‘rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ because unlike general international law that is deemed 
‘axiomatically applicable in relations between states’536 without the need to be explicit, 
treaty obligations are ‘distinctly a matter of relations between the parties’.537  
                                               
532 Shaw, International Law, supra n 500, at p 66. The Statute of the International Court of Justice is 
widely recognised as the most authoritative statement as to the sources of international law. Art 38(1) of 
the Statute of the International Court of Justice , supra n 259, provides that – the Court, whose function is 
to decide in accordance with international law such disputes as are submitted to it, shall apply: (a) 
international conventions, whether general or particular, establishing rules expressly recognised by the 
contesting states; (b) international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law; (c) the 
general principles of law recognised by civilised nations; (d) subject to the provisions of Article 59, 
judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as 
subsidiary means for the determination of rules of law. 
533 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 261. By this, the author seems to indicate that 
treaties are ‘simply’ a product of international law, and not international law. See Gerard Fitzmaurice, 
‘Some Problems Regarding the Formal Sources of International Law’, pp 153 – 195 in Jan Hendrik 
Willem Verzijl and F M Van Asbeck, Symbolae Verzijl  (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1958) at p 153.  
534  [1966] 1(II) Yearbook of International Law Commission 1 – 351, at p 190, para 70 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/publications/yearbooks/Ybkvolumes(e)/ILC_1966_v1_p2_e.pdf> accessed 15 
November 2012; cited in Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 262. 
535 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 263. The author further elaborated that ‘This might 
suggest a distinction between those treaties which codify rules of customary law and those which simply 
establish particular commitments which are voluntarily assumed’.  
536 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 263. 
537 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 263. 
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The explicit requirement that the rules of international law are ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’, and the intentional omission of the word ‘general’ from 
the earlier draft articles, confirmed the intention of the Commission that treaty 
obligations are to be included in the scope of ‘rules of international law’. The omission  
of the word ‘general’ to refer to an unqualified reference to international law, including 
treaties, is deemed justified because a treaty should be interpreted against the 
background of all types of international rules applicable, whether or not they are 
customary rules or rules of written law.
538
 The Panel of WTO in the EC – Biotech case 
was unanimous in stating that treaties and customary rules of international law are rules 
of international law within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c).
539
  
The scope of the rules of international law applicable for the interpretation of a treaty 
term shall encompass all the formal sources of law in addition to general international 
law. The difficulty in considering treaties in a vacuum strengthens the need to interpret 
treaty against its normative environment, where the normative environment is composed 
of the various sources of international law that forms the international legal system as a 
whole.
540
   
The adoption of a broad approach in the interpretation of ‘rules of international law’, 
which encompasses treaty law, custom, principles or standards ‘“common” to the 
parties to the treaty’541 in the interpretative process (whether as the source from which 
they draw their force of obligation or as facts necessarily relevant to the issue under 
consideration) is in accordance with the principle of pacta sunt servanda.
542
   
                                               
538 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 262. 
539 EC- Biotech, supra n 117, at p 332, para 7.67. 
540 Mr. Yasseen succinctly summed up this general position by stating that –  
‘The reference to the rules of international law was indispensable, for just as a term could only be 
understood in a sentence, a sentence only in an article, and an article only in the treaty as a whole. It was 
impossible to understand the treaty except within the whole international legal order of which it formed a 
part, which it influenced and by which it was influenced’. [1966] 1(II) Yearbook of International Law 
Commission, supra n 534, at p 197 para 51,. It is quoted in Jan Klabbers, ‘Reluctant Grundnormen: 
Articles 31(3)(c) and 42 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and the Fragmentation of 
International Law’, pp 141 – 161, in Matthew Craven, Malgosia Fitzmaurice, and Maria Vogiatzi (eds) 
Time, History and International Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, 2007), at p 147. 
541
 [1966] 1(II) Yearbook of International Law Commission, supra n 534, at p 197, para 52.  
542 Art 26 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31. See Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, 
at p 263. 
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3.2 ‘Applicable in the Relations between the Parties’ 
The general scholarly understanding of a rule that is applicable in the relations between 
the parties necessarily refers to ‘a rule that creates legal relationship between the parties, 
either at the time of interpretation, or at the time when the treaty was concluded, 
depending on the particular expression interpreted’.543 The existing interpretation of the 
phrase ‘applicable in the relations between the Parties’ is explored through the notions 
of legality and bindingness where scholars noted that there is a need for a legal 
relationship to exist for a rule to be applicable. This imposes a legality requirement – 
the rule has to be ‘law’,544 and that the rule must be ‘binding’.545  
The research into the binding force of rules of international law considered to be 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ are crucial, especially in the context of 
the interpretation of environmental protection rules. Villiger commented that the ‘vague’ 
or ‘soft’ nature of these rules couched in flexible treaty language, and the open-textured 
quality of customary international law or general principles of international law on the 
environment, give rise to imprecise legal force, and affect the rules’ ability to bind 
states.
546
 
The interpretation of the term ‘the parties’ invites much discussion and controversy.547 
Various scholars have suggested different approaches in the interpretation of ‘the 
parties’, broadly categorised as strict or broad interpretations.548 The ongoing argument 
                                               
543 Linderfalk, ‘Who are ‘The Parties’?’, supra n 260, at p 345. Ulf Linderfalk, ‘Doing the Right Thing 
for the Right Reason: Why Dynamic or Static Approaches Should be Taken in the Interpretation of 
Treaties’, (2008) 10 International Community Law Review 109 – 141. 
544  OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118, at p 34 para 103. The Tribunal stated that: ‘The reference in the 
Court’s [ICJ in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project case] dictum and the doctrinal statement in Oppenheim 
based upon it is to developments in law … the Court’s reference in Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros is to new law 
“in a great number of instruments” and not material that has not yet become law’ (original italics 
maintained). 
545 Jiménez de Aréchaga’s statement on the reason the new text that omitted the requirement of general 
international law in Article 31(3)(c) demonstrated the underlying understanding of the Commission that 
the a rule of international law ‘had to be interpreted in the light of other treaties binding on the parties’. 
[1966] I(II) Yearbook of International Law Commission, supra n 534, at para 70.  
546 Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 VCLT, supra n 254, at p 433, para 24.  
547 Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, supra n 100, at pp 261 – 262; Mélanie 
Samson ‘High Hopes, Scant Resources: A World of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of 
Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties’ (2011) 24 Leiden Journal of 
International Law 701 – 714; Yasuhiro Shigeta, International Judicial Control of Environmental 
Protection. Standard Setting, Compliance Control and the Development of International Environmental 
Law by the International Judiciary (Kluwer Law International, The Netherlands, 2010) at p 239. 
548
 See McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260; Linderfalk, ‘Who are ‘The 
Parties’?’, supra n 260, at p 344. Isabelle van Damme, ‘Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, and Interpretation’ 
pp 298 – 343 in Daniel Bethlehem, Donald McRae, Rodney Neufeld and Isabelle van Damme (eds) The 
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seems to indicate that the potential of Article 31(3)(c) as an anti-fragmentation, 
systemic integration tool is limited. It also seems to suggest that this potential can only 
be realised by adopting the appropriate interpretation of ‘the parties’, either in a 
restrictive sense or a broader sense. 
The following sections will review the prevalent scholarship on the interpretation of the 
phrase ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ from the notion of legality and 
bindingness raised. The subsequent analysis seeks to explore – 
1. What is ‘applicable’ and whether ‘applicability’ imposes the requirement of the 
existence of a legal relationship that is binding. This necessitates clarification of 
the meaning of ‘binding’, in answering what applicable means; and  
2. Who are the parties?  
3.2.1  ‘Applicable’ 
Mark Villiger stressed in forceful terms that for Article 31(3)(c), the applicability of the 
relevant rules necessarily means these rules are binding. He asserted that ‘the term 
“applicable” leaves no room for doubt: non-binding rules cannot be relied upon’.549 
Sands reiterated this position by commenting that the Article’s use of the term 
‘applicable’ refers to its legal character, where ‘the legal status of a rule (other than qua 
treaty) must be assessed and determined to be legally binding upon the parties disputing 
the interpretation prior to the application of the rule.
550
 There seems to be an 
                                                                                                                                         
Oxford Handbook of International Trade Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at p 332. She 
quoted the ILC Fragmentation Study Group where she is of the opinion that the narrower interpretation 
should be referred to, in the interest of pragmatism. She quoted that ‘Article 31(3)(c) also requires the 
interpreter to consider other treaty-based rules so as to arrive at a consistent meaning. Such other rules are 
of particular relevance where parties to the treaty under interpretation are also parties to the other treaty, 
where the treaty rule has passed into or expresses customary international law or where they provide 
evidence of the common understanding of the parties as to the object and purpose of the treaty under 
interpretation or as to the meaning of a particular term. A better solution is to permit reference to another 
treaty provided that the parties in dispute are also parties to that other treaty. Although this creates the 
possibility of eventually divergent interpretations (depending on which States parties are also parties to 
the dispute), that would simply reflect the need to respect (inherently divergent) party will as elucidated 
by reference to those other treaties as well as the bilateralist character of most treaties underpinned by the 
practices regarding reservations, inter se modification and successive treaties’. 
549  Mark E Villiger, ‘The Rules on Interpretation: Misgivings, Misunderstandings, Miscarriage? The 
‘Crucible’ Intended by the International Law Commission’, in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed), The Law of Treaties 
Beyond the Vienna Convention, (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011). 
550 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 102. See 
also Lorand Bartels, ‘Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’ (2001) 35(3) Journal of 
World Trade 499 – 519, at p 501. Bartels added as an afterthought in commenting on the applicability of 
external instruments in the interpretation of WTO provisions that ‘of course, it will be important first to 
assess the legal status of such instruments before applying them as law’. 
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overwhelming work of eminent publicists on the interpretation of the scope of 
‘applicable’ in the context of Article 31(3)(c) indicating that the relevant rules 
applicable in the relations between the parties have to be ‘binding’ for the purpose of 
interpretation.  
The ordinary meaning of ‘applicable’, obtained from a perusal of established 
dictionaries in accordance with Article 31(1) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, in the 
context of interpretation of treaties and in light of this purpose, can be summarised to 
mean –  
1. That may be applied or having reference or appropriate; 551  
2. Affecting or relating to a person or thing; relevant or appropriate, suitable, able 
to applied; fitting;
552
  
3. To employ for a limited purpose, as in ‘apply payments to a reduction in 
interest’, or to put to use with a particular subject matter, as in ‘apply the law to 
the facts’ or ‘apply the law only to transactions in interstate commerce’;553 or 
4. To affect or to touch, as in ‘this clause applies only to deals outside the EU; the 
legal precedent applies to cases where the parents of the child are divorced’.554  
The term ‘applicable’ has not been specifically analysed in the context of Article 
31(3)(c) despite the crucial role it plays in the determination of whether the relevant 
rules can be taken into account in interpretation.
555
 Although the meaning of ‘applicable’ 
in Article 31(3)(c) is not specifically defined, its discussion was mostly linked to the 
                                               
551 Joyce M Hawkins and Robert Allen (eds) The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary (Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1991) at p 64. 
552  Oxford University Press, ‘Oxford Dictionaries’ (2012) 
<http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/applicable?view=uk> accessed 24 May 2012; Cambridge 
University Press, ‘Cambridge Advanced Learner’s Dictionary and Thesaurus’ (2011) available at 
<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/british/applicable> accessed 24 May 2012; Chambers 
Publishers, ‘Chambers 21st Century Dictionary’ (2010) available at 
<http://www.chambersharrapco.uk/chambers/features/chref/chref.py/main?query=applicable&title=21st> 
accessed 24 May 2012; Collins, ‘The Collins English Dictionary’ (2011) available at 
<http://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/applicable> accessed 24 May 2012. 
553 Bryan A Garner, Black’s Law Dictionary, supra n 507, at p 109. 
554 PH Collin, Dictionary of Law (3rd edn, Peter Collin Publishing, 2000) at p 19.  
555 Panos Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’ (PhD, 
Queen Mary University of London, 2010) at pp 16 – 17.  Merkouris stated that: ‘Despite the scrutiny 
under which Article 31(3)(c) has been put, an analysis of the term “applicable” in doctrine is almost non-
existent. This may be partially attributed to the fact that even the definitions of the term ‘applicable’, ie, 
(adjective): relevant or appropriate; (verb): to put to use with a particular subject matter; seem to connect 
this term with another one preceding it: “relevant”. This would seem a somewhat tautological self-
reference …’.   
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analysis and discourse of ‘relevant’.556  If rules of international law determined to be 
‘relevant’ ipso facto means that it is ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’, 
then the whole phrase of ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ will be 
considered to be redundant. By virtue of the retention of this phrase in the text of the 
1969 Vienna Convention, it is apparent that the phrase prescribes a separate 
determination from the consideration of whether or not a rule of international law is 
relevant.      
It is a well-settled canon of interpretation in all systems of law that ‘a clause must be so 
interpreted as to give it a meaning rather than so as to deprive it of meaning’.557 Lord 
McNair, in his separate opinion in Anglo-Iranian Oil Co case rejected the meaning of a 
tacit or an implied agreement to be given to the interpretation of ‘acceptés par la Perse’ 
because ‘some meaning must be given to the word “acceptés”’.558 The ICJ emphasised 
the importance of uncovering the real meaning through the interpretation of the Belgian 
Declaration as it stands, ‘having regard to the words actually used’.559 In addition, the 
principle that ‘a legal text should be interpreted in such a way that a reason and a 
meaning can be attributed to every word in the text’ should be applied in general in the 
interpretation of the text of a treaty.
560
 It is an unfavourable method of interpretation if 
such interpretation would ‘leave certain words in the air’.561 
Thus, ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ should be given its own meaning 
through the interpretation as it stands of the words actually used. The meaning to be 
given to this phrase should not be subsumed under a discourse on ‘relevant’, an 
approach that would have leave the meaning of ‘applicable in the relations between the 
                                               
556 Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 555, at pp 
16 – 17.   
557 British-American Claims Commission, Cayuga Indians (Great Britain) v United States (22 January 
1926, pages 307 – 331) (1926) VI Reports of International Arbitral Awards 173 – 190, at p 184 
<http://untreaty.un.org/cod/riaa/cases/vol_VI/173-190_Cayuga.pdf> accessed 16 November 2012. 
558 Individual Opinion of President McNair of ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case (United Kingdom v Iran) 
(Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 22 July 1952) [1952] ICJ Reports 93, at p 122 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/16/2001.pdf> accessed 7 September 2012. President McNair, from pp 121 – 122, 
elaborated that ‘upon the significance of the expression “acceptés par la Perse” … [t]he words “acceptés 
par la Perse” would not be apt to describe a tacit or an implied agreement, if any such agreement had 
arisen. Some meaning must be given to the word “acceptés”’.  This implied that if some meaning is to be 
given to ‘acceptés’, a tacit or implicit could not be brought within the formula of ‘traités ou conventions 
acceptés par la Perse’.   
559 ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, at p 105.  
560
 ICJ, Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. Case, at p 105.  
561 Gerard Fitzmaurice, ‘The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, 1951-54’ [1957] 33 
British Yearbook of International Law  203 – 293, at p 222. 
122 
 
parties’ in the air, and rendered redundant, which is against the cardinal canon of 
interpretation.  
Scholars interpreted the requirement of applicability to mean ‘binding’, 562  where 
‘binding’ is commonly understood to be formally binding under the prevalent source-
oriented formalistic school of legal theory.
563
  Sands was unequivocal when he 
commented that ‘applicability’ refers to its legal character – the extraneous rule must be 
‘legally binding (other than qua treaty) upon the parties disputing the interpretation to 
be given to a particular treaty’.564  
Gardiner commented that a rule of international law considered to be ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ must necessarily point towards the existence of significant 
relations between the parties especially when parties have an immediate interest in the 
issue of interpretation.
565
 However it is doubtful if the need for a significant relationship 
necessarily implies that ‘applicable’ gives  the connotation that such significant 
relations must be ‘legal’ – whereby a legal relationship between the parties is in 
existence;
566
 or that the rules of international law should be ‘binding’ on the relations 
between the parties.  
A perusal of the existing scholarship that imposes a requirement of ‘bindingness’ in the 
interpretation of ‘applicable’ entails two subsidiary questions in order to answer the first 
question raised above, of what is applicable – 
1. What is the meaning of ‘binding’? This is to clarify the reason behind scholars’ 
assertion that ‘what is applicable must be binding’; and  
2. Is the need for the rules to be binding on the parties in order to be considered as 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ an indirect (yet inappropriate) 
implication of the requirement of legality? This is a further contemplation into 
the statement by Gardiner to the effect that what is applicable indicates the 
existence of a significant relationship that is ‘legal’567.   
                                               
562 Villiger, ‘The Rules on Interpretation’ supra n 549.  
563 Jean D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2011). 
564 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 102. 
565
 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 265.  
566 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 265.  
567 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 265.  
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An analysis into the concept of bindingness will enable a judgment to be made on 
whether the assertions that ‘applicable’ means ‘binding’ is based on sound foundation. 
3.2.1.1 Binding 
The tradition of analytic jurisprudence demonstrates a sustained focus on the 
identification of the constitutive features of law.
568
 Sartor reflected that legal theory has 
‘a large role to play in providing the theories of the grounds of legal bindingness’.569 
Apart from developing normative theories on the grounds of legal bindingness, legal 
theorists are engaged in the empirical investigation of the adoption of views in legal 
communities that provides a description of how (upon which grounds) the members of 
the relevant communities usually derive a bindingness proposition.
570
  
The notion of bindingness is explored to mean ‘cognitive necessity to endorse the 
normative proposition’ or the ‘(cognitive) participability in the collective adoption of a 
normative proposition’.571 Participability in this context, according to Sartor, expresses 
the collective adoption of a rule, or its ‘adoption-worthiness’, which means ‘a rule is 
binding to a reasoner exactly when ideal practical cognition would lead that reasoner to 
                                               
568 Dennis Patterson, ‘After Conceptual Analysis: The Rise of Practice Theory’, in Jaap C Hage, Dietmar 
von der Pfordten (eds) Concepts in Law (Law and Philosophy Library 88, Springer, Dordrecht Heidelberg 
London New York, 2009) at p 117. 
569 Giovanni Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, pp 357 – 386, in Enrico Pattaro, Hubert 
Rottleuthner, Roger A Shiner, Aleksander Peczenik, Giovanni Sartor, and Corrado Roversi (ed) A 
Treaties of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Springer, 2005) at pp 359 – 360. The author 
noted that: ‘We must carefully distinguish such a definition of bindingness from a theory of the grounds 
for bindingness, by which we mean an account of what properties a rule must enjoy in order to be legally 
binding. A theory of the grounds for legal bindingness, when applied to the appropriate inputs (facts and 
evaluations) will provide a determination of what rules are legally binding’. In p 260, the author further 
stated that ‘A theory of the grounds for legal bindingness is indeed mainly constituted by a combination 
of meta-rules about bindingness:  
- positive ones, establishing that a rule is binding if it has certain features, and  
- negative ones, establishing that a rule is not binding if it has certain other features.’ 
The author opined, in p 361 that ‘the definition of legal bindingness as “adoption-worthiness in legal 
reasoning” is neutral with regard to different theories of the grounds of bindingness (of the conditions 
making so that a rule is adoption-worthy): This definition constrains neither the content of the meta-rules 
in these theories, nor the sources they are derived from’. It is noted however that ‘neutrality of the 
definition of legal bindingness does not imply that adopting one or another theory of the grounds of legal 
bindingness is an irrelevant or arbitrary choice. By determining what rules one view as legally adoptable, 
it affects the conclusions of one’s legal reasoning, and hence the decisions one will impose on the parties 
of legal disputes and possibly enforce upon them against their will’. 
570 Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, supra n 569, at pp 344 – 345 and 386.  
571 Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, supra n 569, at p 357.  
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endorse the rule from the plural perspective, in the attempt to participate in the 
collective adoption of that rule’.572  
Accordingly, it is argued that assertion of the legal bindingness of a rule is due to the 
intention to adopt the rule in legal reasoning, which is, the reasoning that is intended to 
establish an enforceable normative conclusion.
573
  
Bindingness denotes the basis of obligations that command or require compliance of 
states.
574
 The terminology of ‘binding’ is commonly taken to mean the authority of law 
commanded  by formal recognition through the doctrine of sources as codified under 
Article 38 of the Statute of ICJ.
575
 The analysis revealed that a careful distinction needs 
to be drawn between ‘formal bindingness’, which is commonly accepted as ‘binding’ by 
the majority of international lawyers, and the inquiry into the ‘binding’ character of a 
rule of law, where ‘bindingness’ is not restricted to the formal sources from where a rule 
is derived.
576
  
This approach is reflected in Rosenne’s comments on the catalogue of elements of the 
sources of doctrines, where resolutions of most international organisations, especially 
organs of the United Nations are considered ‘not binding’ under ‘the terms of the 
constituent instrument of the organisation in question [with no legislative function]’.577 
The inquiry into the ‘binding’ character of a rule, or from where its obligatory character 
arises, is difficult.
578
  
                                               
572 Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, supra n 569, at pp 344 – 345. It is further summarise 
in pp 357 - 358 that: ‘According to our notion of bindingness as (cognitive) participability in the 
collective adoption of a normative proposition, what is binding may vary according to the context and the 
purpose of the bindingness judgment, but also according the specific position of the author of the 
judgment. In fact, such circumstances impact on two (sub-) reasons supporting the conclusion that a new 
rule is binding: 1. the extent to which the general adoption of a new rule would contribute to realising (or 
impairing) legal values, and 2. the chance that one’s adoption of the rule would lead to its collective 
endorsement. These dimensions of legal bindingness adds further contextual specification to the word 
binding’  
573 Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, supra n 569, at pp 344 – 345.  
574 Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1994) at p 13.  
575 See Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at pp 17 – 19.  
576 See a discussion on ‘form’ at pp 9 – 12 in Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it Even 
Matter’ (26 February 2010) supra n 209. 
577 Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at p 18.  
578 Gerard G Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of 
Enforcement’ (1956) 19(1) Modern Law Review 1 – 13, at p 1. The difficulty lies in, as stated by the 
author, in p 8 that, ‘There is, however, this difference between the national and the international position: 
in the national society, the individual has, normally, no difficulty in accounting for his feeling that the law 
is binding on him – for instance, because it has been enacted by the proper authority; whereas it is less 
easy – in fact it is very difficult – in the international field, to say precisely what it is, in the ultimate and 
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There is a proposition that the first and most powerful reason an international law is 
regarded as law is the recognition by the persons whom it controls – the states and other 
subjects of international law, as such.
579
 A law might be considered a valid law due to 
the way it is created, whereby the legal subjects whom the law addresses regard the 
method in which the law is created as authoritative.
580
  
It reflects Fitzmaurice’s observation that the real foundation of authority of international 
law ‘resides in the fact that the States making up the international society recognise it as 
binding upon them, and, moreover, as a system that ipso facto binds them as members 
of that society’. 581  Higgins explored the notion of ‘bindingness’ and the basis of 
obligation of international law and raised two pertinent questions in addressing this 
issue. Firstly, why should any normative system be regarded as binding? Secondly, why 
is that states should comply with the norms of international law?
582
 
In answering the first question, Higgins commented that a wealth of literature has been 
generated on the foundation of the binding, obligatory nature of international law, 
‘ranging from natural law, consent, an infinitely regressive concept 583  of consent 
                                                                                                                                         
juridical sense, that makes international law a binding system that States have a duty to conform to, and 
which, moreover, makes that duty a legal and not merely a moral or social duty’. 
579 Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 19. The author commented, at p 6 that 
analogy can be drawn between national law and international law where, if national law is considered law 
because it is generally accepted as such by the community to whom it is addressed, then international law 
is regarded as a system of ‘law’ if all states are under a legal obligation to abide by its rules. See 
Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement’, 
supra n 578, at p 8. The author reinforces the analogy from national law where he elaborated that ‘Just as 
in the national society the law would not command the assent of the individual unless it were felt to be 
binding precisely because, and for no other reason than that it was the law, so equally international law 
could derive no authority from its acceptance by States as binding, or States would not give that 
acceptance, unless it were felt by them to be in fact inherently binding’. Also at pp 9 – 10: ‘The problem 
of the ultimate foundation of the binding character of law is in no way peculiar to international law. It is a 
general legal problem, and arises just as much with regard to national law as it does for international law’. 
580 Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 6. 
581 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement’, 
supra n 578, at p 8.  
582 Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 13. Such 
questions are raised in the light of her definition of what law is in p 2. Her analysis of international law as 
a process rather than a set of rules are quoted in full: ‘When decisions are made by authorised persons or 
organs, in appropriate forums, within the framework of certain established practices and norms, then what 
occurs is legal decision-making. In other words, international law is a continuing process of authoritative 
decisions. This view rejects the notion of law merely as the impartial application of rules. International 
law is the entire decision-making process, and not just the reference to the trend of past decisions which 
are termed “rules”’. 
583 An inquiry into the juridical foundation of the consent of States that makes a rule binding is a question 
where it is very difficult to give an answer to, as such inquiry will embark on what is ‘known to the 
mathematicians as an infinite regress’. Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International 
Law and the Problem of Enforcement’, supra n 578, at p 9.  
126 
 
anterior to the legal system itself, consensus,
584
 to reciprocity’.585 She opined that for 
international law, it has been accepted that consensus, obtained through the process of 
decision-making in a normative system, be it explicit or tacit, is the foundation of the 
obligatory and binding nature of the rules of international law.
586
  
As to the second question Higgins raised, on the basis of the obligation generated from 
law that drives the compliance of states with the norms of international law, she is of the 
view that the foundation of obligation rests on ‘states’ perception of reciprocal 
advantage in cautioning self-restraint’.587 It is noted that consent in itself does not create 
an obligation unless the consent was given within a system of law that recognises that 
submission of consent is the foundation from which obligation arises.
588
 This is 
reflected in Fitzmaurice’s comment that the basis of obligation and the authority 
generated by international law – i.e. the law’s binding force  – resides in the will and 
recognition of the members of the society.
589
  
The giving of consent by states could be motivated by the presumption of reciprocal 
advantages perceived to be available to them,
590
 but this motivation in itself does not 
explain the ontology of the authority that law commands. Similar arguments could be 
extended to tacit consent or consensus where states’ recognition of the authority of law 
could be deduced in the absent of active act of a submission of consent.  
                                               
584 The concept of consensus is further elaborated where a review of the legality of informal international 
law is based on the criteria of a thick consensus on both the procedural and substantive quality of the 
norm. See Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it Even Matter’ (26 February 2010) supra 
n 209, at p 47. 
585 See Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at pp 13, 14 
and 16. 
586 Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 16. 
587 Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 16. The 
author noted that ‘the classic starting-points remains Brierly, The Basis of Obligation in International 
Law’ (James Leslie Brierly, Hersch Lauterpacht, CHM Waldock, The Basis of Obligation in International 
Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1958)). See also Myres S McDougal, Harold D Lasswell and W Michael 
Reisman, ‘Theories about International law: Prologue to a Configurative Jurisprudence’ (1968) 8 Virginia 
Journal of International Law 188 – 194. See Karl Zemanek, ‘Is the Term “Soft Law” Convenient?’ pp 843 
– 881 in Gerhad Hafter (ed) Liber Amicorum Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern in Honour of His 80th 
Birthday (Kluwer Law International, The Hague, 1998), at pp 856 and 885. The author commented that 
hard law is normally observed and applied because of its ‘general acceptance … the recognition that the 
existing legal rules reflect the shared values and interests of the members of the international community. 
Soft law is normally performed when they correspond to carefully balanced reciprocal interests. As long 
as these interests subsist, the possible political and/or economic consequences of non-performance are 
often a far stronger deterrent than the consequences of the non-performance of most legal obligations. 
This suggests that reciprocity as an incentive of performance is independent of the nature of the 
commitment’. 
588 James Leslie Brierly, The Law of Nations (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1950) at p 54.  
589
 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement’, 
supra n 578, at pp 6 – 12.  
590 Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 16. 
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Hence, it seems that there is only one answer for the two questions raised by Higgins.
591
 
Normative systems, and the norms created from normative systems, are considered 
binding on states due to the consent given by states that ‘declares that consent duly 
given, as in a treaty or a contract, shall be binding on the party consenting’.592 Dixon 
explored substance and content of legal obligations through the notion of material 
sources.
593
 Dixon commented that the purpose of these material sources of law ‘is to 
identify the substance of the obligations which becomes law’.594 
The analysis into the underpinnings of ‘bindingness’ reveals that the connotation of 
‘bindingness’ is not a notion independent from the conceptualisation of law and legality. 
The quest to understand the meaning and nature of ‘bindingness’, the sense of 
obligation imposed by a rule of law, cannot be disengaged from the understanding of 
the law, and the legal system in which law is created.
595
  This raises the second 
subsidiary question of – does the requirement that ‘what is applicable must be binding’ 
originates from the imposition of legality required by rules of international law, and not 
because ‘applicable’ is defined to mean ‘binding’? The next section will address these 
issues accordingly. 
                                               
591 Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 13. Such 
questions are raised in the light of her definition of what law is in p 2. Her analysis of international law as 
a process rather than a set of rules are quoted in full: ‘When decisions are made by authorised persons or 
organs, in appropriate forums, within the framework of certain established practices and norms, then what 
occurs is legal decision-making. In other words, international law is a continuing process of authoritative 
decisions. This view rejects the notion of law merely as the impartial application of rules. International 
law is the entire decision-making process, and not just the reference to the trend of past decisions which 
are termed “rules”’. 
592 Brierly, The Law of Nations, supra n 588, at p 54. The author stated that ‘consent cannot of itself 
create an obligation; it can do so only within a system of law which declares that consent duly given, as in 
a treaty or a contract, shall be binding on the party consenting’. 
593 Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 25. 
594 Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 25. The author laid out that ‘state practice, 
the practice of international organisations, the practice of non-state actors, judicial decisions, the writings 
of jurists and General Assembly resolutions are all material sources for they indicate what a state’s 
obligations actually are, rather than the method by which those obligations became legally binding’. 
However, the sources of law as codified in Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice do not distinguish between formal sources of law and material sources of law.   
595 According to Pokol, ‘the adequate exposition of the concept of law can cover nothing but the concept 
of the legal system. Once the concept of the legal system has been expounded, it is possible … to sum up 
the concept of the less precise “law”, which is actually a notionally looser repetition of the concept of the 
legal system’. Béla Pokol, The Concept of Law. The Mult-Layered Legal System (Rejtjel Edition, 
Budapest, 2001) at p 9. See also Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation, supra n 497, at p 5. Raz 
defined law as ‘the product of many acts of law-making usually over long stretches of time, through 
processes which, far from displaying coherent design, are contributed to by many bodies, only partially 
aware of each other, often pursuing divergent, even conflicting, ends’. 
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3.2.1.2 Bindingness and Legality 
A convergence between the notion of legality and bindingness is apparent in 
Fitzmaurice’s elaboration of law. The notion of ‘law’ is –  
‘revealed as something that has no meaning unless it is external to the will of the 
members of the society in which it functions, as something to which those 
members are subject, and which derives its obligatory character from sources that 
do not rest on consent, but rather themselves confer on consent its law-making 
capacities. And the ultimate source of the validity of this law is and must be extra-
legal’.596  
A rule of law gained its authority and sense of obligation not as much as the states gave 
consent to that rule, but consent of states as to the system of law and the process of law 
making. This consent is what gives law its ‘binding’ force that commands a sense of 
obligation, from which law gains its authority. ‘Bindingness’ in this context, is a quality 
unique to law and a rule of law developed from the system of law. 
This raises the pertinent question of, is it a misconception then, to require that a rule of 
international law be ‘binding’ on the parties in order to be applicable? Is the notion of 
‘bindingness’ not a normative quality specific to law, which should not have 
implications on the interpretation of ‘applicable’ in the context of Article 31(3)(c)? 
An initial perusal of the 1969 Vienna Convention is not capable of addressing these 
questions raised. But the text of the Convention demonstrated that it could be the 
intention of the drafters to distinguish the requirement of legality inherent in the explicit 
reference to ‘rules of international law’ in the earlier part of Article 31(3)(c), with the 
subsequent requirement of the rules of international law to be ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. A requirement of ‘legal relations’ is intentionally omitted, 
although some ‘significant relationship’ should exist in the relations between the parties 
in order to take into account relevant rules of international law in the interpretative 
process via Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
597
  
                                               
596 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement’, 
supra n 578, at p 12.  
597 In reference to the comment by Gardiner – a rule to be applicable, there must exist a significant 
relationship between the parties Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 265. 
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The omission of the term ‘legal’ is not silent as the term ‘legal’ is expressly stipulated in 
Article 63 of the Convention. Article 63 provides that ‘the severance of diplomatic or 
consular relations between parties to a treaty does not affect the legal relations 
established between them by the treaty’.598 A close reading of Article 72 informs that 
‘legal relations’ mean relations established by treaty by which the states have expressed 
their consent to be bound.
599
 Legal relations are distinct from other relations and 
reference to legal relations connotes that the drafters have the intention to refer 
particularly to the legal relations between the parties in Article 72 instead of other 
relations, which could be the case in Article 31(3)(c). 
If the omission of ‘legal’ in Article 31(3)(c) is interpreted, it could imply that the 
requirement of legality, or any legal relation, is not imposed in the phrase ‘applicable in 
the relations between the parties’. This indicates the intention of drafters that Article 
31(3)(c) does not requires a legal relationship established by treaty, and strengthens the 
argument that legality is not a requirement in the interpretation of ‘applicable’.  
It has been argued previously that bindingness is a unique feature of law, and intrinsic 
to a conceptualisation of legality. If legality is not imposed in the phrase ‘applicable in 
the relations between the parties’ (evidenced in the omission of legal relations in the 
latter phrase), bindingness would not be presumed to be a criterion to be fulfilled in the 
interpretation of ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’.  
The subsequent section seeks to support the assertion that a determination of 
‘applicability’ of a rule of international law stipulated in Article 31(3)(c) should not be 
implicated in, or be confounded with, a discourse into the bindingness of law, which 
constitutes a defining feature of legality. A possible suggestion of this disengagement of 
the idea of ‘legality’ and ‘applicability’ is hinted in debates of the ILC, where Mr. 
Bartoš commented that a treaty could be considered in force, but not applicable, if 
certain conditions that lead to the severance of diplomatic relations, which precludes the 
performance of treaties, had occurred.
600
 
                                               
598 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 63. 
599 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 72(1)(b). 
600 ILC, ‘Summary Records of the Eighteenth Session. 4 May – 19 July 1966, [1966] 1(II) Yearbook of 
International Law Commission 1 – 351, supra n 534, at p 213, para 13. Mr. Bartoš stated that ‘he would 
vote for Article 64 [Article 63 in the current text] because he favoured the principle enunciated in the 
Drafting Committee’s text. He wished to point out, however, that the severance of diplomatic relations 
130 
 
3.2.1.3 Requirement of ‘Bindingness’ for ‘Applicable’ Not Supported by Both 
Textual Analysis and Jurisprudence 
(a) Textual Analysis 
The text provisionally adopted in 1964 that subsequently became Article 31(3)(c) stated 
that ‘A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning 
to be given to each term … in the light of the rules of general international law in force 
at the time of its conclusion.’601 The Commission explained that Article 31(3)(c) [Draft 
Article 69(1)(b)] was intended to codify the principle of ‘inter-temporal’ law, reflecting 
that a juridical fact must be appreciated in the light of the law contemporary with it.
602
  
It reiterated the words of Max Huber in the Island of Palmas Arbitration that were 
applied in the Grisbadarna, North Atlantic Coast Fisheries arbitrations, and the case of 
Rights of Nations of the USA in Morocco.
603
 A majority of the members of the 
Commission preferred to maintain the words ‘in force at the time of its conclusion’ 
despite recognising that the scope of a term may sometimes be altered by a change in 
the law.
604
  The Commission decided to leave the temporal element to the intentions of 
the party by subsequently revising the Article to the present wording, and further opined 
that a correct application of the temporal element will be indicated in the interpretation 
of a treaty term in good faith.
605
  
By reference to the development of the provision, it can be found that it is not the 
explicit intention of the Commission to impose the obligation that the ‘rules of 
international law’ must be ‘binding on the parties’ in order to be applicable. The 
requirement that the rules of international law must be ‘binding’ on the parties for them 
to be applicable in the relations between the parties has never been envisaged in the 
                                                                                                                                         
sometimes occurred under conditions which precluded the performance of treaties. He considered that in 
such a case the treaty was in force, but not applicable’.  
601Art 69(1)(b), ILC, ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 16th session, 11 July 1964’ (ORGA 19th 
Session, Supplement) A/5809 (1964) II Yearbook of International Law Commission 173 – 227, at p 199 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_173.pdf> accessed 5 April 2012. 
602 ILC, ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 16th session, 11 July 1964’, supra n 601, at pp 202 – 203, 
para 11. See also ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth 
Session, 4 May – 19 July 1966’ (ORGA, 21st Session Supp No 9) A/6309/Rev.1, [1966] II Yearbook of 
International Law Commission 169 – 363, at p 222, para 16 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a_cn4_191.pdf> accessed 16 November 2012. 
603 ILC, ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 16th session, 11 July 1964’, supra n 601, at pp 202 – 203, 
para 11. ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May 
– 19 July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 222, para 16. 
604
 ILC, ‘Report of the ILC on the work of its 16th session, 11 July 1964’, supra n 601, at p 203, para 1.  
605 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 222, para 16. 
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codification of this element of interpretation. This emphasises that the difficulty of 
comprehensively addressing the temporal issue was due to the consideration that the 
correct application of the temporal element is an interpretation of good faith, and the 
intentions of the parties. 
Besides, if ‘bindingness’ is a requirement, the Convention would be explicit in 
indicating that it is the case, as shown in Article 38 where it provides that a rule set forth 
in treaty is not precluded from becoming binding on a third state as a customary rule of 
international law. If ‘applicable’ means binding, then in the need to maintain uniformity 
and consistency throughout the convention, this provision should have read ‘a rule set 
forth in a treaty is not precluded from becoming “applicable” on a third state as a rule of 
customary international law’.606  
Similarly, if ‘applicable’ means binding, Article 65(4) will not read ‘nothing in the 
foregoing paragraphs shall affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any 
provisions in force binding the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes’ 
(author’s emphasis). Instead, it should read ‘nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall 
affect the rights or obligations of the parties under any provisions in force “applicable 
to” the parties with regard to the settlement of disputes’ (author’s emphasis). The 
wording of this provision goes further, to illustrate  that firstly, provisions in force do 
not necessarily ‘bind’ the parties unless it is the intention of the parties to be so bound, 
or else Article 65(4) will be the ‘provision in force [binding the parties] with regard to 
the settlement of dispute’. Secondly, the Article shows that if rules of international law 
‘applicable’ in the relations between the parties are meant to be ‘binding’ on the parties, 
the wording of Article 31(3)(c) will be ‘rules of international law binding on the parties’ 
as has been done in Article 38 and Article 65(4).  
Moreover, Article 72(1)(b) highlights the fact that the Convention will be explicit in 
indicating what type of ‘relations between the parties’ the Commission has envisaged – 
be it ‘legal’ or ‘binding’ – in phrasing the text of the Convention. Article 72(1)(b) 
stipulates that ‘the suspension of the operation of a treaty … does not otherwise affect 
the legal relations between the parties’ (author’s emphasis) and gives a clear indication 
                                               
606 The current text of Art 38 of the 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, reads ‘Rules in a treaty 
becoming binding on third States through international custom. Nothing in articles 34 – 37 precludes a 
rule set forth in a treaty from becoming binding upon a third State as a customary rule of international law, 
recognised as such’. 
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that if the intention of the provision is meant to create an obligation that addresses the 
‘legal relations between the parties’, it will be explicit in doing so.  
Thus, the current opinion of scholars that – in order for the rules to be ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’, these rules must be ‘binding’; and the relations between 
the parties must be legal – does not seem to be reflected in a textual analysis of the text 
of the Convention.         
(b) Jurisprudence of International Courts and Tribunals 
It is interesting to note that the approach adopted by Pauwelyn also suggested that a 
requirement of bindingness in the interpretation of the term ‘applicable’ is not imposed. 
He suggested that, apart from the applicability of general international law and the 
norms binding on all WTO members that are deemed applicable as reference material 
for the interpretation of WTO covered agreements, norms that ‘reflect their [the parties’] 
common intentions’ are equally applicable in the relations between the parties.607  
The possibility of a non-requirement of ‘bindingness’ in the determination of whether a 
rule of law is considered ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ has opened a 
new horizon for the debate on the normative content of ‘applicable’, and shed new light 
on the interpretation of ‘applicable’. Pauwelyn’s argument that favours and supports the 
notion that the intention of the parties is the ultimate determination of ‘applicability’, 
can be observed from decisions taken by international courts and tribunals. It can be 
observed that the pre-condition of ‘bindingness’ in the determination of whether the rule 
is applicable in the relations between the parties has not always been shown in 
international adjudication.  
In reference to the Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith in the OSPAR Arbitration, 
relevant rules, which were not yet binding on the disputing parties, are considered as 
relevant rules applicable in the relations between the parties. He arrived at this decision 
based on the consideration that it is the common intention of the parties as to the 
‘applicability’ of the 1999 Aarhus Convention as manifested through the fact that the 
parties are signatories to the Convention.
608
 Judge Griffith opined that the OSPAR 
Convention repeatedly and explicitly requires close consideration of international legal 
                                               
607 Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity’, supra n 132, at p 915. 
608 OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith, at paras 7 – 19.  
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sources.
609
 In particularly, the OSPAR Convention defined ‘dumping’ to include an 
operation that takes place in accordance with other relevant international law.
610
  
Judge Griffith opined that by defining ‘dumping’ as not to include ‘[operations] leaving 
wholly or partly in place of a disused offshore installation or disused offshore pipeline 
provided that any such operation takes place in accordance with any relevant provision 
other relevant international law’,611 it provides an explicit mandate for the Tribunal to 
apply the OSPAR Convention as a lex specialis between the Parties. The definition of 
dumping to exclude the leaving of offshore installation or disused offshore pipeline that 
is in accordance with other relevant international law indicates an interpretation of 
Article 9 of the OSPAR Convention that is consistent with ‘broadly defined 
international law, and not confined merely to treaty and conventional law in force 
binding on the Parties’.612  
Judge Griffith cross-referred to the majority decision in paragraphs 101 to 105 that 
rejected the application of Aarhus Convention and also the ‘draft proposals for a new 
EC Directive’ in informing the meaning of Article 9(2) of the OSPAR Convention 
because they are ‘evolving international law and practice’, and ‘material that has not yet 
become law’. 613  The main concern of the majority is not because the proposed 
instruments are not binding, but because these instruments are not yet law, of which 
Judge Griffith departed from the majority decision.
614
 Judge Griffith concluded that the 
–  
‘Aarhus Convention falls within the definition of applicable law and Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention as a legal source that possesses some 
normative and evidentiary value to the extent that regard may be had to it to 
                                               
609 OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith at p 120, para 4. 
610 Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (concluded 22 
September 1992, entered into force 25 March 1998) 2354 UNTS 67; (1993) 32 ILM 1069 
<http://www.ospar.org/html_documents/ospar/html/OSPAR_Convention_e_updated_text_2007.pdf> 
accessed 2 January 2011 (hereinafter: ‘OSPAR Convention’). 
611 OSPAR Convention, supra n 610, Art 1(g)(iii). 
612 OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith at p 120, para 5. 
613 OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith at pp 120 – 121, paras 6 – 7. 
614
 OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118, Judge Griffith commented, in paras 6 – 7 that, the majority rejected 
the application of the Aarhus Convention and the EC legislative proposal due to, as stated in paras 99 – 
105: ‘law in statu nascendi’;  and para 180: ‘legally unperfected instruments’. 
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inform and confirm the content of the definition of information contained in 
Article 9(2) of the OSPAR Convention’.615 
A similar stance has been taken by the ICJ in the case of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project 
where the Court explicitly stated that –  
‘Owing to new scientific insights and to a growing awareness of the risks for 
mankind – for present and future generations – of pursuit of such interventions at 
an unconsidered and unabated pace, new norm and standards have been 
developed … Such new norms have to be taken into consideration, and such new 
standards given proper weight.’616 
The Court proceeded to conclude that the obligation to regularise Variant C through the 
reestablishment of a join regime as required under Articles 9 and 10 of the 1977 Treaty 
is in accordance with Article 5(2) of the 1997 Watercourses Convention.
617
 Despite the 
fact that the 1997 Watercourses Convention has not entered into force during the 
adjudication of this dispute, the Court recognised and applied this Convention in the 
interpretation and application of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. The Court opined 
that ‘modern development of international law has strengthened the principle of [the 
community of interest in a navigable river] for non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses as evidenced by the adoption of the 1997 Watercourses Convention’.618  
Formal sources of international law do not seem to be a great concern in the Iron Rhine 
case.
619
 The Tribunal had the opportunity to reflect on the duty to prevent or mitigate 
significant harm caused by development where the Tribunal opined that this duty had 
now become a principle of general international law, as reflected in Principle 4 of the 
1992 Rio Declaration.
620
 In this context, the Tribunal pronounced that the dictum of 
‘new norms have to be taken into consideration and new standards given proper 
weight’621 is equally applicable in the interpretation of Article XII of the 1839 Treaty of 
Separation and Article IV of the Iron Rhine Treaty. The pivotal consideration of the 
Tribunal was that neither party denies the applicability of environmental norms. This 
                                               
615 OSPAR Proceeding, supra n 118, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Griffith at p 123, para 19. 
616 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra n 1, at p 78, para 140. 
617 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra n 1, at pp 78 – 80, paras 145 – 147. 
618 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra n 1, at p 56, para 85.  
619
 Iron Rhine case, supra n 525. 
620 Iron Rhine case, supra n 525, at para 59. 
621 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra n 1, at p 78, para 140.  
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prompted the Tribunal to decide that any emerging principles, provisions of European 
law or general international law referring to the conservation, management, notions of 
prevention and of sustainable development, and protection for future generation, 
regardless of their status, are relevant in the relations between the parties.
622
        
The International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) adopted similar approach 
where Judge Treves, in his separate opinion, considers the 1995 Straddling Fish Stocks 
Agreement as relevant for the purpose of interpretation despite the fact that it neither 
had entered into force nor was it ratified by the disputing parties in the case of Bluefin 
Tuna. The reason it is considered applicable is that the 1995 Agreement is ‘significant 
for evaluating the trends followed by international law’.623 
These cases confirm that the relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties for the purpose of interpretation do not necessarily need to 
be ‘binding’ on the parties. It could have binding force on the parties due to the nature 
of the rule of international law identified, but it is not a determinative factor in the 
ascertainment of whether the rule of international law is ‘applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ in the context of Article 31(3)(c).  
This assertion is reflected in Pauwelyn’s categorisation of types of rules of international 
law and the purposes for which these rules of international law are used. Pauwelyn 
categorised and treated similarly the three types of international law – namely general 
international law; norms binding on all WTO members; or norms reflecting the parties’ 
[WTO parties’] ‘common intentions’.624 The applicability of general international law 
and norms binding on all WTO members is due to the reason that these laws or norms 
reflect the common intentions of the parties’.625  
In this regard, the requirement of bindingness is not to be considered as a yardstick in 
the ascertainment of ‘applicability in the relations between the parties’ of a rule of 
international law under Article 31(3)(c). The assessment of whether a rule of 
international law is ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ commands the 
question of whether the rule reflects the common intention of the parties.  
                                               
622 Iron Rhine case, supra n 525, at paras 58 and 59.  
623 ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand and Australia v Japan) (Provisional Measures, 27 
August 1999) <http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=62&L=1%2F> accessed 30 December 2011 
(hereinafter: ‘Bluefin Tuna Provisional Measure’). Separate Opinion of Judge Treves para 10. 
624 Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity’, supra n 132, at p 915. 
625 Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity’, supra n 132, at p 915. 
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The analyses of the text and existing jurisprudence in this section revealed that what is 
most important for a rule of international law to be considered ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ was that the rule possesses some normative and 
evidentiary value to inform and confirm the content of the provision to be interpreted.
626
 
Alternatively, it is ‘significant for the evaluation of trends followed by international 
law’.627 From this juncture, it could be observed that rules that are considered to be 
applicable for the reasons stated above could also be said to be ‘relevant’ for the 
interpretation of a treaty term or provision.  
The method of treaty interpretation adopted by the Panel in the EC – Biotech case that 
‘bindingness’ is not a requirement in the determination of whether the rules of 
international law are ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ was commented to 
be ‘over-inclusive’.628 Scholar argued that such approach, where ‘bindingness’ of the 
external ‘informative’ treaty to be taken into account is not a requirement, leads to the 
‘loosening of the requirement of state consent’.629 The criticism posed was based on the 
need for state consent pursuant to the concept of sovereignty as the ‘entrance condition’ 
for an external treaty serving an informative function to be taken into account in treaty 
interpretation, and not to the fact that these external rules must be legally binding.  
This criticism can be addressed by the argument submitted above, that the rules of 
international law deemed applicable in the relations between the parties should reflect 
the common intentions of the parties. The common intention of the parties reflects the 
consent of states as to the interpretation of the external rule, which allows the 
incorporation of the external treaty in the interpretation of a term or provision of treaty 
without the need for the external rule to be binding on the parties. 
In other words, the crux of Young’s argument to impose the requirement of 
‘bindingness’ in the interpretation of ‘applicable’ under Article 31(3)(c) was due to the 
importance placed on the need for state consent. However, this concern is not neglected 
if a requirement of bindingness is not imposed. A rule that is ‘implicitly accepted or 
tolerated by all parties to the treaty under interpretation in the sense that it can 
                                               
626 Evidenced in the dissenting opinion of Judge Griffith in the OSPAR Arbitration, and the judgment of 
the case concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project. See supra n 615 and n 616. 
627 Separate opinion of Judge Treves, See supra n 623 and accompanying text.  
628
 Margaret A Young, ‘The WTO’s Use of Relevant Rules of International Law: An Analysis of the 
Biotech Case’ (2007) 56 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 899 – 930, at p 908. 
629 Young, ‘An Analysis of the Biotech Case’, supra n 628, at pp 908 and 909. 
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reasonably be considered to express the common intentions or understanding of all 
members as to the meaning of the term concerned’630 (which is how applicable should 
be defined), does not bypass state consent. 
The lack of legal ‘bindingness’ of an external treaty does not render the external rules 
inapplicable under Article 31(3)(c) as long as there is consensus from the states. The 
fact that a rule of international law that is binding on the parties could be, or is de facto 
applicable in the relations between the parties as the consent of the states is apparent. 
However, this does not mean that the phrase ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ itself as provided under Article 31(3)(c) imposes a criterion of bindingness.  
The Panel in EC – Biotech illustrated this point succinctly where it stated that – 
‘the mere fact that one or more disputing parties are not parties to the convention 
does not necessarily mean that a convention cannot shed light on the meaning and 
scope of a treaty term to be interpreted’.631 
A common understanding could be drawn from relevant scholars that the requirement 
imposed on the stipulation for the applicability of the relevant rule to be taken into 
account in an interpretative process is the intention of the parties. The fact that the 
relevant rules are binding on the parties merely strengthened the common intentions of 
the parties as to the applicability of the rules in their relations. It does not impose that 
what is ‘applicable’ must be binding.  
In the context of Article 31(3)(c) where relevant rules of international law are used as 
‘an aid to the interpretation of a given provision of an agreement’,632 the interpretation 
that requires ‘applicable’ to be binding is demonstrated to be inconsistent with the 
existing jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. This induces a revision of 
the interpretation of the phrase ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ where 
the existing threshold of ‘bindingness’ is argued in this thesis to be inappropriate.  
The rules of international law considered ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ 
are contingent on the common intentions of the parties. The common intention of the 
parties is informed by the normative content underlying the said rule of international 
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 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 314, para 15(d). 
631 EC- Biotech, supra n 117, at paras 7.94. 
632 Lorand Bartels, ‘Applicable Law in WTO Dispute Settlement Proceedings’, supra n 550,  at p 510. 
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law. Such revision prompts a reconstruction of the salient feature of the phrase ‘relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ where 
emphases are relocated to –  
1. The setting of criteria against which ‘relevant’ is assessed;  
2. The normative scope and content of rules of international law; which informs  
3. The common understanding amongst the parties, or the common intention of the 
parties.
633
  
A reconstruction of the salient points for the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) will 
ensue if ‘applicable’ is appreciated in the light of the argument that Article 31(3)(c) 
does not require that a rule of international law must be binding on the parties in order 
to be considered to be ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’. This flexibility 
afforded in this approach of the interpretation of ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ supports the four possible constructions of ‘the parties’ elaborated in the 
subsequent section in which the ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ are analysed through the interpretation of who ‘the parties’ are. 
3.2.2 In the Relations between ‘the Parties’  
The debate on the correct interpretation of ‘the parties’ continues to plague the 
interpretation and application of Article 31(3)(c).
634
  Gardiner’s interpretation suggested 
otherwise. He is of the opinion that ‘the immediate context [of Article 31(3)(c)] is 
slightly different [where] the omission of “all” is combined with the phrase “applicable 
in the relations between the parties”[, which seems to] import the idea of significant 
relations’ (author’s emphasis)’635 
Much controversy has been created by the claims over the correct interpretation of ‘the 
parties’.636  It is raised that the qualifier of ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ suggests the need for scrutiny if the external rule is ‘truly applicable to (all) the 
                                               
633 Pauwelyn, ‘Bridging Fragmentation and Unity’, supra n 132, at p 915. Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public 
International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, supra n 264, at pp 575 – 576. This notion of 
common understanding and common intentions of parties are further elaborated in the subsequent section 
in the study of the four constructions of ‘the parties’. 
634 Linderfalk, ‘Who are ‘The Parties’?’, supra n 260, especially pp 362 – 364.  
635
 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 265. 
636 Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 555, at p 
17. 
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parties to a treaty’.637 The various interpretative approaches are loosely categorised as 
strict or broad, whereby the determination of ‘the parties’ in the stricter approach or the 
broader approach will influence how Article 31(3)(c) is to be interpreted, that is, 
whether it should be understood in a narrow sense or in a broader context.
638
 However, 
questions remain, especially in the case where the treaty to be interpreted and the 
external treaty relied upon are both multilateral treaties, whether identical membership 
is required in the application of Article 31(3)(c).
639
  
A strict interpretation of ‘the parties’ refers to ‘all parties to the interpreted treaty’, that 
each and every one of the states bound by the interpreted treaty at the time of 
interpretation must be equally bound by the rule used as a means of interpretation. A 
more generally held view at present is the broad or divergent approach in interpretation, 
which suggests that, a correct meaning of ‘the parties’ should be – two or more parties 
to a specific dispute (concerning the interpretation or application of the treaty).
640
 The 
interpreter of that treaty may draw on the existence of a rule of law applicable in the 
relations between the disputing states, irrespective of whether the said rule can be 
applied in the relations between other parties to the interpreted treaty.
641
  
A careful reading of the 1969 Vienna Convention does not reveal how the Convention 
meant to interpret ‘the parties’ because the initial design of this rule was originally to 
deal with the inter-temporal aspect of interpretation.
642
 Hence, it is inevitable that the 
scope and limitation of ‘the parties’ in the application of Article 31(3)(c) are 
indeterminable by sole reference to the ordinary meaning of this term.
643
 The ordinary 
meaning and the context of Article 31(3)(c) is unhelpful in seeking the intended 
meaning of this term.
644
 The controversy over this term has been eloquently summed up 
by Gardiner –  
                                               
637 Wälde, ‘Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples’, supra n 345, at p 775. 
638 Linderfalk, ‘Who are ‘The Parties’?’, supra n 260, at p 345. 
639  Anne van Aaken, ‘Defragmentation of Public International Law through Interpretation: A 
Methodological Proposal’ (2009) 16(2) Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 483 – 512 at p 498. 
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642 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n 272, at p 138.  
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 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 263. 
644 Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 555, at p 
18. 
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‘The first issue is whether the reference is to the parties to a dispute or difference 
over the meaning of a treaty, or to parties to the treaty being interpreted. Even if 
the latter, the question which recurs in the case of a multilateral treaty is whether 
the meaning is just those of the parties to the treaty who have a dispute or 
difference over interpretation, or a group of parties who have established some 
particular international regime among themselves, or whether the reference is to 
all parties to the treaty which is being invoked to provide applicable rules.’645 
Hence, apart from the possibility that ‘the parties’ might refer to parties that are not 
party to the treaty, the controversy also revolves on the situation where even ‘the parties’ 
are parties to the treaty. If the treaty happens to be a multilateral treaty, questions arise. 
First, whether the meaning of the interpreted term in the treaty that takes into 
consideration the external treaty will apply only to the parties to the dispute. 
Alternatively, whether it will be equally applied to the parties not party to a dispute, but 
who are parties to the multilateral treaty to be interpreted.  
To complicate the matter, will such meaning be applicable to the parties to the 
multilateral treaty but not parties to the dispute and the external treaty relied upon for 
interpretation? The discussion of whether ‘the parties’ applies only to parties in dispute 
becomes more convoluted in reference to Article 66(a) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. 
Article 66(a) provides for procedures for judicial settlement, arbitration and conciliation 
where it seems to indicate that the drafters will be explicit if ‘the parties’ are intended 
only for ‘the parties to a dispute’ by referring to these parties as ‘the parties to a 
dispute’.646 The contextual reading of the term does not clarify the confusion. It merely 
provides a possibility that ‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) are not restricted to ‘the 
parties to the dispute’. Whether ‘the parties’ actually refers to any other parties 
remained uncertain.  
The Commentary to the 1969 Vienna Convention was careful in distinguishing the 
meanings for four separate categories of states, according to the requirement in a 
particular context, and stressed that the terminology used must be uniform.
647
 Article 
                                               
645 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 263. 
646 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 66. 
647 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 190, para 12. The four categories are , namely ‘negotiating state’, 
‘contracting state’, ‘party’ and ‘states entitled to become parties to the treaty’ (which the Commission 
considered that it did not appear to require definition). The Commission commented that: ‘Negotiating 
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2(1)(g) defines ‘party’ to mean a state which has consented to be bound by the treaty 
and for which the treaty is in force. However, it does not mean that the use of this term, 
‘party’ conveys similar meaning throughout the Convention.648 This strengthens further 
the proposition that the plural usage of ‘party’, be it ‘parties’ or ‘state parties’ (as 
suggested by Gardiner to be the common usage in treaty parlance), or the Commission’s 
abbreviation to ‘the parties’649 does not necessarily have the same context or meaning of 
‘party’ as defined in Article 2(1)(g).  
A variety of the plural form of ‘party’ is used throughout the Convention and each use 
of this term has its own meaning in the context of the provision. They do not necessarily 
refer to the meaning of ‘party’ as defined in Article 2(1)(g), which refers to states that 
have consented to be bound by a treaty that is in force. It is noted that in Part III of the 
1969 Vienna Convention, the plural form of ‘all the parties’ is used in Article 31(2)(a). 
It provides that the context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall include 
any agreement relating to the treaty made between all the parties (own emphasis) in 
connection with the conclusion of the treaty. The use of ‘all the parties’ in this context 
clearly refers to all the parties of the treaty to be interpreted.  
In the immediate context that has closer proximity with Article 31(3)(c), Article 31(3)(a) 
invokes the term ‘the parties’ in the context of subsequent agreement between the 
parties (own emphasis) regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its 
provisions. ‘The parties’ in this instance strictly referred to parties for whom the treaty 
is in force. This strict approach in the particular context of Article 31(3)(a), despite 
being consistent with the meaning adopted in Article 2(1)(g), is not repeated in Article 
31(2)(a) and (b) where the Commission resorted to use different variations of ‘party’ in 
the specific context of a particular provision. Article 31(2)(a) employs ‘all the parties’ if 
referring to all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; whereas 
Article 31(2)(b) uses ‘one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of the 
treaty’ or ‘the other parties’ in reference to the specific situations pertaining to the 
conclusion of the treaty. In instances of such specificity, different versions of ‘parties’ 
are used.  
                                                                                                                                         
states is required to be distinguished from both ‘contracting states’ and ‘parties’ in different context, 
especially whenever an article speaks of the intention underlying the treaty 
648
 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 190, para 12. 
649 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 263.  
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This is consistent with the uniform approach adopted by the Commission, whereby 
when the Commission intended that all the parties to a treaty are involved in the 
particular provision, the term ‘all the parties’ are specifically mentioned.650 In support of 
this contention, the use of the term ‘the parties’ that does not refer to ‘all the parties’ can 
be found in Article 30(4). The article provides for the application of successive treaties 
relating to the same subject matter when not all the parties to the preceding treaties are 
the parties to the successive treaties (own emphasis). The location of Article 31(3)(c) 
does not seem to be determinative of how ‘the parties’ is interpreted. Recourse to the 
records of the ILC indicates that the provision was moved to the existing position 
simply because it was ‘extrinsic both to the text and to the context as defined in 
paragraph 2’,651 and did not belong anywhere else.  
The Commentary further noted that it is considered justifiable to employ the term ‘the 
party’ in certain cases – where the validity of a treaty that has purportedly come into 
force is challenged;
652
 or where a treaty that was in force has been terminated
653
 – 
despite the decision of the Commission to confine the term to states deemed ‘party’ to a 
treaty that is in force.
654
 For both Articles 65 and 69(3), although the validity of the 
treaty is challenged, the term ‘the party’ is still used even though Article 2(1)(g) defines 
‘party’ to mean ‘a state which has consented to be bound by the treaty and for which the 
treaty is in force’.  
The use of ‘the party’, despite the Commission’s intention to confine to states for which 
the treaty is in force, does deviate from this intention. This observation is pertinent 
especially in the interpretation of ‘parties’ as stated in Article 31(2)(a) and (b) that 
addresses ‘parties’ in connection with the conclusion of a treaty. If the strict 
interpretation provided in Article 2(1)(g) is imposed, unless the state ratifies the treaty 
immediately, and it entered into force straight away (which is not the case normally), 
                                               
650 Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 555, at p 
18. The author further noted in support of his contention that ‘party’ as defined in Article 2(1)(g) does not 
mean ipso facto that the term should be understood as meaning only ‘parties to the interpreted treaty’. If 
the provision intended to be understood to mean only ‘parties to the interpreted treaty’, such intention is 
explicit in the use of ‘all the parties’. Examples include Articles 15(c), 20(2), 30(3), 57(b), and 59(1).  
651 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 222, para 16. 
652 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 69(3). 
653
 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 65.  
654 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 190, para 12. 
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the application of these provisions would be problematic (but in practice, the application 
of these provisions has never been an issue).
655
  
Furthermore, a careful analysis of Article 72 of the 1969 Vienna Convention shows ‘the 
parties’ does not necessarily refer to all parties of the treaty to be interpreted. Article 72 
provides that the suspension of the operation of a treaty ‘releases the parties between 
which operation of the treaty is suspended, from the obligation to perform the treaty in 
their mutual relations during the period of the suspension’ (author’s emphasis). 656 
Interestingly, it is implicit in the Article that the Convention provides for multilateral 
treaty where its obligations are owed in a synallagmatic
657
 way (reciprocal) between the 
parties, as evidenced in the used of the word ‘mutual’.  
The use of the term ‘mutual’ connotes that the operation of treaty during the suspended 
period is terminated only in the mutual relations between paired parties instead of all 
the parties to the treaty being interpreted (author’s emphasis), that is, a bilateral 
relationship between ‘mutual’ parties is permissible within a multilateral treaty. This 
interpretation is supported by the commentary by the Commission where it elaborates 
that ‘the subparagraph speaks of relieving “the parties between which the operation of 
the treaty is suspended” because in certain cases the suspension may occur between 
only some of the parties to a multilateral treaty’.658  
The subsequent subparagraph furthers the same approach whereby it states that the 
suspension of a treaty ‘does not otherwise affect the legal relations between the parties 
established by the treaty’, which the Commission clarified to mean – even though the 
operation of the treaty provisions are suspended, the legal nexus between the parties 
established by the treaty remains intact (author’s emphasis).659 Article 72(2) strengthens 
the interpretation that ‘the parties’ in the context of this provision does not refer to all 
the parties to the treaty, where it provides that ‘the parties’ shall refrain from acts 
tending to obstruct the resumption of the operation of the treaty.  
                                               
655 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 264. 
656 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 72(1)(a) 
657 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 315.   
658 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 267, para 2.   
659 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 267, para 3. 
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After emphasising that the legal relationships between the parties of the treaty are not 
otherwise affected, it further requires that ‘the parties’ (the parties who had invoked the 
suspension of the treaty) shall not undertake acts that will obstruct the resumption of the 
operation of the treaty in accordance with the spirit of good faith.
660
 It is apparent that 
‘the parties’ does not have the intended meaning of ‘all the parties to the treaty’.   
However, if the multilateral treaty is an integral treaty that is owed erga omnes or erga 
omnes partes, where ‘the force of the obligation is self-existent, absolute and inherent 
for each party’;661 or ‘towards all the world rather than towards particular parties’ and 
must be applied integrally,
662
 the interpretation of ‘the parties’ might have to be all the 
parties to the interpreted treaty, depending on the common intentions of ‘the parties’ to 
the multilateral treaty being interpreted.
663
   
However, in EC – Biotech, the Panel took a different approach by explaining that the 
use of ‘all the parties’ in Article 31(2)(a) is necessitated by the existence of Article 
31(2)(b), which does not rule out the interpretation of the term ‘the parties’ to mean ‘all 
the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c). The Panel stated that – 
‘the absence of a reference to “all the parties” in Article 31(3)(c) is explained by 
the fact that Article 31(3) contains no provision like Article 31(2)(b). [This means] 
Article 31(3) contains no provision which refers to “one or more parties” and 
hence could render unclear or ambiguous the reference to “the parties” in Article 
31(3)(c)’.664  
                                               
660 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 267, para 4. 
661 Gerard Fitzmaurice, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur’, 
(18 March 1958) UN Doc A/CN.4/115 and Corr.1 (1958) II Yearbook of International Law Commission 
20 – 46, Art 19, at pp 27 – 28 <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_115_corr1.pdf> 
accessed 16 November 2012.  
662 Gerard Fitzmaurice, ‘Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Gerald Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur’ 
(15 March 1957) UN Doc A/CN.4/107 (1957) II Yearbook of International Law Commission 16 – 70, Art 
19, pp 54 and 55, paras 124 – 128 <http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_107.pdf> 
accessed 16 November 2012.  
663 This strengthens the argument that the common intentions of the parties to the interpreted treaty is of 
paramount importance. Refer to discussion in infra n 1513 on the normative weight is command by an 
interpretation of multilateral agreement that is integral in nature. For a comprehensive distinction between 
synallagmatic treaty and integral treaty, see Oliver Dörr and Kirsten Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary (Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg 2012) at pp 441 – 
445. The Jean Monnet Center for International and Regional Economic Law and Justice, ‘WTO 
Obligations are Bilateral Obligations’ (Academy of European law online, undated) 
<http://centers.law.nyu.edu/jeanmonnet/archive/papers/02/020101-01.html#P49_10903> accessed 24 
May 2012.  
664 EC- Biotech, supra n 117, at p 333 at para 7.68, fn 242. 
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The Panel in the EC – Biotech case decided that ‘the parties’ under Article 31(3)(c) 
requires that all WTO parties have to be a party to the external rules applicable in the 
interpretation of a treaty.
665
  
Samson supported the narrow interpretation based on Article 2(1)(g) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention taken by the WTO Panel, and defended a direct application of the 
interpretative regime of the 1969 Vienna Convention that interpreted ‘the parties’ to 
refers to all of the parties to the treaty.
666
 She supported her contention with two lines of 
inquiry: Firstly, she argues that there is no proof in support of the argument that ‘the 
parties’ under Article 31(3)(c) is meant to differ from its ordinary meaning in the overall 
context of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
The second inquiry proposed was consistent with the argument made in this section. 
She contended that it goes against the desirable outcome of the harmonisation of 
international legal order to interpret ‘the parties’ as referring only to the parties in 
dispute, when harmonisation requires that there is one correct meaning for any treaty 
provision common to all its parties, as obtained through the application of the rules of 
interpretation under the 1969 Vienna Convention.
667
 However, unlike the case of Article 
66, and despite the availability of Article 31(4) to provide for ‘special meaning if the 
parties so intended’, the lack of textual specification does not by itself prove that ‘the 
parties’ under Article 31(3)(c) is not intended to have a meaning that differs from 
Article 2(1)(g).  
The European Court of Justice supported the arguments proposed throughout this 
section that ‘the parties’ is not narrowly restricted to only ‘parties to the treaty’ where 
the Court reiterated that the European Convention on Human Rights –  
‘must be applied in accordance with the principles of international law, in 
particularly with those relating to the international protection of human rights 
where it considers that the positive obligations that Article 8 of the Convention … 
must be interpreted in the light of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on 
                                               
665 EC- Biotech, supra n 117, at p 333 at para 7.68. 
666 Samson ‘A World of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT’, supra n 547, at p 704. 
667Samson ‘A World of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(3)(c) of the 
VCLT’, supra n 547, at p 705.  
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the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction, all the more so where the 
respondent state is also a party to that instrument (own emphasis)’.668  
The approach adopted by the European Court of Justice is entirely consistent with 
Article 31(3)(c) despite not specifically referring to the Article. The Court strongly 
emphasised the need to apply the European Convention on Human Rights in accordance 
with principles of international law, especially principles of international law that relate 
to the international protection of human rights. The Court held that Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights must be interpreted in the light of the Hague 
Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction. The reiteration by 
the Court of the fact that the respondent state ‘is also a party to that instrument’ is 
merely a matter of judicial prudence.
669
 The use of the phrase ‘all the more so’670 by the 
Court indicates the Court’s position that the respondent state, being a party to the Hague 
Convention, merely strengthens the applicability of the Hague Convention in the 
interpretation of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The use of 
this phrase, as interpreted in conjunction with the earlier phrase of ‘must be interpreted 
in the light of the Hague Convention of 25 October 1980 on the Civil Aspects of 
                                               
668 European Court of Human Rights, HN v Poland, Application no 77710/01 (13 September 2005) para 
75 <http://www.humanrights.is/the-human-rights-
project/humanrightscasesandmaterials/cases/regionalcases/europeancourtofhumanrights/nr/2601> 
accessed 8 January 2011. 
669 Saint Thomas Aquinas, translated and edited with introduction and glossary by Richard J Regan, 
Aquinas. The Cardinal Virtues. Prudence, Justice, Fortitude, and Temperance (Hackett Publishing 
Company, Indianapolis, Indiana, 2005) at p 1. It is stated that ‘Prudence involves three acts of reason: 
deliberating well, judging rightly, and commanding what one should do or not do. Commanding what one 
should do or not do, since it is closer to the end of practical reason (i.e., proper human action), is the chief 
act of prudence’. The justification of the Court of its reference to the Hague Convention with the fact that 
the respondent state is a party to the Hague Convention in para 75 (despite not doing so in para 73) 
merely indicates the Court’s intention to demonstrate that its decision is undertaken in fulfilment of the 
three acts of reason in its judicial reasoning. See infra n 670. 
670 This phrase is used by the European Court of Human Rights in para 73 of the Judgment, supra n 668. 
The Court stated that ‘In cases of this kind the adequacy of a measure is to be judged by the swiftness of 
its implementation, as the passage of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the 
child and the parent who does not live with him or her. In proceedings under the Hague Convention this is 
all the more so (author’s own emphasis), as Article 11 of the Hague Convention requires the judicial or 
administrative authorities concerned to act expeditiously in proceedings for the return of children and any 
inaction lasting more than six weeks may give rise to a request for a statement of reasons for the delay’. 
The use of the phrase ‘all the more so’ in para 73 indicates the Court’s intention to reinforce the 
obligation of the national authority to take swift action to facilitate the reunion of a parent with his or her 
child imposed under Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (para 71) in reference to the 
proceedings under Art 11 of the Hague Convention. In para 73, the reference of the Court to the Hague 
Convention is not contingent on the respondent state being a party to the Hague Convention, as the 
reference was made without explicating that the respondent party is a party to the Hague Convention. 
This phrase is used again in para 75 to emphasise the position adopted by the Court over the applicability 
of the Hague Convention in the interpretation of Art 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and 
substantiated the reference with the fact that the respondent state is a party to the Hague Convention, as a 
matter of judicial prudence. 
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International Child Abduction’, implies that, even if the respondent state is not a party 
to the Hague Convention, it does not take away or reduce the competence of the Court 
in interpreting the European Convention on Human Rights in accordance with it.     
Thus, as shown by the preceding arguments, it seems that both limbs of the definition of 
‘party’ under Article 2(1)(g), namely ‘consent to be bound’ and ‘treaty in force’, are not 
generally reflected in the subsequent use of the plural form of this term throughout the 
Convention.
671
 Apart from that, it can be observed that a more flexible interpretation of 
‘parties’ has been undertaken, where this term has been used lato sensu.672 This goes to 
prove that the ordinary meaning of the term ‘the parties’ offers no assistance in the 
identification of its intended meaning.
673
 The interpretation of this term in the context of 
the Convention is not helpful either in the determination of who are ‘the parties’ in 
Article 31(3)(c). Despite the emphasis on the need for consistency by the Commission, 
the different variations of the term in its plural form used throughout the Convention 
made it impossible to circumvent the ambiguity posed by the term ‘the parties’ stated 
under Article 31(3)(c) by an examination of the context.
674
  
Hence, the confusion, succinctly summarised by Gardiner quoted above, remains.
675
 A 
reading based on the ordinary meaning of the term ‘the parties’, or a contextual reading 
of the term, goes no further than showing that ‘the parties’ as stated in Article 31(3)(c) 
could refer to ‘only some of the parties’. 676  Whether the relations examined are 
‘relations between all the parties to the treaty’ similar to that of subsequent practice 
(which entails that sufficient number of parties demonstrated concordant practice
677
 
                                               
671 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 264. 
672 Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 555, at p 
18.  
673 Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 555, at p 
17. 
674 Merkouris ‘Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT and the Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 555, at p 
18. 
675 See Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 263. 
676 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 265. 
677 Alexander M Feldman, ‘Evolving Treaty Obligations: A Proposal for Analysing Subsequent Practice 
Derived from WTO Dispute Settlement’ (2009) 41 International Law and Politics 655 – 706, at p 664. 
The author commented on the difficulty in applying subsequent practice that has led tribunals to question 
what kinds of state conduct amount to ‘practice’ and whether that subsequent practice establishes 
agreement among the parties as to the interpretation and/or modification of the treaty’s terms. The quoted 
opined that ‘In most multilateral treaties, many parties do not engage in the relevant practice or are silent 
as to whether they believe the practice properly interprets the treaty obligation. In these instances, 
agreement must be inferred by other parties’ reactions to the subsequent practice, but this evidence is rare. 
If other parties to the treaty do not partake in the practice and are silent, the value and significance of the 
subsequent practice will depend on the extent to which it is concordant, common, and consistent’. Also 
relevant are pp 690 – 695. 
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with acquiescence and imputed concurrence of the rest) or some other interpretation, 
remains unclear.
678
 The horizon for the quest in search of the correct determination of to 
whom ‘the parties’ refers, remains muddled where the ordinary meaning or a 
contextualised interpretation of this term is not helpful in providing a solution to the 
problem.  
3.2.2.1 The Four Possible Constructions of ‘the Parties’ 
McLachlan attempts to untangle the maze of possible interpretations available to ‘the 
parties’ where he proposes four different ways of possible construction of the term ‘the 
parties’ as possible solutions to the problem: 
(a) All parties to the treaty under interpretation are also parties to any external 
treaties relied upon in the process of interpretation.
679
 
The argument against a narrow interpretation is that, in light of the objective of Article 
31(3)(c) to integrate rules of international law and its potential capacity to do so,  a 
narrow interpretation will negate an integration of rules in their systemic 
environment.
680
 Gardiner commented that the right question to be argued should not be 
whether all the parties are party to the treaty concerned but whether ‘the provisions state 
rules of international law’.681  
                                               
678 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 269.  
679 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 314, referred to the approach 
adopted by the GATT panel in the Tuna/Dolphin case, WTO, United States – Restrictions on Imports of 
Tuna – Report of the Panel (16 June 1994) DS29/R, at para 5.19 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/tunadolphinII.pdf> accessed 16 November 2012. See 
also Linderfalk, ‘Who are ‘The Parties’?’, supra n 260, at pp 351 and 362. EC- Biotech, supra n 117, at p 
333, para 7.68. The Panel noted that the contention that ‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) should be 
understood as referring to all the parties to a treaty has been expressed by Mustafa Kamil Yasseen, 
L’interprétation des Traités d'après la Convention de Vienne sur le Droit des Traités  (1976) 151 Recueil 
des Cours de l'Académie de Droit International at  p  63, para 7. 
680 This sentiment is reiterated in McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260, at p 599. 
The author noted that: ‘if “the parties” refers to all WTO Members, it will be impossible for the provision 
to have application to extraneous treaties because the WTO admits non-sovereign members that are not 
capable of becoming parties to an extraneous treaty’. See also Gabrielle Marceau, ‘WTO Dispute 
Settlement and Human Rights’ (2002) 14 European Journal of International Law 753 – 814. Due to the 
very extensive membership of the WTO, the relevant rules of international law that could be applied in 
the interpretation of WTO agreements will be extremely limited, especially since some of the WTO 
members are not ‘state’ member, which make integration of rules virtually impossible. 
681  Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 271. 
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(b) Reference to the external treaty is permitted provided that the treaty parties in 
dispute are also parties to the external treaty relied upon.
682
  
An overwhelming body of scholarship indicates that this possibility is neither supported 
nor appropriate in international law.
683
 The lack of support seen is due to concerns 
regarding consistency in decision making where an interpretation of a treaty can be 
subjected to different interpretations by relying on the possibility of inter se 
agreements.
684
 It cannot be said that this approach finds no basis in international law, 
because the interpretation and the application of a multilateral treaty might diverge 
between the parties to the same multilateral treaty due to the possibility of inter se 
agreements between them.
685
  
It is detailed further that the type of multilateral treaty affects the application of the 
divergent approach. A distinction has been drawn between ‘ordinary treaties’ known as 
bilateral treaties or ‘treaties of the reciprocal benefits and concessions type’; and 
collective treaties, which are ‘treaties that require absolute or integral performance’,686 
                                               
682  Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, p 272. McGrady labelled this possibility as the 
‘divergent approach’ where such approach interpreted ‘the parties’ to refer to the parties to a dispute. 
According to McGrady’s interpretation of ‘the parties’ in its context, he opined that it is plausible, and 
natural to conclude that ‘the parties’ refer to parties to a dispute because Article 31 can be applicable in a 
dispute settlement context. McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260, at p 593. 
683 McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260; Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 
235; Samson ‘A World of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(30(c) of the 
VCLT’, supra n 547; French, ‘Treaty Interpretation and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’, 
supra n 148, at p 306.  
684 McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260, at pp 609 – 611. McLachlan noted that 
this approach would ‘run the risk of potentially inconsistent interpretation decisions dependent upon the 
happenstance of the particular treaty partners in dispute’. McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic 
Integration’, supra n 162, at p 314. 
685 McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260, at p 601. The concern of consistency in 
decision-making raised against the divergent approach is not exclusively due to the interpretation of ‘the 
parties’ to mean ‘parties to a dispute’.  Art 21 contemplates situations where reservations that apply to 
certain parties only are permissible as long as they fall within the limitations imposed by Art 19. Art 41 of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention provides for the opportunity to conclude an agreement between two or more 
of the parties to a multilateral treaty to modify the multilateral treaty between themselves if certain 
conditions as provided under Art 41(1)(a) and (b) are met. In addition to that, Art 30(4) governs the 
application of successive treaties relating to the same subject matter and foresees the possibility of 
divergence in multilateral treaties between parties.  
686 ILC, ‘Second Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. G Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur’, supra n 662, 
at p 54, para 124. See also Joost Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO 
Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’ (2003) 14(5) European Journal of International Law 907 – 
951. The different typologies of treaties acknowledged are evidenced in the proviso (i) and (ii) of Art 
41(1)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Art 41(1)(b)(i) is apparent that it provides for treaty that have 
synallagmatic obligations when it provides that inter se agreements can be concluded if the modification 
is not prohibited by treaty and ‘does not affect the enjoyment by the other parties of their rights under the 
treaty or the performance of their obligation’. See ILC, ‘Third Report on the Law of Treaties by Mr. GG 
Fitzmaurice, Special Rapporteur’, supra n 661, p 44, para 91. It is stated that ordinary treaty was defined 
to mean ‘treaty, whether bilateral or multilateral, involving a mutual exchange of benefits between the 
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as such a difference was due to the ‘make-up of parties to a dispute’.687 In the case of a 
treaty with synallagmatic obligations, where obligations are modified through inter se 
agreement, the interpretation of ‘the parties’ could adopt the divergent approach to 
mean parties to the dispute.  
Hence, although the adoption of the divergent approach proposed as the second 
possibility by McLachlan founds little support in jurisprudence, and was deemed to be 
unappealing, ‘it is not necessarily a departure from the norm’.688  
(c) Insofar as the external treaty is not in force between all members to the treaty 
under interpretation, the rule contained in that external treaty is treated as being 
a rule of customary international law.
689
 
                                                                                                                                         
parties, or a reciprocal course of conduct by each towards each, of such a kind that a default by one party 
would be a default in that party’s relations with some other party, and could be compensated for by a 
counter default by that party towards the defaulting party.’ (Original emphasis). This means that the 
provision subjected to modification by the inter se agreement is an obligation that involves a mutual 
exchange of benefits that affects the relations with the other party of the inter se agreement, but not other 
parties to the multilateral agreements.  
687 McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260, at p 602. See also McLachlan, ‘The 
Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 315. McLachlan expounded that interpretation 
applied to ‘any particular parties in dispute … if (a) a particular obligation in the treaty is owed in a 
synallagmatic way between pairs of parties, rather than erga omnes partes, then the application of that 
obligation as between the relevant pair of parties [in dispute] may properly be considered in the light of 
other obligations applying bilaterally between those parties only’. See in general Pauwelyn, Conflict of 
Norms in Public International Law, supra n 100, at pp 440 – 486; and Pauwelyn, ‘A Typology of 
Multilateral Treaty Obligations: Are WTO Obligations Bilateral or Collective in Nature?’, supra n 686. 
688 McGrady, ‘Fragmentation of International Law’, supra n 260, at p 603; French, ‘Treaty Interpretation 
and the Incorporation of Extraneous Legal Rules’, supra n 148, at p 307; Fragmentation Report, supra n 
17, at p 238, para 472. The possibility of inter se agreements modifying relations between states in a 
multilateral treaty is most apparent in the international trade regime under the WTO. David Palmeter and 
Petros C Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law’ (1998) 92 American Journal of 
International Law 398 – 413, at p 410. According to Palmeter, under the trade regime, the WTO 
Agreement and its annexed covered agreements are among the many international regulatory agreements 
entered into by governments particularly to address economic, environmental and social problems, which 
raises the question of to what extent such agreements affect the rights and obligations of WTO members 
vis-à-vis other WTO members. At p 411, Palmeter opined that, the conclusion of the GATT panel in the 
Tuna/Dolphin case that those external treaties cited by parties to the dispute, and that were not concluded 
among the contracting parties to the GATT, did not apply to the interpretation or the application of GATT, 
is not consistent with the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. It is 
commented by Palmeter, at p 411 that ‘the parties’ in Art 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention ‘would 
seem to refer to the parties to the particular dispute, not to the parties to the multilateral agreement’. 
689 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 303 (fn 97) referred to the 
emphasis placed in the case of Shrimp/Turtle where although the United States had not ratified UNCLOS, 
it had accepted during the course of argument that the relevant provisions for the most part reflected 
international customary law. WTO, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp 
Products – Report of the Appellate Body (12 October 1998) WT/DS58/AB/R, at para 51 
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/58abr.pdf> accessed 16 November 2012. However, he 
commented that such an approach could have an inappropriate restrictive effect under two situations: (i) It 
could preclude reference to treaties which have very wide acceptance in the international community 
(including by the disputing states) but which are nevertheless not universally ratified and which are not 
accepted in all respects as stating customary international law (such as UNCLOS); and (ii) It could also 
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The merit of adopting this approach where the rule applied in interpretation via Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention must be a rule of customary international law 
is that it has ‘the merit of doctrinal rigour’.690 As a principle or rule of international 
customary law, it is applicable to all parties, be it parties to the treaty or parties to the 
dispute, unless the persistent objector principle applied.
691
 However, McLachlan opined 
                                                                                                                                         
preclude reference to treaties which represent the most important elaboration of the content of 
international law on a specialist subject matter, on the basis that they have not been ratified by all the 
parties to the treaty under interpretation. Such a possibility is not supported by judicial decisions either, 
see Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 273. Samson commented on the risk of 
inconsistency in interpreting ‘the parties’ to mean ‘parties to the dispute’, especially in the event that 
‘inter se agreements can be relied upon to modify multilateral treaties between certain of the parties only’. 
Samson ‘A World of Scepticism about the Anti-Fragmentation Function of Article 31(30(c) of the VCLT’, 
supra n 547, at p 705. 
690 Even if the treaty is not ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’, if the rule of the extraneous 
treaty relied upon for interpretation is a rule of international customary law, the rule can be applied by 
virtue of Article 31(3)(c). See McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at 314; 
Palmeter and Mavroidis, ‘The WTO Legal System: Sources of Law’, supra n 688, at p 409; Gardiner, 
Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 271. This requirement was specifically emphasised by the AB in 
the Shrimp/Turtle case, supra n 689, at p 49, para 130, fn 110. The phrase ‘exhaustible natural resources’ 
of Art XX(g) of the GATT are interpreted ‘in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of 
nations about the protection and conservation of the environment’. The AB cited the 1982 UNCLOS in 
the interpretation and determination of whether living natural resources are ‘exhaustible’ in the context of 
Art XX(g). The AB explicitly noted that India, Malaysia and Pakistan have ratified the UNCLOS, and 
that the United States had agreed that the UNCLOS reflects international customary law for the most part, 
and hence, justified for its incorporation in the interpretation of GATT. See Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, 
supra n 1, at p 38, para 46; p 62, para 99; and pp 39 – 41, paras 49 – 52. The ICJ in Gabčíkovo-
Nagymaros explained the applicability of rules under the 1969 Vienna Convention; and the criteria laid 
down by Draft Article 33 of the 2001 Draft Articles on State Responsibility are relevant in assessing 
whether the conditions for a state of necessity due to their status as customary international law. The Iran-
US Claims Tribunal has always found customary international law applicable. See Fragmentation Report, 
supra n 17, at pp 183 – 184, para 434. In the case of Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Amoco International 
Finance Corporation v The Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, National Iranina Oil company, 
National Petrochemical Company and Kharg Chemical Company Limited, 15 Iran-US CTR 189, at p 222 
at para 112 <http://www.trans-lex.org/231900> accessed 19 June 2012. the Tribunal expressly confirmed 
that customary international law, though superseded by lex specialis, may still be relevant to ‘fill in 
possible lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined terms in its text or, more generally, 
to aid interpretation and implementation of its provisions’. As a lex specialis in the relations between the 
two countries, the Treaty supersedes the lex generalis, namely customary international law. This does not 
mean, however, that the latter is irrelevant in the instant Case. On the contrary, the rules of customary law 
may be useful in order to fill in possible lacunae of the Treaty, to ascertain the meaning of undefined 
terms in its text or, more generally, to aid interpretation and implementation of its provisions. 
691 Fisheries Case (United Kingdom v Norway) 18 December 1951 [1951] ICJ Reports 116  
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/5/1809.pdf> accessed 12 January 2011. Due to the intrinsic nature of 
international law dependent on state consent, several eminent scholars have since maintained that the joint 
United Kingdom – Norwegian view expressed in the case of Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries represented 
existing law that a dissenting state is not bound by the rule to which it objected. See Oscar Schachter, 
International Law in Theory and Practice, supra n 508, at pp 13 – 14. If new principles of customary 
international law are regarded as fundamental and of major importance, strong argument is in favour for 
denying the dissenting state the right to avoid the obligation that all other states incur as a consequence of 
the acceptance of the new principles. The author goes further to assert that the degree of imposition of the 
new customary rules of fundamental and major importance on recalcitrant states will depend on a set of 
relevant circumstances, where the issue cannot be decided solely by reference to voluntarist theory. Refer 
also to Gerard G Fitzmaurice, ‘The General Principles of International Law Considered from the 
Standpoint of the Rule of Law’ (1957) 92-II Recueil des Cours 1 – 228, at pp 99 – 100; Humphrey 
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that the adoption of the third possibility, which requires the application of extraneous 
rules in interpretation, would have an inappropriately restrictive effect.
 692
 
If McLachlan’s third proposition is viewed as, inter alia, a possible means of the 
application of Article 31(3)(c) and the possible definition for ‘the parties’ without 
prejudice to other modes of application, then, such a proposition stands. A rule of 
customary international law will be considered to have solved the problem of consent 
plaguing the discussion on who ‘the parties’ are, where regardless of whether ‘the 
parties’ are all the parties to the treaty interpreted; or parties to the dispute, a rule of 
customary international law are applicable to the two possible interpretation of ‘the 
parties’. 
(d) Establish an intermediate test which does not require complete identity of treaty 
parties, but does require that the external rule relied upon can be said to be 
implicitly accepted or tolerated by all parties to the treaty under interpretation ‘in 
the sense that it can reasonably be considered to express the common intentions 
or understanding of all members as to the meaning of the term concerned’.693 
                                                                                                                                         
Waldock, ‘General Course on Public International Law’ (1962) 106-II Recueil des Cours 1 – 252, at pp 
49 – 53.  
692  McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 314, para 15(c)(ii). See 
discussion in n 688. The restrictive effects as mentioned by McLachlan are premised on the fact that a 
treaty will only state a rule of customary international law if all states are parties to it, and if the treaty as 
a whole is viewed as reflecting customary law. Although it is difficult to assess and evaluate the 
limitation suggested to be inherent in the adoption of the third possibility, the instances as mentioned 
above for both the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 1982 UNCLOS indicated otherwise. The application 
of certain provisions of the 1969 Vienna Convention, the UNCLOS and legal principles regarding shared 
natural resources is not contingent upon the whole treaty being reflective of customary international law. 
693McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 314, para 15(d). The author 
noted that this approach has been adopted in some of the decisions of the WTO AB. This possibility was 
first proposed by Pauwelyn where he stressed that ‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention refers to ‘parties to the treaty’, and not ‘parties to a particular dispute under that treaty’, and 
in the specific context of WTO Agreement that is multilateral in nature. See Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms 
in Public International Law, supra n 100, at p 261; and Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law 
in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, supra n 264, at pp 575 - 576: ‘As noted, the non-WTO rules must 
reflect the “common intentions” of the WTO members by being agreed upon or tolerated – be it explicitly, 
implicitly, or by acquiescence only – by all WTO members … if the non-WTO rule is legally binding on 
all WTO members (like a general principle of law or general customary international law), the non-WTO 
rule must be regarded as an expression of “common understanding””. McLachlan elaborated that the AB  
in Shrimp/Turtle case referred to rules of international law that were not binding on all WTO members, or 
on all the parties to the dispute, to the extent that these non-WTO rules gave meaning to Art XX(g) 
because they reflected ‘the contemporary concerns of the community of nations’. See Gabrielle Marceau, 
‘WTO Dispute Settlement and Human Rights’ (2002) 13(4) European Journal of International Law 753 – 
814, at p 782. Marceau posits from a technical perspective in the interpretation of ‘the parties’ in Art 
31(3)(c), reiterating Pauwelyn’s suggestion that the interpretation of WTO provisions should only take 
account rules of international law that ‘reflect the “common intention” of the WTO Members’ being 
agreed of tolerated – either explicitly, implicitly or by acquiescence by all WTO Members’. At p 782, 
Marceau argued that the usage of ‘all the parties’ in Art 31(2)(a), and ‘one or more parties’ and accepted 
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The AB in EC – Computer Equipment 694  clarified that the purpose of treaty 
interpretation under Article 31(3) ‘is to ascertain the common intentions of the parties’ 
(original emphasis),
695
 even though the rule or the treaty is not legally binding on 
them.
696
 The establishment of the common intention of the parties to the treaty, as laid 
out in EC – Computer Equipment by the AB, is reiterated in the recent case of EC – 
Aircraft.
697
 The AB further elaborated that caution must be exercised in drawing from 
an international treaty to which not all WTO Members are party, where prima facie 
common intentions  cannot be adduced. However, it does not mean that recourse cannot 
be had to non-WTO treaties to which not all WTO members are party.
 698
  
This strengthens the assertion that an interpretation of ‘the parties’ that reflects the 
principle of systemic integration must refer to their normative environment. Such 
reference should be in a manner that gives – 
‘coherence and meaningfulness to the process of legal interpretation [where] a 
delicate balance must be struck between individual WTO Members’ international 
obligations and a consistent and harmonious approach to the interpretation of 
WTO law among all WTO members’.699 
The Shrimp/Turtle
700
 case illustrates this probability where external rules are invoked in 
the interpretation of Article XX(g) of the GATT despite the fact that not all the parties 
to GATT, nor all the parties to the dispute, are party to the external rules.
701
 The AB 
supported the incorporation of the UNCLOS, the Biodiversity Convention, CMS and 
                                                                                                                                         
by ‘the other parties’ of Art 31(2)(b) without qualifications in ‘the parties’ of Art 31(3)(c) ‘allows 
consideration of treaties signed by a subset of the WTO Membership that is less than all the parties, but 
more than one of the parties that is accepted by the other parties’.  
694 WTO, European Communities – Customs Classification of Certain Computer Equipment – Report of 
the Appellate Body (5 June 1998) WT/DS62/AB/R, WT/DS67/AB/R, WT/DS68/AB/R 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/ec-lan(ab).pdf> accessed 17 January 2012 (hereinafter: 
‘EC – Computer Equipment’). 
695 EC – Computer Equipment, supra n 694, at p 31, para 84. 
696 Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, supra n 264, at 
p 576. 
697 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 363, para 845. 
698 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 363, para 845, fn 1916. This is implied in an interesting statement 
noted by the AB where the AB is cognisance of the fact that agreement of the parties regarding a treaty’s 
interpretation may be deduced, not only from the actions of those actually engaged in the relevant practice, 
but also from the acceptance of other parties to the treaty through their affirmative reactions, or depending 
on the attendant circumstances, their silence. 
699 EC – Aircraft, supra n 288, at p 363, para 845. 
700
 Shrimp/Turtle case, supra n 689. 
701 Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, supra n 264, at 
p 576. 
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CITES, in the interpretation of WTO Agreement. They were of the opinion that ‘the 
[words of Article XX(g)] “exhaustible natural resources” must be read by a treaty 
interpreter in the light of contemporary concerns of the community of nations about the 
protection and conservation of the environment’, as informed by the explicit 
acknowledgement of the objective of sustainable development in the Preamble of the 
WTO Agreement.
702
 The AB goes further in support of the incorporation that –  
‘Given the recent acknowledgement by the international community of the 
importance of concerted bilateral or multilateral action to protect living natural 
resources, and recalling the explicit recognition by WTO Members of the 
objective of sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO Agreement, we 
believe it is too late in the day to suppose that Article XX(g) of the GATT 1994 
may be read as referring only to the conservation of exhaustible mineral or other 
non-living natural resources.’703 
The ILC commentary to Article 31(3)(b) is explicit on this point. It explains that the 
Commission, by omitting the word ‘all’ from the provisional draft articles adopted in 
1964 that speaks of ‘establishes the understanding of all the parties’ (author’s own 
emphasis), does not mean to change the rule. The Commission considered that the 
amended phrase ‘the understanding of the parties’ necessarily means ‘the parties as a 
whole’. The Commission elaborated that the omission of the word ‘all’ was merely to 
‘avoid any possible misconception that every party must individually have engaged in 
the practice where it suffices that it should have accepted the practice’.704  
A similar approach was adopted in the European Court of Human Rights in the Demir 
Case.
705
 The Court observed that individual ratification of a source of law is not a 
ground to distinguish between sources of law in the identification of rules relevant to 
the consideration of the object and purpose of the Convention.
706
 The decision of the 
                                               
702 Shrimp/Turtle case, supra n 689, at p 48, para 129. 
703 Shrimp/Turtle case, supra n 689, at p 50, para 131. 
704 ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, 4 May – 19 
July 1966’, supra n 602, at p 222, para 15. Reprinted in Rauschining (ed), The VCLT, supra n 521, at p 
254. 
705 European Court of Human Rights, Case of Demir and Baykara v Turkey App No 34503/97 (Grand 
Chamber, Strasbourg, 12 November 2008) 
<http://www.ictu.ie/download/pdf/case_of_demir_baykara_v_turkey_apr_09.pdf> accessed 18 September 
2012 (hereinafter: ‘Demir’). 
706
 Demir case, supra n 705, at paras 76, 78, and 79. The Court considered that ‘when it considers the 
object and purpose of the Convention provisions, it also takes into account the international law 
background to the legal question before it. Being made up of a set of rules and principles that are accepted 
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Court in the Demir case, where individual ratification was not necessary in the 
identification of relevant rules, supports the assertion that if ‘the parties’ in Article 
31(3)(b) means ‘all the parties’ without requiring the explicit agreement of all of them, 
or their actual engagement in practice, there is no reason to give a different meaning to 
‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c). If the phrase 'all the parties' as stipulated under Article 
31(3)(b) is not interpreted to require individual ratification by all the parties, the 
requirement of individual ratification by all the parties in the interpretation of 'the 
parties' in Article 31(3)(c) could not be said to have been intended by the 1969 Vienna 
Convention.
707
 
The analysis above, supported by the cases of Shrimp/Turtle and Demir, leads to the 
conclusion that in the specific context of a multilateral treaty such as the WTO 
Agreement, the requirement of ‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) is not that all the parties 
to the WTO agreement have, one after the other, formally and explicitly agreed with the 
non-WTO rule, nor even that this rule is otherwise legally binding on all WTO 
members (author’s own emphasis). 708  It could be submitted that the criterion is rather 
that – 
‘the rule can be said to be at least implicitly accepted or tolerated by all WTO 
members, in the sense that the rule can reasonably be said to express the common 
intentions or understanding of all members as to what the particular WTO term 
means (author’s own emphasis)’.709  
The imposition of ‘bindingness’ in the interpretation of ‘applicable’ is the underlying 
reason that leads to the much debated controversy of who are the parties on whom the 
rule is binding. This controversy casts into doubt the potential uses and contribution of 
                                                                                                                                         
by the vast majority of States, the common international or domestic law standards of European States 
reflect a reality that the Court cannot disregard when it is called upon to clarify the scope of a Convention 
provision that more conventional means of interpretation have not enabled it to establish with a sufficient 
degree of certainty’. The Court stated further, in para 78 that ‘The Court observes in this connection that 
in searching for common ground among the norms of international law it has never distinguished between 
sources of law according to whether or not they have been signed or ratified by the respondent State’. The 
Court quoted its own decision in the Marckx v Belgium case, in para 79, and emphasised that ‘the small 
number of ratifications of these instruments [concerning legal status of children born out of wedlock] 
could not be relied on in opposition to the continuing evolution towards full recognition of the maxim 
“mater simper certa est”’. European Court of Human Rights, Case of Marckx v Belgium App No 6833/74 
(Court (Plenary), Strasbourg, 13 June 1979) <http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-
57534> accessed 16 November 2012.  
707 Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, supra n 264, at 
p 575, fn 262. 
708 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, supra n 100, at pp 257 – 263. 
709 Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of Norms in Public International Law, supra n 100, at p 261. 
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Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention as an interpretative mechanism that 
exhibits the principle of systemic integration in the study of the fragmentation of 
international law.  
Scholars have proposed four constructions of the possible interpretation of to whom ‘the 
parties’ refer, in view of the fact that an ordinary interpretation of ‘the parties’ 
according to the context of the treaty does not inform an interpreter who ‘the parties’ 
are.
710
 The four possibilities are plausible as long as consent of the parties as a whole, 
be it explicit or implicit, is established. The general observation of the four 
constructions of ‘the parties’ is, the common intention and shared understanding as to 
the interpretation of the external rule are essential in the determination of the 
applicability of the external in the relations between them.  
In the event that consensus or shared understanding of the external rule regarding its 
interpretation and applicability in the interpretative process is established, there is no 
need to ensure that each individual party to the interpreted treaty has to be individually 
engaged with the external treaty. This conclusion is supported by the Commentary to 
the 1969 Vienna Convention. The Commission removed codification of the temporal 
element, the so-called inter-temporal law in its application to the interpretation of 
treaties in Article 31(3)(c).
711
   
In view of the proliferation of treaty regimes and the engagement of both state and non-
state members in international instruments, it is no longer practical to require that all 
parties to the treaty being interpreted are also a party to the external treaty. The general 
acceptance of consensus, reflected in the common understanding of the parties as a basis 
for obligation, absolves the stringent requirement for all parties to the treaty being 
interpreted is also be a party to the external treaty.
712
     
                                               
710 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 265.  
711 Rauschining (ed), The VCLT, supra n 521, at p 254, para 16. Apart from the difficulty associated with 
the codification of temporal element, the Commission envisioned that the imposition of an evolutive 
interpretation onto a treaty depends on the will of the parties, and had decided to remove the temporal 
element from codification. It is considered that ‘in any event, the relevance of rules of international law 
for the interpretation of treaties in any given case was dependent on the intentions of the parties … and 
that the correct application of the temporal element would normally be indicated by interpretation of the 
term in good faith’.  
712
 Some parties might not be able to give express consent ‘either because they were not party to the law-
making agency or because they did not wish to approve the specific proposals’. Higgins, Problems and 
Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 16. 
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Hence, it can be deduced that the most important element in the application of an 
external rule by virtue of Article 31(3)(c) and also in the application of international law 
in general, intrinsic to the origin of the international legal order itself, is the expression 
of consent,
713
 or the notion of ‘consensus’.714 Such understanding and agreement are the 
foundation underlying the expression of ‘common intention’ sought after in the fourth 
possibility proposed above in the determination of the scope of ‘the parties’ in Article 
31(3)(c).      
The validity of the four possibilities proposed as the possible interpretation and scope of 
‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) is supported by the ILC where the application of Article 
31(3)(c) is subtly formulated to provide interpretative guidance in its application to 
include all four possibilities.
715
   
3.3 Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relations between the Parties: 
Reflection and Conclusion 
The preceding sections have shown that current and existing interpretations of ‘rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ of Article 31(3)(c) of 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties could be challenged. It is demonstrated 
that the threshold of ‘bindingness’ need not be attained in order for a relevant rule of 
international law to be considered as ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’. 
The analysis and review of existing scholarship sufficiently show that rules of 
                                               
713 Fitzmaurice, ‘The Foundations of the Authority of International Law and the Problem of Enforcement’, 
supra n 578, at p 9. The author quoted Verdross, Brierly and others that ‘it is not consent, as such, that 
creates obligation, though it may be the occasion of it. It is a method of creating rules, but it is not, in the 
last resort, the element that makes the rules binding, when created. In short consent could not, in itself 
create obligations unless there were already in existence a rule of law according to which consent had just 
that effect. Another way of putting it is to say that it is because international law already makes consent a 
source of obligation that obligations can arise from consent … the discussion enters what is known to the 
mathematicians as an infinite regress.’ 
714 Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 16. The 
author elaborated that ‘states have undoubtedly come to regard themselves as bound by norms to which 
they have not given their express consent, either because they were not party to the law-making agency or 
because they did not wish to approve the specific proposals. If consensus, often tacit and sometimes 
unenthusiastic, is the basis of international law, then that consensus comes about because states perceive a 
reciprocal advantage in cautioning self-restraint’. 
715 Conclusion on Fragmentation, supra n 289, at pp 414 – 415, para 21.  It is stated that Art31(3)(c) also 
requires the interpreter to consider other treaty-based rules so as to arrive at a consistent meaning. Such 
other rules are of particular relevance where parties to the treaty under interpretation are also parties to the 
other treaty, where the treaty rule has passed into or express customary international law or where they 
provide evidence of the common understanding of the parties as to the object and purpose of the treaty 
under interpretation or as to the meaning of a particular term. 
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international law need not be binding on the parties in order to be considered as 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’. 
Discussions in the previous sections have demonstrated that the phrase ‘applicable in 
the relations between the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) does not impose the requirement 
that the identified rules of international law must be binding. The conclusion arrived at 
is, as long as the rules of international law reflect the common understanding and 
common intentions of the parties as to the interpretation of that given rule of 
international law, it should be considered to be ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’. This conclusion is strengthened by the four possible constructions of ‘the 
parties’ collated by scholars under the perception that the correct interpretation of ‘the 
parties’ will provide the master key in the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c).  
However, if ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ is not interpreted to mean 
‘binding’, then the whole interpretative landscape on Article 31(3)(c) is reconstructed. 
The framework of the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) developed through a re-
interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) relocates the emphasis of interpretation of the Article 
to – 
1. The interpretation of ‘relevant’, and the identification of rules that are relevant; 
2. Whether these rules constitute ‘rules of international law’, and if so, what is the 
content and scope of these rules of international law; and 
3. Whether these rules are considered to be ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’. This determination impels the interpretation of rules of international 
law to delve not just into the explicit text of the rule of international law, but 
also the implicit dimension of the explicit text that shows the shared legal 
understanding of the parties that partake in the making of the law. The common 
intention of the parties can be evidenced in the practice of legality undertaken by 
the parties, which exhibits the shared legal understanding attained by the parties.  
The General Assembly Resolution 3232 (XXIX)
716
 recognised that ‘the development of 
international law may be reflected, inter alia, by declarations and resolutions of the 
General Assembly which may to that extent be taken into consideration by the 
                                               
716  UNGA, ‘Resolution 3232 (XXIX) Review of the Role of the International Court of Justice’ (12 
November 1974). 
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International Court of Justice’.717  The guiding rule to see whether a rule of international 
law is ‘couched in a language [that] imposes a legal obligation of compliance with [the 
rule]’ 718  necessitates a careful analysis of the language of a resolution ‘before a 
conclusion can be made as to its binding effect’.719  
Rosenne is of the opinion that non-formally binding instruments
720
  –  
‘cannot today be ignored entirely [and it would be considered rash if international 
lawyers] took shelter behind the formal position as a ground for ignoring 
resolutions of major international organisations operating in a field of concern to 
him at a given moment’.721   
This is because such instruments are ‘brought within the general thesaurus of 
international law as indicators of a possible direction for the desired evolution of the 
law … [and] to that extent, be considered by the International Court of Justice’.722 
Despite their indeterminate formal position as a rule of international law, their 
applicability is not negated and should be considered in a court of law.  
The cautious expression as to the legal consequence of resolutions of the General 
Assembly and other international organisations in Resolution 3232 (XXIX) generates 
two implications. The first implication is, the requirement of ‘legality’ imposed in 
Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention that specified for rules of international 
law to be taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty term or provision is not 
determined by its source-oriented formal form.
723
 The second implication is, it 
strengthens the proposition that the intention of the parties, demonstrated through the 
language adopted in the resolution, is the deciding factor in the determination of not 
                                               
717 Resolution 3232 (XXIX), supra n 716, at p 142. 
718 See Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at pp 18 and 111. 
719 Namibia case, supra n 277, at p 53, para 114. The Court elaborated that ‘In view of the nature of the 
powers under Article 25, the question whether they have in fact exercised is to be determined in each case, 
having regard to the terms of the resolution to be interpreted, the discussions leading to it, the Charter 
provisions invoked and, in general, all circumstances that might assist in determining the legal 
consequences of the resolution of the Security Council’.   
720 UNGA resolutions and declarations of GA was cited as an example of such instruments. See Rosenne, 
Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at p 18. 
721 Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at p 18. 
722 Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at pp 18 and 19. 
723
 See a discussion of form, or certain formalities or procedural steps as criteria in the ascertainment of 
legal rules in Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it Even Matter’ (26 February 2010) 
supra n 209.  
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only the legality or binding effect of a rule, but also the extent to which the rule is 
applicable in the relations between the state parties.  
The second implication greatly supports the proposition of this chapter that the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ in Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention does not impose a requirement of 
‘bindingness’. The ultimate determinant of whether a rule of international law is 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ depends on the common intention of the 
parties as to the interpretation of that particular rule of international law. 
In this context, the crux of the analysis in the interpretation of ‘applicable’, or the 
applicability of the rules of international law external to the interpreted treaty in the 
interpretative process, resides in the ascertainment of ‘rule of international law’ – 
namely its content and its applicability as commonly understood and intended by the 
parties. This revelation impels the need for a renewed understanding of international 
law, especially the implicit dimension constituted from the shared legal understanding 
attained by the parties, and undertaken in a practice of legality, that informs an 
interpreter as to the common intention and understanding of the parties. The implicit 
dimension underpinning a rule of international law informs the interpretation of whether 
the relevant rule of international law is ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’.  
Drawing from the discussions in the previous sections, this chapter has amply 
demonstrated that the interpretation of ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ 
should be nuanced and multi-layered. This chapter has sufficiently presented the 
argument of this thesis that the existing interpretation of ‘applicable’ and ‘the parties’ is 
inadequate to realise the systemic integration potential of Article 31(3)(c).  
The next chapter of this thesis proposes to reconceptualise the ascertainment of ‘rules of 
international law’, or ‘international law’, that better reflects the contemporary trend in 
international law. For this purpose, an interactional understanding of law could provide 
the content and scope of the relevant rules of international law in which the 
‘applicability’ of the rule ‘in the relations between the parties’ is revealed. An 
interactional theory of law viewed law not as just the explicit textual outcome of a law-
making process, but the entirety of the law-making process that infused the explicit 
dimension codified in the text, with the implicit dimension, the shared understanding, 
161 
 
that provides the structure and context of the text developed through legal 
interactions.
724
  
The explicit stipulation of a requirement of legality in Article 31(3)(c) by virtue of the 
reference to ‘rules of international law’ can be satisfied through an assessment of a 
particular rule against the eight criteria of internal morality. The criteria of legality are 
engaged as a yardstick for the determination of a rule of law and distinguish law from 
other norms. An interactional understanding of law requires that these shared legal 
understandings must be undertaken in a practice of legality undertaken by the parties 
involved in the making of law (the enterprise of law-making) in order to demonstrate 
their common and collective intention that these rules of (international) law, are 
‘applicable’ on them. The fidelity of law that commands the sense of obligation is the 
basis of the understanding of the binding force of law. 
Instead of being constraint by a formalistic, hierarchical and inherently positivist 
approach to the determination of sources, the thesis endeavour to look beyond the black 
letter of law, and attempts to discern the common intentions and understanding of 
parties regarding the content and applicability of a rule of international law. 
  
                                               
724 Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law: An Interactional 
Account (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010) at p 66. 
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4 
Chapter 4. Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relations between the 
Parties: An Interactional Understanding of Law 
4.1 Overview 
This chapter will suggest a reinterpretation of ‘rules of international law’ through the 
adoption of an interactional theory of law proposed by Fuller, and further developed by 
Jutta Brunnée, Stephen Toope and Gerard Postema. An interactional understanding of 
law entails that a rule of international law is interpreted not just at the explicit level, but 
also the implicit dimension in which the shared understanding of a text is found.  
The chapter will analyse and interpret ‘rules of international law’ through the prism of 
an interactional theory of law that comprises three main components. These components 
are shared understandings, the eight criteria of internal morality, and a practice of 
legality. The shared legal understandings developed through an interactional process 
and undertaken in a practice of legality will be able to answer the questions of – what is 
the normative content of the ‘rule of international law’ that indicates the applicability of 
the rule as intended by the members of the law-making enterprise? The scrutiny of the 
interactional process will demonstrate who the members of the enterprise are, and to 
which ‘the parties’ the rule is applicable.   
The rules of international law identified to be ‘relevant’ in the previous chapter are 
analysed through the proposed framework of an interactional conceptualisation of law. 
The outcome of this process provides the substantive and normative content for the 
integration of rules of international law, relevant to the obligation to preserve 
ecosystems of international watercourses.  
The conceptualisation of ‘law’ from an interactional perspective reconstructs the current 
interpretative methodology underlying the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c), where the 
salient features of the Article, ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’, are interpreted in relation to each other instead of individually. 
Moreover, the adoption of an interactional approach to international law raises the need 
to rethink the formal doctrine of sources, which may potentially be another area for 
further research.  
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Part I: Theory 
4.2 Introduction 
‘Identifying international law-making today is not as easy as it used to be.’725 
‘Law is a process in that it is both the product and the source of a flux of various 
dynamics … Law is not only a process. It also constitutes a set of rules which, at times 
and for multiple purposes, need to be ascertained.’726 
Normativity has been correlatively construed as a continuum where the idea of a 
penumbra between law and non-law is gradually being accepted.
727
 The retreat from the 
question of ascertainment was emphasised by the development of the international legal 
order, where most of the international normative activity and the creation of norms are 
beyond the remit of traditional understanding of international law.  
The emerging participation of non-state actors and the pluralisation of both international 
law and international law-making processes have ‘cast into doubt the relevance of 
traditional international law-ascertainment, especially the doctrine of formal sources 
from which international laws were emanated’. 728  The phenomenon of pluralised 
normativity in both the norm-making process and the norms produced at the 
                                               
725 Oscar Schachter, ‘Recent Trends in International Law-Making’ (1988-1989) 12 Australian Yearbook 
of International Law 1 – 15. 
726 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, supra n 563, at p 1.  
727D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, supra n 563, at p 1. The ascertainment 
of law and a formalistic account of legality used to be the central concern of international legal 
scholarship but has now become ‘a matter of “more or less”’ in contemporary agenda of international 
legal scholars. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 46. 
The expression in quote is from Martti Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of 
International Legal Argument (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005) at p 393. 
The idea in support of normative continuum, see Richard R Baxter, ‘International Law in “Her Infinite 
Variety”’ (1980) 29 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 549 – 566, at p 593; Oscar Schachter, 
‘The Twilight Existence of Non-binding International Agreements’ (1977) 71 American Journal of 
International Law 296 – 304; Boyle, ‘Some Reflections on the Relationship of Treaties and Soft Law’, 
supra n 208, at p 913; Christine M Chinkin, ‘The Challenge of Soft Law: Development and Change in 
International Law’ (1989) 38 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 850 – 866, at p 866; Alain 
Pellet, ‘Complementarity of International Treaty Law, Customary Law and Non-Contractual Law-Making’ 
pp 409 – 415, in Rüdiger Wolfrum and Volker Röben (eds) Development of International Law in Treaty 
Making (Springer, Berlin, 2005), at p 415. 
728 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, supra n 563, at pp 3 – 4. Jan Klabbers, 
‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’ (2008) 5 No Foundations 84 – 112, at p 89. 
Albeit for a different reasons, this finding has also been made by scholars affiliated to deconstructivism 
and critical legal studies. See Koskenniemi, From Apology to Utopia, supra n 727, at p 393. 
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international level, necessitates the inquiry into the conceptualisation of norms 
generated.
729
 
A detailed and exhaustive study of the complex phenomenon of the contemporary 
rejection of formalism in the identification of law is beyond the ambit of this 
research.
730
 The present research intends to focus on the understanding of international 
                                               
729 D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, supra n 563, at p 221. D’Aspremont 
observed the gradual change in source-based ascertainment of international law to a recognition of 
international law based on effect (or impact), which brings back the revival of process-based conceptions 
of law-identification, and accentuated the current deformalisation of the identification of international 
legal rules. The gradual shift in the law-ascertainment framework into a ‘deformalise’ approach is drawn 
upon the disconnect between the international rules identified by formal law-ascertainment mechanisms 
and the command actually relied upon by actors. See e.g. Higgins, Problems and Process. International 
Law and How We Use It, supra n 574, at pp 8 – 10. For another illustration of the contemporary tendency 
towards process-based law-identification, see Paul Schiff Berman, ‘A Pluralist Approach to International 
Law’ (2007) 32 Yale Journal of International Law 301 – 329. For a hybrid law-ascertainment approach 
based on both effect and processes see Harlan Grant Cohen, ‘Finding International Law: Rethinking the 
Doctrine of Sources’ (2007) 93 Iowa Law Review 65 – 129. D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of 
International Law, supra n 563, at pp 4, and 12 – 13. See José Alvarez, International Organizations as 
Law-makers (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005). Brunnée and Toope’s suggested that international 
law ought to be defined by the sense of obligation among its addressees, which indirectly grounds law-
ascertainment in the impact of rules on their addressees, Jutta Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 7 (‘The distinctiveness of law lies not in form or in 
enforcement but in the creation and effects of legal obligation’). A similar use of non-formal law-
identification criteria can be found in the studies about non-state actors. See Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin, 
and Gretta Fenner Zinkernagel, ‘Non-State Actors as Standard Setters: Framing the Issue in An 
Interdisciplinary Fashion’, pp 1 – 32, in Anne Peters, Lucy Koechlin, Till Förster, and Gretta Fenner 
Zinkernagel (eds) Non-State Actors as Standard Setters (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009). 
The effect-based approaches must be distinguished from the subtle conception defended by Friedrich 
Kratochwil based on the principled rule-application of a norm which refers to the explicitness and 
contextual variation in the reasoning process and the application of rules in ‘like’ situations in the future. 
Friedrich Kratochwil, Rules Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning 
in International Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989) pp 206 – 
208. See also Friedrich Kratochwil ‘Legal Theory and International Law’ in David Armstrong (ed) 
Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge, London, 2009) at p 58. Likewise, effects-based 
conceptions must be distinguished from the conceptions based on expectations and the relative 
normativity of the Heidelberg project on the international exercise of public authority. See in this respect 
Matthias Goldmann, ‘Inside Relative Normativity: From Sources to Standards Instruments for the 
Exercise of International Public Authority’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1865 – 1908; and Armin von 
Bogdandy, Philipp Dann, and Matthias Goldmann, ‘Developing the Publicness of Public International 
Law: Towards a Legal Framework for Global Governance Activities’ (2008) 9 German Law Journal 1375 
– 1400. While adhering to non-formal law-identification criteria, these authors have tried to formalise it. 
730 My thesis is not attempting to define what formalism of law is. Instead, the thesis adopts the implicit 
understanding of formalism and the formality of law in current legal scholarship to refer narrowly to 
source-based evaluation of legality. See D’Aspremont, Formalism and the Sources of International Law, 
supra n 563, at p 3, referred the ‘formal ascertainment of law’ restrictively to the identification of 
international legal rules by virtue of the ‘formal source from which they emanate’. However, it has to be 
borne in mind that the formal character of law is not limited to identification through the doctrine of 
sources. See Robert S Summers, ‘The Formal Character of Law’ (1992) 51(2) The Cambridge Law 
Journal 242 – 262; Ernest J Weinrib, ‘Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law’ (1988) 
97(6) The Yale Law Journal 949 – 1016, in particularly at pp 953 - 957. The interactional understanding 
of law adopted in this research in the conceptualisation of international law reflects the contemporary 
landscape of international law-making where the importance to ascertain both the explicit and implicit 
dimension of a rule of law has arisen. The ascertainment of the shared legal understanding that provides 
the normative foundation of an explicit rule necessitates a move away from a narrowly-defined 
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law from an interactional perspective, which refers to the transposition of Fuller’s 
procedural natural law
731
 based on the eight criteria of internal morality to the realm of 
international law.
732
 It is the objective of this chapter to synthesise the application of an 
interactional understanding of law in interpreting ‘rules of international law’ under 
Article 31(3)(c). An interpretation of ‘rules of international law’ from an interactional 
perspective is crucial for the operationalisation of this Article in the realisation of its 
potential as an integration tool.  
In light of the interactive nature of multilateral law making
733
 prevalent in the current 
environment, there is a need for a more ‘flexible recognition of changes in patterns of 
state behaviour and wider methods of determining state consent and evidence of that 
consent’.734 The interactional understanding of law proposed by Brunnée and Toope, 
which expanded Fuller’s theory, rekindled the argument of a ‘cooperative international 
law’735 based upon mutual interest and reciprocity in achieving common benefits and 
shared understanding, especially through common institutional participation and 
institutional practices.
736
  
The broadening of the vertical and horizontal scope of international law, especially in 
the area of international environmental law,
737
 has changed the landscape of law making, 
where although states remain a dominant actor of international law, it is no longer 
apparent that the omnes – the international community – must be identified exclusively 
                                                                                                                                         
formalistic approach to legal validity, of which this thesis demonstrates through the interactional 
understanding of relevant rules under the two identified MEAs in Chapters Five and Six. 
731 Fuller opined that ‘much of international law, and perhaps the most vital part of it, is essentially 
customary law … I shall argue that the phenomenon called customary law can best be described as a 
language of interaction’. See Lon L Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’ (1969) 14 American Journal 
of Jurisprudence 1 – 36, at p 2.  
732 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724. 
733 Alan E Boyle and Christine M Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2007) at p 98. The authors describe ‘multilateral lawmaking’ as the ‘most striking features of 
modern international making is the interaction of states, intergovernmental organisations and 
governmental organisations described on various occasions as “epistemic communities” or “transnational 
networks” of officials, experts and interest groups with quasi-autonomous characters that constitutes the 
broader international community than the states’. 
734 Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, supra n 733, at p 12. 
735 Wolfgang Friedmann, Law in a Changing Society (Stevens and Sons Limited, London, 1959) at p 460. 
This argument is expanded in Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1964). 
736 Jutta Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ 
(2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 1 – 52; Alvarez, International Organizations as Law-
Makers, supra n 729. 
737 Geoffrey Palmer, ‘New Ways to Make International Environmental Law’ (1992) 86 American Journal 
of International Law 259 – 283.  
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with states.
738
 An interactional understanding of international law acknowledges and 
recognises the reality of contemporary legal discourse, consisting of the participation of 
‘a range of non-state actors in productive power’, where the interaction and the 
collaborative effort of actors that shape their identities, and in which shared 
expectations arise, may ultimately lead to the making of interactional international 
law.
739
   
The transition of social norms to legal norms is studied where the need for relevant, 
continuous and reciprocal legal communications emphasised by Fuller arise in 
‘communities of practice’. 740  An interactional theory in the understanding of 
international law may not provide a full-fledged doctrine of sources, but it definitely 
contributes to ‘the important enterprise of distinguishing law from the morass of 
approaches to governance in which it threatens to disappear’741 by providing formal and 
substantive criteria for the identification of legal rules.
742
  
                                               
738 John Tasioulas has recognised the place of non-state actors in identifying fundamental norms and 
obligations owed erga omnes. John Tasioulas, ‘In Defence of Relative Normativity: Communitarian 
values and the Nicaragua Case’ (1996) 16 Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 85 – 128. Pauwelyn has 
proposed the test of a thick consensus to be met in the ascertainment of law, especially law obtained 
through informal international law-making. See Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it 
Even Matter’ (26 February 2010) supra n 209, at p 44. 
739 See also Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 85. At p 
15, the authors elaborated that the interactional theory of law articulated a pragmatic view of the creation 
and maintenance of international law based on a few premises. First, ‘legal norms can only arise in the 
context of social norms based on shared understandings. Second, internal features of law, which are 
called the criteria of legality, are crucial to law’s ability to promote adherence, or to inspire “fidelity”. 
Third, legal norms are built, maintained, and sometimes destroyed through a continuing practice of 
legality’. At pp 15 – 16, the authors explained that the interaction and the collaborative effort of actors in 
a ‘community of practice’ where actors’ identities are shaped and in which shared expectations arise, may 
ultimately lead to the making of interactional international law. The concept of ‘community’, as stated in 
p 80, is fundamentally different from the notion of community underlying the historical and contemporary 
universalist claims of international law. A community of practice is constituted by mutual engagement 
rather than by shared values or goals, membership neither presupposes nor necessarily leads to 
homogeneity of purposes. In p 79, the authors draw a difference between the assumptions of 
‘international community’ to uphold not just state interest, but community interests, claimed by the 
Universalist, are misleading and unhelpful. It obfuscates the reality of deep cultural and social diversity 
across our globe. The values embraced in the Universalist approach obfuscate the reality of deep cultural 
and social diversity across our globe; the values said to be represented by the community of states are 
actually culturally western-specific values. The authors envisaged that the concept of ‘community’ in this 
context embraces diversity. The joint enterprise of members of a community of practice requires only that 
they share an understanding of ‘what they are doing and why’. A ‘thin’ community of international legal 
practice based in very limited shared understandings that there is a need for law in shaping international 
communication and interaction, can be said to exist.’ 
740 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 16.  
741 A term quoted from Benedict Kingsbury, ‘International Law as Inter-Public Law’ pp 167 – 204 in 
Henry S Richardson and Melissa S Williams (eds) Moral Universalism and Pluralism (New York 
University Press 2009) at p 197. 
742 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728.  This complements 
the need for ‘a formal mechanism that clearly identifies when treaties have been followed by a significant 
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The multilateral environmental treaty regimes are particularly congenial and useful for 
an interactional analysis, where the norms within a treaty-based regime over multiple 
issues (that pose what Fuller called ‘polycentric problems’)743 are constructed by the 
shared understanding of actors or regime-participants of diverse perspectives and 
priorities through repeated negotiation.
744
 It is described that ‘institutions can “represent 
frozen configurations of privilege and bias”’ whereby if the insights provided by an 
interactional international law are being taken seriously, ‘it is possible to build a setting 
[an institution] that will facilitate a practice of legality and the emergence of 
communities of practice that could lead to the deepening of social interactions’.745  
Such a setting allows the recursive process
746
 of the purposive enterprise of law 
making
747
 that actualises the common interest of society, where the ‘dialectic of ideas 
                                                                                                                                         
number of nations for a sufficient amount of time for its substance to have attained the status of 
customary law would at least allow for better integration with those well established treaties. An example 
might be the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’. Meinhard Doelle, ‘Integration among 
Global Environmental Regimes: Lessons Learned from Climate Change Mitigation’  pp 63 – 85, in Aldo 
Chircop, Ted L McDorman and Susan J Rolston (eds)  The Future of Ocean Regime Building: Essays in 
Tribute to Douglas M Johnston (Martinus Nijhoff, Leiden, Boston, 2009) at pp 83 – 84. See also 
Meinhard Doelle, ‘Climate Change and the Use of the Dispute Settlement Regime of the Law of the Sea 
Convention’ (2006) 37 Ocean Development and International Law  319 – 337. 
743 Lon L Fuller, ‘Adjudication and the Rule of Law’ (1960) 54 American Society of International Law 
Proceedings 1 – 7, at pp 3 - 5. The author clarified polycentric problems in the context of adjudication in 
order to avoid misunderstanding. It is stated that ‘1. Polycentricity is not merely a matter of the 
complexity of the issues present to the deciding tribunal. It is not complexity of issues but of patterns of 
decision that characterises the polycentric problem … 2. Polycentricity is not a matter merely of a 
multiplicity of affected parties. It can arise between two parties. [Multiple parties] would make for a 
cumbersome hearing, but it would not make the problem polycentric … 3. Polycentric problems are not 
problems without rational solution [where entire structure must be deal as a whole at once] … 4. The fact 
that adjunctive decision affects and enters into a polycentric relationship does not of itself mean that the 
adjudicative tribunal is moving out of its proper sphere. On the contrary, [drawing analogy with an 
economic market], the laying down of rules that will make a market function properly is one for which 
adjudication is generally well suited … 5. Polycentricity of any given problem is a matter of degree, 
though a distinction may be a matter of degree …’ 
744 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724,  at p 17. 
745 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 85. 
746 Anthony D’Amato, ‘International Law as A Unitary System’ (Northwestern University School of Law 
Public Law and Legal Theory Series No 08-02, SSRN–id1106420) at pp 6 – 10 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1106420> accessed 29 May 2012. The recursive process undertaken in the self-
regulating system will produce rules that both explain the facts and justify them. 
747 Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law (Revised edn, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 
1969) at pp 106 – 107; Fuller, at p 130, described law as ‘a purposive human effort consists in the 
enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’ where law is treated as an activity 
whereas the legal system is the product of the said activity. and that the legal system is the sustained 
purposive effort. At pp 194 – 195, Fuller stated that ‘the quality and terms of the parties’ emergent 
relationship – its “laws” if you will – constitute an important social reality, but it is a reality brought into 
being and kept alive by purposive effort and by the way each of the parties interprets the purposes of the 
other’. At p 129, Fuller stated that ‘law is formed and maintained through continuing struggles of social 
practice’. At p 209, Fuller argued that in a legal system ‘the existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of 
expectations between lawgiver and subject is part of the very idea of a functioning legal order’. Lon L 
Fuller, ‘American Legal Philosophy at Mid-Century’, (1954) 6(4) Journal of Legal Education 457 – 485, 
at p 467. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 7. Law as 
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which is concealed within the dialectic of practice of customary law becomes the 
dominant form of the dialectic of practice’.748 
This echoed D’Amato’s pragmatic observation, from a self-preserving point of view, 
that the emergence of customary international law over time does not ‘depart 
appreciably from patterns of state behaviour’. 749  The ‘successful norms in the 
Darwinian struggle taking place in the international arena’750 will be those that are 
closest to state behaviour because the international legal system is interested in an 
orderly and peaceful international environment that is conducive to its own maintenance 
and self-perpetuation.
751
  
                                                                                                                                         
‘a continuing struggle of social practice, the work of its everyday participants, a continuous effort to 
construct and sustain a common institutional framework to meet the exigencies of social life in 
accordance with certain ideals’ illustrate Fuller’s perception of ‘law’ in terms of ‘the activity that sustains 
it, instead of considering only the formal sources of its authority’. Lon L Fuller, ‘American Legal 
Philosophy at Mid-Century’ (1954) 6 Journal of Legal Education 457 at p 467. Fuller emphasised that 
‘law is not a datum, but an achievement that needs ever to be renewed’. Kenneth I Winston, ‘Three 
Models for the Study of Law’, in Willem J Witteveen and Wibren van der Burg (eds), Rediscovering 
Fuller: Essays on Implicit Law and Institutional Design (Amsterdam University Press, Amsterdam, 1999) 
at p 63. The author elaborated that ‘it is the work of its everyday participants, a continuous effort to 
construct and sustain a common institutional framework to meet the exigencies of social life in 
accordance with certain ideas’). When law is understood as a purposive activity, its existence will now 
depend ‘on effective interaction and cooperation between citizens and law-making and law-applying 
officials’. In this context, reciprocity is necessary where citizens are interacting agents who create law 
through ‘specific processes of communication’ in which the mutually constructed law gained its authority. 
Gerard J Postema, ‘Implicit Law’ (1994) 13 Law and Philosophy 361, reproduced in Witteveen and van 
der Burg (eds) Rediscovering Fuller, n 747, at pp 256 – 275; and Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 23, 24, and 25. See also See also Fuller, ‘Human 
Interaction and the Law’, supra n 731, at p 27, which Fuller commented that ‘law and its social 
environment stand in a relation of reciprocal influence; any given form of law will not only act upon, but 
be influenced and shaped by, the established forms of interaction that constitute its social milieu’. See 
also Lon L Fuller, ‘A Reply to Professors Cohen and Dworkin’ (1965) 10 Villanova Law Review 655 – 
666, at p 661.   
748 Philip Allot, ‘The Concept of International Law’ (1999) 10 European Journal of International Law 31 
– 50, at p 43. The author, at pp 38 – 39, explains that ‘Customary law, including customary international 
law, is the product of a dialectic of practice, as opposed to legislation, including international treaty-law, 
which is the product of a dialectic of ideas’. It is demonstrated, recently in the case of Nile Basin that 
‘when states participated in norm creation through open interactional processes, communities of practice 
are created that allow for the evolution of stronger normative regimes’. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy 
and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 27 – 28. 
749 D’Amato, ‘International Law as A Unitary System’, supra n 746, at pp 10 – 11. 
750 D’Amato, ‘International Law as A Unitary System’, supra n 746, at p 11. 
751 D’Amato, ‘International Law as A Unitary System’, supra n 746, at p 11. ‘Law has a self-perpetuating 
quality. When it is accepted that the principles governing the activities of a society amount to ‘law’, as is 
the case with states and international law, the rules of that system assume a validity and force all of their 
own.’ Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 11.  
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4.3 Lon L. Fuller’s Interactional Theory of Law 
Fuller opined that ‘much of international law, and perhaps the most vital part of it, is 
essentially customary law, which can best be described as a language of interaction’752 
(author’s emphasis).753 Fuller’s ‘eunomics’ models on the ‘theory of good order and 
workable social arrangements’, 754  where customs or social practices are understood 
broadly as ‘the patterns of reciprocal expectations and actions that arise tacitly out of 
human interaction’.755 Social norms constructed through ‘struggles of social practice’ 
and the necessary legal communications are distinguishable from other social norms due 
to the explicit sense of obligation that they generate.
756
 
Fuller’s interactional conception of law consisted of several claims. First, legal order is 
constituted by an explicit, namely the formally institutionalised, explicitly articulated 
and enacted dimension, and an implicit dimension that are interdependent. Second, the 
implicit dimension must be understood in interactional terms at several levels.
757
 Third, 
                                               
752 Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, supra n 731, at p 2.  
753 Helmut Philipp Aust, Complicity and the Law of State Responsibility (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2011) at p 59. The author commented, in reference to Charter of the United Nations (26 June 
1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 59 Stat 1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153, Art 2(1) that ‘We have 
to account for the legal relationships between States as forms of interaction between sovereign equals. It 
is thus not a relationship of subordination between various actors but one of coordination’.  
754 Gerald J Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence (Springer, 2011), at p 
147. These institutions or practices have a distinctive structure for decision making with a distinctive 
mode of participation for individuals in that decision making. They are also equipped with a set of 
background conditions that enable the institution to function well, governed by an ‘internal morality or a 
set of governing principles or ideals appropriate to it’. See also Robert S Summers, Lon L Fuller (Edward 
Arnold, United States of America, 1984) at p 8. Summers noted Fuller’s conception of ‘eunomics’ as a 
study of basic processes of social ordering and their corresponding forms of law. Kenneth I Winston (ed) 
The Principles of Social Order: Selected Essays of Lon L Fuller (Revised Edition, Hart Publishing, 2001) 
at pp 8 – 9 and pp 188 – 205. The six primary types of social arrangements or mechanisms of social order 
are custom or practice, contract, adjudication, mediation, legislation, and administration or ‘managerial 
direction’. The common features these arrangements or mechanisms of social order, known as ‘focal 
points of human striving’, share include specificity of purpose that aims to address a range of problems, 
or to procure certain outcomes. These focal points typically perform the tasks of social ordering whereby 
legal order is seen as ‘a balanced combination of several of these social orders’, as stated  by Winston in 
pp 8 – 9.  
755 Summers, Lon L Fuller, supra n 754, at p 8. Summers noted Fuller’s conception of ‘eunomics’ as a 
study of basic processes of social ordering and their corresponding forms of law. The generation of social 
norms through interaction, and the sense of responsibility that arises only from humans’ ability to reason 
with norms are the two key ideas that inspired the interactional framework. Brunnée and Toope, 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 20. 
756 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 26. When law is 
understood as a purposive activity, its existence will now depend ‘on effective interaction and cooperation 
between citizens and law-making and law-applying officials’. 
757 Fuller eloquently stated that ‘Implicit in all is the view that law and its social environment stand in a 
relation of reciprocal influence; any given form of law will to only act upon, but be influenced and shaped 
by, the established forms of interaction that constitute its social milieu’. Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and 
the Law’, supra n 731, at p 27. Postema postulated that interactional terms are ‘(a) social behaviour is the 
product of the intermeshing of anticipations of rational self-directing agents with respect to the reasoning 
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the content of laws and the effectiveness and legitimacy of the legal order depends on 
the cooperation achieved at the vertical level between the governing and the governed.
 
758
  
When law is understood as a purposive activity, its existence will now depend ‘on 
effective interaction and cooperation between citizens and law-making and law-
applying officials’.759 Reciprocity is necessary where citizens are interacting agents who 
create law through ‘specific processes of communication’ in which the mutually 
constructed law gained its authority.
760
  
The moral foundation of legal order, propounded by Fuller, ‘is one that promotes human 
interaction on two planes: horizontally, between individuals pursuing their own ends in 
society and vertically, in the political relationship between rulers and ruled’.761 
4.3.1 The Horizontal Nature of Law 
All systems of normativity, even state systems of law, are constructed through rhetorical 
activity and social practice, producing increasingly influential mutual expectations or 
                                                                                                                                         
and actions of others with whom they are locked in networks of interdependence; (b) as the result of more 
or less explicit mutual accommodations, these intermeshing anticipations congeal into regularities of 
behaviour and stable points of expectation in the network of conventions or practices; and (c) the content 
and practical (reason-giving, action-guiding) force of these conventions depends fully on the network of 
intermeshing expectations out of which they arose.’ The levels in which interactions took place are ‘(a) in 
citizen-to-citizen relations; (b) in relations among departments of government and individual officials in 
formal governmental roles; and (c) in relations between officials and departments of government, on the 
one hand, and individual citizens and non-governmental groups and institutions, on the other.’ Postema, A 
Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 153. 
758 In particularly, the legal order is contingent on ‘a broad congruence between the explicit directives of 
the legal order and the implicit conventions and practices that give structure to the social lives of law 
subjects’. Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 153.  
759 Gerard J Postema, ‘Implicit Law’, supra n 747, at p 256. See also Lon L Fuller, The Morality of Law, 
supra n 747, at pp 194 – 195, ‘The quality and terms of the parties’ emergent relationship – its “laws” if 
you will – constitute an important social reality, but it is a reality brought into being and kept alive by 
purposive effort and by the way each of the parties interprets the purposes of the other’. And at p 209, 
arguing that in a legal system ‘the existence of a relatively stable reciprocity of expectations between 
lawgiver and subject is part of the very idea of a functioning legal order’. See Fuller, ‘Human Interaction 
and the Law’, supra n 731, at p 27, ‘law and its social environment stand in a relation of reciprocal 
influence; any given form of law will not only act upon, but be influenced and shaped by, the established 
forms of interaction that constitute its social milieu’; and Fuller, ‘A Reply to Professors Cohen and 
Dworkin’, supra n 747, at p 661. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, 
supra n 724, p 23, fn 16. 
760 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 24 – 25.   
761 Dyzenhaus explained that ‘the promotion of interaction on the horizontal plane leads to the idea of 
individual liberty, while on the vertical plane one gets the development of democracy. Each plane will 
perforce influence the particular ideas developed in the other. One consequence is that the moral 
foundation of legal order not only constrains what can be done in its name, but also becomes open to 
question and change from within. However, the author commented that Fuller might not want to tie legal 
order to a very particular vision of constitutional democracy. David Dyzenhaus, ‘Fuller’s Novelty’, in 
Witteveen and van der Burg (eds) Rediscovering Fuller, supra n 747, at pp 98 – 99.  
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shared understandings of actors that are reinforced through practice of legality that 
fulfils the eight criteria of internal morality, whereby obligation, or fidelity to law, can 
be generated.
762
 An interactional view of law explains the central features of the 
international system, what Georges Scelle termed ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’, in which 
the dual role of states as both subjects of international law and lawmakers is 
highlighted.
763
  
It makes ‘analytical sense to speak of states as individual agents, and to treat 
sovereignty as a proxy for autonomy’, but having said that states are proxy for 
autonomy does not go on to show that state sovereignty is indispensable for 
interactional international law.
764
 In fact, an interactional approach attempts to illustrate 
how contemporary international law is more receptive to the actions of non-state 
participants, where norms, although formally sanctioned by states, are greatly 
influenced by a diversity of actors.
765
 In light of the burgeoning participation of 
individuals and ‘non-state collectivities such as governmental or non-governmental 
                                               
762 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 34.  
763 For commentary on Scelle’s theory of dédoublement fonctionnel, see (1990) 1 European Journal of 
International Law 193 – 239 <http://207.57.19.226/journal/Vol1/No1/index.html#TopOfPage> accessed 
10 September 2012. In particularly, see Antonio Cassese, ‘Remarks on Scelle’s Theory of “Role Splitting” 
(dédoublement fonctionnel) in International Law’ (1990) 1 European Journal of International Law  210 – 
231, especially at p 227. The author commented that ‘It follows that the new trends emerging in the 
international community have led (or are leading) to an enhancement of the “dual” role played by state 
agents under Scelle’s doctrine of dédoublement fonctionnel’. Aust, Complicity and the Law of State 
Responsibility, supra n 753, at pp 59 – 60. The author noted that ‘States play a double role in international 
law: they enact the law to which they are then bound. To this scenario, the idea of the so-called 
dédoublement fonctionnel could apply: Georges Scelle conceptualised this idea with individuals in mind 
who would fulfil a double role as agents of their home State and of the international community. His 
considerations have afterwards, mutatis mutandis, been applied to States. This transposition of Scelle’s 
concept makes sense insofar as States may at times act as agents for their own interests and may at other 
times (also) act for the interests of the international community as a whole … its basic tenets still hold: 
international law lacks a general institutional structure which would turn it is not a legal system which no 
longer needs to rely on States for its practical enforcement. Therefore, States may take up different roles 
on the international level, depending on the circumstances in which they act. In some situations, they are 
law-makers, whereas in other situations they are subjected to the law they previously enacted. This double 
role of States, it needs to be carefully analysed what the rule of law protects States against’. A distinction 
could be drawn between human agency central to Fuller’s account of interactional law, and state 
sovereignty in interactional international law where state sovereignty can be seen only as an imperfect 
proxy for human agency. Nonetheless, it is still plausible to relate states’ interaction through law to that of 
individual human beings within a system of law. See Gerald J Postema, ‘Custom in International Law: A 
Normative Practice Account’ in Amanda Perreau-Saussine and James Bernard Murphy (eds) The Nature 
of Customary Law: Legal, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives (Cambridge University Press, 2007) 
at p 306. The author contested that ‘despite obvious disanalogies, international actors, like individual 
human agents, can and do engage in discursive, practically concrete normative practices’. 
764 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 36.  
765 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 36. The authors 
stated that ‘A “State” exists only within a normative framework, that is, the framework of international 
law. Unlike individual human beings, states are entirely creatures of interaction. States are but one 
manner in which people can organise themselves to pursue their goals.’ See also Benedict Kingsbury, 
‘International Law as Inter-Public Law’, supra n 741, at pp 175 – 179.  
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organisations or corporations’, 766  the potential for major shifts in the horizon of 
international legal interaction is imminent. 
4.3.2 The Vertical Nature of Law 
The sense of obligation, the ‘added value of law’,767 is a product of reciprocity. 768 It is 
the connection between citizens and government with respect to the observance of rules 
– the reciprocal fulfilment of duties – on which fidelity of law is founded. 769  The 
creation of law at the international level that commands the sense of obligation, the 
fidelity to law – is contingent on the congruence between the practice of states and the 
shared legal understandings that embedded Fuller’s criteria of legality.770  
A deeper sense of reciprocity, evidenced in the adherence of practice to a rule of law 
that is created and maintained collectively, is even more salient in international society 
because states are both subjects and lawmakers.
771
 An interactional conceptualisation of 
law where the horizontality of the international society is seen as an asset instead of a 
defect in international law making, highlights the interactional nature of the 
international normative order, and better explains the contemporary practice of 
international law.
 772
  
                                               
766 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 36.  
767 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 42. 
768 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 37. The New 
Haven School dismisses the need to explain obligation because international law ‘functions purely on the 
basis of reciprocal obligations rooted in interests’. Higgins, Problems and Process. International Law and 
How We Use It, supra n 574, at p 16. See also Michael Byers, Custom, Power and the Power of Rules 
(Cambridge University Press, 1999) at pp 89 – 105.  
769 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 38. This version 
of reciprocity is specifically addressed in Fuller’s eighth criterion of legality, which is, law are 
administered congruently with their language as announced. See Jeremy Waldron, ‘Why Law – Efficacy, 
Freedom, or Fidelity?’ (1994) 13(3) Law and Philosophy 259 – 284, at p 277.  
770 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 40 - 41. At p 41, 
the authors stated that ‘Only when the conditions of legality are met, and embraced by a community of 
practice, can we imagine agents feeling obliged to shape their behaviour in the light of the promulgated 
rules.’ However, this does not mean that each law must be regarded as having moral force on its own.  
Winston, ‘Three Models for the Study of Law’, supra n 747, at p 62 stated that ‘Actors may well follow a 
particular law out of calculated self-interest or to avoid governmental coercion’. However, Brunnée and 
Toope, in p 42, commented that they are looking at a broader point about fidelity to the legal order.  
771 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 40.  
772 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 34. First, the 
horizontality is an asset, and not a defect of law. Second, the understanding of law that grounds in social 
interaction highlighted its ability to shape human behaviour through the generation of fidelity. Third, a 
procedural conception of the rule of law upholds and supports diversity in moral and political ends while 
at the same time helping to build a stronger global society through the possibility of deeper normative 
communities. Fourth, an over-indulgence in a formalistic account of legality misses the opportunity for a 
richer understanding of customary, treaty and soft law. Fifth, ‘legitimacy’ has a specific, legal meaning.  
173 
 
4.4 A Framework for an Interactional Theory of International Law 
An interactional theory of law proposes the acknowledgment of the construction of 
international actors, both state and non-state actors, in the hard work of international 
law making that is based in, and derived from, social interaction that is legal.
773
 An 
interactional theory of international law comprises three elements:  
1. The shared understanding of states and international actors on what they want to 
accomplish through law, and of specific candidate norms, through an 
interactional process that is legal.
 774
   
2. The shared understanding must meet specific criteria of legality that establishes 
the conditions for reasoned dialogue and reciprocity and enables an extension of 
normative ambition to include the development of a broader base of shared legal 
understandings.
775
  
3. The shared understandings or norms that adhere to the criteria of legality must 
be reinforced through a continuing practice of legality.
776
  
                                               
773 For an analogous reference, see Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Communities of Judgment and Human Rights’ 
(2000) 1(2) Theoretical Inquiries in Law 245 – 282 where the author gave a detailed account of the 
concepts of ‘common sense’, ‘community’ and ‘other judging subjects’ in the elaboration of Hanna 
Arendt’s work on judgment, which was deemed relied on a ‘common sense’ shared by members of a 
community of judging subjects. And also, by the same author, Jennifer Nedelsky, ‘Judgment, Diversity, 
and Relational Autonomy’, pp 103 – 120, in Ronald Beiner and Jennifer Nedelsky (eds) Judgment, 
Imagination, and Politics: Themes from Kant and Arendt (Rowman and Littlefield, Lanham, 2001) where 
the author traces the contradistinctions and the relationship between ‘judgment and autonomy’ in the 
context of judiciary diversity’. 
774 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 186. Legal interactions are an essential feature of law, 
precisely because law’s central purpose is to ‘open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the 
channels through the barriers that separate them’. 
775 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 72. The authors 
noted that shared understanding cannot be enacted as ‘[t]he form of law will prove a hollow shell unless 
law-making is understood as an effort to build and sustain legality’.  
776 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 55. At p 70, and 
pp 75 – 76, the authors noted that practice is an important component in an account of interactional law, 
where law is built through a practice that sustains shared understandings of legality, as the vigour of a 
norm is the ‘triumph of constant effort to support it’. The authors cited the demise of the prohibition on 
the use of force where its inconsistent invocation and application in international practice, and 
exceptionalism by powerful states all threaten to undermine its legality, and underscore the work of all 
other international actors – states, citizens, inter-governmental organisations, NGOs, and the media to 
uphold its legality. The authors elaborated further, in pp 80 – 81 that without a robust interaction that 
facilitates deep engagement in diversity, law cannot emerge nor it can be created in international society. 
See Etienne Wenger, Communities of Practice: Learning, Meaning, and Identity (Cambridge University 
Press, 1998) at pp 131 – 133, stated that for a community of practice to exist, participants must be 
engaged in interactions of a certain density and specificity. The communities of practice can exist only in 
settings that allow for sustained mutual engagement. They must have sustained mutual relationships 
(harmonious or not), shared approaches to interaction, shared indicators of membership, knowledge of 
others and their roles in the joint enterprise, shared discourses and shortcuts to communication, and 
common criteria for the appropriateness of actions and outcomes. 
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It is an important feature that an interactional law can exist despite a thin set of 
substantive commitments, which reflects the reality of contemporary international law. 
Limited shared understanding on substantive values is not an insurmountable obstacle to 
the creation of law as long as efforts are maintained to build a more resilient community 
of legal practice that promotes continuous mutual engagement and interactions, which 
allows for the development of richer substantive rules.
777
 
4.4.1 Shared Understanding 
Brunnée and Toope’s conceptualisation of ‘shared understanding’ is based on what 
Fuller described as stable interactional expectancies.
778
 These stable interactional 
expectancies are mutually adjusted in an interactional and reciprocal process, and arise 
from the ‘vocabulary of deeds and basic grammar that will organise deeds into 
meaningful patterns’.779 This dynamic process allows the identification of the quality 
and terms of an emerging shared understanding intended to govern the relationship 
between the parties
780
 who are rational self-directing agents.
781
 This reflects the classical 
horizontal relationship, the ‘ordre relationnel’ (relational order) that exists between 
equal sovereigns at the international level.
782
 
This view is supported by Giovanni Sartor in his discussion of the ‘bindingness’ of legal 
rules, where it is proposed that a rule is binding to a reasoner when ideal practical 
cognition would lead that reasoner to endorse the rule from the plural perspective, that 
is, the collective participation in the adoption of that rule.
783
 This proposition 
                                               
777 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 87. 
778 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 209. The purposive enterprise of law that facilitates 
social interactions depends on ‘a relatively stable reciprocity of expectations between law-giver and 
subject’. Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 153. 
779 Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, supra n 731, at p 33. Fuller stated that ‘Stable interactional 
expectancies can arise with reference to roles and functions as well as to specific acts; a language of 
interaction will contain not only a vocabulary of deeds but also a basic grammar that will organise deeds 
into meaningful patterns’. 
780 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 195. Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, 
supra n 569, at p 341.  
781 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 151. Fuller, 
The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 209. Fuller stated that ‘for a legal system, the existence of a 
relatively stable reciprocity of expectations between lawgiver and subject is part of the very idea of a 
functioning legal order’.  
782 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: between Memory and Prophecy’ pp 123 
– 137, in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed) The Law of Treaties Beyond the Vienna Convention (Oxford University 
Press, Oxford, 2011) at p 125. 
783 Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, supra n 569, at pp 344 – 345. At pp 331 – 355, Sartor 
explored the two ‘schema’ of bindingness, which is persistent convergence of shared normative belief 
dimension, and the present teleological convergence dimension. The reasoning schema entails that there 
should be a persistent convergence of a shared normative belief in order to ensure that there is a sufficient 
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exemplifies how the normative notion of legal validity allows a rich construction of the 
conceptions of law where social facts (or what he stated as legal sources) can be given 
appropriate recognition as reasons supporting legality.
784
  
4.4.1.1 The Horizontal Feature of Shared Understanding  
The ability of the subjects of law to rely on law in decision-making, and their 
commitment to law, are ‘fostered by adherence to the requirements of legality’. 785 
Legality is related to social practice in the broader sense, where a common reference 
point, known as ‘implicit rules’ embedded in social practice, is shared between subjects 
and makers of law.
786
  Postema postulated that legal norms ‘exist only to the extent that 
they are accepted and practiced in the community at large’, and concluded that law 
‘reduces to the behaviour of everyone in the community’. 787  Fuller described the 
implicit element as ‘a language of interaction’788 where in order to understand the nature, 
                                                                                                                                         
chance of contributing to the collective adoption of the rule. As to the teleological convergence schema, 
there should be a belief that adoption of this rule representing a shared normative belief would contribute 
to legal values. The two schema as analysed in the conceptualisation of ‘bindingness’ lead to a 
determination that the rule is ‘binding’. 
784 Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, supra n 569, at p 357.  
785 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 66. 
786 See Postema, ‘Implicit Law’, supra n 747, at pp 259 and 264. Friedrich V Kratochwil, ‘How do 
Norms Matter?’ in Michael Byers (ed), The Role of Law in International Politics: Essays in International 
Relations and International Law (Oxford University Press, 2000), pp 40 – 41 (providing the example of 
the injunction ‘Dogs must be carried on the escalator’ and of the social understandings needed to 
correctly understand that rule). Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra 
n 724, at p 66. 
787 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 143. Law 
viewed from this lens refocused the conventional attention on the ‘superficial facts about the behaviour of 
state functionaries to deeper facts about the social behaviour and patterns of social interactions that give 
official behaviour its meaning and force’. At p 147, Postema stated that the concept of ‘implicit law’ 
derives from Fuller’s ‘eunomics’ model of legal theory where customs or social practice, ‘understood 
broadly as the patterns of reciprocal expectations and actions that arise tacitly out of human interaction’, 
is accorded a special place in his account of the legal order. This ‘pattern of reciprocal expectations and 
actions that arise tacitly out of human interaction’ is the founding blocks for the ‘informal and implicit 
foundation of the formal and explicit institutions, constitutions, and processes of the legal order’ that 
gives meaning, legitimacy and effectiveness to the formal institutions and processes. See also Summers, 
Lon L Fuller, at p 8. Winston (ed) The Principles of Social Order, supra n 754, at pp 8 – 9 and pp 188 – 
205. 
788 Lon Fuller, ‘Human Interaction and the Law’, supra n 731, at p 2. Fuller elaborated that ‘To interact 
meaningfully men require a social setting in which the moves of the participating players will fall 
generally within some predictable pattern. To engage in effective social behaviour men need the support 
of intermeshing anticipations that will let them know what their opposite numbers will do, or that will at 
least enable them to gauge the general scope of the repertory from which responses to their actions will be 
drawn. We sometimes speak of customary law as offering an unwritten “code of conduct”’.  At p 33, 
Fuller proceed to explain that customary law does not limit itself to requiring or prohibiting precisely 
defined acts, but may also designate roles and functions, and then, when the occasion arises, hold those 
discharging these roles and functions to an accounting for their performances.  
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limits and characteristic modes of functioning of a legal order’s more immediately 
apparent surface phenomena, we must appreciate its social depth.
789
 
The implicit dimension of legal order (also known as custom or social practice) is 
broadly understood as the patterns of reciprocal expectations and actions that arise 
tacitly out of human interaction, and are sustained through the rational and purposive 
social interactions of people.
790
 Fuller explained that such is a situation of human 
interaction, where each participant guides himself by anticipating what the other will do 
and will expect him to do.
791
 Postema gave a similar account of implicit norms where he 
summarised that implicit norms emerged from the accommodation and adjustment of 
expectations and actions of interacting agents.
792
  
4.4.1.2 The Vertical Feature of Shared Understanding 
The establishment of stable interactional expectancies between lawgiver and subject, of 
which states play this dual role,
793
 can be analogised to the vertical dimension of 
interaction between officials of government and ordinary citizens in Fuller’s eunomic 
model.
794
 The congruence between official action and declared rule, one of the criteria 
of legality, is the ‘very essence of the rule of law … where law furnishes a baseline for 
self-directed action, not a detailed set of instructions for accomplishing specific 
                                               
789 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 148. At p 151, 
Postema postulated that explicit rules might structure the coordination of law-making and law-applying, 
but ‘much of it depends on the reciprocal expectations of the agencies and their intermeshing 
anticipations’. Fuller succinctly stated that ‘The effective functioning of the total law-making and law-
applying process, depends, then upon a kind of customary law that lies behind enacted law and enables it 
to achieve its goals effectively’, Winston (ed) The Principles of Social Order, supra n 754, at p 195. 
790 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 148.  
791 Lon L Fuller, Anatomy of the Law (Praeger, 1968), at p 73. 
792 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 148. Raz 
reiterated the same point, and explained that man-made rules, whether customary, legislated or social 
rules are not independent. It is emerged within an institutional structure, and form part of a system of 
social rules. Joseph Raz, Between Authority and Interpretation (Oxford University Press 2009) at p 5. Raz 
opined that ‘In fact rules made by people (I will refer to all such rules, whether customary, legislated, or 
others, as social rules) hardly ever stand alone. Typically they emerge within an institutional structure, 
and form part of a system of social rules’. 
793 Karl Zemanek, ‘Is the Term “Soft Law” Convenient?’ pp 843 – 881 in Gerhad Hafter (ed) Liber 
Amicorum Professor Ignaz Seidl-Hohenveldern in Honour of His 80th Birthday (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague, 1998), at p 844. ‘States are not only the subjects but also the makers of 
international law and are as such free to invent new processes of lawmaking as it suits their purposes, as 
long as these processes are accepted by the system partners’. Fuller described law as ‘the product of an 
interplay of purposive orientations between the citizen and his government’. Winston (ed) The Principles 
of Social Order, supra n 754, at p 254; Gerald J Postema, ‘Implicit Law’ (1994)13(3) Law and 
Philosophy 361 – 387, at pp 368 – 373. 
794 Winston (ed) The Principles of Social Order, supra n 754, at p 254; Gerald J Postema, ‘Implicit Law’ 
(1994)13(3) Law and Philosophy 361 – 387, at pp 368 – 373.  
177 
 
objectives’.795 An interactive relationship between lawmaker and subject, caught in a 
web of ‘reciprocal interactive expectancies’, supports the above propositions that the 
implicit social dimension is inherent and intrinsic to the very process of making law.
796
  
These reciprocal interactive expectancies give rise to a relationship that has a distinctive 
normative (or what Fuller called, moral
797
) dynamic, and which provides fertile soil for 
implicit understandings, norms, and conventions to take root.
798
 Vertical congruence of 
interactions between officials and subjects, ‘the establishment of stable interactional 
expectancies between lawgiver and subject’ is pivotal in the understanding of ‘law’ 
because it is from such vertical congruence of interactions that law derives its content, 
effectiveness, and indeed its very existence.
799
  
                                               
795 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 210, elaborated that law is ‘a matter of providing the 
citizenry with a sound and stable framework for their interactions with one another, the role of 
government being that of standing as a guardian of the integrity of this system’.  
796 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 152. Postema 
summarised that ‘The subjects’ understanding of the law enacted depends on their expectations with 
respect to the way in which other subjects and officials are likely to understand it and the practical force 
they are likely to accord it; likewise, officials will draft laws and others will interpret them in ways that 
they anticipate that subjects are likely to understand them .’ 
797 Fuller explained that ‘certainly there can be no rational grounds for asserting that a man can have a 
moral obligation to obey a legal rule that does not exist, or is kept secret from him, or that came into 
existence only after he had acted …’ where he seems to conflate normativity with morality, and labelled 
his procedural natural law as criteria of internal morality. See Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at 
p 39. See also Anthony D’Amato, ‘Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law’ (Faculty Working Papers, 
Northwestern University School of Law Scholarly Commons, 1981) 
<http://scholarlycommons.law.northwestern.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1130&context=facultyworki
ngpapers> accessed 2 November 2012.  
798 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 152. Postema 
stressed that law can be said to ‘exists’, or capable of effective governance in its distinctive way only 
when the implicit rules (which are unwritten, customary commitments) embedded in the legal order, 
giving structure and stability to the collaborative enterprise of law are acknowledged and honoured.  
799 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 151. See also 
Winston (ed) The Principles of Social Order, supra n 754, at p 254, and Gerald J Postema, ‘Implicit Law’ 
(1994)13(3) Law and Philosophy 361 – 387, at pp 368 – 373. Postema eloquently summarised the two 
key implications of the Fuller’s argument on the importance of vertical interaction and congruence 
between government and subject, depending on its content, to the effectiveness and existence of law. At p 
151, Postema qualified ‘effectiveness’ to be limited to ‘effectiveness given a commitment to govern in a 
law-like way.’ Postema elaborated that ‘it is intended as an argument about the extent to which law exists 
(allowing, as Fuller always does, that this is always a matter of degree)’. At pp 152 – 153, he stated that 
this argument concerns ‘conditions under which the meaning or content of the laws (directives regarded 
as laws) is practically determinate’. More importantly, the vertical dimension of congruence in the 
interactional relationship between law-maker and subject. The vertical dimension presupposes the 
horizontal dimension because the reciprocity at the vertical level and the congruence achieved are merely 
a reflection of the horizontal dimension, the implicit rules engaged and understood. It is asserted that ‘law 
is a projection of the ongoing life of the society it intends to governed, and cannot be cut loose from the 
developing life into which it is projected’. His arguments are adapted from Lon L Fuller, Anatomy of Law 
(Frederick A Praeger, New York, Washington, London, 1968) at p 66. Fuller initiated a lengthy 
discussion on the importance of ‘implicit sources’ on the interpretation of law where he pointed out that it 
is ‘fallacious to suppose that in interpreting a statute the judge simply draws out of its text a meaning that 
the legislature has put there.’ He cited an example of a hypothetical statute prohibiting vehicles from 
entering a park in the determination of the effect of the statute. The answer to the question of what are 
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Thus, it is demonstrated in the preceding sections that the horizontal feature and the 
vertical feature of shared understanding, developed through interaction and reciprocity, 
which result in the congruence between lawmaker and its subjects, are not mutually 
independent from each other. Reciprocity is possible only if vertical congruence is not 
disengaged from its horizontal dimension, grounded in the implicit rules where the 
interactions took place. A separate discussion of the horizontal and the vertical feature is 
conceptually useful in drawing the nuanced difference between both features in order to 
enable a more subtle and refined understanding of the intricate complexity involved in 
the development and the emergence of shared understanding.   
The conceptualisation of shared understanding is based on Fuller’s interactional theory 
where the interactional and reciprocal processes of law as a purposive enterprise allow 
mutual expectations to organise into stable, meaningful patterns, and gradually 
converge into stable interactional expectancies. The interactional process gradually 
shapes and develops shared understanding through mutual reciprocity. Congruence 
between lawmakers and subjects dictates the emergence of shared understanding, where 
such congruence presupposes a horizontal feature whereby congruence is possible only 
if it is not disengaged from the expectations of the subjects as embedded in the implicit 
rules of the societal structure in which such interactions and reciprocity took place.  
Shared understandings represent the embedded and implicit dimension of background 
knowledge, norms and practices that are re-generated and maintained through social 
interaction. The emergence of shared understanding provides the structure that shapes 
conduct and behaviour of actors, and their relations and role within the social matrix.
800
 
                                                                                                                                         
parks for must necessarily be drawn from ‘what may be called implicit sources, from the attitudes and 
practices of the community, and some shared conception of the most beneficial use of park areas. The 
considerations that make it vain to suppose that a statute can be cut loose from the developing life into 
which it is projected apply with a vengeance to the interpretation of constitutions’. 
800 See Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 64 – 65. In 
this respect, Philip Allot shared similar sentiments where he commented that – 
‘A treaty is a disagreement reduced to writing … [It] is not the end of a process, but the beginning of 
another process … The making of legislation is a similar dialectical process, by which conflicts of ideas 
and interest are resolved into a legal form which then re-enters the general social process as a new datum. 
The treaty and the law become a datum in the general social process, but it is a datum with a life of its 
own.’ Philip Allot, ‘The Concept of International Law’, supra n 748, at p 43. 
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4.4.2 Internal Morality of Law 
A law which a man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void and no law: and it is 
impossible to obey contradictions, or act according to them.
801
 
What Fuller had claimed as ‘internal morality of law’ is rooted in his interactional 
understanding of law, where the morality of these criteria lies partly in their ability to 
uphold and promote agency, as ‘they enabled citizens to reason with law, to make 
choices about their own lives and appropriate conduct’.802 The congruence of law with 
wider social practice posited by Postema, which is the precondition that exists for 
legality to evolve, is grounded in social consensus expressed in practice.
803
 This shared 
understanding generated by social practice evolves and matures through more 
interactions.
804
  The communications that shape such interactions, be they symbolic or 
physical, weaves the social fabric.
805
  
                                               
801 Vaughan CJ in Edward Thomas v Thomas Sorrell, (1674) Vaugh 330 at p 337, 124 English Reports 
1098 – 1113, at p 1102. Quoted by Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 33. 
802  Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 30. The 
autonomy of law, its capability to generate the obligation to obey, the ‘fidelity’ generated, is ‘rooted in a 
sense of legitimacy gained primarily from upholding the ‘internal morality of law’. Brunnée and Toope 
commented that it is generally agreed that Fuller’s eight internal morality of law ‘capture the essence of 
rule of law’ where when the law meets these conditions, it is capable of influencing the practical 
reasoning of citizens and directing the conduct of citizens, in accordance with his categorisation of law as 
‘the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules’. Colleen Murphy, ‘Lon Fuller and 
the Moral Value of the Rule of Law’ (2005) 24 Law and Philosophy 239 – 262, at pp 240 and 241. The 
author elaborated that ‘when lawmakers respect the eight principles of the rule of law, their laws can 
influence the practical reasoning of citizens. Citizens can take legal requirements and prohibitions into 
consideration when deliberating about how to act. They can predict how judges will interpret and apply 
rules, enabling them to form reliable expectation of the treatment different actions are likely to provoke. 
When the rule of law is realised, their expectations of congruence will not be disappointed. Taken 
together with the reasonable expectation that fellow citizens will also obey the law, these expectations 
justify the belief that the law gives citizens reasons to act or refrain from acting in certain ways.’ At p 242, 
the author opined that the rule of law provides ‘some normative grounds for thinking that citizens have a 
moral obligation to obey the law’. See also Vaughan Lowe, ‘The Politics of Law-Making: Are the 
Method and Character of Norm Creation Changing’ in Michael Byers (ed) The Role of Law in 
International Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2000) at p 221. Lowe described international law as 
‘a system where the plausibility of analogical reasoning and the persuasiveness of topical, rhetorical 
argument lie at the root of the perception of legitimacy’. 
803 Postema, ‘Implicit Law’, supra n 747, at p 265. 
804 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 33. 
805 Tim Blanning, The Pursuit of Glory: Europe 1648 – 1815 (Allen Lane, London, 2007), at p 3. Fuller 
argues that ‘how and when we accomplish communication with one another can expand or contract the 
boundaries of life itself … It is through communication that we inherit the achievements of past human 
effort’. Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 186. The rhetorical activity involved in 
communication was claimed to be ‘a means of discerning and evaluating the ends available to a given 
community’ where law is constructed through ‘everyday practice by all participants in the system’. See 
Francis J Mootz III, ‘Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric’ in Witteveen and van der 
Burg(eds) Rediscovering Fuller, n 747, at p 444 and Willem J Witteveen, ‘Rediscovering Fuller: An 
Introduction’ in Witteveen and van der Burg(eds) Rediscovering Fuller, n 747, at p 37. Brunnée and 
Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 31. The authors commented that 
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Fuller expounded the eight ways to fail to make law with the example of the benevolent 
dictator Rex who came to the throne ‘filled with the zeal of a reformer’.806 The internal 
morality of law, or the eight criteria of legality proposed by Fuller are:
807
  
(1) The generality of law, namely, there must be rules for the creation of a system 
for subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules;
808
 
(2) promulgation of laws;809 
(3) Non-retroactive laws;810  
(4) The clarity of law.811 
The specificity and clarity of law depend on the nature of the problem, and determine 
the extent to which delegation of its precision to courts or special administrative 
                                                                                                                                         
‘the practice-driven account of the generation of law is, of course, closely allied to Adler’s ‘community of 
practice’ description of the generation of all social norms.  
806 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 33 – 39. The eight reasons for failure explained by 
Fuller from the example of the Rex are: a failure to achieve rules where every issue has to be decided on 
an ad hoc basis; a failure to publicise, and to make available to the affected parties the rules expected for 
observation; the abuse of retroactive legislation that fails to guide action, and undercuts the integrity of 
rules prospective in effect since the rules risk retrospective change; a failure to make rules understandable; 
the enactment of contradictory rules;  rules that require conduct beyond the powers of the affected party; 
introducing such frequent changes in the rules that the subject cannot orient his action by them; and a 
failure of congruence between the rules as announced and their actual administration. 
807 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 46 – 91.  
808 The requirement of generality is interpreted occasionally to mean ‘the law must act impersonally, 
where its rules must apply to general classes and should contain no proper names’. Fuller, The Morality of 
Law, supra n 747, at pp 47 and 48. 
809  The promulgation of laws simply means the publishing of the law, and to make them generally 
available, whereby such publication or promulgation is subjected to the principle of marginal utility, 
depending on how far requirements imposed by the law ‘depart from generally shared views of right and 
wrong’. The more it is at variant with generally shared views the more promulgation is needed. The large 
coincidence between moral and legal demands entails that the objection of a rule based on difficulty of 
access will be reduced. Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 49, 50 and 51.  
810 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 53. At pp 53 – 54, Fuller commented that there are still 
occasions where it is essential to resort to retrospective law as a curative measure to advance the cause of 
legality, especially in the circumstances that such recourse aims to alleviate the effect of a failure to 
realise other desiderata of legality. The role of judges in deciding disputes invariably creates retrospective 
law where in the resolution of the dispute through a pronouncement on the issue, the judge invariably 
engages in an act of retrospective legislation. In this context, retrospective law-making is to be tolerated 
because it is essential that the parties must have the chance to learn what the rules are, and to be assured 
that in the event of dispute on their meaning, a dispute resolution mechanism is in place. Fuller, The 
Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 56 – 57. See Richard H Fallon Jr and Daniel J Meltzer, ‘New Law, 
Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies’ (1991) 104(8) Harvard Law Review 1731 – 1833. 
Francis X Beytagh, ‘Ten Years of Non-Retroactivity: A Critique and A Proposal’ (1975) 61(8) Virginia 
Law Review 1557 – 1625. Jill E Fisch, ‘Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach’ 
(1997) 110(5) Harvard Law Review 1055 – 1123. For a definition of ‘retrospectivity’, see ‘Chapter 1 
Defining Retrospectivity’ pp 9 – 37, in Charles Sampford, Retrospectivity and the Rule of Law (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2006). Kenneth J Kress, ‘Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin’s 
Rights Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions’ (1984) 72(3) California Law Review 369 
– 402. 
811 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 63. 
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tribunals is permissible.
812
 Clarity of law does not require that law is to be drafted in 
such a way that it prescribes the command of the law in absolute terms, and does not 
negate the incorporation of standards such as ‘good faith’ and ‘due care’ into rules.813 A 
similar response is offered to the criticism levelled against the improbability of this 
criterion in the evaluation and assessment of general principles of law. These principles 
of law are mostly open-textured in nature, serving as a guide to the development, 
interpretation and application of law or as a benchmark against which rules, standards 
and behaviour can be evaluated.  
Even very clear rules are not meant to prescribe action in absolute terms, as rules are 
meant only to provide a framework for action. Such misconception is to ‘conflate 
fidelity to law with deference for established authority’.814 In fact, it is sometimes more 
effective to take advantage of, and to incorporate into law ‘common sense standards of 
judgment that have grown up in the ordinary life lived outside legislative halls’ since ‘a 
specious clarity can be more damaging than an honest open-ended vagueness’.815 
Many rules of international law evolved from state practice, where rigid obligations or 
overriding legal rights are not stipulated. It is the nature of the international legal system 
that ‘clear and unambiguous substance of a rule’ 816  cannot always be achieved, as 
international law is not an adversarial system.
817
 This flexible nature of international 
law, where no objectively ‘right’ answer allows a premium on compromise and where 
                                               
812 Fuller elaborated that ‘the problems of governmental regulation may safely be assigned to adjudicative 
decision with a reasonable prospect that fairly clear standards of decision will emerge from a case-by-case 
treatment of controversies as they arise’. Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 65. In the context 
of the 1992 Framework Convention on Climate Change, Brunnée and Toope illustrated that the clarity 
requirement of the Convention is satisfied through the subsequent elaboration of subsidiary rules, or the 
reference to complementary rules. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, 
supra n 724, at p 179. 
813 Hayek caution against the creeping vagueness into law in his eloquent but sweeping condemnation of 
legal provisions requiring what is ‘fair’ or ‘reasonable’. He stated that – ‘One could write a history of the 
decline of the Rule of Law … in terms of the progressive introduction of these vague formulas into 
legislation and [adjudication], and of the increasing arbitrariness and uncertainty of, and the consequent 
disrespect for, the law and the judicature’. Friedrich von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom (George Routledge 
and Sons, London, 1944) at p 81. 
814 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 63. See a brilliant discussion of the application of the 
Fuller’s internal morality to the principle of precautionary principle in Jaye Ellis and Alison FitzGerald, 
‘The Precautionary Principle in International Law: Lessons from Fuller’s Internal Morality’ (2004) 49 
McGill Law Journal 779 – 800 <http://lawjournal.mcgill.ca/documents/Ellis_and_FitzGerald.pdf> 
accessed 22 May 2012.  
815
 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 64. 
816 Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 11 – 12. 
817 Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 11.  
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states are entitled to choose ‘a range of policies, all of which will be legal’, is ‘a great 
advantage for a system so bound up with politics and diplomacy’.818 
(5) Non-contradictions in the laws:819 
This criterion is especially useful in the current climate of a fragmented legal order 
ostensibly riven with contradictions. It is interesting that Fuller did not pronounce that 
laws that contradict are not law, but proceeded to seek reconciliation through recourse 
to the context. This is aligned with the current approach in the field of international law 
that seeks to address conciliation of conflicting norms through a variety of techniques, 
including principles of harmonisation, systemic integration and mutual supportiveness. 
(6) Laws not requiring the impossible:820 
The study on the impossibility of law enquires into the aspirational language of a law 
that looks into the fine line between extreme difficulty and impossibility. There is a 
blurred distinction between vigorous exhortation and imposed duty. This is 
exceptionally true in the current trend of international environmental law making, where 
provisions are mostly aspirational instead of requiring the impossible.  
                                               
818 Dixon, Textbook on International Law, supra n 531, at p 12.  
819 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 65 – 69. The avoidance of contradictions in law is 
simply one of logic where there cannot be a violation of the law of identity whereby an act is forbidden 
and commanded at the same time. The first accepted principle of recourse for dealing with apparent 
contradictions in law is to seek any means in which reconciliation of the seemingly inconsistent 
provisions is possible through ‘effecting a reciprocal adjustment between the two statutes, interpreting 
each in the light of the other’. Fuller elaborated that in the determination of incompatible rules, other 
extrinsic considerations beyond the language of the rules must be taken into account, because it 
encompasses the whole institutional setting of the problem – legal, moral, political, economic, and 
sociological where the repugnancy might be rendered as merely the consequence of legislative oversight. 
However, Fuller acknowledged the difficulty in such endeavour where ‘one would be to know where to 
stop, for the courts might easily find themselves embarked on the perilous adventure of attempting to 
remake the entire body of our statutory law into a more coherent whole. The reinterpretation of old 
statues in the light of new would also present embarrassing problems of retrospective legislation’. 
820 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 70. Fuller distinguished this requirement with other 
desiderata that make up the internal morality of law, and are ultimately concerned with the possibility of 
obedience. Although it is reasonable to contend that it is impossible to obey a law that is not created, 
promulgated, unintelligible, or in contradiction, it is not the purpose of the development of this article. 
This desiderata rises from the justification that there is a need to develop principles for the guidance 
purposive human effort, and not to engage in an exercise in logical entailment. At pp 70 – 71, Fuller 
viewed that ‘such law serves what Lilburne called a law-less unlimited power’ by its very absurdity’. He 
distinguished this requirement with other desiderata that make up the internal morality of law, and are 
ultimately concerned with the possibility of obedience. Although it is reasonable to contend that it is 
impossible to obey a law that is not created, promulgated, unintelligible, or in contradiction, it is not the 
purpose of the development of this article. Fuller stated in p 71 that ‘its brutal pointlessness may let the 
subject know that there is nothing that may not be demanded of him and that he should keep himself 
ready to jump in any direction’. 
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Ellis and FitzGerald outlined a variety of possible circumstances in which a principle of 
law might be deemed ‘impossible’.821 It can be found that there is no hard and fast line 
to be drawn between a rule that can be achieved with extreme difficulty, and a rule that 
is impossible,
822
 for a harsh and unfair rule need not contradict the basic purpose of a 
legal order, unlike a rule that demands what is patently impossible.
823
 Despite the need 
for an inquiry that seeks to exemplify the two ends, alas, the law ‘knows no magic that 
will enable it to transcend this antinomy’.824  
On this, Fuller observed that ‘between the two [extreme difficulty and impossibility] is 
an indeterminate area in which the internal morality [that requires a law that is not 
asking the impossible] and external moralities [of what is fair and just] meet’.825 The 
determination and assessment of a rule against the criteria of not asking the impossible 
must be taken on a case-by-case basis, in consideration of the context and all relevant 
factors surrounding the law. 
(7) Constancy of law through time:  
Brunnée and Toope adapt the requirement of constancy for its relevance and application 
to multilateral environmental treaty regimes,
826
 where it is considerably more difficult 
and costly for developing countries to meet the commitments negotiated than they have 
                                               
821 Ellis and FitzGerald, ‘The Precautionary Principle in International Law’, supra n 814, at pp 790 – 791. 
Such possible circumstances include an exorbitant price and an impossibly onerous duty that rendered an 
action or the achievement of the rule unviable. Another possible circumstance arises in the case of strict 
liability where the rule prohibits an activity in order to avoid a particular harm that the actor cannot 
reasonably know that it will lead to such harm. Concern is not placed on laws that requires patently 
impossible acts that is absurd, but laws that places a very high burden on the subjects, perhaps in the hope 
that such aspirational imposition of duty contribute towards the a positive outcome, short of the actual 
attainment of the desirable goal. 
822  Fuller observed that the notion of impossible is, he stated, ‘what is in fact impossible may be 
determined by presuppositions about the nature of man and the universe, presuppositions that are subject 
to historical change’. He cited the example of laws purporting to compel religious or political beliefs 
whereby today’s opposition will be grounded on ‘unwarranted interference with individual liberty’. 
However, Jefferson took the view that such laws are compelling the impossible, although he is ‘well 
aware that the opinions and beliefs of men depend not upon their own will, but follow involuntarily the 
evidence proposed to their minds’. Fuller then raised the question of ‘whether there is not in this 
conception a profounder respect both for truth and for human powers than there is in our own’. 
823 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 79.  
824 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 72. Fuller commented at p 71, that the application of an 
objective standard (the standard of a reasonable man), it runs the risk of imposing on him requirements he 
is incapable of meeting. If contrary course is taken where a subjective inquiry into whether his individual 
limitations fell short of what he ought to have achieved, the capacity for objective judgment may be lost. 
He adds further, at p 72 that ‘It is therefore condemned to tread an uncertain middle course, tempering the 
standard of the reasonable man in favour of certain obvious deficiencies, but formalising even its 
definitions of these’. .  
825 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 79.  
826 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 182 – 183.   
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initially envisaged at the time the agreement is concluded.  In such instances, although 
the commitments themselves are predictable, the ramifications may not have been 
completely so. Moreover, the evolutionary nature of most environmental problems 
results in a difficulty in maintaining predictability.  
In light of this context, it is deemed that this criterion is satisfied as long as at least the 
decision-making rules and law-making processes are constant and predictable.
827
 It is 
noted that the adaptation of this criterion against the backdrop of a rapidly changing 
field of international environmental law has a positive impact on how a rule measures 
against the previous criterion of not asking the impossible. In the recognition and 
acknowledgment that predictability and constancy are constantly negotiated for the 
purpose of ensuring continued feasibility, or in accordance with changing circumstances 
particularly pertinent in the adaptive management of the environment, the law in 
question will be increasingly less impossible, or more reasonable. 
(8) Congruence between official action and declared rule:828 
Fuller elaborated that the congruence is prone to be destroyed or impaired through 
‘mistaken interpretation, inaccessibility to the law, the lack of insight into what is 
required to maintain the integrity of a legal system, bribery, prejudice, indifference, 
stupidity and the drive toward personal power’.829 There are varieties of procedural 
devices designed to maintain congruence, where most of them are elements of 
procedural due processes.
830
  
                                               
827 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 182 – 183.   
828 Fuller pronounced that the legality criterion that requires the congruence between official action and 
declared rules is the most complex of all the legality criteria. Congruence denotes the consistent 
application of the law by the officials charged with its administration. It is to be reminded that congruence 
is exceptionally important in the development and the emergence of shared understanding. The non-
congruence, or the non-observation of the rule of law will seriously impair the development and 
functioning of a legal system, where by a law not observed by its maker cannot be deemed law at all.  
Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 81 – 91. See Nico Krisch, ‘Review of Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law: An Interactional Account by Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope 
(Cambridge University Press 2010)’ (2012) 106(1) American Journal of International Law 203 – 209, at p 
206.  
829 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 81. 
830 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 81. Fuller cited examples relevant to the procedural due 
processes that maintain congruence, such as right to representation by council, the right to cross-examine 
adverse witnesses, habeas corpus, right to appeal an adverse decision to a higher tribunal, and even locus 
standi. Fuller raised the concern that ‘a haphazard and fluctuating principles concerning these matters can 
produce a broken and arbitrary pattern of correspondence between the constitution and its realisation in 
practice. 
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Interpretation occupies a sensitive and central position in the maintenance of 
congruence between law and official action, where the most subtle element in the task 
of maintaining congruence lies in the problem of interpretation.
831
  Legality requires 
that the application of law must be executed in accordance with ‘principles of 
interpretation appropriate to their position in the whole legal order’.832 Central to the 
task of interpretation is the necessity to understand the aim, objective or the context of 
the law,
833
 although the purpose of a statute, or rather, the ‘intention of the statute’ is not 
as easily discerned or defined.
834
   
In instances where a situation is not covered by the legislature, or the legislature offers 
no meaning (to the problem), ‘the judges, [in such cases] are professing to declare what 
the legislature meant, and they are in truth, themselves legislating to fill up casus 
omissi’. 835  In light of the above, one is driven towards the reinforcement of the 
                                               
831 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747. Closely connected to the problem of interpretation in the 
determination of the congruence between the law and its administration, is the role of interpreter (Fuller 
cited the example of judges). Fuller cited, at pp 81 – 84, several situations in which interpreter plays a 
pivotal role. Fuller stated that the chief function of interpretation is said to discover the actual meaning of 
the legislature. However, even ‘when a legislature has had a real intention’, there are still various 
occasions that doubt arises as to the intention. In this respect, judges are sometimes seen as a bulwark 
against lawless administration of law. In the event of limited financial ability of affected parties to seek 
redress in courts, the overseeing agency such as the Scandinavian ombudsman will be capable of 
responding to complaints that are more informal. In instances where a situation is not covered by the 
legislature, or the legislature offers no meaning (to the problem), ‘the judges, [in such cases] are 
professing to declare what the legislature meant, and they are in truth, themselves legislating to fill up 
casus omissi’. At p 87, Fuller opined that the time for praise or blame for a creative interpretation by 
judges ‘comes when we [can] survey’ what had been accomplished in their inescapably creative role as 
judges. At p 91. Fuller elaborated that ‘If the interpreting agent is to preserve a sense of useful mission the 
legislature must not impose on him senseless tasks. If the legislative draftsman is to discharge his 
responsibilities, he in turn, must be able to anticipate rational and relatively stable modes of interpretation. 
This reciprocal dependence permeates in less immediately obvious ways the whole legal order. No single 
concentration of intelligence, insight, and good will, however strategically located, can insure the success 
of the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules.’ 
832 Fuller quoted the Barons of the Exchequer in the Heydon’s Case in 1584 that the principles are ‘(1) 
what was the common law before the making of the Act; (2) What was the mischief and defect for which 
the common law did not provide’; (3) What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and appointed to cure 
the disease of the common wealth; (4) The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of all the judges 
is always to make such construction as shall suppress the mischief, and advance the remedy’. Fuller 
added a fifth element, which was ‘How would those who must guide themselves by its words reasonable 
understand the intent of the Act for the law must not become a snare for those who cannot know the 
reasons of it as fully as do the judges’. Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 82 – 83. 
833 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 83. 
834 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 87. Fuller explained, at p 85 that – ‘the social mischief it 
seeks to remedy is often subtle and complex, and perceptible only to those holding certain value 
judgments’. 
835 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 84. Fuller quoted John Chipman Gray and Roland Gray, 
The Nature and Sources of the Law (The Macmillan Company, New York, 1921) at pp 172 – 173. This 
point is reflected in Jörg Kammerhofer, Uncertainty in International Law: A Kelsenian Perspective 
(Routledge, Oxon, 2011) at p 102. The author stressed that ‘filling the “gap” is creation, not cognition’, 
where ‘cognition’ is taken to mean interpretation. See Kammerhofer, ‘Systemic Integration, Legal Theory 
and the ILC’, supra n 104. 
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proclamation that the problem of interpretation occupies a ‘sensitive, central position in 
the internal morality of the law’ with all it subtleties, for interpretation reveals the 
cooperative nature of the task of maintaining legality.
836
 
4.4.2.1 Internal Morality of Law – A Commentary  
Brunnée and Toope recounted that, for Fuller, the key to the distinction between law 
and non-law lies in what Fuller termed the internal morality of law – the eight criteria of 
legality.
837
 The procedural nature of the criteria of legality is rooted in Fuller’s belief 
that ‘certain conditions must be in place to allow human beings to pursue their purposes 
through law and for law to guide their actions and interactions’.838 
Fuller recognised that legal norms are distinguishable by the explicit responsibilities 
they impose and, by the specific sense of obligation that they generate. When the 
conditions are met, the process of law-creation, imbued in a practice of legality 
embraced by the community of practice,
839
 obtains distinctive legal legitimacy.
840
 Only 
a complete failure of any of the eight criteria would deny a normative order the 
                                               
836 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 91.  
837 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 26. The authors 
stated that the eight criteria that identify legal norms are general, prohibiting, and requiring or permitting 
certain conduct. They must also be promulgated and therefore accessible to the public, enabling citizens 
to know what the law requires. They should not be retroactive, but prospective, enabling citizens to take 
the law into account in their decision-making. The law must be clear, and should avoid contradiction, not 
requiring or permitting and prohibiting at the same time. It must be realistic and not demand the 
impossible. Its requirement of citizens must remain relatively constant. Finally, there should be 
congruence between legal norms and the actions of officials operating under the law. 
838 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 25. Brunnée and 
Toope, at p 28, reiterated that this ‘distinctive form of legitimacy is internal to interactional law and not 
an external measure of political value or preference’. This rises from Fuller’s project to bring morality 
firmly within the reach of law. Dyzenhaus, ‘Fuller’s Novelty’, supra n 761, at p 97 elaborate that ‘the 
moral foundation of law has to be manifest in the institutions of law so that law can fulfil its moral task – 
the promotion of interaction between individuals subject to the law. [As] “law is not, like management, a 
matter of directing other persons how to accomplish tasks set by a superior, but is basically a matter of 
providing the citizenry with a sound and stable framework for their interactions with one another, the role 
of government being that of standing as a guardian of the integrity of this system”; [and] the judicial role 
is to see to it that the interpretation of particular laws measures up to the moral foundation which gives 
law its legitimacy. Wherever law is found, there we will find the phenomenon of “an interplay of 
purposive orientations between the citizen and his government”. But all can be compared and evaluated 
on a common measure – the promotion of human interaction – and to that extent any legal order promotes 
an authentic or sound moral order – an internal morality of law’.  
839 The reasoning of rules through interaction in the continual process of mutual engagement by the 
community of practice brings these criteria to live. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in 
International Law, supra n 724, at p 86. 
840 It is further stated that ‘morality, at least the part of morality that is both public and legitimately 
enforceable, is produced through the procedures of legality, procedures which promote such values as 
publicity, accountability, and participation’. Dyzenhaus, ‘Fuller’s Novelty’, supra n 761, at p 97. The 
fidelity generated, the obligation felt due to the adherence to the eight criteria of legality (also the 
‘practice of legality’) produces law that is legitimate in the eyes of the addressee. Brunnée and Toope, 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 25 and 27.  
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distinctive legal quality, but beneath that, the fulfilment of the criteria is a matter of a 
morality of aspiration rather than a morality of duty, where the conceptualisation of ‘law’ 
is a matter of degree.
841
  
Jan Klabbers commented on Fuller’s theory and its applicability in the international 
legal order, drawing several interesting aspects of the applicability and usefulness of 
Fuller’s doctrine in looking at the doctrine of sources in international law.842 Some of 
the criteria might seem to be counterintuitive, where occasions of international law 
being less than clear, contradictory, or seeming to demand the impossible, are prevalent 
and expected in international law.
843
 However, it is found that the first point of 
relevance of Fuller’s doctrine at the international level was his perception of law not 
made by authorities, but emerges between subjects of the law, and the congruence of 
law with its social substratum known as implicit laws.
844
 
At the international level, congruence is seen as congruence amongst the actions of a 
majority of international actors.
845
 Congruence seems to pose a different set of problems 
at the international level, where the application of law is more likely to be inconsistent 
and unpredictable through diverging interpretation (or even blatant violations). It is in 
this respect that the reformulation of Fuller’s criteria of legality to inform the 
conceptualisation of international law in response to the normative development in 
international legal order might be useful.
846
  
                                               
841 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 198 – 200. See also Peter P Nicholson, ‘The Internal 
Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’ (1974) 84 Ethics 307 – 326, at pp 309 – 311. Nicholson stated, in 
p 309 that ‘the significance of the distinction between the moralities of duty and aspiration is the internal 
morality of law is “largely a morality of aspiration”’. 
842 It is commented that an immediate transposition of Fuller’s doctrine is not possible simply because the 
domestic setting in which the theory arises where a kind of legal vacuum (single society, governed by a 
benign dictator) is assumed.  Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 
728. 
843 It is logical to demand that international law be ‘clear’ to the extent possible as hiding disagreement 
behind ‘constructive ambiguity’ is pointless, despite its prevalence. Likewise, contradictory rules are a 
concern acknowledged by the international community, of which the discourse of fragmentation seeks to 
address. Rules that seem to demand the impossible, evidenced in the obligations set out in a majority of 
international environmental treaties and the ensuing compliance issues that were raised, can merely be 
seen as an expression of aspiration, rather than legal commitment in a true sense. 
844 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at pp 96 – 97. 
845 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 35. 
846 A resurgence in the elaboration of Fuller’s criteria of internal morality of law in the ascertainment of 
the legal normativity of international legal order can be found in Thomas Schultz, ‘The Concept of Law 
in Transnational Arbitral Legal Orders and Some of Its Consequences’ (2011) 2(1) Journal of 
International Dispute Settlement 59 – 85; Ralf Michaels, ‘A Fuller Concept of Law Beyond the State? 
Thoughts on Lon Fuller’s Contributions to the Jurisprudence of Transnational Dispute Resolution – A 
Reply to Thomas Schultz’ (2011) 2(2) Journal of International Dispute Settlement 417 – 426; and Peer 
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A basis of international normativity indeed lies in shared understandings, which 
prompted Brunnée and Toope to propose that rules could be destroyed through the 
continuing practice of states and other international actors.
847
 However, such a proposal 
has to be contemplated in light of the need to distinguish normative-legal aspiration and 
actual behaviour because ‘the real demands of justice are not determined by our present 
understanding of them’,848 and the potential of law is not limited to what is already 
widely practiced.
849
  
To put the matter into perspective, despite the need to separate normative-legal 
aspiration and actual behaviour where law should not be reduced to mere state 
behaviour, if a particular law is commonly disregarded, and does not seem to have 
impact on guiding state behaviour, the meaningfulness of law must surely be 
questioned.
850
 Perhaps, as emphatically put by Glennon, ‘non-compliance shades into 
non-law’.851  
An analysis of the demise of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter
852
 arrived at the 
conclusion that a ‘rule that has fallen into desuetude is no longer obligatory’.853 The 
                                                                                                                                         
Zumbansen, ‘Debating Autonomy and Procedural Justice: The Lex Mercatoria in the Context of Global 
Governance Debates – A Reply to Thomas Schultz’ (2011) 2(2) Journal of International Dispute 
Settlement  427 – 433.  
847 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 35. This lead the 
authors, at p 269 to conclude that that actual practice of many countries does not show respect to the 
prohibition against torture and thus, ‘the absolute prohibition on torture does not meet the standards of 
interactional international law’. Such startling assessment put into serious doubt the formulation of 
Fuller’s notion of congruence in international law as prohibition against torture is one of the few widely 
recognised jus cogens norms. This raises the need to consider the question of whether international law is 
all ‘apology’, where rules merely mirror state action and lose all critical distance. See Koskenniemi, From 
Apology to Utopia, Supra n 727, and Krisch, ‘Review of Legitimacy and Legality in International Law’, 
supra n 828, at p 206. 
848 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1989) at p 232.  
849 Krisch, ‘Review of Legitimacy and Legality in International Law’, supra n 828, at p 206. 
850 Cohen, ‘Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources’, supra n 729, at p 960.  
851 Michael J Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’ (2005) 93 Georgetown Law Journal 939 – 991, at p 
960. Glennon opined, at p 956 that law at the international realm is relentlessly reflexive, ‘where the 
collapse of legal rules through violation feeds upon itself, creating a downward spiral and threatening the 
contagion of other legal rules’. 
852 Art 2(4) of the United Nations Charter, supra n 753, provides that ‘All Members shall refrain in their 
international relations from the threat or use of  force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations’.  
853 Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’, supra n 851, at pp 958 – 960. At p 960, Glennon stated that 
‘If a rule is breached by a significant number of states a significant number of times over a significant 
period of time, I would not call it international law … It may still exert “compliance pull” as a social 
norm. It may still be regional law – it is entirely possible that different use-of-force norms hold sway in 
Europe, say than in Africa. It may be “soft law” whatever that is. But it is not international law. It is not a 
rule embraced by the international community as a whole. If the community of nations behaves as though 
rules do not exist, then they do not exist; and if they do not exist, they are not binding … and no longer 
capable of moving men to action’. 
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change in the underlying social norms, leading to the fall of law into desuetude and 
reflected in the institution of legal order,
854
 provides an insight in the transposition of 
Fuller’s formulation of congruence into the present context of an international legal 
order that is constantly in a state of flux.  
Fuller’s notion of congruence challenges the existing positivist emphasis on consent, 
where international law is viewed from a perspective that is more attenuated to the 
dynamics and expansion of the international community. It is beyond dispute that 
international legal order resides in an international society. Whether a norm is 
internalised by the international community and treated as law that has binding force is 
a social fact. Fuller’s notion of congruence is plausible, and even welcomed in this 
respect.  
The interaction and the need for reciprocity in striking a stable pattern of expectancies 
according to Fuller’s theory procedural natural law, evidenced in its requirement of 
congruence brings forth the dynamic process of international law. As already hinted at 
by Krisch in his commentary of Brunnée and Toope’s scholarship, there is indeed a 
need to distinguish normative-legal aspirations and actual behaviour, and perhaps, there 
is also a need to distinguish normative-legal aspirations from normative-legal duty.
855
 
In terms of the applicability of Fuller’s framework in the international setting, the 
institutionalised multilateral law-making process or the recent activities of the Security 
Council is not too remote from the legislating exercise practiced at the domestic setting 
to render a Fullerian analysis futile.
856
 What is most interesting in Fuller’s doctrine was 
the lack of distinction between law made through legislation, and other law-making 
devices (i.e. custom), where legislation is viewed not as an exercise of authority, but a 
continuum of law as a social ordering process.
857
 
                                               
854 Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’, supra n 851, at p 983. 
855 Krisch, ‘Review of Legitimacy and Legality in International Law’, supra n 828, at p 206. 
856 See Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (Cambridge University 
Press 2007).  
857 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at p 97. On the 
emergence and normativity of other international law-making devises, see Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses 
Wessel, and Jan Wouters (eds) Informal International Lawmaking (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2012). 
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One of the criticisms posed against Fuller’s conceptualisation of law is the lack of 
consideration of the question of value.
858
 Fuller treats law that satisfies the eight internal 
moralities as law that is morally responsible and responsive without having to rely on 
values.
859
 Klabbers argued that it is such value that provides the source of command that 
separates law from other normative commands. It is such value that differentiates law 
from other normative systems from which formal validity arises.
860
 In answering this 
critique, it is important to look at how Fuller has treated substantive principles of 
external morality more commonly known as values.  
Fuller’s natural law method principally lies in the attempt to articulate a scholarly 
framework for the investigation of the natural laws of social dynamics, ‘without 
relapsing to the comforting but misguided quest to develop a comprehensive natural law 
system of substantive moral principles’. 861  Fuller regards the internal and external 
moralities as being connected and insists that there is a natural affinity or continuity of 
moral status between them, despite the conceptual usefulness in the separation of the 
two.
862
 The nuanced connections do risk an ultimate collapse of law and morality into 
each other, but that may be what ‘international law is in need of, judging by the clever 
justifications of torture, refusal of habeas corpus, renditions, and the like in today’s 
international law’.863  
                                               
858 The critics, especially Hart, Dworkin, Cohen, and Summers opined that ‘the principles of internal 
morality of law are not moral principles, and following them is not moral action; so there is no necessary 
connection between law and morality’. See Nicholson, ‘The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His 
Critics’, supra n 841, at p 312. 
859 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at p 100.  
860 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at pp 100 – 104. 
Klabbers further commented, in p 106 that Fuller’s internal morality of law presupposes formal validity 
of international law, and merely focused on the evaluation and assessment of the substantive validity of 
law. 
861 Mootz,  ‘Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric’, supra n 805, at p 429.  
862 Fuller argued that – ‘[T]o be in a position to pursue morally praise-worth goals, citizens require a 
stable, institutionalised social framework within which to act. Consequently, providing such a framework 
for moral behaviour – which is precisely the work of legislators, judges, and lawyers – is itself a moral 
undertaking. The internal morality of law is not just a means of distinguishing law from non-law, it also 
represents the institutional form of law that enables citizens to participate in the external morality of 
aspiration and excellence. A conceptual distinction between the two moralities is to better-explain their 
nuanced connections’. Mootz,  ‘Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric’, supra n 805, at p 431. 
Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 160. On the relationship between law and morality of 
Fuller’s conceptualisation of the moral foundation of legal order, see Dyzenhaus, ‘Fuller’s Novelty’, 
supra n 761, at pp 98 – 99. 
863 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at p 108. See also 
Philippe Sands, Lawless World. America and the Making and Breaking of Global Rules (Allen Lane, 
London 2005). In this respect, Brunnée and Toope provide a succinct exposition as to the seemingly 
independent of any normative values of Fuller’s procedural natural law. The legality requirements 
proposed by Fuller, ‘despite its largely autonomous relationship with morality, or normative values, are 
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Fuller regards that despite the procedural nature of the eight desiderata of internal 
morality of legality, it is harder if not impossible to inflict injustice through legal 
means.
864
 Adherence to the legality requirements alone could not possibly bridge a 
yawning gap between law and social understandings. More importantly, the adherence 
to these procedural requirements creates conditions in which reasoned communication 
and decision-making with deeper agreement or fidelity to law, can be nurtured.
865
 The 
creation of these conditions are crucial especially in the face of disagreement on values 
or policies characteristic of international law making of today. 
We must not lose sight of the most basic assumption of law, that is, law per se is 
morally good.
866
 It is on this basis that Fuller developed his thesis that the existence of a 
legal system is found upon a relatively stable reciprocity of expectations between 
lawmaker and subject, and provides citizens with a sound and stable framework for their 
interactions with each other.
867
 Law is not just an internal principle of efficiency, as 
shared by his example of managerial direction, but a principle of efficiency rooted in 
morality and imposes moral duties.
868
 Fuller’s position on law and morality provides a 
                                                                                                                                         
not completely divorced from the dominant understandings in Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 67. Indeed, Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at 
pp 131 – 132, and pp 145 – 167, argued that the ‘internal morality’ requirements are still connected to the 
standards of external morality’. 
864 See Nicholson, ‘The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’, supra n 841, at pp 312 – 322. 
See also Mootz III, ‘Natural Law and the Cultivation of Legal Rhetoric’, supra n 805, at pp 429 – 431. 
Mootz explained, at p 430 that ‘Fuller consistently emphasised that the two moralities coincide as a 
practical matter’. It is further elaborated at p 431 ‘Fuller regards the two moralities as being connected by 
more than mere coincidence in history. He insists that there exists a natural affinity, or continuity of moral 
status, between the two moralities, despite the conceptual usefulness of distinguishing them … Fuller’s 
argument proceeds as follows: to be in a position to pursue morally praiseworthy goals, citizens require a 
stable, institutionalised social framework within which to act; consequently, providing such a framework 
for moral behaviour – which is precisely the work of legislators, judges, and lawyers – is itself a moral 
undertaking’. See also Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 205 – 207. Fuller emphasised, at p 
207 that ‘to regard as morally indifferent the existence or non-existence of law is to assume that moral 
precepts retain the same meaning regardless of the social context into which they are projected … it 
brings to expression a distaste for phenomena of interaction characteristic of positivistic thought [where] 
the essential reality of law is perceive as a one-way projection of authority originating with government 
and imposing itself upon the citizen’. 
865 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 67 – 68.  
866 Fuller was quoted at length – ‘For men to live together successfully they need rules that will keep 
peace among them, make them deal justly with one another, and enable them to collaborate effectively. It 
is the legal system which provides such rules, rules which are the foundation of morality. Law and 
morality are inseparable. Law is morally good: it brings mutual benefits to those who share in its 
cooperative enterprise. Therefore the purposes of law makers, who seek to achieve these effects, are 
morally good’. Nicholson, ‘The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’, supra n 841, at p 320. 
867 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 210. 
868 Nicholson, ‘The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’, supra n 841, at p 324.  
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viable alternative perspective on law and morality to that of legal positivists, which had 
better reflect social facts, social reality and also social dynamics.
869
 
Klabbers commented that although Fuller’s doctrine does not qualify as a fully-fledged 
source doctrine because it lacks a Grundnorm,
870
 Fuller’s conception of law as 
facilitative and allowing for self-directed actions would be recognisable in 
contemporary international legal language.
871
 If viewed from the perspective of law as a 
largely social construction that ‘mainly serve certain purposes other than, or in addition 
to, the service of high moral ends’,872 it becomes plausible to regard Fuller’s eight 
criteria of legality as ‘approaching a full-fledged sources theory, combining formal and 
substantive criteria for the identification of legal rules’.873  
In fact, the thin reference to value in Fuller’s doctrine is more befitting in the realm of a 
pluralised international legal order, where attempts to assert a common good on the 
international community will be difficult due to the global political diversion constituted 
by an approximation of 200 independent sovereign entities.
874
 More importantly, the 
internal morality of law proffers a standard against which international law made could 
be assessed, and which could inform the constitutionalisation of international law.
875
  
The preceding section elaborated on how the eight criteria of morality are positioned in 
the overall framework of an interactional understanding of law where the criteria of 
legality shape the generation of shared understandings. It provides a structural 
framework where shared understandings are guided towards the attainment of 
legality.
876
 An identification of international law, its obligatory force and its content, 
through the lenses of law-making as an interactive process where a rule is constantly 
                                               
869 Nicholson, ‘The Internal Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’, supra n 841, at p 326. 
870 A rule of recognition immediately identified by the two leading 20th century positivists, Hans Kelsen 
and HLA Hart that establishes law’s formal validity. Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of 
International Law’, supra n 728, at p 107. 
871 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at p 102. 
872 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at p 107. 
873 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at pp 107 – 108. He 
stated further that ‘not only laying down a substantive set of criteria for the validity of law, but 
simultaneously embodying also a formal criterion: law that did not meet the eight criteria, to a certain 
extent, would simply not be law’. 
874 See Benjamin R Barber, ‘Conserving Politics: Michael Oakeshott and the Conversation of Political 
Theory’ pp 152 – 176, in Benjamin R Barber, The Conquest of Politics. Liberal Philosophy in 
Democratic Times (Princeton University Press, 1988) at p 169.  
875 Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, supra n 728, at p 106. 
876 By focussing on the dynamic relationship of the development of a rule embraced by a community of 
practice that emphasises the interactive process instead of the mere discovery of rules through static 
sources, Fuller’s thesis undermines the formalism of the positivist system. Nicholson, ‘The Internal 
Morality of Law: Fuller and His Critics’, supra n 841, at p 326. 
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shaped in a practice of legality, is more attenuated to the dynamics of the international 
society and will provide a deeper and more powerful understanding of international law.
 
877
   
Contrary to the relaxed approach adopted by Fuller, recent scholars took the view that it 
is crucial to maintain the distinction between law and non-law in order to ‘uphold an 
admittedly weak rule of law tradition’.878 An attempt to clearly demarcate the tipping 
point where non-law turns to law, or vice versa might risk ‘consigning the issue to 
sterility’, especially when the ‘law’ properly so-called is simply a symbol for an idea 
that may vary with the person or context in which the word is used.
879
 The controversy 
surrounding a correct definition of law is merely a logomachy – a ‘dispute about words, 
not things’ – and that the answer to the question of ‘is there a true international law … 
depends upon the definition of law which we choose to adopt’.880  
                                               
877 Despite Fuller’s lack of interest in identifying a fixed boundary between law and other forms of social 
normativity, it is more important that the two essential commitments in law – human autonomy, and 
communication or interaction – interact with each other, so that Fuller’s autonomy’ was an autonomy 
created and supported through communication. The promotion and facilitation of social interaction while 
supporting autonomy are the moral foundation of the institution of law envisaged by Fuller. Dyzenhaus, 
‘Fuller’s Novelty’, supra n 761, at p 97. He noted that ‘for Fuller, the moral foundation of law has to be 
manifest in the institutions of law so that law can fulfil its moral task – the promotion of interaction 
between individuals subject to the law …’ Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law, supra n 724, at p 29. The authors mentioned that ‘it is only to the extent that law supports autonomy 
while facilitating social interaction that law pursues “moral” ends’.  
878 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 26 – 27. The 
authors  proceed to assess the regimes of climate change, human rights and use of force under the 
framework of interactional theory of international law it established and instigate a binary determination 
of whether a rule is a law or not. They believed that the distinction between being legally obliged to 
follow a rule and being encouraged to do so through social pressure alone is important to the political 
calculations of international actors. In addition, a theory of legal obligation helps social actors to take 
strategic decisions about how to act so as to shape, uphold or change norms. The authors extrapolated 
Fuller’s approach toward the relative specificity of law, the obligatory quality of law from Fuller’s 
arguments, where Fuller reiterated that when the eight criteria of legality are met, law will tend to attract 
its own adherence, as what he called it ‘fidelity to law’. The closest Fuller comes to discussing the 
distinction between law and other forms of social normativity is in the concluding chapter of Lon L Fuller, 
The Law in Quest of Itself (The Foundation Press, Chicago, 1940). See also, but more opaquely, Lon F 
Fuller ‘Freedom as a Problem of Allocating Choice’ (1968) 112 Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical Society 101 – 106; and Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 33 – 38 (on 
mythical King Rex coming to understand an interactional legal order as relying on internalised 
conceptions of bindingness). See also Klabbers, ‘Constitutionalism and the Making of International Law’, 
supra n 728, at pp 106 – 108 (arguing that Fuller’s eight requirements might be seen as approaching a 
fully fledged sources theory of international law, ‘combining formal and substantive criteria for the 
identification of legal rules’). See also Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it Even 
Matter’ (26 February 2010) supra n 209, at p 44. Pauwelyn opined that ‘to have a theoretical bright line 
which separates law from non-law (as difficult as it may sometimes be to actually draw that line in a 
particular case) remains conceptually important’.  
879
 Glanville L Williams, ‘International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word “Law”’ (1945) 22 
British Yearbook of International Law 146 – 163, at pp 146 and 163.  
880 Williams, ‘International Law and the Controversy Concerning the Word “Law”’, supra n 879, at p 154. 
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Glennon, despite arguing that repetitive violations cause the fall of a rule into desuetude, 
has to concede that the assessment of when a law becomes non-law ‘will always be a 
matter of opinion’.881 To couch his proposition in a term more familiar to lawyers, the 
dividing line between binding legal rules and non-binding norms, is a matter of 
interpretation.
882
 This is precisely what Fuller had in mind when he posited that the 
‘problem of interpretation occupies a sensitive, central position in the internal morality 
of the law. It reveals, as no other problem can, the cooperative nature of the task of 
maintaining legality’.883 
In this context, an interactional account that views law as shared understanding rooted 
in criteria of legality and undertaken by the practice of legality, captures the true 
normative force of international law that can, and truly does shape state action.
884
 
4.4.3 Practice of Legality and the Community of Practice 
‘Law is not a datum, but an achievement that needs ever to be renewed’.885 
The shared legal understandings generated through robust interactions and reciprocity 
between lawmakers and subjects, nourished by the implicit rules of the broader 
background understandings, must be maintained through a practice of legality.
886
 A 
practice of legality is built up through reasoned dialogue (interaction and reasoning 
through law) and reciprocity (vertical congruence), where a broader base of shared legal 
understandings is developed via interactions that adhere to the requirements of 
legality.
887
 The practice of legality is a distinctive type of interaction performed by ‘a 
                                               
881 Glennon, ‘How International Rules Die’, supra n 851, at p 964. 
882 Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it Even Matter’ (26 February 2010) supra n 209, 
at p 13. The author commented that ‘The conventional view [intent-based criterion to distinguish law 
from non-law] is that an instrument becomes international law when the parties to it want it to be 
international law. In many cases, the intent of the makers of informal international law may be unclear. 
Whether informal international law is international law then becomes a question of interpretation’.  
883 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 91. That might be partly the reason Fuller did not 
endeavour to clarify when social norms turn to legal norms, but instead, encourage and promote the 
engagement of interaction and reciprocity by the purposive enterprise, and allowed the development of 
law to take its own course, in accordance with the demands of the participants. This strengthens the 
position adopted in this thesis. It is not the purpose of the thesis to give a ‘proper’ definition to law, but to 
look beyond a formalistic, positivist imposition of doctrine of sources and seek to unearth the dynamic 
process of rules of international law, which provides the rules their content, and their basis of obligation. 
884 Cohen, ‘Finding International Law: Rethinking the Doctrine of Sources’, supra n 729, at p 129.  
885  The vigour of law is upheld through the constant effort to support it. Fuller, ‘American Legal 
Philosophy at Mid-Century’, supra n 747, at p 467. 
886 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 80 – 81.  
887 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 72.  
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joint enterprise of members that shares collective understandings, directing and 
rationalising their conducts for them’.888  
The importance of subsequent practice in the interpretation of a treaty is enshrined in 
Article 31(3)(b) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The definition of ‘practice’ in Article 
31(3)(b) is useful to elucidate the meaning and scope of ‘practice’ in a practice of 
legality. Sinclair emphasised that the requirement of practice necessitates not one 
isolated fact or act, or even several individual applications. ‘Practice’ must be 
constituted by a plurality of acts, or a sequence of facts or acts.
889
 It requires ‘an element 
of constancy which is reinforced by the context in that subsequent practice must be 
sufficient to reveal the agreement of the parties on interpretation’.890 Essentially, what is 
to be required of practice, must necessarily satisfy three criteria, namely – concordant; 
common; and consistent.
891
 
Thus, in order to qualify as ‘subsequent practice’, the act or pronouncement subsequent 
to the declaration of the rule must be consistent and sufficiently distinct to express the 
interpretation of the parties regarding the pronounced rule. This interpretation is aligned 
with the definition of ‘practice’ as adopted in the ICJ where practice is not merely an ad 
hoc act or pronouncements, but a sequence or a plurality of such acts or 
pronouncements.  
                                               
888 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, 45.  
889 Sinclair, The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra n 272, at p 137.  
890 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 230. 
891 Fitzmaurice, Elias, and Merkouris (eds) Treaty Interpretation and the VCLT, supra n 279, at p 223. 
The criteria that need to be satisfied in order to meet the requirement of ‘practice’ have been laid out by 
the ICJ in the case of Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) are firstly, the practice must linked to a 
belief on the part of the parties or the relevant representative of the parties that the act or conduct is a 
position taken in the interpretation of the treaty (or a particular rule of international law) as to its 
application. Second, the other parties to the relevant treaty or the relevant rule of international law in 
question are fully aware of, and accepted the action or conduct of application as a confirmation of the 
interpretation of the treaty or rule. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Botswana/Namibia) (Judgment of 13 
December 1999) [1999] ICJ Reports 1045, at p 1094, para 74 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/98/7577.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. The meaning of ‘subsequent practice’ is 
explored in the WTO where the AB in the Chile – Priceband case reiterated the definition of ‘subsequent 
practice’ as laid down in the Japan Alcohol case. The AB quoted that ‘[subsequent practice] is a 
concordant, common and consistent sequence of acts or pronouncements which is sufficient to establish a 
discernible pattern implying the agreement of the parties [to a treaty] regarding its interpretation’. WTO, 
Chile – Price Band System and Safeguard Measures Relating to Certain Agricultural Products – Report 
of the Appellate Body (23 September 2002) WT/DS207/AB/R 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/chile-agproducts(ab).pdf> accessed 17 November 2012, at 
pp 68 – 69, para 213. WTO, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages – Report of the Appellate Body (4 
October 1996) WT/DS8/AB/R; WT/DS10/AB/R; WT/DS11/AB/R 
<http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/wto/cases/WTDS8ABR.pdf>  accessed 17 November 2012.  
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In light of the current jurisprudence on the ambit and scope of ‘practice’, the two 
dimensions of a practice of legality in the present context, namely –  
- a horizontal interaction of reasoned dialogue in the attainment of shared 
understandings, and a vertical reciprocity in obtaining congruence between law; 
and 
- practice that adheres to the rule of law;  
must not be isolated acts, but a plurality and a series of actions or conduct of mutual 
engagement. 
4.4.3.1 Practice of Legality 
The interactional account of law emphasises the importance of the practice aspect of an 
interactional process in law making. Law emerges only when shared legal 
understandings obtained in social interactions are undertaken in a practice of sufficient 
specificity and density that satisfies the element of legality.
892
 Brunnée and Toope 
articulated that an interactional law is a more strengthened version of usus that reflects 
the opinio or the conviction or belief, but disregard the usefulness of a determination of 
opinio that largely resides in the abstract.
893
  
Postema delved deeper into the subject matter of the notion of normative practice that is 
akin to a practice of legality in his elaboration and description of custom as a 
deliberative normative practice,
894
 developed based on the initial conceptualisation by 
                                               
892 Such assertion is deemed to go beyond mere usus or opinio required in the current determination of 
customary international law. It is established in international law that customary international law is 
found ‘primarily in the actual practice and opinio juris of states’ where the practice must be executed in 
evidence of a belief that the practice is obligatory by virtue of the existence of a rule of law that impose 
such obligation. This is implicit in the very notion of opinio juris sive necessitatis. In general, see 
Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 47. 
893 Brunnée and Toope noted that ‘Interactional law is not dependent upon practice alone, for that would 
undermine any distinction between social and legal norms. But neither does it require reference to an 
artifice – opinio juris -  that refers to ‘belief’ on the part of a social construct, thereby upholding the 
fiction of consent … thus providing a more objective, less mystical account of how customary legal 
norms become binding’. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, 
p 47. On the development of customary international law, see North Sea Continental Shelf Cases 
(Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands) (Judgment of 20 February 1969 (1969) ICJ Reports 3 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012, at p 44, para 77. 
894 Postema ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’, supra n 763, at pp 279 – 306. 
Postema, at p 287, has termed the specific interactional process of a practice of legality as ‘normative 
practice’, of which such practice is distinguishable from other ‘regularities of behaviour by the mode of 
engagement or participation of custom-following agents in a normative practice’. He went further to 
identify the features essential in constituting ‘normative practice’ that are interrelated, namely mutual 
commitment, a notion of correct use and common resources. 
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Robert Brandom.
895
 A normative practice presupposes that the agent undertaking a 
commitment acknowledges that his actions and judgments will be subjected to an 
implicit element of correctness.
896 
The reciprocal and mutual recognition of normativity 
in adherence to the implicit standards of correctness hold these rational agents, 
participants or parties to the normative practice of their commitments, where the 
intrinsically interrelated features of normative practice constitute a common resource 
from which the rational agents draw.
897
   
The essential features of ‘normative practice’ are not dissimilar to the notion of 
‘interactional law’, or the emergence of ‘a community of practice’. In fact, an 
interactional ascertainment of law through the prism of shared understanding 
(commitment) that satisfies the criteria of legality (standard of correctness), which is 
then maintained and developed through a practice of legality (common resources), is 
fundamentally similar.     
The notion of a deliberative normative practice supports a requirement of an 
interactional process that is of a particular specificity and density.
898
 A deliberative 
normative practice that establishes customary (legal) norms must be deliberate, and is 
equipped with two defining features – they must be essentially discursive and 
practically concrete.
899
 A deliberative normative practice requires that the commitments 
of intentions, shaped by discursive practices that went through a deliberative reasoning 
process in which thoughtful adjustment of norms are grounded in, are executed through 
concrete practice.
900
 The satisfaction of two crucial elements of deliberative practice, 
                                               
895 Robert B Brandom, Making It Explicit (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994) and Robert B 
Brandom, Articulating Reasons (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 2000). 
896 Postema ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’, supra n 763, at p 289. This 
standard of correctness is a standard in which the agents or participants are rely on in the determination of 
whether their actions or judgments are ‘correct’, without which the notion of ‘wrong’, or ‘mistake’ is 
emptied of all content, and so does the notion of normativity. 
897 Postema ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’, supra n 763, at p 289. The 
standard of practice, the commitment is not mere belief or opinio ‘in the heads of participants’, but in the 
practice. Postema postulated that it is – ‘the activity rather than any articulated account of it that is the 
fundament, the commons from which all the participants drawn and to which they all contribute [whereby] 
all accounts or formulations are ultimately accountable to this commons’. 
898 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 70. 
899 Postema ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’, supra n 763, at p 290. The 
discursive element provides the substantive foundations, the underlying network of reasoning and 
arguments that explore, proffer, or assess the content of norms in actions and judgments.  
900 Postema ‘Custom in International Law: A Normative Practice Account’, supra n 763, at pp 290 – 291. 
An analogy of the practicality of interactional law formed through a practice of legality can be found in 
Postema’s pronouncement of the distinctive practical concreteness of customary norms that are anchored 
to discursively articulated but concrete deeds. He enunciated that –  
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namely discursiveness and practical concreteness, is paramount in the formation of 
customary (legal) norms.  
An analogy can be drawn between deliberative normative practice and the practice of 
legality propounded by Brunnée and Toope. Deliberative normative practice proposed 
by Postema is crucial in the formation of customary norms while the interactional 
theory of law based on Fuller’s legal theory involves extensive inquiry into different 
aspects of law – the quest of law, the anatomy of law, and the morality of law. Where 
deliberative normative practice progresses into customary law through satisfaction of 
the elements of commitment subject to an implicit standard of correctness that are 
deliberately practised, an interactional law is said to exist when a community of practice 
that performs the shared understanding generated through interactions and reciprocity 
emerges.  
An interactional understanding of law benefits from Postema’s thesis on deliberative 
normative practice. The elements of concretised practicality and discursive articulation 
fill in the lacuna of what constitutes a practice of legality, and how it is measured, by 
providing the necessary insights that inform the conceptualisation and assessment of the 
sufficiency of a practice of legality to satisfy the requirement of interactional law.  
4.4.3.2 Community of practice 
The idea of a community of practice completes the thesis of an interactional theory of 
law based on shared legal understandings undertaken in a practice of legality.
901
 It can 
be analogised to a ‘joint enterprise of members of a community of practice that share 
collective understandings’, which direct their conduct and give reasons for them.902 A 
                                                                                                                                         
‘Custom-shaping normative practices [akin to the formation of interactional law] require mastery, not of 
abstract rules, or of tracing presuppositions and implications, but of rules-in-action, of grasping the 
custom-relevant significance of actions in their concrete circumstances, and of judgment applying the 
rules’. 
901 Essential constituents of interactional law, described as the emergence of a community of practice on 
the shared legal understandings achieved through the interactions and reciprocity of the relevant parties 
(the law-makers and the subjects), are further developed by legal philosophers and legal theorist. The 
scholars, most notably Brunnée and Toope in the establishment of essential yardsticks of interactions and 
reciprocity in interactional theory of law; and Postema who detailed the essential elements of important 
notions such as shared understandings and practice of legality crucial in the ascertainment of international 
law from an interactional perspective. The concept of community of practice can be said to ‘round up’ the 
relationship between law and shared understandings in the sense that the generation of shared legal 
understandings that are intertwined with a practice of legality creates the emergence of a community of 
practice, of which interactional law arises. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International 
Law, supra n 724, at p 69.  
902 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 45.  
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community of practice is said to have emerged when a practice of legality built around 
Fuller’s eight criteria of legality and nourished by broader social practices, creates 
shared legal understandings that leads to the creation of law.
903
  
Such interactions or such practice of legality must be of a certain density and specificity 
where basic shared understandings of legality are sustained, even though they might not 
share the same goals or values.
904
 The adequacy or sufficiency of a practice of legality 
that fulfils the threshold of density and specificity required to constitute law is explored 
through the twin pillars of discursiveness and concrete practice of the notion of 
deliberative normative practice. In this context, Postema’s assertion that ‘enacted, 
pedigree-validated, authoritative norms represent only the surface phenomena of law’ 
can be fully appreciated since ‘a full realisation of the rule of law requires the 
observance of principles of the rule of law beyond those that assist in determining the 
content of the law’.905  
It can be summarised that an interactional law-making process arises from a community 
of practice that engages actors in a practice of legality aimed at building and maintain 
shared legal understandings, where the criteria of legality adhered facilitates interaction 
on the basis of mutual respect and reciprocity.
906
 Source-oriented formal validity is not 
the only criteria for the ascertainment of law. It is the adherence to specific criteria of 
                                               
903 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 69 – 70. The 
authors opined that ‘communities of practice exist not just in domestic settings, but can also operate in 
transnational or international relations. For example, the world of diplomacy, or the trade, environment or 
human rights arenas could all be thought of as particular types of communities of practice in which state 
and non-state actors participate in international law and policy processes’. The authors equate 
interactional law as a particular type of community of practice where a practice of legality built around 
shared understandings permeated with Fuller’s criteria of internal morality, be they procedural or 
substantive, modest or ambitious, are undertaken. At p 69, the authors explained that a community of 
practice exists as long as there is a basic layer of shared understandings of legality where participants in 
the legal system continued to build and maintain the practice of legality where shared legal 
understandings may flourish, deepen and become more complex. The authors, at p 65 explored the 
linkages and divergences between shared understandings, communities of practice and their perspective 
of an interactional framework of international law. They reiterated the proposition that law guides self-
directed human interaction only if relatively stable patterns of expectation (or shared understandings) that 
embedded legality emerged in which Fuller theory of law has demonstrated the importance of horizontal 
and vertical interaction, and reciprocity between law makers and subjects in the creation and sustenance 
of law. 
904 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 69, 70, 80 and 
81.  
905 Postema, ‘Implicit Law’, supra n 747, at p 268. David Dyzenhaus, The Constitution of Law: Legality 
in a Time of Emergency (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006) at p 231 that argues that 
positivist legal order is but ‘a step along a continuum of legality’. 
906 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 76. 
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legality, which promotes fidelity and generates a sense of obligation that creates 
international law.
907
 
Thus, it is amply illustrated that the emergence of shared understandings is 
characterised by the continuous interaction and reciprocity in a practice of legality by 
the community of practice where the ultimate aim of that purposive enterprise is to 
achieve ‘substantial congruence between the everyday practices and understandings of 
citizens and the formal dictates of law’.908 The congruence is fostered by the adherence 
to the requirements of legality tethered to a shared basic repertoire of common reference 
points implicit in the broader social practices.
909
  
The vertical aspect of congruence through the interaction and reciprocal relationship 
between the lawmaker and subject is only possible if it reflects a shared basic repertoire 
of common reference points implicit in the broader social practices in adherence to the 
requirements of legality. Such substantive congruence exemplifies two interrelated 
qualities, namely a respect for systematic structure and an understanding of the social 
context.
910
 
The horizontal and vertical features of Fuller’s interactional theory of law are parallel to 
a classic conceptualisation of the international legal order. The potential for Fuller’s 
interactional account of law to inform the ascertainment of law at the international level 
seems promising where the ‘dédoublement fonctionnel’ of states as both law maker and 
subject in the international legal order fits Fuller’s preoccupation with law as a set of 
non-hierarchical practices that orders human interaction. 
Three main components are synthesised in reference to Fuller’s interactional theory of 
law in order to transpose an essentially domestic framework into the international realm. 
The first requirement of the emergence of shared understanding encapsulates the 
horizontal dimension of Fuller’s interactional understanding of law where the surface 
phenomenon of explicit law is informed and nourished by its implicit dimension of the 
broader society. Shared understanding emerges through a continuous process of mutual 
engagement where shared expectancies converge, in which a substantial congruence 
                                               
907 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 76. 
908 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 152. See also 
Postema, ‘Implicit Law’ at pp 373 – 379.  
909 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 66. 
910 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 229. 
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between the governing and the governed is attained.
911
 The substantial congruence 
attained derives its distinctive legal quality only if the process of interaction and 
reciprocity is shaped through a systematic structure rooted in the eight desiderata of 
internal morality of legality.   
The eight criteria of legality that structure the development of shared understanding, and 
shape the process of interactions, are not an independent yardstick of legality. Their 
main role is to structure and guide the engagement of interaction and reciprocity of 
international actors to reach congruence that attains the characteristic of legality, as 
opposed to other forms of normative interaction. They exhibit their influence only when 
actors undertake and perform the shared understanding achieved in a practice of legality, 
where the practice is deemed legal if it is rooted in the criteria of legality.  
The notion of a practice of legality is summarised as the engagement of shared legal 
understanding in concrete practice. It has been analogised to an enriched form of usus 
where the belief or conviction of opinio in the abstract must be undertaken in practice. 
Postema’s thesis on the notion of deliberative normative practice provides a more in 
depth insight into the assessment of the specificity and density of a practice of legality. 
A normative practice is considered deliberate only if the twin pillars of articulated 
discursiveness and concretised practice is fulfilled. Such specifications complement and 
support the requirement of sufficiency of specificity and density of a practice of legality 
to qualify as an emergence of a community of practice.  
A particular concern is whether the tipping point of social norms to legal norms is 
contingent on the satisfaction of all criteria of legality, in view of the positioning of the 
criteria of legality as a systematic structure that guides interaction and reciprocity. 
Unless any of the criteria is blatantly disregarded or breached, the satisfaction of these 
criteria is a matter of a morality of aspiration.
912
  
                                               
911 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 86. For the 
elaboration of a community of practice, see supra n 903 and accompanying text. 
912 ‘Law is a not a datum, but an achievement that needs ever to be renewed’. Fuller, ‘American Legal 
Philosophy at Mid-Century’, supra n 747, at p 467. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in 
International Law, supra n 724, at pp 43 – 44. The very process of interaction, ‘the reasoning through law’ 
that society is gradually built up, of what Fuller had called ‘the enterprise of law-making’, is aspirational 
where the goal of fidelity to law, is not presumed to be fully achieved. Similar observation can be made of 
the ascertainment of law at the international level where a study of international law in general revealed 
that despite the existence of formal, positivistic doctrine of sources, the distinction between law and non-
law is shrouded in shades of grey. See Jan Klabbers, Anne Peters, and Geir Ulfstein, The 
Constitutionalization of International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2009) at p 97. 
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According to an understanding of international law as a purposive effort that is 
interactional, law is said to have emerged when there exists a community of practice 
that practices the shared legal understandings developed through reciprocal interactions 
between the maker and the subject. This perspective allows for the lifting of the veil of 
formal sources of law to reveal the content of the law and its binding force limited by 
(or frustrated by, due to a lack of) the veil of positivist, source-oriented formality.  
4.5 Discussions and a Suggestion for Reinterpretation 
In reference to the previous chapters, a separate interpretation of terminologies, namely 
‘relevant’, ‘rules of international law’, ‘applicable’, and ‘the parties’ in the 
interpretation of the phrase ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ is incapable of clarifying the interpretation of the whole phrase. It 
has been illustrated that although scholars have insisted that what is applicable must be 
binding, it is not supported by jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals. In 
addition to that, the imposition that the rules must be binding for them to be applicable 
is neither supported by a literal reading of the convention text, nor the travaux 
preparatoire of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Apart from that, various scholarships on 
the possible meaning and scope of ‘the parties’, be it the narrow approach, or the broad 
approach, have caused more confusion than solutions.  
This research endeavours to show that the existing interpretation of ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ is incapable of clarifying the actual meaning of the Article. 
It proposes to reconstruct Article 31(3)(c) through the re-interpretation of salient points 
and seeks to identify how relevant rules of international law shall be incorporated into 
the interpretation of a treaty term or provision through the application of Article 
31(3)(c).  
A reconstruction of ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ imposes that ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ cannot be 
interpreted in isolation from the rest of Article 31(3)(c). What is ‘applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ is qualified and conditioned by ‘rules of international law’ 
that are ‘relevant’. In this context, ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ must 
be interpreted in relation to ‘relevant rules of international law’, as opposed to the 
existing scholarships that interprets each salient point, ‘rules of international law’, 
‘relevant’, ‘applicable’ and ‘the parties’ independently.  
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This research proposes a reconstruction of the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) that is 
capable of operationalising the Article in the quest to realise the potential of the Article 
as an integration tool in reflection of the principle of systemic integration. It challenges 
the existing interpretation that argues that ‘what is applicable must be binding’, as 
understood in the formally binding context. The thesis argues that the requirement of 
‘bindingness’ contended by scholars as explained in Chapter Three originates not from 
the word ‘applicable’, but from the explicit requirement of legality entrenched in the 
phrase of ‘rules of international law’ in Article 31(3)(c).  
‘Applicable’ should be given its ordinary meaning, through an interpretation in 
accordance with its context to mean, inter alia, may be applied, having reference, 
relevant or appropriate, or to employ for a limited purpose, for the purpose of 
interpretation. The applicability of the rule is dependent on the shared understanding 
achieved by the parties in the making of the rule that reflects the common intention of 
the parties as to the content and scope of the parties, and the extent of its applicability 
that denotes the binding force of the rule.  
The determination of the applicability of a rule in the relations between the parties 
derives solely from the development of the rule of law by the enterprise of law making. 
This strengthens the argument that all the elements of the phrase of ‘rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ need to be interpreted 
in relation to each other, where the implicit dimension of the rules of international law 
informs the applicability of the rules in the relations between the parties. Full 
understanding of the provision could not be realised in an isolated interpretation of 
‘relevant’, ‘rules of international law’, ‘applicable’ and ‘the parties’ as done in existing 
literature.  
The important question to be asked is then, what is a rule of international law? As it has 
been established that ‘rules’ cannot be interpreted in isolation from international law, 
the next question to consider will be, ‘what is international law’? An answer found in 
the formal doctrine of sources will not be able to inform the interpretation and the 
subsequent operationalisation of the phrase ‘rule of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. Even if a source-oriented determination of legal validity 
confirms that the relevant rule is a rule of international law, it does not provide the 
content and the extent of the applicability of the rules of international law commonly 
intended and understood by the parties, for their application in the interpretative process.  
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Chapter Three shows that the legality, or the bindingness, of a rule of international law 
is independent from the sources from which it is derived.  That a rule is found in treaty, 
custom, and general principles of law, or even soft law does not, per se, delimit or 
expand its legality and its binding force. An ascertainment of what is binding demands a 
foray beyond its sources.
913
 This thesis proposes a framework of analysis for the 
purpose of identifying the content and scope of a rule of law, and seeks to explore the 
bindingness of the rule – the shared legal understanding of a rule that is commonly 
intended by the parties in the enterprise of law-making – which informs the 
interpretation of the ‘applicability’ of the rule.  
An interactional understanding of rules of international law enables the ascertainment of 
the legality of the rule, its content and the fidelity it generates, unconstrained by whether 
these rules came from one of the formal sources of law. An interactional understanding 
of rules of international law supports the prevailing interpretation adopted by scholars 
(where ‘the parties’ are interpreted broadly to include non-parties to the external rules of 
international law), whereby the external rules of international are taken into account in 
the interpretation of a treaty, as long as it is the common understanding of the parties. A 
review of the jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals reveals that as long as 
the ‘relevant rule of international law’ reflect the common understanding of ‘the parties’, 
whether or not the relevant rule originates from one of the sources of law codified in 
Article 38(1) of the Statute of ICJ is immaterial.  
According to an interactional understanding of international law, the content and 
applicability of the rules of international law that is commonly intended and understood 
by the parties for its application in the interpretative process could be found from an 
analysis of the rule through the three components of shared understanding, criteria of 
legality, and a practice of legality. Shared understanding consists of the horizontal 
aspect of the reciprocal expectations sustained through rational and purposive social 
interactions of people and the vertical congruence of lawmaker to the rule of law. It is 
an extension of the notion of implicit rules that forms the broader context from which 
legal norms are derived.  
                                               
913 Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it Even Matter’ (26 February 2010) supra n 209, 
at p 47. The author commented that in order to alleviate the tension between formal international law 
arising from thin State consent; and informal international law based on thick consensus in both the 
procedural and substantive quality of the norm, ‘a fundamental reassessment not so much of informal 
international law but of traditional international law would be called for’. 
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Legal order is to be understood as comprising both the explicit dimension that is 
formally institutionalised, enacted and articulated; and the implicit dimension that is 
interdependent where there is a broad congruence between explicit directives and the 
implicit conventions and practices. The implicit dimension is the product of the 
interactions and the intermeshing of networks of interdependent anticipations and 
reasoning of actions. These anticipations and reasoning of actions are mutually 
accommodating and congeal into regularities of behaviour and stable points of 
expectation in the network of conventions or practices.  The content and practical 
(reason-giving, action-guiding) force of these conventions or practices is derived from 
the congruence of the networks of intermeshing anticipations and reasoning of actions.  
The shared understanding obtained has the potential to develop into legal norms only if 
it is intertwined with, and in satisfaction of, the eight criteria of legality known as the 
eight morality of law developed by Fuller. The shared understandings identified from 
social interactions have the potential to develop into ‘law’ only if such shared 
understandings are ‘legal’. This means, the shared understandings must satisfy the 
requirements of generality; promulgation; non-retroactivity; clarity; non-contradiction; 
reasonable; constant through time; and in compliance with the rule of law; in order to be 
considered as ‘law’.  
Only if the criteria of legality are satisfied will the social understandings achieved from 
social interactions and mutual reciprocity command the autonomy of law that is capable 
of generating fidelity to law and imposes the obligation to obey. The force of law is 
rooted in the sense of legal legitimacy gained through upholding the internal morality of 
law, which gives a rule of law its binding character.  
However, a shared legal understanding is not ‘law’ unless it has been put into a 
continuous engagement of a practice of legality. A practice of legality is understood as a 
robust interactional process of continuing practice of shared understanding that adheres 
to the eight criteria of internal morality. The idea of a practice of legality is further 
substantiated by the notion of deliberative normative practice that consists of three 
elements, i.e., commitment, standard of correctness and common resources.  
It is emphasised that a practice of legality must be of certain specificity and density 
before an interactional law is said to emerge. Furthermore, the normative practice is 
deliberate whereby its discursiveness aspect that provides the reasoning and arguments 
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on the actions and judgments tending to be law, is concretised in practice. A rule of 
international law, or an interactional international law, is said to have been created when 
a community of practice emerges that continuously engages with and develops the 
shared legal understandings.   
Thus, through the framework established in the ascertainment of ‘rules of international 
law’ from an interactional perspective, the conceptualisation of international law is 
revitalised to correspond to the dynamic changes in the law making of the international 
legal order. The doctrine of sources where international law is found is revisited in order 
to incorporate modern ways of making law that produce a variety of legal instruments, 
not all of which fit comfortably into the sources of international law enshrined in the 
traditional, formal doctrine of sources. 
An interpretation of ‘rules of international law’ through an interactional account places 
less emphasis on the sources from which rules of international law are derived. Instead, 
the interactional framework focuses on whether these rules are rules of international law 
obtained through shared legal understanding of the participating actors where these 
actors are committed to the development of its legal normativity through continuous 
engagement in a practice of legality.  
This interpretation of ‘rules of international law’ complements and supports scholars’ 
construction of ‘the parties’ where consent or consensus of parties are considered to be 
more important than whether the parties are party to the treaty in the assessment of 
whether an external rule shall be taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty term 
or provision. The identification of the intention of the parties through an interactional 
construction is important in addressing the inter-temporal issues raised with respect to 
Article 31(3)(c), where emphasis is placed on the intentions of the parties in the 
application of the second limb of the inter-temporal law that supports an evolutionary 
interpretation.
914
  
If the rule reflects the shared legal understanding achieved by the social enterprise that 
has been undertaken in a practice of legality, it necessarily reflects the common 
understanding of the parties. Since these rules are the ‘triumph’ achieved from the hard 
work of society, these rules will be considered ‘applicable in the relations between the 
                                               
914 The issue of inter-temporality is addressed in Section 1.6.1 of Chapter One of this thesis.  
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parties’ and shall be taken into account in the process of interpretation as long as the 
criterion of relevance is satisfied.   
More importantly, the research purports to highlight that in light of recent developments 
in the contemporary international law-making process, there is a need to rethink the 
traditional, formal doctrine of sources in order to incorporate the recent phenomena of 
multilateral, pluralised actors
915
 in the scene of the international legal order that 
revolutionised the law-making environment of the international legal order.
 
The 
potential of Article 31(3)(c) as an integration tool can be extended if the ascertainment 
of what is international law is re-established in view of the expansion of international 
law.
916
  
The multilateralisation
917
 of international law making as encapsulated in the conclusion 
of multilateral agreements that establish a common pattern of institutional arrangements, 
                                               
915  In fact, the most striking feature of contemporary international law-making processes is the 
participation of non-state actors, namely inter-governmental organisations and non-governmental 
organisations, recently described as ‘epistemic communities’ or ‘transnational networks’ of officials, 
experts and interest groups equipped with quasi autonomous power, in the making of international law. In 
Alan Boyle and Christine Chinkin, ‘UNCLOS III and the Process of International Law-Making’ pp 371 – 
388 in Tafsir Malick Ndiaye and Rüdiger Wolfrum (eds) Law of the Sea, Environmental Law and 
Settlement of Disputes. Liber Amicorum Judge Thomas A Mensah (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 
2007) at pp 371 – 372. Pauwelyn, ‘Is it International Law or Not, And Does it Even Matter’ (26 February 
2010) supra n 209, at p 25. The author commented that ‘the fact that informal international law-making 
processes include non-State actors (the actor informality of IN-LAW) does not preclude IN-LAW from 
being international law’. 
916  Arnold N Pronto, ‘Some Thoughts on the Making of International Law’ (2008) 19(3) European 
Journal of International Law 601 – 616.  
917 ‘Multilateralism’ is traditionally understood as ‘a dialogue among government representatives who 
“hope to work out common approaches to common concerns”’, quoted in Michael G Schechter, 
‘Systemic Change, International Organizations, and the Evolution of Multilateralism’ pp 23 – 41, at p 23, 
in James P Muldoon, Jr, JoAnn Fagot Aviel, Richard Reitano, and Earl Sullivan (eds) The New Dynamics 
of Multilateralism. Diplomacy, International Organizations, and Global Governance (Westview Press 
Boulder 2011). Keohane has defined it as ‘the practice of coordinating national policies in groups of three 
or more states, through ad hoc arrangements or by means of institutions” where as he limited his 
connotation of ‘multilateralism’ to arraignments involving states’, or more specifically, intergovernmental 
arrangements despite acknowledging that transnational relations are important. See Robert O Keohane, 
‘Multilateralism: An Agenda for Research’ (1990) 45(4) Multilateralism: Old and New 731 – 764, at p 
732. Recent international relations scholars have accommodated the increased interactions among and 
between non-state actors including non-governmental organisations (NGOs), transnational advocacy and 
transnational social movements, and intergovernmental organisation due to the erosion of the pillars of 
state sovereignty by democracy and globalisation.  Scholars have advocated the redefinition of 
‘multilateralism’ to encompass interactions between multilateral economic institutions and global social 
movements in an ‘incrementally pluralised governing structures’ that captures the complexity, substantive, 
and qualitative dimensions this phenomenon, which makes it distinct. For the purpose of this research, 
multilateralism, multilateralisation and multilateral law-making are understood in the context of this 
research as ‘interactions of states, intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) and non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) commonly described as “epistemic communities” or “transnational network” of 
officials, experts and interest groups with quasi-autonomous character’ that constitute a broader 
international community. In Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, supra n 733, at pp 98 
– 99.  
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is a recent phenomenon of modern international law. The emergence of international 
consensus is strengthened by the multilateralisation of international law making in 
contemporary international legal order, especially in the context of international 
organisations such as MEAs.
918
   
A general summary of the suggestion of the re-interpretation of the salient features of 
Article 31(3)(c) is presented. The phrase of ‘rules of international law’ is interpreted 
through an interactional account of international law to refer to shared legal 
understandings maintained by a continuous practice of legality in a community of 
practice. These rules generate a sense of obligation, the fidelity of law that commands 
compliance (bindingness) from the parties. In light of a reinterpretation of ‘rules of 
international law’ in accordance with an interactional understanding of law, Article 
31(3)(c) is reconstructed and re-interpreted where –  
1. Determination of whether the rule is a rule of international law. These rules are 
ascertained through the prism of an interactional theory of law, where the 
existence of law is contingent on whether a community of practice has emerged. 
2. The rules of international law are considered to be ‘applicable’ in the 
interpretative process between the parties if the shared legal understanding of the 
parties reflects their common intention and collective agreement as to the 
interpretation of both the explicit and implicit dimension of the rule, and has 
demonstrated this shared legal understanding in their practice of legality. This is 
a de facto demonstration of their collective understanding of the bindingness of 
the rule or the obligation commanded by the rule, which generates their fidelity 
to the rule of law.   
                                               
918 In the contemporary law-making process, the institutional framework established by virtue of a treaty 
instrument, guided by the mandate of its constituent instrument that codifies shared legally 
understandings, can ‘represent frozen configurations of privilege and bias’ and contributes toward the 
emergence of the community of practice necessary for the generation of law. Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J 
Toope, ‘International Law and Constructivism: Elements of an Interactional Theory of International Law’ 
(2000) 39 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 19 – 74, at pp 29 – 3. The authors follow Alexander 
Wendt’s definition of institution to mean ‘relatively stable set or “structure” of identities and interests’. 
See also Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’ (2005) 59(1) 
International Organization 39 – 75, at p 52. In fact, the institutional arrangement created is meant to 
develop the norms contained in the treaty, and may serve as a catalyst, or provide the necessary platform 
for the generation of new international law. See Robin R Churchill and Geir Ulfstein, ‘Autonomous 
Institutional Arrangements in Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ (2000) 94 American Journal of 
International Law 623 – 659, at p 636 and 642; and Boyle and Chinkin, The Making of International Law, 
supra n 733, at p 161. 
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3. ‘The parties’ are members to the joint enterprise of law-making where shared 
legal understandings are attained and practiced. 
‘Rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ should be 
interpreted as a whole where the extent and scope of what is ‘applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ depends on the force and the autonomy of law commonly 
understood by the parties to be applicable on them. Who the parties are is no longer a 
separate determination from the parties who had participated in the making of the rule 
of international law. In this regard, the determination of who ‘the parties’ are and the 
debate of whether a narrow or broad approach should be taken in the interpretation of 
‘the parties’ is no longer crucial to the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c).  
By identifying ‘the parties’ as members to the joint enterprise of law-making, it is not 
necessary to show who each individual party is, and whether they are formally bound 
(through ratification) by the rule of law. As long as the parties to the interpreted treaty 
are engaged in the development of the rule of law (and satisfy other conditions provided 
under the Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention), the rule will be considered 
to be applicable in the relations between them.  The extent of applicability will then 
depend on the content of the shared legal understanding attained in the interactional 
process.  
This interpretation of ‘the parties’ corresponds to the multilateralisation of treaty 
making in an institutionalised setting such as the Conference of the Parties (COP) of 
multilateral environmental treaty regimes. The collective understanding developed 
within and beyond a treaty regime through cross-referencing between treaty regimes 
strengthens the international shared understandings of a relevant rule of international 
law, and enhances the universality of the rule. This confirms the emergence and 
establishment of a common international understanding on this subject matter. It is 
noted by Dupuy that – 
‘cross-references from one institution to another, the recalling of guidelines 
adopted by other apparently concurrent international authorities, recurrent 
invocation of the same rules formulated in one way or another at the universal, 
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regional and more restricted levels, all tend progressively to develop and establish 
a common international understanding’.919 
If the ‘rule of international law’ is created through an interactional process that involves 
the parties as a whole (majority of states), these parties will be assumed to share the 
common understanding that the rule of international law is intended to be applicable to 
them in an interpretative process. This applies even though the parties, on an individual 
basis, might not be party to the external international law taken into account.  
This approach adopted in dealing with ‘the parties’ is deemed more appropriate in light 
of the prevailing multilateral setting of international law-making, where the normative 
development of international law on the environment is conducted through multilateral 
settings that involve the majority of states. Under such settings, an ascertainment of law 
that embraces diversity in the face of pluralised interests with thin commonalities, and 
promotes legitimacy that facilitates achievement of shared understandings, is very much 
in need.  
It is not only a matter of theoretical importance in looking at law from an interactional 
perspective. It is also a matter of practicality and pragmatism. Looking at a rule of 
(international) law through an interactional perspective enables the operationalisation of 
Article 31(3)(c) for the interpretation of a rule of law in its systemic environment in 
light of the principle of systemic integration.   
4.6 Conclusion 
The re-interpretation of the phrase ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ in light of an interactional understanding of law enables the 
revelation of the implicit dimension of the shared legal understanding that provides the 
normative foundation to an explicit rule. The normative content and scope of a relevant 
rule of international law, brought to the forefront through an interactional ascertainment 
of international law via the three-component framework inform the interpretation of a 
treaty term or provision by virtue of Article 31(3)(c).  
The next two chapters (Chapters Five and Six) proceed to illustrate the application of 
this architecture of interpretation constructed from an understanding of international law 
                                               
919 Pierre-Marie Dupuy, ‘Soft Law and the International Law of the Environment’ (1991) 12 Michigan 
Journal of International Law 420 – 435, at p 424.  
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from an interactional perspective. The rules that are considered relevant are assessed 
through the three-tier interactional framework of shared understanding; satisfaction of 
legality; and a practice of legality in the determination of whether these rules are rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. The assessment of a 
rule through the interactional framework developed in this chapter identifies the 
normative content and to what extent these rules are applicable in the relations between 
the parties for the purpose of interpretation in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) of the 
1969 Vienna Convention.      
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5 
Chapter 5. Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relations between the 
Parties: An Interactional Understanding of Law 
Part II: Operation - 1971 Ramsar Convention on Wetlands 
5.1 Overview 
A review of existing interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis revealed that a separate interpretation of selected terminologies 
of the Article, such as ‘applicable’ and ‘the parties’, is incapable of operationalising the 
Article to reflect the principle of systemic integration. A reconstruction of the 
interpretation for ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations in the relations 
between the parties’ is necessary where what is ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ has been shown to be qualified and conditioned by the nature and content of 
‘rules of international law’. What is ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ 
depends on the external rule of international law sought to be taken into account in the 
interpretative process. The nature of the ‘relevant rule of international law’ determines 
whether it is applicable in the relations between the parties. 
This realisation highlights the importance of exploring and identifying the content and 
status of the external rule of international law. The ascertainment of the content and 
fidelity of the rule of international law through an interactional understanding of law 
clarifies the interpretation of the ‘rule of international law that is applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. The ascertainment of the extent of the relevant rule of 
international law is undertaken through an interactional perspective of law. A rule of 
international law is understood as a shared legal understanding undertaken in a practice 
of legality by the purposive enterprise of law. The emergence of a rule of international 
law is characterised by the attainment of a practice of legality of a certain specificity 
and density along the continuum of social norms at one end, and legal norms at the 
other end.  
The conceptualisation of a rule of international law through an interactional 
understanding of law reflects scholars’ interpretation of ‘the parties’, where ‘the parties’ 
need not be a party to the external rule as long as the rule reflects the common 
understanding of the parties. This common understanding can be deduced from the 
213 
 
shared legal understanding developed through the interactional and reciprocal process of 
law making.  
The ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ that shall 
be taken into account in the interpretation of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of 
international watercourses in Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention will be 
determined through an interactional framework. This framework consists of three 
components, namely shared understanding; criteria of legality; and practice of legality. 
An interactional understanding of law looks beyond the legal formality of the formation 
of law limited through formal sources of law. It identifies, through the interactional and 
reciprocal process of the formation of law, the normative content, and the legality of 
rules. The subsequent section will look into the rules of international law through the 
prism of the three components in order to uncover the content of the rules of 
international law that determines whether it is ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’.  
This chapter will first determine the shared understandings implicit to Articles 2.1 and 
4.1 of the Ramsar Convention, identified to be relevant for the interpretation in Chapter 
Two for the interpretation of Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. Secondly, 
it will assess the shared understanding against the eight criteria of internal morality in 
the determination of its legal validity. Thirdly, the chapter proceeds to ascertain whether 
the parties to the COP of Ramsar Convention performed the shared legal understanding 
attained at the institutionalised law-making platform of COP in a practice of legality.   
This is necessary to confirm that these rules are ‘rules of international law’ within 
Article 31(3)(c) from the perspective of an interactional understanding of international 
law. In addition, the assessment of these rules through the interactional framework 
enables the ascertainment of their normative content, and allows the identification, from 
the shared legal understanding undertaken in a practice of legality, whether these rules 
of international law are ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’.  
5.2 Rules of International Law - Shared Understanding  
Chapter Two established that Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention are 
relevant for the interpretation of the obligation to preserve the freshwater ecosystems of 
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international watercourses.
920
 This section will explore the shared legal understanding 
undertaken in a practice of legality of these rules in order to determine what is the 
content of the rules that are ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’.  
The 2002 Guidelines for management planning for Ramsar sites and other wetlands 
adopted by Resolution VIII.14 (2002) were specifically developed to address the 
requirements of Articles 3 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention.
921
 Articles 3 and 4.1 seek 
to promote the conservation of wetlands and waterfowl through the establishment of 
nature reserves on wetlands, and provide for their management thereof. The 
interpretation and application of these Articles are furnished by the 2002 Guidelines, 
where requirements concerning the conservation of wetlands in Listed and non-Listed 
wetlands are specified, with particular focus on site-based management planning.
922
  
The 2002 Guidelines for the management of Listed and non-Listed Ramsar sites are 
complemented by the 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines for the Future 
Development of the List of Wetlands of International Importance of the Convention on 
Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971).
923
 The 2009 Strategic Framework guides the 
implementation for the future development of Listed wetlands, and its objective  is to 
develop and maintain an international network of wetlands ‘important for the 
                                               
920 Art 2(1) provides that ‘Each Contracting Parties shall designate suitable wetlands within its territory 
for inclusion in a List of Wetlands of International Importance’. Art 3.1 provides that ‘The contracting 
Parties shall formulate and implement their planning so as to promote the conservation of the wetlands 
included in the List, and as far as possible the wise use of wetlands in their territory’. Article 4(1) 
provides that ‘each Contracting Party shall promote the conservation of wetlands and waterfowl by 
establishing nature reserves on wetlands, whether they are included in the List or not, and provide 
adequately for their wardening’. 
921 Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’ 
(adopted by Resolution VIII.14 (2002) of the Ramsar Convention), para 2. See Ramsar Convention, 
‘Resolution VIII.14: New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’ 
(Valencia, Spain, 18 – 26 November 2002) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-resol-
resolution-viii-14-new/main/ramsar/1-31-107%5E21393_4000_0__> accessed 18 July 2012 (hereinafter: 
‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’) . It is noted that 
‘Resolutions are what the Contracting Parties commit themselves to do’. Agenda Item 16.7 Conference 
Decisions, para 257, Ramsar Convention, ‘Minutes of the 20th Meeting of the Standing Committee, 
Fourth Day, 3 October 1997’ (Minutes of the 20th Meeting of the Standing Committee, 29 September – 3 
October 1997, Gland, Switzerland, 17 October 1997) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/es/ramsar-documents-
standing-minutes-of-20th/main/ramsar/1-31-41%5E21668_4000_2__> accessed 20 July 2012. 
922
 Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 3.  
923 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426. 
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conservation of global biological diversity and for sustaining human life through the 
maintenance of their ecosystem components, processes and benefits/services’.924    
Due to the permanent presence, or presence for some significant period of time, of water 
in wetlands, the wetland ecosystems are adapted to the hydrological regime that is 
influenced by the quantity and quality of freshwater flowing into these wetlands.
925
 The 
successful management of wetlands sites thus requires maintenance of sources of water 
inter-connected through the hydrological cycle, and puts the river basin as the 
fundamental functional unit for water management.
926
 It is clarified that the ecosystem 
approach, although focused on the maintenance of ecosystem structure and functioning, 
is broadly similar to the concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
where the river basin, synonymous with the ecosystem boundary, is deemed the most 
appropriate physical entity for the planning and management of water.
927
  
The 2002 Guidelines emphasise the role of management plans and a continuous, long-
term management process in satisfaction of the obligations stipulated under Articles 3 
and 4.
928
 The initial stage of management planning begins with a minimal management 
plan that meets the minimal requirement and equipped with an organisation responsible 
for its management. This establishes an adaptable and dynamic framework, which 
                                               
924 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 2, para 6. The 
amendment made in 2005 was to take into account subsequent development in ecosystems sciences 
whereby ‘ecosystem benefits’ is defined in accordance with the MA definition of ecosystem services as 
‘the benefits that people receive from ecosystems’. 
925  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, para 14.  
926  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 15 and 16. In para 17, it is stated that ‘when groundwater plays a 
significant role in supplying water to a wetland, and since the underlying aquifer does not always coincide 
with the surface river basin, more than one basin overlying the aquifer may constitute the appropriate unit 
of water resource management’. See Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution VII.18: Guidelines for Integrating 
Wetland Conservation and Wise Use into River Basin Management’ (San José, Costa Rica, 10 – 18 May 
1999) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-resol-resolution-vii-18/main/ramsar/1-31-
107%5E20586_4000_0__> accessed 18 July 2012.  
927  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 19. Resolution X.19, COP10 confirms that the Consolidated Guidance for 
Integrating Wetland Conservation and Wise Use into River Basin Management annexed to this 
Resolution updates and wholly supersedes earlier guidance on the matter. The COP invites Contracting 
Parties to make good use of it as appropriate, adapting it as necessary to suit national conditions and 
circumstances within the frameworks of existing regional initiatives and commitments, in the context of 
sustainable development consistent with national institutions and legal frameworks. See  Ramsar 
Convention, ‘Resolution X.19. Wetlands and River Basin Management: Consolidated Scientific and 
Technical Guidance’, (10th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Ramsar Convention, 
Changwon, 28 October – 4 November 2008) at paras 5 and 6 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_x_19_e.pdf> accessed 19 July 2012.   
928  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 6 and 41. 
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enables gradual evolution and development in the management process as information 
becomes available.
929
 The management process involves the identification and 
designation of wetlands; the assessment and monitoring of wetlands; and the in situ and 
ex situ management of wetlands, where a flexible approach that allows appropriate 
response and adaptation to take place is adopted.
930
  
The conservation objective and the recognition of the ecosystem approach are apparent 
in the 2002 Guidelines. The 2002 Guidelines stipulate, as part of the management 
planning process, the designation of a whole river basin into several types of zonation 
around the core wetland area if it does not include the surrounding area of influence.
931
 
The 2002 Guidelines stress the importance of a buffer zone that surrounds the core 
wetland area in recognition of the influence the surrounding area might have on the 
ecological character of the wetland itself.
 932
  
The 2002 Guidelines recommend the application of an ecosystem approach that 
considers the functioning of the ecosystems in the designation of management site.
933
 
Due to the dependence of wetlands on water supply from outside the wetland, the river 
basin or catchment area should be viewed as a buffer zone for the wetland, especially 
when water and land-use in these extended areas indirectly affect the ecological 
                                               
929  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 41 – 44.  
930  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 44 – 48. The flexible approach adopted in the management of wetlands 
is known as ‘adaptable management, see ‘Part IX. Adaptable Management’ in Ramsar Convention, ‘New 
Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 48 – 
52.  
931  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 53 – 57. In Para 56, it is stated that ‘when the Ramsar site itself does not 
include a buffer zone, it is generally appropriate for management planning purposes to identify and 
establish such buffer zone around the core wetland area defined within a Ramsar site or other wetland’. It 
is further stated that ‘when a wetland site is composed of discrete sub-sites, a buffer zone should be 
defined for each, including, where appropriate, all the area between the sub-sites’. In Para 57, it is stated 
that ‘the location of a buffer zone in relation to the core wetland area of a designated Ramsar site will 
vary depending upon what ecosystems are included within the site boundaries. Where the designated site 
is only the wetland itself, then for management purposes a buffer zone should be defined in the 
surrounding area outside the designated site. In contrast, where the site encompasses the wetland and its 
surroundings , the buffer zone should extend to the boundaries of the designated site, and then a ‘core 
area’, perhaps the wetland ecosystem itself, defined within the site’. 
932 It stated that – ‘[t]he buffer zone should be that area surrounding the wetland within which land use 
activities may directly affect the ecological character of the wetland itself. [T]he objective for land use 
within the buffer zone should be one of sustainable use through ecosystem management, consistent with 
the maintenance of the ecological character of the wetland.’ Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for 
Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 56.  
933  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at p 4, para 19. 
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character of the wetland.
934
 The Biosphere Reserve is an example of the zonation 
concept. It divides a site up to three zones – core zone, buffer zone (for research and 
training) and transition zone (for sustainable use).
935
   
The 2002 Guidelines reveal that many Ramsar sites are mostly multiple use sites similar 
to Biosphere Reserves, even though some sites are designated within protected areas.
936
 
The management objectives for multiple use sites differ from protected area sites, where 
the use of the core wetland is broadly to ensure that the ecological character of the 
wetland is maintained or enhanced in order to ensure the continuity of provision of 
ecosystem services and functions.
937
  
The permission, according to the 2002 Guidelines, to allow for a designation of Ramsar 
site or a nature reserve as a multiple use site, indicates that the obligation to conserve 
wetlands under Articles 3 and 4 includes the core/buffer zonation approach for multiple 
uses and also the establishment of zonation for a particular use.
938
 The salient aspect for 
such designation is the establishment of zonation and management objectives for each 
zone. Full stakeholder participation from the earliest stage in the demarcation of zones 
                                               
934  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, para 58. It is further noted that ‘if a particular case of wetland is situated within a 
very large river basin, basin-scale or coastal zone management may be seen as a third, outer zone for 
management purposes. A more limited buffer zone immediately surrounding the wetland may still be a 
necessary management planning tool’.  
935  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, para 59. The Biosphere Reserve concept is potentially applicable to all 
reservation sites under Ramsar convention, especially when the site is designated as both a Ramsar site 
and Biosphere Reserve where the boundary for Ramsar site and the zonation established for the Biosphere 
Reserve should be clearly demarcated. Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning 
for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 59.  It is stated that ‘[t]he Biosphere Reserve 
zonation concept, in which the site may include up to three zones - core zone, buffer zone (for research 
and training) and transition zone (for sustainable use) - is potentially applicable to all Ramsar sites, and 
should be applied whenever feasible and appropriate. Its application is particularly important where a site 
is designated as both a Ramsar site and Biosphere Reserve, and here the relationship between the Ramsar 
site boundary and the zonation established for the Biosphere Reserve should be clearly established’. 
936  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, para 60. In para 61, it is elaborated that ‘any zonation scheme should recognise 
the existing multiple uses of Ramsar sites and their surroundings, and ensure that management objectives 
for the core zone are designed primarily to maintain the ecological character of the wetland, as well as 
that those for any form of surrounding buffer zone are consistent with this maintenance of the ecological 
character. Clear, separate but complementary and mutually supportive management objectives should be 
established for each zone’. 
937  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 60. 
938  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 62. The Man and the Biosphere Programme is an example of the 
core/buffer zonation approach for multiple uses. The zonation established for a particular use that is under 
discussion is ecotourism.  
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and setting of objectives is involved in order to minimise user conflicts.
939
 This aspect is 
an important element in the ecosystem approach, where Principles 2 and 12 of the 
Ecosystem Approach Guidelines 2004 developed by the Biodiversity Convention 
impose that management should be decentralised to the lowest appropriate level in 
which all relevant sectors of society and scientific disciplines should be involved.
940
  
At this point, it is observed that the scope of ‘conservation’ is informed by the 
recognition of the ecosystem and the ecosystem approach. The conservation process, 
which encompasses the initial identification of a natural or near natural site, and its 
designation and its continuous management, does not stop at the stage where the 
pristine or unspoilt site is  designated and set aside for protection. It goes beyond an 
abstract understanding of preservation by ensuring, through continuous management, 
the safeguarding and even improvement of the ecological character of a reserve site
941
 
to ensure sustainability of ecosystem functioning and values to maintain people’s 
livelihood and the conservation of biodiversity.
942
 However, the expansive scope of the 
definition of conservation includes preservation, and is thus important in informing the 
interpretation of the term.
943
 
The short-term target set by the Contracting Parties for the Ramsar List to the year 2010 
to contain at least 2,500 sites covering 250 million hectares, reflects their concern over 
the continuing loss and degradation of wetlands in many parts of the world.
944
 The long-
                                               
939  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 63 – 64. 
940  Biodiversity Convention, Decision V/6, supra n 12, para 7(B) 
941  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 60. The updated definition of ‘ecological character’, informed by the 
ecosystem approach is ‘the combination of the ecosystem components, processes and benefits/services 
that characterise the wetland at a given point in time’. Benefits is defined in accordance with the MA’s 
definition of ecosystem services as ‘the benefits that people receive from ecosystems’. In Ramsar 
Convention, ‘Resolution IX.1 Annex A. A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of Wetlands and the 
Maintenance of Their Ecological Character’, supra n 422.  
942  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 60. 
943 The present concept of ‘conservation’, as developed by the IUCN and in the World Conservation 
Strategy, includes both the ‘classic’ elements of protection and preservation, including restoration, and 
the safeguarding of ecological processes and genetic diversity besides management of natural resources in 
order to ensure their maintenance by sustainable utilisation. See Heijnsbergen, International Legal 
Protection of Wild Fauna and Flora, supra n 443, at pp 51 – 52. The need for an evolutionary 
interpretation of the term preservation is necessary, in the light of the advent of the ecosystem approach, 
and the intrinsic limitation of the definition of ‘preservation’ that constraints implementation. Van 
Heijnsbergen, at p 44 noted that the term preservation ‘implies the intention of a durable guarantee 
against the loss of the damage to the object by defending it against external threats … but it tells us little 
about the norms of management and the strategies necessary’.  
944 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 5, para 21. 
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term target for the Convention is to include in the Ramsar List ‘at least one suitable 
representative of each wetland type, according to the Ramsar classification system 
found within each biogeographic region’.945  
The 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines tighten the efforts
946
 of realising the 
vision of the Ramsar Convention.
947
 It refines the obligation to conserve wetlands, in 
particularly through the designation of Listed wetland sites under Article 2.1, while 
emphasising the importance for the natural or near natural national networks of Ramsar 
sites in each contracting party to be fully representative of the diversity of wetlands and 
their ecological and hydrological functions.
948
  
                                               
945 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 17, para 65.  
946 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, p 2, para 4. It is 
commented that the strategic direction given to the development of the Listed Wetlands has previously 
been rather limited. The 6th COP urged Parties through the Convention’s Strategic Plan 1997 – 2002, to 
‘increase the area of wetland designated for the List of Wetlands of International Importance particularly 
for wetland types that are under-represented either at the global or national levels’ (Operational Objective 
6.2). The 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines, supra n 426, reiterated the purpose of the adoption 
and subsequent amendment of the Guidelines, which is – ‘to provide a clearer view, or vision, of the long-
term targets or outcomes which the Convention is seeking to achieve through the Ramsar List; [and] to 
assist Contracting Parties in taking a systematic approach to identifying their priorities for future 
designations, in order to create comprehensive national networks of Ramsar sites, which, when 
considered at the global level, fulfil the stated vision for the Ramsar List’. See also Ramsar Convention, 
‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, p 2, para 5. 
947  The visions are – to ‘develop and maintain international network of wetlands important for the 
conservation of global biological diversity and for sustaining human life’ where the international network 
of wetlands sites are ‘built from coherent and comprehensive networks of Ramsar Listed wetlands 
established within the territory of each Contracting Party to the Convention’. See  Ramsar Convention, 
‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, pp 2 and 3, paras 6 and 7.  
948 Objective 1, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 3. In 
para 9, it is stated that ‘the criteria for designation should be ‘suitable’ (ie internationally important) and 
representative of every natural or near-natural wetland type present in each ‘biogeographic region’, as 
defined globally, supranationally/regionally or nationally’. Para 10 stated that, ‘suitable site’ is 
determined in relation to those wetlands that ‘play a substantial ecological or hydrological role in the 
natural functioning of a major river basin, lake, or coastal system’. Objective 2, Ramsar Convention, 
‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, p 3. Para 11 stated that development of the Ramsar List 
should be reviewed where Criteria for identification and selection of Ramsar sites should be further 
refined as appropriate to best promote conservation of biodiversity and wise use of wetlands at the local, 
subnational, national, supranational/regional, and international levels. In the context of the conservation 
of global biodiversity, the second objective explicitly takes on the inclusion of wetlands into the Ramsar 
List wetlands that consist of threatened ecological communities critical to the survival of vulnerable, 
endangered or critically endangered endemic species; wetlands that are critical to the conservation of 
biodiversity in each biogeographic region; wetlands that provide important habitat for plant and animal 
species at critical stages in their life cycle or during adverse conditions; or wetlands that are of direct 
significance for waterbird and fish species or stocks, as well as other taxa determined by the relevant 
Ramsar site selection criteria. See Objective 2, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and 
Guidelines’, supra n 426, at pp 3 – 4, paras 12 – 15. Para 12 stated that threatened ecological 
communities or ecological communities critical to the survival of endemic species identified as vulnerable, 
endangered or critically endangered under national, international or intergovernmental endangered 
species legislation or programmes. Biogeographic region is define as ‘a scientifically rigorous 
determination of regions as established using biological and physical parameters such as climate, soil type, 
vegetation cover, etc. See also p 7, para 32, For many contracting parties, biogeographic regions will be 
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The criteria of representativeness, rarity or uniqueness of wetlands that are in a natural 
or near natural state for the designation of wetland sites within a biogeographic 
region
949
 have particular emphasis on their ecological character. The designation of 
wetlands requires that the ecological character of the site should play a substantial role 
in the natural functioning of a major river basin or coastal system, especially the 
hydrological functions provided by wetland ecosystems.
950
 A wetland is considered 
important, which warrants designation for conservation, if it is critical to the sustenance 
of species, ecological communities, and populations of flora and/or fauna.
951
  
These objectives and the subsequently developed criteria have greatly enhanced the 
scope of the obligation to conserve wetlands – not just the conservation of wetlands as 
habitats for waterfowls, but also the extension of the conservation objectives to include 
biodiversity conservation, in recognition of wetlands as a rich source of biodiversity of 
international importance.
952
  
The 2009 Strategic Conservation Framework and Guidelines elaborate the processes 
and procedural mechanisms required for the conservation of wetlands in accordance 
with Article 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention. Conservation starts with the designation of 
wetlands according to specific criteria, guided by the 2009 Strategic Framework and 
Guidelines on the identification and designation of specific wetland types;
953
 temporary 
pools;
954
 and artificial wetlands,
955
 as Ramsar Wetlands of International Importance. 
The designation of sites is followed by the presentation of information on the sites for 
the Ramsar database, including the reasons for their inclusion into the Ramsar List 
                                                                                                                                         
transboundary in nature and will require collaboration between countries to define those wetland types 
which are representative, unique, etc. In some regions and countries, the term ‘bioregion’ is used as a 
synonym for ‘biogeographic region’. 
949 Criterion 1, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 17. 
950 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 17, para 68. The 
hydrological attributes may include, as stated in para 69: (i) a major role in the natural control, 
amelioration or prevention of flooding; (ii) importance for seasonal water retention for wetlands or other 
areas of conservation importance downstream; (iii) important for the recharge of aquifers; (iv) form part 
of karst or underground hydrological or spring systems that supply major surface wetlands; (v) major 
natural floodplain system; (vi) having major hydrological influence in the context of at least regional 
climate regulation or stability (eg certain areas of cloudforest or rainforest, wetlands or wetland 
complexes in semi-arid, arid or desert areas, tundra or peatland systems acting as sinks or carbon, etc); 
and (vii) having a major role in maintaining high water quality standards. 
951 For detail elaboration, refer to Criteria 2, - 9 of Objective 2, pp 18 – 25, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 
Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426. 
952 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 5, para 21. 
953
 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at pp 26 – 39.  
954 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at pp 39 – 44.  
955 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 44.  
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according to the criteria set out, and the Ramsar classification system for wetland 
types.
956
  
The presentation of information for sites on the Ramsar database are in the form of the 
Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS), which is completed and supplied to the 
Ramsar Secretariat after designation of sites by a contracting party, and updated at least 
every six years.
957
 Submission of information is important where the initial submission 
defines the ecological character of Ramsar sites as the basis for monitoring and 
management of wetlands for their continual maintenance. The information provided in 
the RIS should be consistent with the description of the ecological character, features, 
values and functions of the wetland, the factors affecting or likely to affect its character, 
values and functions, and the management planning process, including monitoring in 
the management plan prepared for the designated site.
958
  
Apart from the initial submission of information of designated wetlands that requires to 
be updated periodically, the ongoing reporting and monitoring of the implementation of 
the obligation to conserve are an important element of the procedural mechanism 
imposed under the obligation to conserve. The Contracting Parties are required to 
submit the relevant information on the conservation undertaken in Ramsar sites in 
accordance with Item 27 of the RIS.
959
 The Contracting Parties need to provide details 
on nationally relevant protected area status, international conservation designations (in 
addition to Ramsar site status), and the bilateral or multilateral conservation measures 
on transboundary wetlands, as appropriate.
960
 If a reserve has been established, 
information such as the date of establishment, size of the protected area, or the part of 
                                               
956 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 50. In p 57, para 
19, it is noted that the Classification System for Wetland Type provides the description of what types of 
wetland are covered by each of the wetland type codes, grouped in three major categories: marine-coastal, 
inland, and human-made wetlands, and that wetland types under two or more of these categories may be 
present within a Ramsar site. See also ‘Annex B Ramsar Classification System for Wetland Type’ pp 64 – 
66, in Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426. 
957 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 50. 
958  Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 51. A 
comprehensive guide on the information to be provided in each numbered section of the RIS is found at 
pp 52 – 63.  
959 ‘Appendix A, Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands’, at p 49 in Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic 
Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at pp 45 – 49.  
960‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’ in 
‘Appendix A, Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands’, supra n 426, at p 60. 
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wetland included within a protected area where the area of protected wetland habitat is 
noted, is to be submitted.
961
 
The RIS submission requirements recommend that the IUCN management categories 
for protected areas
962
 be applied to the designated Ramsar sites.
963
 The categories of a 
particular Ramsar site will indicate the extent of the commitment to conserve by the 
contracting parties on that particular site. The 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines 
illustrate the common understanding of the contracting parties to adopt IUCN’s 
categorisation method in the designation of wetlands for the purpose of conservation. 
The recommendation of the adoption of the IUCN categorisation indicates the more 
expansive interpretation of ‘conservation’, although preservation is still an important 
element of conservation.  
The categorisation of protected areas under the IUCN approach can be broadly 
classified into two types – preservation and sustainable use. Categories Ia, Ib and III 
share a similar trait, that is, their protection motivation is not to supply benefits or 
services to sustain human livelihoods, but to protect the outstanding representativeness 
of their natural condition and their aesthetic qualities or cultural significance.
964
 
The ‘preservation-cluster’ of the IUCN categorisation corresponds with the Group A 
criteria laid out in the 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines, which stipulates that a 
wetland should be considered internationally important if it contains a ‘representative, 
rare, or unique example of a natural or near-natural wetland type found within the 
appropriate biogeographic region’.965 This criterion develops into the conservation of 
                                               
961 Item 27 of the RIS, see Para 27(a), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information 
Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 60.  
962  Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar 
Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. It is elaborated that IUCN defines a ‘protected area’ as : ‘An area 
of land and/or sea especially dedicated to the protection and maintenance of biological diversity, and of 
natural and associated cultural resources, and managed through legal or other effective means’. 
963  Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar 
Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at pp 60 - 61. 
964 See ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands 
(RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61, para 27(b). Category Ia Strict Nature Reserve, categorises area of land and/or 
sea ‘possessing some outstanding or representative ecosystem, geological or physiological features and/or 
species that is available primarily for scientific research and/or environmental monitoring purpose. 
Category Ib Wilderness Area, refers to a large area of unmodified or slightly modified land and/or sea 
that is protected to preserve its natural condition. Category III Natural Monument, categorises reserve 
area containing one, or more specific natural or natural/cultural feature which is of outstanding or unique 
value because of its inherent rarity, representative or aesthetic qualities or cultural significance. 
965
 Criterion 1, ‘Annex C. Criteria for Identifying Wetlands of International Importance and Guidelines 
for Their Application’ in Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, 
at p 67. 
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natural reserves that protects for sustainability and not development,
966
 whereby the 
objective of conservation is not benefits/services oriented. These areas are protected 
because they ‘possess outstanding or representative ecosystems, geological or 
physiological features and/or species’967 in a near-natural or natural condition; 968  or 
contain outstanding or unique value due to their inherent rarity, representative or 
aesthetic qualities or cultural significance.
969
  
Category II is located on the sustainable use cluster of the IUCN categorisation, where 
designation as protected area served mainly to protect the ecosystem integrity of the 
area in order to ensure continuous enjoyment of the present and future generation for 
spiritual, scientific, educational, recreational uses, on the condition of that these uses are 
environmentally and culturally compatible.
970
 Protection of pristine or natural 
conditions is not imposed, as long as modifications to the protected areas due to usage 
are not inimical or adversely affect the ecosystem integrity of these areas.  
Similarly, Category VI establishes areas of protection focused on the long-term 
protection and maintenance of biological diversity which at the same time ensure the 
provision of a sustainable flow of natural products and services for the satisfaction of 
the needs of communities.
971
 The protection of areas that consist of predominantly 
unmodified natural systems is to ensure the safeguard of the integrity of the ecosystems 
through the protection of its biodiversity for the benefits of continual sustenance of 
human livelihood. Although the protection of the area is benefits- or services-oriented, 
the outcome is the maintenance of the areas of protection in its predominantly 
unmodified form satisfies the restricted scope of preservation. 
                                               
966  Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution IX.1 Annex A. A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of 
Wetlands and the Maintenance of Their Ecological Character’, supra n 422, at p 7, fn 3. 
967 Category Ia, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on 
Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
968 Category Ib, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on 
Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
969 Category III Natural Monument, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the 
Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
970 The conservation for the services and benefits a wetland ecosystem can provide can be found mainly 
in Category II of the IUCN categorisation. Category II established areas of protection that – ‘protect the 
ecological integrity of one or more ecosystems for the present and future generations; exclude 
exploitation or occupation inimical to the purpose of designation; and provide a foundation for spiritual, 
scientific, educational, recreational and visitor opportunities that are environmentally and culturally 
compatible’. Category II National Park, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the 
Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
971 Category VI Managed Resource Protected Area, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for 
Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
224 
 
Categories II and VI correspond loosely to the Group B Criteria
972
 for designation of 
wetlands sites for the conservation of biodiversity. The importance of the designated 
site is not due to the protection of vulnerable or endangered species. Instead, it is 
deemed important to ensure the conservation of biodiversity crucial to the maintenance 
of ecosystem integrity for the production and provisioning services, aesthetic, spiritual, 
scientific, educational, recreational and touristic enjoyment of human beings.  
Category IV is not established specifically for human livelihoods, and allows 
intervention to ensure maintenance of habitats.
973
 This Category reflects the initial 
motivation for the establishment of the Ramsar Convention, which is the protection of 
wetlands important as habitat for waterfowl. Apart from the inclusion of fishes and 
other non-avian taxa, Category IV of protected areas for habitat/species management 
provides for active management intervention to ensure the maintenance of habitats to 
meet the requirements of specific species. This category corresponds largely with 
several criteria established for the designation of wetlands, especially criteria 
established based on specific species, such as Criteria 5 and 6 on waterbirds; Criteria 7 
and 8 on fish, and Criterion 9 that provides generally to other non-avian taxa that is 
wetland-dependent.
974
 
A broad approach is envisioned in Category V where the protection areas span across a 
landscape and/or a seascape that covers a vast area of land, with coast and sea as 
appropriate.
975
 The protection protects evolution of interaction between humans and 
their environment that results in ‘an area of distinct character with significant aesthetic, 
ecological and/or cultural value, and often with high biological diversity.
976
 The 
protection of the landscape or seascape aims to safeguard the integrity of the traditional 
interaction between people and nature over time, which is vital to the maintenance and 
evolution of such an area.
977
  
                                               
972 ‘Annex C. Criteria for Identifying Wetlands of International Importance and Guidelines for Their 
Application’ in Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 67. 
973 Category VI Habitat/Species Management Area, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for 
Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
974 ‘Annex C. Criteria for Identifying Wetlands of International Importance and Guidelines for Their 
Application’ in Ramsar Convention, ‘Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at pp 67 and 68.  
975  Category V Protected Landscape/Seascape, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for 
Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
976  Category V Protected Landscape/Seascape, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for 
Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
977  Category V Protected Landscape/Seascape, Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for 
Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
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In sum, the shared understanding of the contracting parties is evidenced in the adoption 
of the 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines that enumerate specific content of the 
Parties’ obligation to conserve. The Contracting Parties agreed to categorise protected 
areas management according to the list of categories proposed by IUCN whenever 
appropriate;
978
 provide a description of the management planning process;
979
 and submit 
a copy of management plan developed or approved for the site as supplementary 
information to the RIS, if available.
980
 The 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines 
provide further direction, elaboration and clarification in the implementation of the 
vision, objectives and targets of the Ramsar Convention, especially for Listed Wetlands. 
These are done through the adoption of a systematic approach in the identification of 
priority wetlands for designation, and enhance the RIS as a comprehensive tool in the 
satisfaction of the reporting and monitoring procedural obligations stipulated under the 
Ramsar Convention.  
The 2002 Guidelines are relevant as general management guidance for Listed and non-
Listed Wetlands, especially in terms of the methodology of management, the drafting of 
management plan, and the integration of the management of designated wetlands within 
the broader management scale under the integrated water resources management and 
integrated coastal zone management frameworks.  
The implementation of the Ramsar Convention is assisted through a series of Ramsar 
Strategic Plans, the most current in operation being the third Ramsar Strategic Plan 
2009 – 2015, 981  where the Strategic Plan that aims to contribute towards the 
implementation of the Ramsar Convention is further strengthened the shared legal 
understanding enshrined in the Ramsar Convention. In particularly, it specifies that the 
Strategic Plan aim to contribute to – 
                                               
978  Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar 
Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 60. 
979  Para 27(c), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar 
Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
980  Para 27(c), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar 
Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at p 61. 
981 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’ (adopted by Resolution X.1) (Ramsar 
Convention, Changwon 2008) <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/key_strat_plan_2009_e.pdf> accessed 19 July 
2012, para 24. See Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution X.1. The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’ (10th 
Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands, Changwon, Republic of Korea, 
28 October – 4 November 2008) <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_x_01_e.pdf> accessed 19 July 
2012. 
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‘a common understanding at global, national and subnational levels of the 
Convention’s purposes and principles, … [and] progress at all levels in the 
conservation and wise use of wetlands and the related benefits for biodiversity and 
human well-being’.982 
The Strategic Plan is devised to achieve the goals of the Ramsar Convention where 
strategies are developed towards identified and targeted key result areas. The first goal 
in the implementation of the Ramsar Convention is the wise use of wetlands where the 
necessary, appropriate instruments and measures are developed, adopted and used.
983
 
The wise use of wetlands means, inter alia, more participative management of wetlands, 
where conservation decisions are made with an awareness of the importance of the 
ecosystem services provided by wetlands.
984
  
The obligation to conserve wetlands as nature reserves is developed further under Goal 
2 of the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015.985  Goal 2 seeks to ‘develop and maintain an 
international network of wetlands that are important for the conservation of global 
biological diversity, including waterbird flyways and fish populations and for sustaining 
human life’.986 The common understanding of the contracting parties of the Ramsar 
Convention as to the conservation of wetlands is carefully laid out in the strategies 
develop to achieve this goal. The strategies develop to achieve Goal 2 adopt a step-wise 
approach.  
Strategy 2.1 provides the first step in the designation of a Ramsar site.
987
 The purpose of 
the designation of the Ramsar site is to facilitate the preparation of national plan and 
management priorities for these sites and increase the covering of Ramsar sites 
worldwide, especially the designation of Ramsar sites from under-represented wetlands 
types.
988
 Strategy 2.2 reflects the Ramsar Guidelines that management is a continuous, 
long-term process that is adaptable and dynamic, where a management plan will grow 
                                               
982 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 4, para 24.  
983 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 6. 
984 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 6. 
985 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at pp 10 – 12.  
986 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 10. 
987
 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 10. Ramsar 
Convention, Handbook 14. Data and Information Needs. A Framework for Ramsar Data and Information 
Needs (4th edn, Ramsar Handbooks, Ramsar Convention, 2010) <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/lib/hbk4-
14.pdf> accessed 19 July 2012. 
988 Strategy 2.1.i – 2.1.iv, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at 
p 10. 
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as information becomes available.
989
 It ensures that the Ramsar Sites Information 
Service is available and enhanced as a tool for guiding further designation of wetlands 
under the List, and for the purpose of research and assessment.
990
 Strategy 2.3 
recommends that new Ramsar sites should have effective management planning prior to 
designation, as well as resources for the implementation of the management plan.
991
 The 
objective of the planning and management of all designated Ramsar sites is to maintain 
the ecological character of these sites through several measures, including zoning 
measures for larger Ramsar sites, wetland reserves and other wetlands, and strict 
protection measures in certain wetlands of particular sensitivity.
992
 A dynamic and 
adaptable management process necessitates a review of all existing Ramsar sites to 
determine the effectiveness of management arrangements.
993
 
The obligation under Article 3.1 of the Ramsar Convention is specifically addressed in 
Strategy 2.6, where the condition of these sites are monitored and negative changes in 
their ecological character are addressed and reported to the Secretariat. Where 
appropriate, tools such as the Montreux Record and the Ramsar Advisory Mission can 
be applied to address problems.
994
 For non-Listed sites, Strategy 2.7 requires that the 
appropriate management and wise use of wetlands provided under Ramsar’s 2002 
Guidelines for the management and planning of Ramsar sites and other wetlands should 
be applied, with priority on recognised internationally important wetlands not yet 
designated as Ramsar sites.
995
 
The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 is intended to provide guidance to all relevant 
parties on how they should focus their efforts in the implementation of the Ramsar 
Convention over the next two triennia.
996
 It was adopted by the 10
th
 Meeting of the COP 
to the Ramsar Convention in Resolution X.1 where the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 was 
approved as the basis for the future implementation of the Convention.
997
 The approval 
of the Strategic Plan by the contracting parties is based on the recognition that each 
contracting party is free to choose the extent to which it will implement the Strategic 
                                               
989  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 41 and 43.  
990 Strategy 2.2, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 10. 
991 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 11. 
992 Strategy 2.4, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 11. 
993 Strategy 2.5, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 11. 
994 Strategy 2.6, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 12. 
995
 Strategy 2.7, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 12.  
996 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 1, para 1. 
997 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981,  at para 8.  
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Plan, the resource allocated for its implementation and the timeframes used in the 
implementation.
998
 The approval of the Strategic Plan, despite being couched in the 
softer language of implementation to the extent deemed fit by each Contracting party, 
still contributes towards a common understanding of the contracting parties as to the 
purposes and principles of the Convention. It strengthens the commitments of the 
parties to an improved implementation and progress at all levels in the conservation and 
wise use of wetlands.
999
  
The shared commitment as exhibited in the adoption of the Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 
– 2015 is further strengthened in the recent adjustments made to the Strategic Plan for 
the 2013 – 2015 triennium adopted in Resolution XI.3.1000 The preambular language of 
Resolution XI.3 recalls the request of the COP for the Standing Committee to assess 
progress and difficulties in the implementation of the Strategic Plan and to propose 
adjustments if necessary.
1001
 Apart from the review by the Standing Committee, the 
contracting parties provide information in their National Reports to the COP 11 on their 
implementation progress and difficulties, and their proposal for adjustments.
1002
 
Indication of the contracting parties’ commitments, and that the 28 strategies developed 
under the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 ‘represent a general consensus of the most 
important priorities for most parties’.1003 The consensus is demonstrated through the 
willingness of the contracting parties to report the results of the actions undertaken and 
achievements attained under the Strategic Plan at the global level and the national level 
to the Conference of the Parties.
1004
  
                                               
998 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at para 6.  
999 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 4. 
1000 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.3. Adjustment to the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 for the 2013 – 
2015 Triennium’ (11th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, 
Iran, 1971) Bucharest, Romania, 6 – 13 July 2012) <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/cop11/res/cop11-res03-
e.pdf> accessed 20 July 2012. 
1001 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.3. Adjustment to the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 for the 2013 – 
2015 Triennium’, supra n 1000, at p 1, para 2. 
1002 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.3. Adjustment to the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 for the 2013 – 
2015 Triennium’, supra n 1000, at p 1, para 3. 
1003 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 2, para 7.  
1004 Results are reported through regional and global synthesis reports prepared by the Secretariat for 
outcomes at the global level; and through Contracting Parties’ National Reports where the National 
Wetland Committees, where they exist, will have an important role in the evaluation and follow up of 
these results. See Annex of Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.3. Adjustment to the Strategic Plan 2009 
– 2015 for the 2013 – 2015 Triennium’, supra n 1000, at p 2, paras 1 and 2. The reporting of the result by 
contracting parties is through regional and global synthesis reports prepared by the Secretariat for 
outcomes at the global level; and through contracting parties’ National Reports where the National 
Wetland Committees will have an important role in the evaluation and follow up of these results. 
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5.3 Satisfaction of the Criteria of Legality 
Brunnée and Toope emphasised that it is important to distinguish between law and non-
law, and imposed that it is important for the internal morality of law, the features of 
legality crucial to the generation of a distinctive legal legitimacy and a sense of 
commitment ‘among those to whom law is addressed’, to be fulfilled.1005 The fidelity of 
law amongst the subject of law derives from the satisfaction of the criteria of morality in 
the process of law making.  Brunnée and Toope stated that – 
‘What distinguishes law from other types of social ordering is not form, but 
adherence to specific criteria of legality: generality, promulgation, non-
retroactivity, clarity, non-contradiction, reasonableness, constancy and 
congruence between rules and official action’.1006  
The eight criteria of morality proposed by Fuller
1007
 provide a structural framework 
where shared understandings achieved through a process of interaction and reciprocity 
are guided towards the attainment of legality. It is against these criteria of morality that 
shared understandings of the contracting parties of the Ramsar Convention on the 
obligation to conserve wetlands under Articles 2.1 and 4.1 are assessed and measured in 
the determination whether these rules, and their implicit shared understandings, are 
‘rules of international law’ in accordance with the interactional framework. 
5.3.1 Generality 
The requirement of generality is occasionally interpreted to mean ‘the law must act 
impersonally where its rules must apply to general classes and should contain no proper 
names’.1008 A requirement of generality requires that the participation in the making of 
the agreement is universal, especially if the obligation tackles a global, or at least a 
transboundary problem. Brunnée and Toope stated that – 
‘it is to ensure that all states are subject to the requirements of the convention and 
participate in the effort to develop an effective and appropriate response, even if 
                                               
1005 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 25.  
1006
 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 39 and 46 – 90. 
1007 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 46 – 91.  
1008 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 47. 
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the commitment of states under the convention is differentiated, the differentiation 
is based upon generally applicable criteria’.1009 
The Secretary-General, Mr Ban Ki-moon gave a strong assertion of the need for the 
conservation of biodiversity, and the protection of ecosystems, in order to safeguard this 
natural infrastructure that sustainably and continuously produces ecosystem services 
essential to the existence of life on Earth.
 1010
 He remarked that – 
‘Many still think the Earth is ours to use as we like. This argument betrays a 
woeful ignorance of the importance of ecosystems to our well-being as a species, 
to climate regulation, to water supplies, to food security… conserving the planet’s 
species and habitats – and the goods and services they provide – is central to 
sustainable development and the Millennium Development Goals’.1011   
The emphasis that the protection of ecosystems enables the international community to 
achieve the Millennium Development Goals makes the issue of conservation of wetland 
ecosystems and biodiversity a global issue. This is supported by the outcome of the MA 
that problems affecting key ecological systems affect the well-being of hundreds of 
millions of people.
1012
 One of the affected ecosystems is wetlands, which include rivers, 
lakes, and salt and saltwater marshes; arid land; coastal systems and tropical forests.
1013
  
In particularly, the impairment of wetland-related ecosystems function and the 
degradation of biodiversity in most major drainage basins are due to water abstraction, 
habitat loss and fragmentation, and pollution by nutrients, sediments, salts, and 
toxins.
1014
 Wetlands, a source and user of water forming part of a river basin and 
intricately connected to the freshwater ecosystems, are vital in the production of 
                                               
1009 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 178. 
1010 United Nations Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘Remarks at the High-level Event on Biodiversity’ 
(High-level Event on Biodiversity, New York, 22 September 2010) 
<http://www.un.org/apps/sg/sgstats.asp?nid=4791> accessed 20 July 2012. 
1011 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘Remarks at the High-level Event on Biodiversity’, supra n 
1010. 
1012 ‘Chapter 1. MA Conceptual Framework’ in Rashid Hassan, Robert Scholes, and Neville Ash (eds) 
Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and Trends: Findings of the Condition and Trends 
Working Group (Island Press, Washington, 2005) pp 1 – 25, at p 14 
<http://www.maweb.org/documents/document.765.aspx.pdf> accessed 20 July 2012.  
1013 Robert Scholes, Rashid Hassan, and Neville J Ash, ‘Summary: Ecosystems and Their Services around 
the Year 2000’, in Hassan, Scholes, and Ash (eds) Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and 
Trends: Findings of the Condition and Trends Working Group, supra n 1012, at p 14 
<http://www.millenniumassessment.org/documents/document.766.aspx.pdf> accessed 17 November 
2012 . 
1014 Scholes, Hassan, and Ash ‘Summary: Ecosystems and Their Services around the Year 2000’, supra n 
1013, at p 14. 
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ecosystem services that contribute towards the ‘protection, purification, retention and 
provision of water resources for water and food supplies, and played a vital role in 
groundwater recharge and flood control on which the well-being of people and their 
livelihoods depend on’.1015 
The alarming trends of degradation and deterioration of ecosystems around the globe 
exposed by the MA threaten to impair human well-being and propelled governments 
and the international community to move towards strengthening the safeguarding of 
ecosystems, in order to ensure that these ecosystems continuously and sustainably 
provide the flow of ecosystem services crucial to sustain life. This makes the 
conservation of wetlands a global issue that requires global or universal participation ‘in 
the effort to develop an effective and appropriate response even if the commitments of 
states might be differentiated’.1016  
In the determination of whether Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention satisfy 
the criterion of generality, it is necessary to look at the membership of the contracting 
parties to ensure that almost all states, if not all states, are entitled to participate in 
decision-making, especially as the conservation of wetlands is a global concern.
1017
 
Looking at the membership of the Ramsar Convention, which stands at 163 Contracting 
Parties at present, the criteria of generality can be said to be satisfied as long as all these 
contracting parties are entitled to participate in the decision-making process on matters 
related to Articles 2.1 and 4.1.  
Participation of all contracting parties to the COP established under Article 6 of the 
Ramsar Convention is stipulated in Article 7.2. It is provided that ‘each of the 
contracting parties represented at a Conference shall have one vote, recommendations, 
resolutions and decisions being adopted by a simple majority of the Contracting Parties 
present and voting’. The COP consists of voting members of –  
‘government representatives from each Contracting Parties to receive national 
reports on the preceding triennium, approve the work programme and budgetary 
arrangements for the next three years, and consider guidance for the Parties on a 
                                               
1015  Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution IX.3 Engagement of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands in 
Ongoing Multilateral Processes Dealing with Water’ (9th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) Kampala, Uganda, 8 – 15 November 2005) at p 1 paras 3 
and 13 <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_ix_03_e.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012.    
1016 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 178. 
1017 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 178. 
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range of ongoing and emerging environmental issues; and non-voting observers 
consist of representatives of non-member States, intergovernmental institutions, 
and national and international non-governmental organisation’.1018 
In view of the participation of all contracting parties in the decision-making process 
regarding the obligation to conserve wetlands as supported in the Ramsar Convention, it 
can be said that this obligation satisfies the criterion of generality. Since this obligation 
echoes a global commitment of the international community to tackle the problem of 
biodiversity degradation and the impingement of ecosystem integrity that threatens the 
sustainability of ecosystem services provisioning, the quasi-universal participation of 
states parties in the Convention can be said to have satisfied the criterion of generality 
required in the assessment of the legal legitimacy of these rules. 
5.3.2 Promulgation 
Promulgation means the publishing of the law to make it generally available, but 
subjected to the principle of marginal utility.
1019
 Fuller envisioned promulgation as the 
education of citizens in the meaning of the law that might be applied to them, 
conditioned by the principle of marginal utility.
1020
 It is important that the law is 
adequately published
1021
 because the citizen is entitled to know the laws that are 
applicable to ‘the practice of his calling’, 1022  including rules governing internal 
procedures of the Convention.
1023
 This criterion is clearly met by the Ramsar 
                                               
1018  Ramsar Convention, ‘The Conference of the Contracting Parties’ (8 December 2010) 
<http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-about-bodies-conf-conference-of-the-7690/main/ramsar/1-36-71-
72%5E7690_4000_0__> accessed 20 July 2012. See Rules 16 and 17, Ramsar Convention, ‘Rules of 
Procedure for Meetings of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Wetlands of 
International Importance especially as Waterfowl Habitat (Ramsar, Iran, 1971)’ (10th Meetings of the 
Conference of the Contracting Parties, Changwon, Republic of Korea, 29 October 2009) 
<http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-rules-rules-of-procedure-of-21056/main/ramsar/1-31-
114%5E21056_4000_0__> accessed 20 July 2012.  
1019 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 49 and 51. Fuller stated, at p 51 that ‘The requirement 
that laws be published does not rest on any such absurdity as an expectation that the dutiful citizen will sit 
down and read them all.’ 
1020 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at  p 49. 
1021 ‘Adequately published’ in this context implies that the promulgation of the law has at least induces 
one man in a hundred takes the pains to inform himself concerning the laws applicable to the practice of 
his calling’. It is said to be adequate also if the law is known by a few, and these few man who ‘take the 
pains’ of informing himself of the law set a pattern to be followed by others, and indirectly influences the 
action of many. The publication of the law is also deemed adequate if the public is able to offer criticisms. 
See Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 51.  
1022 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 51. 
1023 Refer supra n 1018. 
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Convention as the Convention text is published in various mediums, and widely 
circulated.
1024
 
5.3.3 Non-Retroactivity 
The criterion of non-retroactivity is clearly met by the Ramsar Convention where the 
obligation to conserve wetlands has no retroactive effect. Although a reservation as to 
the possible retroactive effect is raised in one of the Meetings of the Standing 
Committee,
1025
 the Convention, be it the recommendations, resolutions or decisions, has 
not been challenged on this ground. Moreover, the Ramsar Convention is still subject to 
the 1969 Vienna Convention, Article 28 of which stipulates that the provisions of a 
treaty ‘do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place or any situation 
which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty with respect to 
that party’, unless a different intention appears from the treaty established.1026 
Non-retroactivity of the Convention’s resolutions is evidenced in the recent adjustment 
to the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 for the 2013 – 2015 trienniums. The COP adopts the 
adjustments made to the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 and instructs the Secretariat to 
make these adjustments available to contracting parties and all others who are 
concerned with its implementation.
1027
 Furthermore, the resolution of the COP to urge 
the contracting parties to consider the adjustments in planning their implementation of 
the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 in the coming triennium of 2013 – 20151028 indicates that 
the adjustments do not affect previous implementation of the Strategic Plan. 
5.3.4 Clarity 
Fuller opined that the most essential ingredient of legality is the clarity of law, where 
obscure and incoherent legislation can make legality unattainable by anyone.
1029
 The 
specificity and the clarity of law depend on the nature of the problem.
1030
 The Ramsar 
Guidelines recognised that wetlands are dynamic areas, open to influence from natural 
                                               
1024 The Ramsar Convention website makes available all information relating to the Convention in its 
website, Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (undated) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-
home/main/ramsar/1_4000_0__> accessed 17 November 2012.   
1025 Agenda Item 16.7 Conference Decisions, para 257, see supra n 921. 
1026 Art 28, 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31.  
1027 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.3. Adjustment to the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 for the 2013 – 
2015 Triennium’, supra n 1000, at p 2, para 8. 
1028 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.3. Adjustment to the Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015 for the 2013 – 
2015 Triennium’, supra n 1000, at p 2, para 8. 
1029 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 63. 
1030 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 63. 
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and human factors that necessitate a dynamic and continuous management planning 
process.
1031
 Thus, the assessment of clarity for this obligation to preserve wetland 
ecosystems applies notably to the procedural provisions of the obligations, especially 
when the nature of the obligation is contingent on the availability of information, and 
relies heavily on scientific information.
1032
  
Brunnée and Toope take a similar approach in the assessment of the clarity of the ‘rules’ 
of the 1992 Convention on Climate Change, where the clarity requirement of the 
Convention is said to be satisfied through the subsequent elaboration of subsidiary rules, 
or the reference to complementary rules.
1033
  
Under the Ramsar Convention, the obligation to conserve wetlands through their 
designation as natural reserves under Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention is 
further supplemented by the 2002 New Guidelines for Management Planning for 
Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands and guided by the Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015.  
The 2002 Guidelines lay out in detail the management and planning for Ramsar sites 
and other wetlands, in satisfaction of the obligations relating to the conservation of 
wetlands and the wise use of wetlands as stipulated under Article 3 and Article 4.1 of 
the Convention,
1034
 which would inform Article 2.1 as well. 
The 2002 Guidelines provides comprehensive management guidance. The guidance 
includes general guidelines;
1035
 management approach and principles, such as the 
concept of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), Integrated River Basin 
Management (IRBM), and the integration of wetland site management within broad-
scale environmental management planning;
1036
 the recommendation of the participatory 
                                               
1031  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, paras 7 and 9. 
1032 The Ramsar Guidelines commented that ‘the management plan itself should be a technical document, 
though it may be appropriate for it to be supported by legislation and in some circumstances to be adopted 
as a legal document’. Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites 
and Other Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 8.  
1033 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 179. 
1034  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 2.  
1035  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at Part II, paras 7 – 13. 
1036  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at Part III, paras 14 – 27. 
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approach in the planning process;
1037
 and the application of the precautionary approach 
in the management of the environment.
1038
 
The management process is fully elaborated whereby pivotal stages of the management 
planning process are identified.
1039
 The assessment benchmark for the output of 
management is also explained in the 2002 Guidelines.
1040
 The 2002 Guidelines further 
recommend the framework for an adaptable management process in the planning of the 
management of wetlands;
1041
 and suggest the management units, zonation and buffer 
zones of designated wetlands.
1042
 The 2002 Guidelines even go to the extent of 
recommending a structure and content of a management plan for a Ramsar site or other 
wetland. This will assist the contracting parties to satisfy the obligations stipulated 
under Article 2.1, 3 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention, which are, the conservation of 
wetlands through a designation of wetlands as Ramsar sites, or the establishment of 
natural reserves. The 2002 Guidelines set out the contents to be included in the 
management plan, such as the preamble; the description of the site; the evaluation 
process and the evaluation criteria; the three-step preparation of measureable objectives 
of the management; the development of action plan for the management project, and its 
review procedures.
1043
 
Furthermore, the operationalisation of the 2002 Guidelines is guided by the Ramsar 
Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015, which is adjusted for the 2013 – 2015 trienniums. Five 
goals are targeted in the Strategic Plan in order to attain the mission of the Ramsar 
Convention, which is the ‘conservation and wise use of all wetlands through local and 
                                               
1037  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at Part V, paras 29 – 38. 
1038  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at Part VI, paras 39 – 40.  
1039  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 44. The stages include: (1) Identification and designation of wetlands; (2) 
Wetland assessment; (3) Wetland monitoring; (4) In situ wetland management; and (5) Ex situ  wetland 
management. 
1040  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 45 – 47. Para 47 commented that ‘the only means of judging whether or 
not inputs and outputs are adequate is by considering the outcomes of management. When this has been 
done, and only then, it will be possible to determine whether the management is appropriate’. 
1041  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at Part IX, paras 48 – 52. 
1042  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at Part X, paras 53 – 65. 
1043  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at pp 16 – 34. 
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national actions and international cooperation, as a contribution towards achieving 
sustainable development throughout the world’.1044  
With such specificity and clarity in the procedural aspect of the conservation of 
wetlands, that highlights the pivotal role of the framework for the planning and 
management of wetland sites, the obligation to conserve under Articles 2.1 and 4.1 
satisfies the clarity criterion imposed under Fuller’s legality criteria. Moreover, ‘clarity 
is more of a work that is in progress with respect to the convention’s substantive 
provisions’1045 where the open textured principles or provisions ‘serve as guideposts for 
this continuous law-making enterprise’. 1046 Thus, the progressive clarification of the 
rules on the conservation of wetlands necessary to attain legality is forged and promoted 
over time through a structured procedural framework. 
5.3.5 Non-Contradiction 
The avoidance of contradictions in law is simply one of logic
1047
 but interestingly, 
Fuller’s approach is not to pronounce that contradictory law is not law, but to seek 
reconciliation through recourse to the context and the reciprocal adjustment between the 
two contradictory laws.
1048
  
The preamble of the Ramsar Convention indicated the desire of the contracting parties 
to stem the progressive encroachment and the loss of wetlands through the conservation 
of wetlands.
1049
 Despite indicating the desire to conserve wetlands, the economic 
potential of wetlands is also acknowledged in the preamble. 
1050
 
The concepts of ‘wise use’ and ‘conservation’ seem to be contradictory from the outset. 
The preamble recognised the interdependence of humans on their environment and in 
consideration of the fundamental ecological functions wetlands possess, which lead the 
contracting parties to be desirous of stemming the progressive encroachment on, and the 
                                               
1044  The five goals are: (1) Wise use; (2) Wetlands of International Importance; (3) International 
cooperation; (4) Institutional capacity and effectiveness; and (5) Membership Ramsar Convention, ‘The 
Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at pp 5 and 6. Separate strategies are developed under 
each goal that itemised, and detailed the steps to be undertaken in the attainment of these Goals.  
1045 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, p 180. 
1046 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, p 181. 
1047 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 65 – 66. 
1048
 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 68 – 69. 
1049 Preambular Paragraphs 4 and 5, Preamble, Ramsar Convention, supra n 13. 
1050 Preambular Paragraph 3, Preamble, Ramsar Convention, supra n 13. 
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loss of wetlands through conservation in order to prevent the irreparable loss of a 
resource of great economic, cultural, scientific and recreational value.  
In recognition of the apparently inconsistent rules, the Convention makes some 
reciprocal adjustment in reference to the context representative of the institutional 
setting of the contradiction. The interpretation of ‘wise use’ is updated, taking into 
account the Convention’s mission statement, the MA’s terminology, the concept of the 
ecosystem approach and sustainable use applied by the Biological Convention, and the 
definition of sustainable development adopted by the 1987 Brundtland Commission.
1051
 
The ‘wise use’ concept indicates that the utilisation of the ‘natural productivity and 
biodiversity at a site’ is permitted ‘as long as the basic ecological functioning of the 
wetland is not disturbed’.1052 The updated definition is ‘wise use of wetlands is the 
maintenance of their ecological character, achieved through the implementation of 
ecosystem approaches, within the context of sustainable development’.1053  
The adjustment made to the concept of ‘conservation’ is more subtle, where the Ramsar 
Convention decided that in order to maintain the biodiversity and productivity of the 
wetlands (i.e., their ‘ecological character’ as defined by the Convention) while 
permitting the wise use of their resources, ‘an overall agreement is essential between the 
various managers, occupiers and other stakeholders’. 1054 However, conservation still 
lies at the heart of the Convention, where Strategy 2.1.iii stipulated that, in order to 
attain Goal 2 laid out in the 3
rd
 Strategic Plan of developing and maintaining an 
international network of wetlands, at least 2500 Ramsar sites covering at least 250 
million hectares is targeted to be designated by 2015.
1055
 It is noted by the COP, in the 
elaboration of the phrase ‘in the context of sustainable development’ in the updated 
definition of ‘wise use’, there is a qualification that – 
                                               
1051  Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution IX.1 Annex A. A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of 
Wetlands and the Maintenance of Their Ecological Character’, supra n 422, at para 22. 
1052  Michael Smart, ‘Chapter 2 The Ramsar Convention: Its Role in Conservation and Wise Use of 
Wetland Biodiversity’ in AJ Hails (ed) Wetlands, Biodiversity and Ramsar Convention: The Role of the 
Convention on Wetlands in the conservation and Wise Use of Biodiversity (Ramsar Convention Bureau, 
Gland Switzerland, 1997) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-documents-cops-cop8-wetlands-
biodiversity-21181/main/ramsar/1-31-58-128%5E21181_4000_0__#c2> accessed 11 August 2012. 
1053  Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution IX.1 Annex A. A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of 
Wetlands and the Maintenance of Their Ecological Character’, supra n 422, at para 22. 
1054
 Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 7. 
1055 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 10. 
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 ‘although it is recognized that whilst some wetland development is inevitable and 
that many developments have important benefits to society, developments can be 
facilitated in sustainable ways by approaches elaborated under the Convention, 
and it is not appropriate to imply that “development” is an objective for every 
wetland’.1056 
Potential contradictions between the Ramsar Convention and other MEAs that relate to 
biodiversity or other ecosystems, are addressed through mutually supportive 
collaboration as affirmed in Ramsar resolutions,
1057
 and supported through Goal 3 of the 
3
rd
 Strategic Plan. The 3
rd
 Strategic Plan aims to enhance the conservation and wise use 
of wetlands using effective international cooperation. Strategy 3.1 promotes the forging 
of synergies and partnerships with international and regional MEAs and other 
intergovernmental agencies, especially through the harmonisation of information 
management and reporting systems.
1058
 
In the current climate of the fragmentation of international law on the environment, the 
possibility of contradictions on the obligation to conserve biodiversity and ecosystems 
is high. However, these laws should not be pronounced non-law,
1059
 but should be read 
in light of each other to seek conciliation through a variety of legal techniques, 
including principles of harmonisation, systemic integration and mutual supportiveness.
 
 
5.3.6 Law Not Requiring the Impossible – Reasonableness  
A law that is ‘impossible’ is limited by its own absurdity where the subject is expected 
to brace himself to jump in any direction, since the ‘pointlessness’ of an absurd law 
                                               
1056  Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution IX.1 Annex A. A Conceptual Framework for the Wise Use of 
Wetlands and the Maintenance of their Ecological Character’, supra n 422, at p 7, fn 3. 
1057 These resolutions are Resolutions VII.4 (1999), VIII.5 (2002), IX.5 (2005) and X.11 (2008). Ramsar 
Convention, ‘Resolution XI.6. Partnerships and Synergies with Multilateral Environmental Agreements 
and other Institutions’ (11th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands 
(Ramsar, Iran, 1971) Bucharest, Romania, 6 – 13 July 2012) 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/cop11/res/cop11-res06-e.pdf> accessed 31 July 2012, at p 1, para 1. 
1058 Such collaborations, however, is conservative, as they are still subjected to the independence of the 
mandates embodied in each convention. Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.6. Partnerships and 
Synergies with Multilateral Environmental Agreements and other Institutions’, supra n 1057, at p 1, para 
1. 
1059 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 68 – 69. However, Fuller acknowledged the difficulty 
in such endeavour where ‘one would be to know where to stop, for the courts might easily find 
themselves embarked on the perilous adventure of attempting to remake the entire body of our statutory 
law into a more coherent whole. The reinterpretation of old statues in the light of new would also present 
embarrassing problems of retrospective legislation’. See also Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 182. 
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commands ‘nothing that may not be demanded of him’.1060 The criterion that law should 
not command the impossible rises from the justification that there is a need to guide the 
purposive human effort away from an exercise in logical entailment.
1061
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the study into the impossibility of law is two-pronged: firstly, 
the inquiry into the difference between aspirational language of a law; and secondly, the 
fine line between extreme difficulty and impossibility. There is a blurred distinction 
between vigorous exhortation and imposed duty. This is exceptionally true in the 
current trend of international environmental law making, where provisions are mostly 
aspirational instead of requiring the impossible.
1062
 
In the context of the obligation to conserve wetlands under the Ramsar Convention, the 
status of sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of International Importance is an 
illustration of whether the obligation placed under Articles 2.1 and 4.1 are ‘impossible’. 
The issue of reasonableness is raised in Resolution X.13 where the COP discusses the 
reasons for the failure to achieve the quantitative and qualitative target set in Resolution 
VII.11 (1999).
1063
  
According to Resolution X.13, there is an increase of more than 25% in the total area 
designated since COP 9, with a total of 1,822 sites designated as of 4 November 2008 
(for COP in 2009), although the increase falls below the targeted 2,000 sites set in 
Resolution VII.11 (1999); and 2,500 set by the year 2010.
1064
   
It is noted that there remain significant gaps in the comprehensiveness and 
representativeness of the global network of sites, where concerns are expressed for the 
                                               
1060 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 71. 
1061 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 70. 
1062 Ellis and FitzGerald, ‘The Precautionary Principle in International Law’, supra n 814, at p 790. In pp 
790 – 791, Ellis and FitzGerald outlined a variety of possible circumstances where the precautionary 
principle might be deemed ‘impossible’. Concern is not placed on laws that require patently impossible 
acts that are absurd, but laws that place a very high burden on the subjects, perhaps in the hope that such 
aspirational imposition of duty contribute towards a positive outcome, short of the actual attainment of 
the desirable goal. Such possible circumstances include an exorbitant price and an impossibly onerous 
duty that rendered an action or the achievement of the rule unviable. Another possible circumstance arises 
in the case of strict liability where the rule prohibits an activity in order to avoid a particular harm that the 
actor cannot reasonably know that it will lead to such harm. 
1063  Ramsar Convention. ‘Resolution X.13. The Status of Sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance’ (10th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands 
(Ramsar, Iran, 1971) Changwon, Republic of Korea, 28 October – 4 November 2008) at para 4 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_x_13_e.pdf> accessed 21 July 2012. 
1064  Ramsar Convention. ‘Resolution X.13. The Status of Sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance’, supra n 1063, at para 4. As it currently stands in 2012, the total sites 
designated for the List of Wetlands is 2,062, which falls below the targeted 2,500 sites established in the 
Ramsar Strategic Framework and Guidelines for the Development of the Ramsar List (2005).  
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lack of RIS and the lack of adequate maps that are supplied to the Secretariat so that 
information on the current status of 58% of the Ramsar sites are not available.
1065
 
Furthermore, of all the 56 Ramsar sites included in the Montreux Record, only three 
sites have been removed from the Record since COP 9, excluding the application for 
removal of six sites from five contracting parties that is currently under review by the 
Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP).
1066
 
However, this does not mean that the obligation to conserve wetlands is impossible and 
that the obligation does not attain legality. There is no hard and fast line to be drawn 
between a rule that can be achieved with extreme difficulty and a rule that is 
impossible.
1067
 Some rules, especially in the field of the environment, are set in the hope 
that such aspirational imposition of duty contributes towards a positive outcome, short 
of the actual attainment of the desirable goal.
1068
 Fuller’s observation in this matter was 
that ‘between the two (extreme difficulty and impossibility) is an indeterminate area in 
which the internal morality that requires a law that is not asking the impossible and 
external moralities of what is fair and just’,1069 which necessitates an assessment on a 
case-by-case basis. 
In the present context, the assessment of the obligation to conserve under the Ramsar 
Convention against the reasonableness criterion is similar to the assessment against the 
criterion of clarity in which the clarity requirement of the Convention can be satisfied 
through the subsequent elaboration of subsidiary rules, the reference to complementary 
rules, and the progressive clarification through a procedural structure.  
For the obligation to conserve wetlands under the Ramsar Convention, despite not 
meeting the targets laid down in year 2005 by Resolution VII.11 (1999), which is a 
designation of 2,500 sites by year 2010, various efforts have been undertaken by 
contracting parties by undertaking the necessary procedural means in their bid to fulfil 
their obligation to conserve wetlands.
1070
 The COP, in recognising that the pressure on 
                                               
1065  Ramsar Convention. ‘Resolution X.13. The Status of Sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance’, supra n 1063, at paras 4 and 5. 
1066  Ramsar Convention. ‘Resolution X.13. The Status of Sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance’, supra n 1063, at para 9.  
1067 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 79. 
1068 Ellis and FitzGerald, ‘The Precautionary Principle in International Law’, supra n 814, at p 790. 
1069 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 79.  
1070
 Ramsar Convention. ‘Resolution X.13. The Status of Sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance’, supra n 1063, at paras10. For example, in paras 20 and 21, it is mentioned that 
18 Contracting Parties have provided reports fully in accordance with Art 3.2 of the Convention, and 
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Ramsar wetland sites will be likely to increase (where many sites have undergone or are 
undergoing change in their ecological character, or are likely to undergo such change), 
reaffirms the commitment made in Resolution VIII.8 to implement fully the terms of 
Article 3.2 of the Convention. It continues to encourage the adoption and application of 
a suitable monitoring and assessment regime as part of the management planning for 
Ramsar sites and other wetlands.
1071
 
The non-satisfaction of the obligation might potentially be due to a lack of capacity, 
where gradual capacity building will resolve the issue.
1072
 The need to strengthen 
capacity building is remarked in the Standing Committee where it is stated that ‘there is 
an urgent need to strengthen capacity for the Convention’s implementation by the 
contracting parties at all levels’. 1073  As capacity improves, and the procedural 
obligations necessary to attain the ultimate goal of the designation of wetlands as 
natural reserves for conservation purposes are closely observed, the rule that requires 
the conservation of wetlands will become less aspirational, less impossible, and more 
inclined towards the legal-norms end of the social norms-legal norms continuum. 
5.3.7 Constancy 
The adverse impact of a continuous global rise of greenhouse gases emissions has 
caused persistent drought and extreme weather events, sea-level rise, coastal erosion, 
and ocean acidification that further threaten food security.
1074
 The uncertainty of the 
impacts of climate change, where the ‘contours and urgency’1075 of the problem is not 
fully understood, makes it difficult or even impossible to predict commitments that stay 
constant. Brunnée and Toope adapt the criterion of constancy by suggesting that in light 
of such uncertainty, the satisfaction of the requirement of constancy must necessarily 
                                                                                                                                         
another 21 Contracting Parties have provided information in their National Reports where human-induced 
changes in ecological character have occurred, are occurring or may occur. In para 30, the COP 
mentioned that there are Contracting Parties who have brought their Information Sheets for Ramsar 
Wetlands (RISs) up to date for all Ramsar sites within their territory. 
1071  Ramsar Convention. ‘Resolution X.13. The Status of Sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance’, supra n 1063, at paras 17 and 18.  
1072 See Ramsar Convention. ‘Resolution X.13. The Status of Sites in the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance’, supra n 1063, at para 8. It is recalled, at p 2, para 8 that the Contracting Parties 
expressed their concern in Resolution VIII.8 (2002) that many of the Parties do not have in place the 
mechanisms to fulfil Article 3.2. 
1073 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Chairperson of the Standing Committee’ (11th Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) Bucharest, Romania, 6 – 
13 July 2012) at p 9, para 56 <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/cop11/doc/cop11-doc05-e-sc.pdf> accessed 22 
July 2012.  
1074 The Future We Want, supra n 59, at para 190. 
1075 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 183. 
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ensure that at least the decision-making rules and the law-making processes are 
transparent and predictable.
1076
  
Article 3.1 imposes the obligation to formulate and implement management planning 
that promotes the conservation of wetlands included in the List, whereas for non-Listed 
wetland natural reserves, Article 4.1 requires that conservation of wetlands is to be 
promoted by establishing nature reserves and provide adequately for their wardening. 
The 2002 Guidelines provides that the safeguarding and management of wetland sites 
and their ecological character adopt a flexible approach that allows managers to 
‘respond to the legitimate interest of stakeholders, and permits adaptation to the 
changing political climate, uncertain and variable resources, and survive the vagaries of 
the natural world’.1077  
The adaptive management plan recommended by the 2002 Guidelines encapsulates a 
management planning process that provides a mechanism to achieve an overall 
agreement between various managers, owners, occupiers and other stakeholders in the 
maintenance of ecological character and wise use of wetland’s resources by people.1078 
At the same time, the management plan enables the management planning process to 
learn through experience; to take account of and respond to changing factors that affect 
the features; to continuously develop and refine the management processes; and to 
demonstrate that management is appropriate and effective.
1079
 
The 2002 Guidelines recommend the format of the management plan – an essentially 
technical document that may be appropriate to be supported by legislation or to be 
adopted as a legal document.
1080
 The management plan forms part of a dynamic and 
continuous management planning process, where the plan will be kept under review and 
will be adjusted where appropriate in order to take into account the monitoring process, 
changing priorities, and emerging issues.
1081
 
                                               
1076 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 183. 
1077  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 48.  
1078  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at p 2, para 7.  
1079  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at p 2, at p 13, para 52.  
1080  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at p 2, para 8.  
1081  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at p 2, para 9.  
243 
 
The 2002 Guidelines and the recommended management plan, guided by the 3
rd
 
Strategic Plan where 17 strategies are developed to guide the achievement of the 2
nd
 
Goal of developing and maintaining an international network of wetlands, and to ensure 
transparency and predictability in decision-making and law-making processes. Against 
the background of a rapidly changing environment, where feasibility can only be 
ensured if commitments are constantly negotiated in respond to changes, the procedural 
framework (as exhibited in the 2002 Guidelines) and the 3
rd
 Strategic Plan, which are 
adopted and applied by the contracting parties in their fulfilment of their obligation to 
conserve under Articles 2.1 and 4.1, go as far as they can to satisfy the criterion of 
constancy. 
5.3.8 Congruence between Official Action and Declared Rules – the Observation 
of the Rule of Law 
Congruence denotes the consistent application of the law by the officials charged with 
its administration.
1082
 In the context of the Ramsar Convention, the ‘officials charged 
with its administration’ are primarily, the state parties who are party to these treaties. 
Other states and non-state actors, not party to the Convention but who nonetheless 
observe and apply the provisions of the treaties, participate in the making of law and by 
virtue of their implementation continued to develop the law, should also be considered 
to be ‘officials charged with its administration’ for the assessment of the criterion of 
congruence.
1083
 This is because the conservation of wetlands and the safeguarding of 
biodiversity, are global concerns.
1084
  
The 2012 Report of the Secretary General on the implementation of the Convention at 
the global level shows the progress and achievements of the parties since COP 10 on 
key challenges and implementation priorities. The progress and achievements include 
increased of membership from 158 Contracting Parties to 160; from 1,758 Ramsar Sites 
to 2,006; from 161.3 million hectares of Ramsar Sites to 192.8 million hectares; and 
                                               
1082 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 81 – 91. See Krisch, ‘Review of Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law’, supra n 828, at p 206.  
1083 This is reflected in the multilateralisation of international law-making in environmental treaty regimes, 
as discussed in Section 4.5 of this thesis. It is explicit in the Ramsar Convention that the COP provides a 
multilateral platform for the deliberation of all matters concerning the review and the implementation of 
the Convention where it the representation in COP of persons who are experts on wetlands or waterfowl 
in scientific, administrative or other appropriate capacities, are permissible. See Ramsar Convention, Art 
7.1. 
1084 Refer to Chapter 4, Section 4.5 on the implications of the multilateralisation of law-making in the 
international legal order in strengthening international consensus. 
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increased worldwide recognition of the role of wetlands in conservation and sustainable 
development, with particular emphasis on the provisioning, supporting, and regulating 
ecosystem services provided by wetlands.
1085
 
It is emphasised repeatedly that the satisfaction of procedural obligations that gear the 
contracting parties towards their satisfaction of substantive obligations indicates the 
commitments of the contracting parties in the satisfaction of their obligations under the 
Convention. For COP 11, there were 127 reports submitted on time, another 11 reports 
received after the deadline, for a return rate of 86%.
1086
 Ninety contracting parties have 
fully met their reporting obligation since COP 8, where annual reports of the Regional 
Initiatives and the Ramsar Sites Information Service database are the other sources of 
data used in their report.
1087
 The reporting procedure is important in fulfilling the 
obligation to conserve wetlands, as outlined in Goal 2 of the 3
rd
 Strategic Plan, where 
the contracting parties are required to complete and update as appropriate, RIS that were 
submitted for all Ramsar sites.
1088
 It is reiterated in the Secretary General’s report that 
accurate information is helpful to track the progress made, the difficulties encountered, 
and possible areas of improvement.
1089
  
The Secretary General’s report deals more specifically with the achievements attained 
for Goal 2 of the 3
rd
 Strategic Plan.
1090
 All contracting parties have together designated 
248 additional sites covering 31.5 millions of hectares since COP 10.
1091
 According to 
the data provided in the National Reports, Ramsar sites are in a better condition than 
wetlands in general, where deterioration in the condition is reported compared to the 
condition of other wetlands.
1092
 
                                               
1085 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’ (Ramsar COP 11 DOC.7, 11th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971) Bucharest, Romania, 6 – 13 July 2012) at p 2, para 5 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/cop11/doc/cop11-doc07-e-sg.pdf> accessed 22 July 2012. 
1086 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p 2, para 5 
1087 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p 7, para 52. 
1088 Strategy 2.1.ii, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 10. 
1089 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p 7, para 52. 
1090 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at pp 17 – 20.  
1091 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p 17, para 63.  
1092 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p17 and 18, para 64.  
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Effective management planning in place is crucial for the conservation of wetlands. The 
number of sites with management is increasing. However, much effort needs to be 
undertaken as only 59% of the contracting parties who have a management plan in place, 
and even then only 92% of these are being implemented, and 32% of them being 
revised or updated.
1093
 However, it is further stated that there is a need for more support 
in terms of management plan, especially in the Africa region.
1094
 
An assessment of the actions undertaken by the contracting parties reveals that in 
general, there is congruence between the obligation to conserve wetlands and the 
application of the obligation. Designation of sites has largely increased, whereby the 
condition of designated sites has showed less deterioration, more stability, and in some 
cases, improvements. Moreover, the commitment of the contracting parties to fulfil their 
obligations to conserve under the Convention is apparent in the adoption of the  
Guidelines and Strategic Plans that direct the implementation of their obligations under 
the Convention. The procedural requirements to report, monitor, and establish 
management plans for Ramsar sites are strongly encouraged by the Convention and 
upheld by the treaty practice of a substantial majority of contracting parties, indicating a 
general congruence of the administration of the obligation to conserve, with the 
obligation itself.
1095
 
The efforts undertaken by the contracting parties in the fulfilment of the obligation to 
conserve, which forms one of the two main pillars of the Ramsar Convention, shows 
that there is a strong congruence between official action and declared rules where the 
rule of law is observed. 
In summary, the eight criteria of morality provide a structural framework positioned in 
the overall framework of an interactional understanding of law, where shared 
understandings are guided towards the attainment of legality and shape the generation of 
                                               
1093 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p17 and 18, para 66. 
1094 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p17 and 18, para 66. 
1095 The commitments of the Contracting Parties to improved compliance of their obligation under the 
Ramsar Convention is affirmed in Resolution VIII.24 where challenges that hinders compliance are raised 
and addressed. Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution VIII.24. UNEP’s Guidelines for Enhancing Compliance 
with Multilateral Environmental Agreements, and Guidelines for National Enforcement, and International 
Cooperation in Combating Violations, of Laws Implementing Multilateral Environmental Agreements’ 
(8
th
 Meeting of the Conference of the Contracting Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 
1971) Valencia, Spain, 18 – 26 November 2002) <http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/res/key_res_viii_24_e.pdf> 
23 July 2012.  
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shared legal understanding. Shared legal understandings emerge through the dynamic 
relationship of an interactive process instead of the mere discovery of rules through 
static sources. 
The obligation to conserve wetlands provided under Articles 2.1 and 4.1, supported by 
the Convention’s procedural requirements for the achievement of this substantive 
obligations measures up to the requirements of legality. The clarity of the obligation and 
the congruence of practice with the rule are constantly developed as the capacity of the 
contracting parties improves, and when the underlying normative understandings 
flourish through continuous practice. 
5.4 A Practice of Legality (Norm Application) 
The vigour of law is upheld through the constant effort to support it. The shared legal 
understandings generated through robust interactions and reciprocity between 
lawmakers and subjects, nourished by the implicit rules of the broader background 
understandings, must be maintained through a practice of legality.
1096
 A practice of 
legality is built up through reasoned dialogue (the horizontal congruence through 
interaction and reasoning through law) and reciprocity (vertical congruence), where a 
broader base of shared legal understandings is developed via interactions that adhere to 
the requirements of legality.
1097
 It is a distinctive type of interaction performed by ‘a 
joint enterprise of members that shares collective understandings, directing and 
rationalising their conducts for them’.1098  
A practice of legality is said to exist when norm creation meets the criteria of legality 
and is matched with norm applications that also satisfy the legality requirements. It 
must not be an isolated act, but a plurality or a series of actions or conduct of mutual 
engagement. The present assessment in the context of this research is whether the 
obligation to conserve wetlands has developed into a practice of legality. 
 It is shown in the discussion of the criteria of legality that the membership of the 
Ramsar Convention stands at 163 Contracting Parties, with a designation of 2,062 
Ramsar sites under the List of Wetlands of International Importance that covers a total 
                                               
1096
 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 80 – 81.  
1097 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 72.  
1098 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, p 45.  
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surface area of 197,258,568 hectares.
1099
 The recent COP 11 reveals that 55 contracting 
parties have designated a total of 217 Ramsar sites, an increase of 10% covering a total 
of 14,679,990 hectares as of 13 July 2012 since the close of COP 10 (4 November 
2008).
1100
  
It is noted that the satisfaction of the procedural requirements of the Ramsar Convention 
is important in the fulfilment of its substantive obligations. Apart from the measurement 
of whether there is an increase in the designation of wetlands as Ramsar sites by the 
contracting parties, whether the contracting parties satisfy the relevant procedural 
requirements will be the yardstick in the assessment of whether there is an existence of 
a practice of legality for the obligation to conserve wetlands. The practice of the 
contracting parties is commented on in the most recent Resolution for COP 11. The 
Resolution noted that there still remain significant gaps in the comprehensiveness and 
representativeness of the global network of Ramsar sites. In addition, the total of 2,026 
sites falls below the target of 2,500 sites by the year 2010 that the contracting parties 
had established in the Strategic Framework and Guidelines for the Development of the 
Ramsar List (2005).
1101
 Concern was raised for 1,385 Ramsar sites in 149 countries, 
where their status of their Ramsar sites are not available.
1102
 
Many contracting parties do not have in place the mechanisms to fulfil Article 3.2. In 
many instances, the reports first received by the Secretariat of Ramsar sites facing 
human-induced change or likely change in their ecological character come from third 
parties under Article 8.2(d).
1103
 Twelve contracting parties provided information only in 
their National Reports to COP 11, rather than reporting the matter immediately in 
                                               
1099  Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Convention on Wetlands’ (undated) 
<http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-home/main/ramsar/1_4000_0__> accessed 7 November 2012.  
1100 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’ (11th Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 
1971) Bucharest, Romania, 6 – 13 July 2012) at p 1, para 3. 
<http://www.ramsar.org/pdf/cop11/res/cop11-res04-e.pdf> accessed 31 October 2012. The statistics 
might differ from the statistics stated in Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the 
Implementation of the Convention at the Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p 2, para 5. However, in order to 
remain faithful to the different sources cited, the slight variations of statistics are maintained. 
1101 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’, supra n 1100, at p 2, para 4..  
1102 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’, supra n 1100, at p 2, para 5. The non-availability of current status arises where RIS or 
adequate maps have not been provided or updated for more than six years. 
1103 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’, supra n 1100, at p 2, paras 8 and 10. 
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accordance with Article 3.2 of the Convention, which indicates that the obligation under 
Article 3.2 is not satisfactory.
1104
  
The Resolution on the status of Ramsar sites reaffirmed the commitment made by the 
parties to implement the terms of Article 3.2 fully and continue to adopt and apply 
suitable monitoring regimes as part of their management planning for Ramsar sites.
1105
 
Various efforts are undertaken under the Ramsar Convention to assist the contracting 
parties in performing their obligations. The Ramsar Secretariat and the STRP are asked 
to set up criteria for the streamlining of the procedure for reporting cases of human-
induced negative changes in the ecological character of a Ramsar site in accordance 
with Article 3.2, and to streamline and combine the lists of Article 3.2 cases with the 
Montreux Record.
1106
 Apart from that, the Ramsar Convention continues to strengthen 
the capacity of the contracting parties, where the STRP was requested to display 
specific examples of the efforts by contracting parties to develop and implement a 
strategic approach to Ramsar site nomination.
1107
 
It can be shown that a community of practice that undertakes the practice of legality on 
the shared legal understanding to conserve wetlands in accordance with Articles 2.1 and 
4.1 of the Ramsar Convention has emerged, where there is a gradual increase of the 
designation of wetlands for the purpose of conservation. The practice of legality for this 
rule is rooted in the satisfaction of the procedural obligations provided under the 
Convention, as informed by the 3
rd
 Strategic Plan. The 3
rd
 Strategic Plan outlined key 
strategies to guide the contracting parties in achieving their obligation to conserve 
wetlands of international importance,
1108
 which has gradually yielded tangible results, 
evidenced in the increase of total areas of wetlands conserved, and the decreased 
deterioration and increased stabilisation of these wetlands.
1109
 
                                               
1104 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’, supra n 1100, at p 2, para 9. 
1105 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’, supra n 1100, at p 3, paras 14 and 15. 
1106 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’, supra n 1100, at p 4, paras 21and 22. 
1107 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance’, supra n 1100, at p 4, para 23. 
1108
 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at pp 10 – 12. 
1109 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, pp 17 – 18, para 64. 
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In general, the shared understanding arrived at by the contracting parties of the Ramsar 
Convention pertaining to the obligation to conserve is evidenced in Articles 2.1 and 4.1 
of the Convention. That is, the contracting parties shall designate suitable wetlands in 
their territory in a List of Wetlands of International Importance, and shall formulate and 
implement their planning in order to promote the conservation and wise use of the 
Listed wetlands. Even if wetlands are not listed, the Contracting Parties undertake to 
promote the conservation of these wetlands through the establishment of nature reserves. 
The shared understanding on the interpretation of the obligation to conserve wetlands is 
summarised in the Ramsar Convention Manual.
1110
 The detailed content for the 
obligation to conserve, via the commitments to designate and formulate plans for the 
conservation of wetlands within the territory of the contracting parties in the List, and 
the establishment of nature reserves on non-Listed wetlands are elaborated through 
guidelines and strategic plans adopted by the contracting parties in its triennium COP.  
The recent 2009 – 2015 Strategic Plan expressly confirmed that the strategies developed 
in the Strategic Plan are representative of the general consensus of the most priorities 
for most parties. This general consensus arrived at by the contracting parties 
demonstrates the applicability of the rule of international law on the obligation to 
conserve enshrined in the Ramsar Convention on its 162 Contracting Parties.
1111
 
The COP recommended and adopted various procedural means to achieve the short term 
and long-term target of the Convention. The short-term target is to conserve at least 
2,500 sites covering 250 million hectares that suitably represents each wetland type 
found within each biogeographic region.
1112
 The target itself, which could be said to be 
a morality of aspiration (as opposed to a morality of aspiration), might not form part of 
the normative content of Articles 2.1 and 4.1, but the procedural mechanisms impose on 
                                               
1110 The conservation of wetlands necessitates the use of Ramsar criteria for the identification of wetlands 
of international importance; the making of national wetland inventories that will identify major sites for 
wetland biodiversity; the designation of wetlands in the List of Wetlands of International Importance; the 
formulation and implementation of planning that promotes the conservation of Listed sites; the use of 
Ramsar datasheet and classification and description system; and the establishment of nature reserves on 
wetlands and the provision of adequate wardening. Ramsar Convention Secretariat, The Ramsar 
Convention Manual: A Guide to the Convention on Wetlands, supra n 416 at p 15. The shared 
understanding can be found in the interpretation of the responsibilities of the Contracting Parties in 
Resolution 5.1 of the Conference of the Parties (1993) that adopts the Framework for the implementation 
of the Ramsar Convention.  
1111 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 2, para 7. For the 
current statistics on the number of contracting parties and Listed sites, see supra n 1099.  
1112 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at pp 5 and 17, paras 
21 and 65. 
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the contracting parties in assisting their effort to fulfil their conservation obligation 
forms part of the normative content of Articles 2.1 and 4.1.  
The satisfaction and compliance of their obligation to conserve are measured against 
whether the contracting parties submit their national reports on time; or whether the 
contracting parties have fully meet their reporting obligations, especially in updating 
their Regional Initiatives and the Ramsar Site Information Service database through 
submission of RIS.
1113
 Moreover, assessment of compliance is measured against the 
satisfaction of strategies under the 3
rd
 Strategic Plan, especially in the designation of 
Ramsar sites and the formulation of management plans for designated sites.
1114
 
The 2002 and 2009 Guidelines, and guided by the constantly revised strategic plans, 
provide extremely comprehensive instructions in assisting the contracting parties in 
their implementation of their obligation under the Convention to conserve wetlands. 
The active furnishing of implementation guidance illustrates the intention of the 
contracting parties to strengthen the implementation of their obligations under the 
Convention, which evidenced the commitments of the contracting parties that the shared 
understandings arrived at are intended to be legal. The obligation to conserve itself is 
general, promulgated, non-retroactive, non-contradictory, and not unreasonable. The 
clarity of these rules will be gradually developed through an adaptive, cyclical 
management process resulted from the application of clear procedural rules. The 
constancy of both the substantive and procedural rules (output) will evolve in response 
to the feedback (outcomes) resulting from the act of management intervention (input) 
executed.
1115
 The congruence between the contracting parties and the declared rules is 
dependent on the capacity of the contracting parties, which the Convention has been 
striving to assist and support.
1116
 
                                               
1113 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at pp 2 and 7, paras 5 and 52,  
1114 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p17 and 18, paras 64 and 66. 
1115 For an elaboration of the definition of input and output, and the subsequent outcomes, see Ramsar 
Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’, supra n 
921, at pp 11 – 12.  
1116 Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the Implementation of the Convention at the 
Global Level’, supra n 1085, at p17 and 18, para 66. See also Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The 
Status of Sites on the List of Wetlands of International Importance’, supra n 1100, at pp 3 and 4, paras 14, 
15 and 21, 22 and 23. The Resolution on the status of Ramsar sites reaffirmed the commitment made by 
the parties to implement the terms of Article 3.2 fully (para 14) and continue to adopt and apply suitable 
monitoring regime as part of their management planning for Ramsar sites (para 15). Various efforts are 
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As presented in the explanation in the foregoing sections, it is clearly shown that the 
shared understandings of the parties on their commitments to conserve wetlands are 
supported by the practice of legality.
1117
 The contracting parties are relatively steadfast 
in the undertaking of a practice of legality on their obligation to conserve under the 
Convention.
1118
 As capacity grows, the practice of legality will be more robust.
 1119
   
5.5 ‘Applicable in the Relations between the Parties’ 
In the interpretation that incorporates external rules of international law that are relevant, 
it is important to identify the content of the rules that is to be taken into account in the 
interpretative process. It has been established that what is ‘applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ depends on the particular rules of international law. An 
interactional perspective in the analysis of the rule reveals not only the content of the 
rule, but also the ‘applicability’ of the rule on ‘the parties’, as the ‘applicability’ of the 
rule constitutes part of the shared legal understanding arrived at by the parties. The 
shared legal understandings attained through the interactional process by the members 
engaged in the practice of legality determine whether the rules are applicable to them. 
This approach is supported by the context of the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention 
and the writing of eminent scholars that the phrase ‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) does 
not require that the parties to the interpreted treaty must be a party to the external treaty 
as long as the external rule –  
‘can be said to be implicitly accepted or tolerated by all parties to the treaty under 
interpretation in the sense that it can reasonably be considered to express the 
                                                                                                                                         
undertaken by the Convention to assist the Contracting Parties in performing their obligations. The 
Ramsar Secretariat and the Scientific and Technical Review Panel (STRP) are asked to set up criteria for 
the streamlining of the procedure for reporting cases of human-induced negative changes in the ecological 
character of a Ramsar site in accordance with Art 3.2 (para 21), and to streamline and combine the lists of 
Art 3.2 cases with the Montreux Record (para 22). Apart from that, the Convention continued to 
strengthen the capacity of the Contracting Parties where the STRP was requested to showcase specific 
examples of the efforts by Contracting Parties to develop and implement a strategic approach to Ramsar 
site designation (para 23). 
1117  The Ramsar Convention has 163 Contracting Parties with a designation of 2,062 Ramsar sites 
covering a total surface area of 197,259,908 hectares. See Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Convention 
on Wetlands’ (undated) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-home/main/ramsar/1_4000_0__> 
accessed 17 November 2012. 
1118 COP 11 indicates an upward trend in the conservation of wetlands under the List where there is an 
increase of 10% of designated Ramsar sites in the List since the close of COP 10 (4 November 2008) with 
a total area of 14,679,990 hectares.  Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution XI.4. The Status of Sites on the List 
of Wetlands of International Importance’, supra n 1100, at pp 1 and 2, paras 3 and 4.  
1119
 This is demonstrated through an 86% return rate of national reports, with 90 Parties fully meeting 
their reporting obligation. See Ramsar Convention, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the 
Implementation of the Convention at the Global Level’, supra n 1085, at pp 2 and 7, paras 5 and 52. 
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common intentions or understanding of all members as to the meaning of the term 
concerned’.1120 
The meaning that is ‘implicitly accepted or tolerated by all parties that can be 
considered to express common intentions or understandings of all members’ 1121  is 
reflected in the shared understanding of the parties involved in the enterprise of law-
making. The members who participate in the interactional process will be ‘the parties’ 
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c).  
The parties refer to the 163 contracting parties of the Ramsar Convention. The rules 
relevant to the preservation of ecosystems of international watercourses are the 
obligation to conserve as provided under Articles 2.1 and 4.1. The shared legal 
understandings of the Contracting Parties pertaining to the rule, and undertaken in their 
practice of legality, are to implement all necessary procedural obligations to achieve the 
short-term and long-term target of the Convention to designate 2,500 Ramsar sites that 
are representative of the wetland type of the biogeographic region.  The procedural 
obligations required to achieve their shared legal understandings are –  
(1) the identification and designation of wetlands;  
(2) the assessment of wetlands; 
(3) the monitoring of wetlands; 
(4) the management of wetlands.1122 
What is ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ is not just a general stipulation 
to conserve, but the satisfaction of the procedural obligations intrinsic to the obligation 
to conserve, which are enumerated above. The accepted meaning of the rules that 
impose the obligation to conserve and are reasonably considered to express the common 
intentions or understanding of the Contracting Parties are the duty to identify and 
designate future wetlands into the List, to ensure the continuous assessment and 
monitoring of these wetlands, and to provide the appropriate management planning 
                                               
1120 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at pp 314 – 315. Pauwelyn, Conflict 
of Norms in Public International Law, supra n 100, at pp 257 – 263.  
1121 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at pp 314 – 315. 
1122  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at p 11. The 2002 Guidelines and the 3rd edition of the 2009 Strategic Framework 
and Guidelines elaborates in detail the structural framework for the future development of Listed 
wetlands, and the management and planning of Listed wetlands and other wetlands. 
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process for these wetlands. These shared legal understandings are hence considered as 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’. 
5.6 Conclusion 
This chapter undertakes the assessment of Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar 
Convention, which are identified to be relevant in Chapter Two through an interactional 
framework developed in Chapter Four for the ascertainment of these rules through the 
three components of shared understanding; criteria of legality; and the practice of 
legality.  
The conceptualisation of international law through an interactional perspective enables 
the revelation of the implicit dimension of a rule of international law that informs the 
interpretation of these rules. Furthermore, the shared legal understanding confirmed in 
practice provides the normative content and scope that informs the interpretation of 
Article 20. More importantly, this shared legal understanding indicates the applicability 
of these rules in the relations between the parties, which is crucial for the interpretation 
of Article 31(3)(c), and the subsequent operationalisation of this Article in reflection of 
its systemic integration potential.  
This chapter illustrates the operationalisation of the second stage of the analytical 
framework proposed in Chapter Four of this thesis that interprets the phrase ‘rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c). In 
the context of the Ramsar Convention, Articles 2.1 and 4.1 are rules of international law 
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c). The extent of applicability of these rules in the 
relations between the parties could be derived from the scope of the shared legal 
understanding practised by the parties, as arrived at in Section 5 of this thesis.    
The subsequent Chapter Six presents the operation of the analytical framework 
developed in Chapter Four in the context of the relevant provisions identified in the 
Biodiversity Convention. 
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6 
Chapter 6. Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relations between the 
Parties: An Interactional Understanding of Law 
Part II: Operation - 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity 
6.1 Overview 
The previous Chapter Five illustrates the operation of the second stage of the analytical 
framework that interprets the phrase ‘rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ stipulate in Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention through the prism of an interactional understanding of international law. 
The interactional framework, developed in Chapter Four, proposes the ascertainment of 
a rule of international law through three components, namely shared understanding; 
satisfaction of the eight internal morality of law; and a practice of legality.  
The assessment of the Ramsar Convention provisions identified to be relevant for the 
interpretation of Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention through the 
interactional framework in the previous chapter enables the ascertainment of the shared 
legal understanding undertaken in a practice of legality implicit to Articles 2.1 and 4.1 
of the Ramsar Convention. The implicit rules provide the normative content that 
informs the interpretation of Article 20, and indicates the applicability of these rules in 
the relations between the parties, which informs the interpretation of the phrase 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’.  
This chapter undertakes similar operation where Article 8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity 
Convention is assessed through the interactional framework in the determination of 
whether these rules are ‘rules of international law’ under an interactional understanding 
of international law. The assessment enables identification of the implicit dimension of 
the rule that informs the interpretation of ‘applicable in the relations between the 
parties’. 
6.2 Rules of International Law – Shared Understanding 
Chapter Two identifies that the relevant rules for the interpretation of Article 20 in the 
Biodiversity Convention are the obligation to undertake in-situ conservation stipulated 
in Article 8, which is defined to include conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats 
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and the maintenance of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings.
1123
 
Article 8 sets out a clear framework of the necessary elements for in situ  
conservation
1124
 where Article 8(a) and (d) specifically provides that the contracting 
parties shall, as far as possible and as appropriate, establish a system of protected areas 
to promote the protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable 
populations of species in natural surroundings. It is relevant to the obligation to preserve 
freshwater ecosystems stipulated under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
in the context that both provisions are geared towards maintaining the ecosystem 
integrity of ecosystems through the conservation of ecosystems and natural habitats.  
Protected areas are designated and set aside to protect and safeguard the natural 
functioning and ecological processes of ecosystems that cannot be maintained in most 
intensely-managed landscapes and seascapes,
1125
 and contribute towards the 
conservation of biodiversity, especially in the face of major threats such as conversion 
of land for agriculture and other production activities.
1126
 Protected areas are defined as 
‘a geographically defined area which is designated or regulated and managed to achieve 
specific conservation objectives’1127 where a system of six management categories for 
protected areas are developed by international guidelines on the categorisation of 
protected areas through the World Commission on Protected Areas (WCPA).
1128
 
The importance of the obligation to conserve under Article 8 in the fulfilment of the 
objectives of the Convention is reaffirmed in Decision II/7 of COP 2 (1995). The initial 
understanding in the implementation of the obligation is to request the Executive 
Secretary for further information relevant to its implementation, especially in the 
compilation and dissemination of the information, and a suggestion of how collection 
                                               
1123 Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Art 2. 
1124 CBD, ‘Decision III/9 Implementation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention’ (Third Ordinary Meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Buenos Aires, Argentina, 4 – 
15 November 1996) UNEP/CBD/COP/3/38, at p 68 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-03/full/cop-
03-dec-en.pdf> accessed 31 July 2012.  
1125  Nigel Dudley, Guidelines for Applying Protected Area Management Categories (IUCN, Gland 
Switzerland 2008) at p 2 <http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/PAPS-016.pdf> accessed 30 July 2012. 
1126 UNEP-WCMC, Review of the Biodiversity Requirements of Standards and Certification Schemes. A 
Snapshot of Current Practice (CBD Technical Series No 63, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 2011) at p 16 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-ts-63-en.pdf> accessed 30 July 2012.  
1127 Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Art 2.  
1128  CBD, ‘Protected Areas. Introduction’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/protected-old/intro.shtml> 
accessed 30 July 2012. The six management categories can be found at UNEP-WCMC, ‘IUCN 
Management Categories’ (2012) <http://www.unep-wcmc.org/iucn-protected-area-management-
categories_591.html> accessed 30 July 2012; and IUCN, ‘IUCN Protected Area Management Categories’ 
(16 January 2012) <http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/pa/pa_products/wcpa_categories/> 
accessed 30 July 2012. 
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and sharing of relevant information and experience might be enhanced.
1129
 The 
subsequent COP 3 (1996) emphasised the need for the sharing of experience and the 
dissemination of information and requested the Parties not only to submit their first 
national reports on time, but also to include in their national plans or strategies and 
legislation, measures for the conservation of biodiversity.
1130
 COP 3 (1996) 
recommended the development of a thematic approach in the compilation and 
dissemination of information on the implementation of Articles 6 and 8, including 
protected areas within this approach.
1131
 Among the efforts undertaken to promote the 
establishment and management of protected areas, the fourth COP encouraged the 
Executive Secretary to develop relationships with other processes in the fostering of 
good management practices pertaining to the comprehensive management of protected 
areas,
1132
 and the collaboration with other initiatives.
1133
  
A concrete shared understanding arrived at for the obligation to conserve via the 
establishment of a system of protected areas, which is still in operation, is published in 
                                               
1129 CBD, ‘COP 2 Decision II/7 Consideration of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention’ (Second Meeting of 
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Jakarta, Indonesia, 6 – 17 
November 1995) UNEP/CBD/COP/2/19, at p 11, paras 3 and 4 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-
02/full/cop-02-dec-en.pdf> accessed 30 July 2012.  
1130 CBD, ‘Decision III/9 Implementation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention’, supra n 1124, at pp 68 
and 69.  
1131 CBD, ‘Decision III/9 Implementation of Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention’, supra n 1124, at pp 69 
and 70.  
1132  CBD, ‘Decision IV/15 The Relationship of the Convention on Biological Diversity with the 
Commission on Sustainable Development and Biodiversity-related Conventions, Other International 
Agreements, Institutions and Processes of Relevance’ (Fourth Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Bratislava, Slovakia, 4 – 15 May 1998) at p 75 – 78, at 
para 6 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-04/full/cop-04-dec-en.pdf> accessed 31 July 2012. The 
areas of management includes methods and approaches to deal with protected areas; ecosystem and 
bioregional approaches to protected area management and sustainable use of biological diversity; 
mechanisms to enhance stakeholder involvement; methods for developing systems plans and integrating 
biological diversity considerations into sectoral strategies and planes; and transboundary protected areas.  
1133 The collaborations include - the Commission on Sustainable Development in its implementation of 
Agenda 21; the endorsement of the Joint Work Plan with the Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance; the endorsement of the memoranda of cooperation entered into by the Executive Secretary 
with the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission, the World Bank, the Food and Agriculture 
Organisation of the United Nations, the World Conservation Union, the Cartagena Convention, the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development; ensuring consistency in the implementation of the Convention on Biological 
Diversity and the World Trade Organisation agreements, including the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and the strengthening of relationship with the United Nations 
Framework Convention on Climate Change and its Kyoto Protocol, and the United Nations Convention to 
Combat Desertification in those Countries Experiencing Serious Drought and/or Desertification. See  
CBD, ‘Decision IV/15 The Relationship of the Convention on Biological Diversity with the Commission 
on Sustainable Development and Biodiversity-related Conventions, Other International Agreements, 
Institutions and Processes of Relevance’ at pp 75 and 76, paras 1, 3, 7, and 8.  
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Decision VII/28 of the seventh COP (2004).
1134
 Decision VII/28 (2004) confirms that 
the establishment and maintenance of systems of protected areas and special measures 
areas under Article 8 are essential for achieving and implementing the ecosystem 
approach, and ultimately achieving the three objectives of the Convention.
1135
 It 
endorses the contributions of the outputs of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the 
programme of work on protected areas.
1136
  
The Vth Congress calls on the COP of the Biodiversity Convention to strengthen the 
Convention’s effort regarding protected areas.1137 The global system of protected areas 
needs to comprise an ecologically representative and coherent ecological network of 
national and regional protected areas, corridors, buffer zones and transboundary 
protected areas.
1138
 This system is characterised by interconnectivity with the landscape 
and existing socio-economic structures and institutions, linked to, supported by, and 
integrated with efforts to conserve and sustainably use biodiversity across the broader 
landscape/seascape in accordance with the principles embodied in the Ecosystem 
Approach.
1139
  
The Vth Congress recommends the COP to adopt specific targets and timetables for the 
in situ conservation of all globally critically endangered and endangered species 
confined to a single site; the habitats, or viable representations of every terrestrial, 
freshwater and marine ecosystem within protected areas; and the protection of all 
natural ecological processes that generate and maintain biodiversity and provide 
                                               
1134 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447.  
1135 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at para 1.  
1136 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at para 3. The IUCN Vth 
World Parks Congress is a 10 yearly event that provides the major global forum for setting the agenda for 
protected areas. The Vth IUCN World Parks Congress was held in Duran, South Africa, from 8 – 17 
September 2003. See IUCN, ‘World Parks Congress’ (29 January 2010) 
<http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/pa/pa_event/wcpa_wpc/> accessed 31 July 2012. 
1137 IUCN, ‘Message of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity’ 
(Vth IUCN World Parks Congress, Durban, South Africa, 8 – 17 September) 
<http://cmsdata.iucn.org/downloads/cbdmessageen.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. Also in CBD, 
‘Protected Areas. Message of the Fifth World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity. 
Note by the Executive’ (Seventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the convention on Biological 
Diversity, 9 – 20 and 27 February 2004) UNEP/CBD/COP/7/INF/36 (9 February 2004) 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-07/information/cop-07-inf-36-en.pdf> accessed 16 October 
2012. 
1138 It is elaborated that the global system of protected areas needs to safeguard all globally and nationally 
important areas for biodiversity, based on sound science. CBD, ‘Protected Areas. Message of the Fifth 
World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity. Note by the Executive’, supra n 1137, 
at p 2.  
1139 IUCN, ‘Message of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
supra n 1137, at pp 1 and 2. 
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humanity with vital ecosystem services.
1140
 The Congress considers that a more 
comprehensive, representative and effectively managed system of protected areas 
necessitates the maximisation of the representation and persistence of biodiversity in 
protected area networks through the establishment of enabling environment
1141
 and the 
implementation of national and individual site biodiversity strategic plans.
1142
 
The recommendations of the Vth World Congress laid out the foundation for the 
conservation of biodiversity through the establishment of protected areas. These 
recommendations are subsequently adopted thematic programmes of work on protected 
areas.
1143
 Decision VII/28 (2004) confirms the need to adopt specific targets to be 
incorporated into the framework of the programme of work,
1144
 and reiterates the 
importance of capacity building and financial resources for the implementation of the 
programme of work.
1145
 COP 7 (2004) explicitly recognised the importance of the 
integration of biodiversity conservation into sectoral policies and programmes, where 
approaches such as ecological networks, ecological corridors and buffer zones options 
are considered in the implementation of programme of work on protected areas.
1146
 An 
ad hoc open-ended working group on protected areas established in COP 7(2004) will 
support and review of the implementation of the programme of work on protected areas, 
are conducted by an ad hoc open-ended working group on protected areas established in 
COP 7 (2004).
1147
  
                                               
1140 IUCN, ‘Message of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
supra n 1137, at p 2.  
1141 IUCN, ‘Message of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
supra n 1137, at pp 3 – 5. Enabling environment is created through the creation of enabling conditions 
and the empowerment of a broad range of sectors, communities and interests through capacity building, 
financial support, well-functioning governance structure and sound policies, and the mechanisms for 
assessment, monitoring and reporting. 
1142 IUCN, ‘Message of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
supra n 1137, at p 2. In particularly, actions need to be taken to address the severe under representation of 
freshwater ecosystems and marine ecosystems in the global protected area system, and the creation and 
expansion of marine protected area networks, including the marine biodiversity and ecosystem processes 
in the world oceans beyond national jurisdiction. 
1143 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at pp 1 and 4, paras 3 and 
31. 
1144 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at paras 6 and 7. 
1145 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at paras 8 and 9.  
1146 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at paras 12 and 13. It is 
elaborated in fns 2 and 3 of Decision VII/28 that ecological networks ‘encompass the application of the 
ecosystem approach that integrates protected areas into the broader land- and/or seascapes for effective 
conservation of biodiversity and sustainable use’; and that ‘ecological corridors may not be applicable to 
all Parties’. 
1147 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at p 4, para 25.  
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Decision VII/28 (2004) adopted the Programme of Work on Protected Areas that 
reaffirmed the importance of protected areas as instruments for meeting the 
Convention’s target to reduce biodiversity loss, especially in the provision of a range of 
goods and ecological services while preserving natural and cultural heritage, and 
contribute towards poverty alleviation, research, education, recreation and tourism.
1148
 
The aim of the Programme of Work is to support the establishment and maintenance of 
terrestrial and marine areas that collectively form a global network targeted to reduce 
the current rate of biodiversity loss at all levels. Apart from that, the Programme of 
Work aims to achieve the attainment of sustainable development in accordance with the 
objectives of the Strategic Plan of the Convention, the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development Plan of Implementation and the Millennium Development Goals.
1149
 
The Programme of Work provides guidance for the implementation of the Biodiversity 
Convention in order to achieve the three objectives of the Convention, namely in situ 
conservation, sustainable use of biodiversity and the fair and equitable sharing of 
benefits arising from the use of genetic resources.
1150
 For the obligation to undertake in 
situ conservation, Programme Element 1 of the Programme on Protected Areas, 
stipulates the step-wise direct actions for the planning, selecting, establishing, 
strengthening, and managing protected area systems and sites.
1151
 Programme Element 
1 provides firstly, the establishment and strengthening of an integrated global network 
of national and regional systems of protected areas to establish a global network of 
comprehensive, representative and effectively managed national and regional protected 
area systems.
1152
       
                                               
1148 ‘Annex. Programme of Work on Protected Areas’ in CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 
8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at p 6 (hereinafter ‘Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28’).  
1149 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 7. 
1150 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 6 and 8.  
1151 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 8.  
1152 Target, Goal 1.1, in Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 8. 
The parties are suggested to establish suitable time-bound and measurable national and regional level 
protected area targets and indicators, and take action to establish or expand protected areas, especially 
under-represented marine and inland water ecosystems in national, regional and transboundary systems of 
inland water protected areas, and the consideration of the conservation needs of migratory species, within 
a certain timeframe. In addition, to achieve the target, the Parties are advised to conduct effective 
participation of indigenous and local communities, and the relevant stakeholders in the review of existing 
and potential forms of conservation and their suitability, and to complete a system gap analyses on the 
protected area at national and regional levels, taking into account Annex I of the Biodiversity Convention 
and other relevant criteria. The outcome of the national or regional gap analysis will provide the 
necessary input for the identification of protected areas for designation that is comprehensive and 
ecologically representative of the national and regional systems of protected areas, including protected 
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In order to facilitate Parties in the implementation of their obligation to conserve 
through the establishment of protected areas, Goal 1.2 recommends the integration of 
protected areas into the broader land- and seascapes for the maintenance of ecological 
structure and function.
1153
 The Programme of Work highlights the importance of and the 
need to develop
1154
 effective site-based planning and management of protected areas 
that is participatory
1155
 and uses science-based site planning processes in achieving the 
target set out for the conservation of biodiversity.
1156
 Collaboration in the establishment 
of transboundary protected areas between neighbouring protected areas across national 
boundaries is necessary to strengthen regional networks.
1157
 Moreover, the obligation to 
conserve necessarily implies the need to prevent and to mitigate the negative impacts of 
key threats to the protected areas.
1158
 
                                                                                                                                         
areas that benefit indigenous and local communities. See Activities (1.1.1) – (1.1.7), Goal 1.1, 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 8 – 9.  
1153 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 9 – 10. The Parties are 
suggested to undertake activities such as (1.2.1) evaluation of existing efforts in the integration of 
protected areas into the broader context, and sectoral plans and strategies; (1.2.2) Identification and 
implementation measures, including policy, legal, and planning to improve integration of protected areas 
into broader context; (1.2.3) Integration of protected areas system through establishment and management 
of ecological networks, ecological corridors and/or buffer zones, and the maintenance of ecological 
processes where appropriate, in consideration of the needs of migratory species; (1.2.4) Development of 
tools of ecological connectivity where necessary or beneficial as determined by national priorities for the 
conservation of biodiversity; (1.2.5) and the rehabilitation and restoration of habitats and degraded 
ecosystems, as appropriate. 
1154 Activity 1.4.4, Goal 1.4, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 
12. These plans should integrate climate change adaptation measures in the planning, management and 
design of protected area system (Activity 1.4.5). 
1155 Activity 1.4.1, Goal 1.4, in Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, 
at p 11. 
1156 Goal 1.4, in Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 11 – 12. 
The activities suggested for the site management of protected areas include the creation of a highly 
participatory process that incorporates relevant ecological and socio-economic data in accordance with 
the ecosystems approach (Activity 1.3.1); the identification of appropriate measurable conservation 
targets based on the criteria laid out in Annex I of the CBD and other relevant criteria (Activity 1.4.2); the 
conduct of analysis on opportunities of the protected are to contribute towards conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity at the local and regional scales, as well as an analysis of threats and means 
of addressing them (Activity 1.4.3). It is important that the management should be conducted through 
well-trained and skilled personnel who are properly and appropriately equipped and supported (Activity 
1.4.6). 
1157 Goal 1.3, in Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 10 – 11. 
The Parties targeted to establish and strengthen transboundary protected areas to enhance the conservation 
and sustainable use of biodiversity through the implementation of the ecosystem approach, and improving 
international cooperation (see Activities 1.3.3 and 1.3.4). Collaborative actions include the establishment 
of effective regional networks of protected areas in areas identified as common conservation priorities, 
and the establishment of multi-country coordination mechanisms to support long term management of 
networks (Activity 1.3.1). For marine areas protected areas that lie beyond the limits of national 
jurisdiction, collaboration can be struck in accordance with international law with other parties through 
the relevant partners, based on scientific information (Activity 1.3.2). 
1158 Goal 1.5, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 12 – 13.  
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The Programme of Work on Protected Areas furnishes the much-needed detail to clarify 
the obligation imposed by the Biodiversity Convention on the Parties to conserve on-
site biodiversity through the establishment of protected areas. The establishment of 
protected areas, as noted from the detailed elaboration of the Programme of Work, 
necessitates the parties to take a step-wise procedural approach in the implementation of 
this obligation under Article 8. The procedural mechanism starts with information 
procurement, designation of national, regional and transboundary protected areas, the 
integration of these areas via ecological networks, corridors and/or buffer zones in 
accordance with the ecosystem approach, and the management of such protected areas, 
including the provision of mechanisms to address negative impacts of key threats to the 
protected areas. It is evident in Decision VII/28 (2004) that a clear timeline is stipulated, 
although its implementation might vary in view of differences in capacity and 
circumstances. What is clear was the intention of the contracting parties of Biodiversity 
Convention in achieving their shared understanding of the conservation of biodiversity 
through the establishment of a system of protected areas in order to reduce biodiversity 
loss.  
The biodiversity of inland water ecosystems are given particular attention in Decision 
IV/4 (1998) in reference to Recommendation III/1
1159
 of the Subsidiary Body on 
Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice (SBSTTA),
1160
 where the importance of 
inland water ecosystems for global biodiversity and human welfare, and their 
vulnerability to human actions are recognised.
1161
 The COP welcomed the strategic 
approaches to the management of freshwater recommended by the Commission on 
Sustainable Development, and urged parties to include inland water biodiversity 
considerations in participatory and collaborative work with institutions
1162
 on work 
related to inland water resources, including the Joint Work Plan with the Ramsar 
Convention.
1163
  
The initial shared understanding on the obligation to conserve freshwater ecosystems 
under the Biodiversity Convention is demonstrated in the adoption of Recommendation 
                                               
1159 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450.  
1160 CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 14, para 1. 
1161Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 17. Recommendation III/1 was adopted as Annex I 
to Decision IV/4 as a work programme under the CBD, on the biodiversity of inland water ecosystems 
and the associated matters of identification and monitoring, assessment methodology and taxonomy  
1162 Institution here includes organisation and conventional bodies. 
1163 CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at pp 3 and 4, paras 2, 3, and 4.  
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III/1 annexed to Decision IV/4 (1998) as a work programme on inland water 
ecosystems.
1164
 The elements highlighted in the work programme need to be integrated 
in the national and sectoral plans of parties and to be implemented as soon as 
possible.
1165
 Applications for financial support by state parties are advised to prioritise 
the identification of inland water ecosystems; the preparation and implementation of 
integrated watershed, catchment and river basin, or inland water ecosystems 
management plans; and the investigation of processes that leads to the loss of 
biodiversity of inland water ecosystems.
1166
  
The Programme of Work adopted by COP 4 (1998) focused on several salient elements 
in the conservation of inland water biodiversity, including the assessment of the status 
and trends of the biodiversity of inland water ecosystems and the identification of 
options for conservation and sustainable use.
1167
 The COP recommends several actions 
areas to the parties for the implementation of Element A, including integrated watershed 
management; research on the ecosystem approach; monitoring and assessment; and 
environmental impact assessment of projects.
1168
 The parties are advised to prepare 
indicative lists of inland water ecosystems based on the criteria set out in Annex I of the 
Biodiversity Convention, and the work of the IUCN.
1169
 Moreover, the Parties are urged 
to adopt an integrated approach in the assessment, management and where possible 
                                               
1164 CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 14, para 1. 
1165 CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 15, para 5.  
1166 CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450,  at p 15, para 7.  
1167 Element A, CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at pp 17 – 22. A work plan for the SBSTTA for the 
assessment inland water biodiversity should include the status and trends, and the conservation and 
sustainable use of inland water biodiversity including the valuation of ecosystem goods and services of 
inland water ecosystems, at pp 18 – 19, para 8. Apart from the continued collaborations of the Executive 
Secretary with other relevant institutions, and the development of a list of experts on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biodiversity of inland waters, COP 4 suggested the clearing-house mechanism be used 
to promote and facilitate exchange of information. The Executive Secretary and the SBSTTA are 
requested to assist small island states in the development of rapid-assessment methodologies in light of 
immediate threats to their inland water ecosystems; or the development of rapid assessment 
methodologies on disaster and mitigating activities in states that suffer ecological disaster within their 
territory (pp 18 – 19, paras 1 – 7). In addition, the Executive Secretary is tasked to take decision action to 
advance the Global Taxonomy Initiative that should be implemented as soon as possible. See Element D, 
Element A, CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 24.  
1168 Element A, CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at pp 19 – 22, para 9(a) – (m).   
1169 Element B, CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 23. The three criteria set out for identification and 
monitoring in Annex I of the Convention text are – (1) ecosystems and habitats containing high diversity, 
large numbers of endemic or threatened species, or wilderness; required by migratory species; of social, 
economic, cultural or scientific importance; or, which are representative, unique or associated with key 
evolutionary or other biological processes; (2) Species and communities which are threatened; wild 
relatives of domesticated or cultivated species; or medicinal, agricultural or other economic value; or 
social, scientific or cultural importance; or important for research into the conservation and sustainable 
use of biological diversity, such as indicator species; and (3) Described genomes and genes of social, 
scientific or economic importance. 
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remedial action on inland water ecosystems and adjacent ecosystems, both within the 
boundaries of the parties, or transboundary in nature.
1170
  
The Programme of Work on Inland Water Biodiversity adopted in Decision IV/4 
provides the foundation for the further elaboration and clarification of the obligation to 
conserve biodiversity of freshwater ecosystems, within an overarching umbrella of the 
protected area approach.
1171
 The initial shared understanding on the obligation to 
conserve focuses more on the assessment of status and trends of the biodiversity of 
inland water ecosystems and identification of options for their conservation and 
sustainable use.
1172
  COP 4 (1998) recognised the importance of inland water 
ecosystems for global biodiversity and human welfare, and at the same time, their 
vulnerability to human action due to the link between human communities, inland 
waters and their biodiversity that necessitates the participation and awareness of local 
community in their conservation and sustainable use.
1173
  
The need to adopt an ecosystem approach that integrates conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity and the fair and equitable sharing of benefits of inland waters are 
confirmed in the Preamble of Annex I to Decision IV/4 (1998).
1174
 A work plan was 
developed for the SBSTTA to build upon the ongoing efforts in inland water 
ecosystems conservation.
1175
  
The SBSTTA initially undertakes the assessment of status and trends using existing 
information, and the development of guidelines for the rapid assessment of inland water 
biodiversity for different types of inland water ecosystems.
1176
 The SBSTTA will then 
compile case-studies of watershed, catchment and river basin management experiences 
and best practices, in which lessons emerging from these case studies are synthesised. 
These lessons are mostly from areas such as watershed management that incorporates 
the ecosystem approach, and the use of protected areas and their management strategies 
in the conservation and sustainable use of inland water ecosystems.
1177
In addition, the 
SBSTTA was tasked to develop methods and techniques for the valuation of goods and 
                                               
1170 Element C, CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at pp 23 and 24.  
1171 CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p19, para 8(c)(vii). 
1172 Section A, Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at pp 17 – 22. 
1173 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 17. 
1174 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 17. 
1175
 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 18, para 8.  
1176 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 18, para 8(a) and (b). 
1177 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at pp 18 – 19, para 8(c)(i) and (vii). 
264 
 
services of inland water ecosystems, incentives and policy reform, and the 
understanding of ecosystem function.
1178
 
The parties, as recommended by the COP, are encouraged to adopt integrated land and 
watershed management based on the catchment/watershed/basin approach in the 
protection, use, planning and management of inland water ecosystems. In particular, 
integrated watershed/catchment/basin management strategies are adopted to maintain, 
restore or improve the quality and supply of inland water resources, and the economic, 
social, hydrological, biological diversity and other functions and values of inland water 
ecosystems.
1179
 In furtherance of the objective of the conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity through an integrated basin-wide management framework, the Parties 
are encouraged to explore the appropriate technological means, including technology 
transfer; and to conduct research on the application of the ecosystem approach.
1180
   
In addition, the Parties are required to conduct monitoring and assessment of the status, 
trends and threats of inland waters ecosystems, to evaluate inland water biodiversity and 
to promote the sustainable use thereof.
1181
 The importance of environmental impact 
assessments of water development projects are recognised in Decision IV/4 (1998) 
adopted by the COP.
1182
 Other areas that were given attention were alien species, 
genotypes and genetically modified organisms; education and public awareness; 
collaboration with broader water resource community; transboundary cooperation; local 
and indigenous communities’ participation; economic and legal instruments; and 
financing of projects.
1183
 
It is pertinent to note that the interactional process undertaken by the law making 
enterprise and the development of the rules relating to the conservation of in situ 
biodiversity involves the participation of various organisations, institutions and 
conventions, most notably the Ramsar Convention.
1184
 This is where the international 
consensus on the need for an integrated approach to river basin management that 
                                               
1178 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 19, para 8(d). 
1179 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 19, para 9(a) and (b). 
1180 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 20, para 9(b), (c) and (d).  
1181 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 20, para 9(f). 
1182 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at p 21, para 9(g). 
1183 Annex I of CBD, Decision IV/4, supra n 450, at pp 21 – 22, para 9(h) – (m) and para 10.  
1184 The outcome of the collaboration with Ramsar includes the River Basin Initiative on the integration of 
biodiversity, wetland and river basin management. Ramsar Convention, ‘Brief Description of the River 
Basin Initiative’ (28 February 2001) <http://www.ramsar.org/cda/en/ramsar-news-archives-2001-brief-
description-of-the/main/ramsar/1-26-45-88%5E21059_4000_0__> accessed 3 August 2012. 
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incorporates ecosystem functions and values is made explicit.
1185
 The collaborations 
with other programmes, organisations, institutions, conventions and stakeholders 
working on the research, management and conservation of inland water biodiversity 
contribute towards the clarification and development of the shared understanding of the 
obligation to conserve biodiversity of inland water ecosystems. This leads to the 
enhancement of the content and normativity of the rules to conserve as codified under 
Article 8 of the Biodiversity Convention. 
At its seventh meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the COP 7 (2004) adopted a revised 
and elaborated Programme of Work on the Biodiversity of Inland Water Ecosystems 
that updates the Programme of Work adopted in Decision IV/4 (1998).
1186
 Decision 
VII/4 (2004) highlights the collaboration with other organisations, institutions and 
conventions, or the streamlining of many of its activities, to promote synergies and 
avoid duplications.
1187
 The aim of the revised programme of work on inland water 
ecosystems is to enhance the implementation of the Biodiversity Convention at the 
catchment/watershed/river basin levels and to fulfil its leadership role in international 
biodiversity issues relating to inland water ecosystems.
1188
 Decision VII/4 (2004) 
specifically provides that the generic term of ‘ecosystem’ refers to genomes and genes, 
species and communities, ecosystems and habitats, unless otherwise specified.
1189
 This 
confirms the shared understanding of the contracting parties that conservation of 
                                               
1185The River Basin Initiative was endorsed by Decision V/2 (2000) (see infra n 1207) of the Biodiversity 
Convention, and its importance is reiterated in Decision VI/2 of COP 6. Cooperation with the Ramsar 
Convention continued with the 3rd Joint Work Plan with the Ramsar Convention (2002 – 2006) as 
endorsed by the COP in Decision VI/20. See CBD, ‘Inland Waters Biodiversity – Background’ (undated) 
<http://www.cbd.int/waters/background/> accessed 3 August 2012. See CBD, ‘The Joint Work 
Programme (JWP) between the CBD and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971): 
Progress with Implementation and Development of the Fifth Joint Work Programme (2011 Onwards)’ 
(Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 18 – 
29 October 2010) UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/38 (19 October 2010) 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-10/information/cop-10-inf-38-en.pdf> accessed 17 August 
2012.  
1186 CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158. The adoption of a Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water 
Biodiversity was considered necessary in Decision VI/2 of the CBD where the COP emphasised ‘the 
importance of review and elaboration of the programme of work on biodiversity of inland water 
ecosystems’. CBD, ‘Decision VI/2 Biological Diversity of Inland Waters’ (incorporated as Annex to the 
Sixth Ordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, The 
Hague, Netherlands, 7 – 19 April 2002) UNEP/CBD/COP/6/20  <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-
06/full/cop-06-dec-en.pdf> accessed 3 August 2012. 
1187 CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 1 para 4. At p 6, para 3. The activities include the assessment 
of status and trends and rapid assessment, pp 3 – 5, paras 15 – 26; classification systems and criteria for 
the identification of important inland water biodiversity, pp 5 – 6, paras 27 – 30.  
1188 ‘Annex. Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity’ (hereinafter: ‘Revised 
Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity’), in CBD, ‘Decision VII/4 Biological 
Diversity of Inland Water Ecosystems’, supra n 158, at p 7, para 5. 
1189 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 8.  
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biodiversity does not exclude conservation of ecosystems or habitat, as biodiversity is 
defined to include all the components of the environment.
1190
 
The implementation of the programme of work is guided by several principles that 
operate as guiding principles.
1191
 Apart from the transposition of the three pillars of the 
Biodiversity Convention in the context of inland water biodiversity, namely the 
promotion of the conservation, sustainable use of inland water biodiversity and the fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits gained from the use of inland water genetic 
resources,
1192
 the ecosystem approach must be applied in the management of inland 
water ecosystems.
1193
  
Apart from that, the Programme of Work must not only involve the participation of 
indigenous and local communities and relevant stakeholders, where their scientific, 
technical and technological knowledge are used and drawn upon.
1194
 It must also 
support indigenous and local communities in the re-establishment, development and 
implementation of traditional approaches and/or adaptive management approaches to 
conserve and sustain the use of the biodiversity of inland water ecosystems
1195
. In order 
to promote conservation and sustainable use of inland water biodiversity, appropriate 
transfer and development of technologies, with appropriate funding, must be made 
available for the implementation of the Programme of Work.
1196
  
Decision VII/4 (2004) has emphasised the need for clarification and elaboration of the 
programme of work on inland water biodiversity. More specifically for the obligation to 
conserve inland water ecosystems, Goal 1.2 of Programme Element I on the 
conservation, sustainable use and benefit sharing of biodiversity is most relevant in 
furnishing the normative content of this obligation under Article 8. Goal 1.2 of the 
Revised Programme of Work aims to establish and maintain comprehensive, adequate 
and representative systems of protected inland water ecosystems
1197
 within the 
                                               
1190  The conceptual variations in the definition of biodiversity are recognised by Oguamanam. See 
Oguamanam, ‘Biological Diversity’, supra n 341, at pp 210 – 212.  
1191  Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 9(a) – 
(e).  
1192 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 9(a) 
and (d). 
1193 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 9(b).  
1194 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 9(e). 
1195 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 9(c). 
1196
 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 9(a). 
1197 Protected inland water ecosystems includes all IUCN protected area categories, as appropriate, at 
Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11, para (b).  
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framework of integrated catchment/watershed/river-basin management. It specifically 
addresses the obligation to conserve inland water biodiversity under Article 8, in 
particularly paragraphs (a) to (e).
1198
 Goal 1.2 aims to provide a comprehensive, 
adequate and representative development and maintenance of a system of protected 
inland water ecosystems within the framework of integrated catchment/watershed/river 
basin management that involves transboundary collaboration between neighbouring 
Parties where appropriate.
1199
  
In order to achieve Goal 1.2 of establishing and maintaining a comprehensive, adequate 
and representative systems of protected inland water ecosystems, the parties are 
required to provide examples of protected-area establishment and management 
strategies that support the conservation and sustainable use of inland water ecosystems. 
They are also required to undertake the assessment and identification of priority sites to 
be included in the system of protected inland ecosystems.
1200
 The Revised Programme 
of Work suggested the incremental development of the availability of resources and 
national priorities that contribute to the systematic
1201
 conservation and sustainable use 
of biodiversity, which maintains the overall ecosystem function, productivity and health 
within each drainage basin as part of an integrated management approach.
1202
 Where 
necessary, collaborations must be undertaken with neighbouring parties for the 
identification, recognition and management of transboundary protected inland water 
ecosystems.
1203
 
The contracting parties of the Biodiversity Convention opined that the Revised 
Programme of Work is not intended to be prescriptive for parties, given their varying 
                                               
1198 Goal 1.2, under ‘context and linkages, Articles of the Convention on Biological Diversity’ in Revised 
Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11. 
1199 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11.  
1200 It is suggested that assessment can apply the guidance on operationalising Annex I of the Biodiversity 
Convention and its harmonised application with the criteria for identifying Wetlands of International 
Importance under the Ramsar Convention, especially sites important for migratory species dependent on 
inland water ecosystems. See Activities 1.2.1, 1.2.2 and 1.2.3, Revised Programme of Work on Inland 
Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11.  
1201 A systematic approach necessitates that parties to both the Biodiversity Convention and Ramsar 
Convention should harmonise their work, in particularly activity 1.2.4 with the development of national 
networks of wetlands of international importance that are comprehensive and coherent in line with the 
Ramsar strategic framework for the future development of the List of Wetlands of International 
Importance and taking into account ecological connectivity and the concept of ecological networks. 
Activity 1.2.6, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 12.  
1202 Activity 1.2.4, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
11.  
1203 Activity 1.2.6, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
12. 
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national circumstances, capacities, and priorities.
1204
 It is viewed as providing a 
comprehensive and integrated framework of activities where nationally appropriate 
responses
1205
 can be formulated by each of the contracting parties within the context of 
their national biodiversity and sustainable development strategies and action plans.
1206
 
Limitations in the implementation of the Programme of Work on Inland Water 
Biodiversity are noted, especially in terms of the lack of information on inland water 
biodiversity, and the need for improved data and information on the status and trends of, 
including threats to, the biological diversity of inland water ecosystems.
1207
 In addition, 
the capacity of states to develop and implement national and sectoral plans to conserve 
and to use the inland water ecosystems in a sustainable manner necessitates the 
implementation of capacity-building measures
1208
. 
The tenth COP (2010) concluded that the Revised Programme of Work on Inland 
Waters Biodiversity remains ‘a good framework for implementation of relevant 
                                               
1204 Financial resources are sourced to increase the capacity of the Parties where in Decision VII/24, the 
COP urges Parties, other Governments and multilateral funding bodies to ‘provide the necessary financial 
support to developing countries, in particularly the least developed and small island developing States, as 
well as countries with economies in transition, taking into account Art 20 and Article 8 (m) of the 
Biodiversity Convention to enable them to build capacity and implement the programme of work and 
undertake the reporting required, including national reports under the Biodiversity Convention, to enable 
the review of implementation of the programme of work on protected areas in line with goal 2.2 of the 
programme of work’. CBD, ‘Decision VIII/24. Protected Areas’ (Eighth Meeting of the Conference of the 
Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Curitiba, Brazil, 20 – 31 March 2006) at p 2, para 4 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-08/cop-08-dec-24-en.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. For 
mobilisation of financial resources for the implementation of the programme of work by developing 
countries, see CBD, ‘Decision VIII/24. Protected Areas’, at pp 3 – 7, paras 17 – 28. For development of 
capacity for the identification, designation, management, monitoring and evaluation of national and 
regional systems of protected areas, see CBD, ‘Decision VIII/24. Protected Areas’, at p 7, paras 29 – 34.   
1205 These responses are in accordance with the fundamental guiding principles as stated in Revised 
Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 9: (a) promotion of 
the conservation and sustainable use of inland water biodiversity; (b) application of the ecosystem 
approach to the management of inland water ecosystems; (c) the support of indigenous and local 
communities to re-establish, develop and implement traditional approaches and/or adaptive management 
approaches to conserve and sustain the use of the biodiversity of inland water ecosystems; (d) promotion 
of the fair and equitable sharing of benefits gained from the use of inland water genetic resources and 
associated traditional knowledge based on prior informed consent in accordance with national laws; and 
(d) the use of scientific, technical and technological knowledge of indigenous and local communities and 
relevant stakeholders, with their participation and prior informed consent in accordance with national law, 
in the implementation of all programme elements.  
1206 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 7, para 6.  
1207 See CBD, ‘Decision V/2. Progress Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Work on the 
Biological Diversity of Inland Water Ecosystems’ (Annex III to the Decisions Adopted by the Conference 
of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, 15 – 26 May 2000) 
UNEP/CBD/COP/5/23, at p 72, para 3 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-05/full/cop-05-dec-en.pdf> 
accessed 3 August 2012; and CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 3, para 16.  
1208 CBD, ‘Decision V/2. Progress Report on the Implementation of the Programme of Work on the 
Biological Diversity of Inland Water Ecosystems’, supra n 1207, at p 73, para 8.  
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activities’.1209 This conclusion strengthened the shared understanding of the parties of 
their obligation to conserve the inland waters biodiversity, which furthers the common 
understanding on the Article 8 obligation to conserve in situ biodiversity through 
establishment of protected areas.  
In addition to the Programmes of Work stated above, the tenth COP (2010) adopted a 
revised Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 20201210 pursuant to its Decision IX/9.1211 
COP 10 (2010) recognises that the Strategic Plan represents ‘a useful flexible 
framework that is relevant to all biodiversity-related conventions’,1212 especially when 
the Strategic Plan is the outcome of submissions made by parties, observers, partners, 
and the participation of various bodies of the UN system convened through the 
Environmental Management Group, and of the scientific community.
1213
  
The nature of a flexible framework presented in the form of the revised Strategic Plan 
indicates that the development of national and regional targets imposed in the Plan 
depends on national priorities and capacities. Its implementation takes into account both 
the global targets and the status and trends of biodiversity in the country, and the 
resources provided through the resource mobilisation strategy.
1214
 Noting the financial, 
human and technical resources that constrain parties’ implementation of the 
Convention,
1215
 the Strategic Plan aims to promote effective implementation of the 
                                               
1209 CBD, ‘X/28 Inland Waters Biodiversity’ (Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the 
Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Tenth Meeting, Nagoya, Japan, 18 – 29 October 2010) 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/28 (29 October 2010) at pp 1 – 2, para 6 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-28-en.pdf> accessed 11 August 2012. 
1210 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’ (Decision Adopted by the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at 
Its Tenth Meeting, Nagoya, Japan 18 – 29 October 2010) UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/2 (29  October 2010) 
at p 1 para 1 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-dec-02-en.pdf> accessed 4 August 2012.  
1211 Decision IX/9 called on the need for the revision and update of the Strategic Plan adopted in Decision 
VI/26 and the associated framework of goals, targets and indicators stipulated in Decision VIII/15, 
including the adoption of paragraph 2 of Decision VIII/8 and Paragraph 10 of Decision VIII/9. CBD, 
‘Decision IX/9 Process for the Revision of the Strategic Plan’ (Decision Adopted by the Conference of 
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Ninth Meeting, Bonn, 19 – 30 May 2008) 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/IX/9 (9 October 2008) at p 1 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-09/cop-09-
dec-09-en.pdf> accessed 4 August 2012.  
1212 5th preambular paragraph, CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and 
the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 1. 
1213 2nd and 4th preambular paragraphs, CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 
2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 1.  
1214 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 2, para 3(b). 
1215 ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ annexed to CBD, 
‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, 
supra n 1210, at p 6, para 6 (hereinafter: ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets’). 
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Convention that inspires broad-based action by all parties and stakeholders, and to 
enhance the coherence in the implementation of the provisions of the Convention and 
the decisions of the COP.
1216
  
The Strategic Plan confirms an important shared understanding of the parties on the 
obligation to conserve biodiversity, which is the recognition of the ecosystem approach, 
whereby the rationale for the protection of biodiversity is its importance as the 
underpinning of ecosystem functioning and the provision of ecosystem services 
essential for human well-being.
1217
 The Strategic Plan outlines multiple entry points to 
achieve the vision of the Strategic Plan,
1218
 and to take effective and urgent action to 
halt biodiversity loss to ensure resilience of ecosystems that continuously provide 
essential services.
1219
 The entry points include addressing the underlying causes of 
biodiversity loss; decreasing direct pressures on biodiversity; safeguarding and restoring 
where necessary biodiversity and ecosystem services; ensuring continued provision of 
ecosystem services and accessing to these services; and enhancing support mechanisms 
for capacity building.
1220
  
The Strategic Plan is organised under five strategic goals and 20 headline Aichi targets 
that comprise both aspirations for achievement at the global level, and a flexible 
framework for the establishment of national or regional targets, taking into account 
national needs and priorities, and their contributions to the achievement of the global 
targets.
1221
 More specifically, the Strategic Plan outlines the shared understanding of the 
COP on the conservation of biodiversity in Strategic Goal C, where the aspiration to be 
achieved at the global level is to improve the status of biodiversity by safeguarding 
ecosystems, species and genetic diversity.
1222
  
                                               
1216 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 6, 
para 1.  
1217 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 6, 
para 3. 
1218 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 7, 
para 11. The vision of the Strategic Plan is a world of ‘Living in harmony with nature’ where ‘by 2050, 
biodiversity is valued, conserved, restored and wisely used, maintaining ecosystem services, sustaining a 
healthy planet and delivering benefits essential for all people’.  
1219 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 8, 
paras 12. 
1220 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 7, 
para 10. 
1221
 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 8, 
para 13. 
1222 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 9. 
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Targets 11 – 13 provide a flexible framework to achieve the global goal of improved 
state of biodiversity, where the manifestation of their implementation is contingent on 
national needs and priorities. A Specific target of at least 17% of terrestrial and inland 
water areas and 10% of coastal and marine areas by 2020, especially areas of particular 
importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services, are conserved through systems of 
protected areas and other area-based conservation measures that are effectively and 
equitably managed, ecologically representative and well connected.
1223
 Ecologically 
representative and effectiveness of management are the two pivotal qualitative aspects 
to Target 11.
1224
 Target 12 further develops the obligation to conserve to include to the 
prevention of the extinction of known threatened species, with their declining 
conservation status improved and sustained.
1225
 The obligation extends to the 
conservation and maintenance of genetic diversity and the minimisation of genetic 
erosion.
1226
  
The implementation of the strategic goals and targets are primarily conducted through 
activities at the national or subnational level, with supporting action at the regional and 
global levels that adopts a participatory approach at each level of implementation.
1227
 
National biodiversity strategies, action plans and national targets are key instruments for 
translating the Strategic Plan to national circumstances and for the integration of 
biodiversity across all sectors of government and society.
1228
 The programme of work 
                                               
1223 Target 11, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 
1215, at p 9. 
1224  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’ (Fourth 
Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group on Review of Implementation of the Convention, 
Montreal, 7 – 11 May 2012) UNEP/CBD/WG-RI/4/INF/5 (23 April 2012) at pp 6 – 14 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/wgri/wgri-04/information/wgri-04-inf-05-en.pdf> accessed 13 August 
2012. The Ad Hoc Technical Expert Group on Indicators for the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 
2020 identified three categories of operational indicators that provides support to the parties to improve 
their monitoring and reporting systems. See the Annex of CBD, ‘XI/3. Monitoring Progress in 
Implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ in 
CBD, ‘Advance Unedited Copy of COP-11 Decision’ (Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties 
to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 – 19 October 2012, Hyderabad, India) at p 29 
<http://www.cbd.int/cop/cop-11/doc/2012-10-24-advanced-unedited-cop-11-decisions-en.pdf> accessed 
7 November 2012. The list of indicators for achieving Target 11 addresses trends in coverage, condition, 
representativeness and effectiveness of protected areas and other area-based approaches. 
1225 Target 12, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 
1215, at p 9. 
1226 Target 13, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 
1215, at p 9. 
1227 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 10, 
para 14. 
1228 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 10, 
para 14.  
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on different thematic programmes of work under the Convention, together with the 
various crosscutting programmes and initiatives, are key tools in the updating of 
national biodiversity strategies and actions plans.
1229
  
An effective implementation of the Strategic Plan in the attainment of objectives of the 
Convention necessitates the broadening of political support from the Heads of State and 
Government, and the parliamentarians of all Parties who understand the value of 
biodiversity and ecosystem services.
1230
 In addition, partnerships at all levels, including 
partnerships with programmes, funds and specialised agencies of the United Nations 
systems, or other MEAs, are required for effective implementation.
1231
 The assessment 
and evaluation of implementation involve two important steps. First, the reporting by 
parties to the COP of their national targets or commitments and policy instruments they 
have adopted for the implementation of the Strategic Plan.
1232
 Second, the review by the 
COP, in particularly the Ad Hoc Open-ended Working Group on Review of 
Implementation of the Convention.
1233
  
Parties advocate other supportive mechanisms under the Strategic Plans in light of the 
various limitations that hamper implementation. Global and regional capacity-building 
programmes could provide technical support and facilitate peer-to-peer exchange that 
complements national activities. It could also provide capacity building on 
mainstreaming of gender, indigenous and local communities’ concerns into the 
implementation of the Strategic Plan at national and subnational levels.
1234
 Apart from 
                                               
1229 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 10, 
para 15. 
1230 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 10, 
para 16. 
1231 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 10, 
para 17. 
1232 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 11, 
para 18. Reporting shall include milestones achieved for the targets set, and the report on progress 
towards these targets and milestones. 
1233 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 11, 
para 19. The Ad Hoc Working Group will keep under review implementation of the strategic Plan, and 
support effective implementation by Parties in ensuring that new guidance is informed by the experience 
of Parties, in line with the principle of adaptive management through active learning. The COP will 
review the progress towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets as set out in the Strategic Plan and make 
recommendations to overcome any obstacles encountered in meeting those targets. The SBSTTA will 
facilitate the review process by developing a common set of biodiversity metrics to be used to assess the 
status of biodiversity and its values. It is stated in pp 12 - 13, para 25 that supportive mechanisms for the 
monitoring and assessment in global monitoring of biodiversity; and the regular assessment of the state of 
biodiversity and ecosystems services, future scenarios and effectiveness of responses.  
1234 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 11, 
para 20. 
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that, supportive mechanisms are available through the clearing-house mechanism and 
technological transfer to overcome technical incapacity,
1235
 and strategies for the 
mobilisation of resource to counter financial limitation.
1236
 Ongoing research on 
biodiversity-ecosystem function and services-human being linkages are needed to 
ensure effective implementation of the Strategic Plan, not excluding the contributions of 
knowledge, innovations and practices of indigenous and local communities relevant to 
the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity.
1237
 
The shared understanding of the parties to the Biodiversity Convention on the 
obligation to conserve biodiversity is demonstrated through the commitments 
continuously developed in the COPs since the first COP held in 1994.
1238
 The current 
shared understanding of parties, after decades of hard work in developing the rule of 
law in this area, culminated in the adoption of the Strategic Plan by the tenth COP. 
The most relevant aspect of the Convention for the interpretation of the obligation to 
preserve ecosystems of international watercourses is the conservation of biodiversity 
through the establishment of protected areas as stated under Article 8 of the 
Convention, especially paragraphs (a) and (d).  
The obligation imposed by Article 8 requiring the parties to conserve biodiversity 
and protect their natural surroundings and habitats is incrementally developed 
through the adoption and implementation of the Programme of Work on Protected 
Areas. In particularly, the thematic programme on inland water biodiversity fully 
demonstrates the application of the ecosystem approach within the framework of 
integrated catchment/watershed/river-basin management where the drainage basin 
approach is employed.
1239
 The Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water 
Biodiversity adopted in Decision VII/4 of the seventh COP (2004) guides national, 
regional and global efforts to reduce inland water biodiversity loss through the 
                                               
1235 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 12, 
para 22. 
1236 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 12, 
para 23. It is reiterated that capacity-building and timely, adequate, predictable and sustainable financial 
and technical resources are essential to facilitate the implementation of the Strategic Plan. Strategic Plan 
for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 13, para 25(e). 
1237 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, at p 13, 
para 25(c) and (d). 
1238 CBD, ‘Conference of the Parties’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/cop/> accessed 5 August 2012.  
1239 Goal 1.2, especially Activity 1.2.4 where drainage basin is specifically stated as the functioning unit 
for the systematic conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity, and the maintenance of overall 
ecosystem function, productivity and ‘health’. Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological 
Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11.  
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protection of inland water ecosystems. The national, regional and global efforts 
undertaken to reduce inland water biodiversity loss are further supported by the 
Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 - 2020 adopted in Decision X/2 of COP 10 
(2010).  
COP 10 (2010) crystallises the common intention of the Parties and their commitments 
in the implementation of the Strategic Plan. The tenth COP, in assertive language, 
decides that future meetings of the COP shall review progress in the implementation of 
the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020, shall share experiences relevant for 
implementation and shall provide guidance on means to address obstacles 
encountered’.1240 The concerted effort of the parties are indicated in the decision of the 
COP to consider the need for, and possible development of, additional mechanisms that 
enhance existing mechanisms of the Convention to enable the parties to implement the 
Strategic Plan, and ultimately meet their commitments under the Convention.
1241
 
6.3 Satisfaction of the Criteria of Legality 
The explicit requirement that the rules that shall be taken into account in the 
interpretation of a treaty term or provision in Article 31(3)(c) necessitates a 
determination of whether Article 8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity Convention satisfies 
the legality threshold for the interpretation of Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention. The remainder of this chapter will assess the legality of the shared 
understanding achieved on the obligation to undertake in situ conservation of 
biodiversity under Article 8(a) and (d) through the structural framework provided by the 
eight criteria of morality for the determination of whether these shared understandings 
attained the status of ‘rules of international law’.  
                                               
1240 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 4, para 14. This commitment is reaffirmed in the recent COP 11 (2012) 
through Decisions XI/2; XI/3; XI/23 and XI/24 in CBD, ‘Advance Unedited Copy of COP-11 Decision’, 
supra n 1224. 
1241 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 4, para 15. The commitment to achieve the Aichi Biodiversity Targets 
through the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 is reaffirmed in the most recent COP 11 (2012). 
See CBD, ‘XI/2. Review of Progress in Implementation of National Biodiversity Strategies and Action 
Plans and Related Capacity-building Support to Parties’ in CBD, ‘Advance Unedited Copy of COP-11 
Decision’, supra n 1204, at preambular paragraph 1. Decision XI/2 (2012), at p 18, para 1, emphasises the 
need of parties and other governments to review, as appropriate, update and revise their national 
biodiversity strategies and action plans in line with the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020, 
including national plans related to biodiversity.  
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A conceptualisation of a rule of international law through an interactional framework 
requires that rules developed through interactions, as established in Chapter Four of this 
thesis, are differentiated from other social norms by virtue of their satisfaction of the 
criteria of legality. The confirmation that Article 8(a) and (d) and the shared 
understanding that underpins these rules are ‘rules of international law’ is crucial for 
their incorporation in the interpretation of Article 20 in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention.
1242
  
6.3.1 Generality 
As noted in Chapter Four and exemplified in Chapter Five, the requirement of 
generality is sometimes interpreted to mean ‘the law must act impersonally, that its 
rules must apply to general classes and should contain no proper names’.1243 This is 
interpreted to require a generality in the participation of states in the enterprise of  
international law making, especially in the context of a global concern. The universality 
of the conservation of biodiversity is evident in Decision X/2, where the COP invites 
the UNGA to consider the adoption of relevant elements of the Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and its Aichi Targets as integral elements of the Millennium 
Development Goal, especially Goal 7 that addresses environmental sustainability.
1244
 Its 
generality is strengthened by the participation of various bodies of the UN systems in 
the development of implementation guidelines and the reporting, monitoring and 
assessment of the progress of implementation.
1245
 
The first assessment of the obligation to conserve stipulated under Article 8 against the 
criterion of generality is the participation of the parties in the making of this rule. The 
membership for the Biodiversity Convention currently stands at 193 parties.
1246
 Each 
party
1247
 is entitled to one vote in the COP.
1248
 The COP is the plenary organ and the 
                                               
1242 Similar operations are undertaken for Article 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention in Section 5.3 of 
this thesis. 
1243 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at 47.  
1244 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 4, para 16(e).  
1245 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at 4th preambular paragraph at p 1; and p 4, para 16(e). 
1246  CBD, ‘List of Parties’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/> accessed 9 August 
2012. 
1247
 Rule 16, CBD, ‘Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity’ (Annexed to Decision I/1 and Decision V/20) 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/legal/cbd-rules-procedure.pdf> accessed 10 August 2012. Each party is 
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forum in which decisions relating to the implementation of the Convention are 
undertaken, including the development and operationalisation of obligations under the 
Convention.
1249
 In this context, the obligations and the subsequent decisions adopted by 
the COP in the development and operationalisation of the obligations of the Convention 
have general application, as all parties in an interactional process participate in the 
enterprise of the making and development of the rule. The satisfaction of the 
desideratum of generality applies equally to Article 8(a) and (d) where the mechanisms 
proposed and adopted in the COP decisions to facilitate implementation of the 
Convention, especially the Programme of Work on Protected Areas on Inland Water 
Biodiversity, are arrived at through the participation of all Parties. 
Moreover, the mechanisms and rules developed in satisfaction of the obligation to 
conserve inland water ecosystems and their biodiversity applies equally to both the 
convention bodies and the parties to the Convention. For example, the implementation 
of Goal 1.2 of the Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biodiversity adopted 
in Decision VII/4 (2004)
1250
 for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive, 
adequate and representative system of protected inland water ecosystems within the 
framework of integrated catchment/watershed/river-basin management is applicable not 
only to the contracting parties. It also imposes a duty on the Executive Secretary of the 
                                                                                                                                         
represented by a delegation consisting of a head of delegation and such other accredited representatives, 
alternate representatives and advisers as it may require. 
1248 Art 31, Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12. Rule 39(1), CBD, ‘Rules of Procedure for Meetings of 
the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, supra n 1247. 
1249 Jutta Brunnée, ‘COPing with Consent: Law-Making under Multilateral Environmental Agreements’, 
supra n 736, at p 16. It exhibits the hybrid character of the COP as both an issue-specific diplomatic 
conferences and the permanent plenary bodies of international organisations ‘that exercise their functions 
at the interface of the law of treaties and international institutional law’. The CBD Secretariat explained 
that the COP is the governing body of the Convention, and ‘shall keep under review the implementation 
of the Convention’. See Art 23, Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12. It is the supreme decision-making 
body of the Convention where its main functions are ‘to monitor progress and to agree on programmes of 
work’ for the implementation of the convention. CBD, ‘Traditional Knowledge, Innovations and Practices. 
Introduction’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/traditional/intro.shtml> accessed 9 August 2012. In its 
capacity to review the implementation of the Convention, the COP has the power to ‘consider and 
undertake any additional action that may be required for the achievement of the purposes of this 
Convention in the light of experience gained in its operation’. Art 23(4)(i), Biodiversity Convention, 
supra n 12. The decisions adopted at the COPs are part of the process in which implementation of the 
Convention is reviewed and undertaken, where the obligations under the Convention is developed and 
operationalised. See CBD, ‘Decision V/20 Operations of the Convention’ (Decisions adopted by the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity at Its Fifth Meeting, Nairobi, 15 – 26 
May 2000)  UNED/CBD/COP/5/23, para 37 - 41 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-05/full/cop-05-
dec-en.pdf> accessed 10 August 2012. The COP, in para 38, decides on the mechanisms to enhance the 
review and facilitation of implementation of the Convention, including the preparation of strategic plan 
for the Convention, the second national reports and means to support implementation. 
1250 Goal 1.2, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11. 
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Convention to support the efforts undertaken by the parties to achieve Goal 1.2 laid out 
in the Revised Programme of Work.
1251
 
The obligation to conserve inland water biodiversity is a global concern and the effort in 
reaching a solution for its conservation is crystallised in Article 8 of the Convention, 
where continuous effort in promoting and enhancing its implementation has been 
undertaken in the interactional process of the COP. The quasi-universal participation of 
the international community in the COP process evidences the generality of the 
obligation to conserve, and further supports the assertion that Article 8 on in situ 
conservation, especially paragraphs (a) and (d), satisfies the criterion of generality. 
6.3.2 Promulgation 
As noted, in reference to the theoretical framework laid out in Chapter Four, Fuller 
envisioned promulgation as the education of citizens the meaning of the law that might 
be applied to him, conditioned by the principle of marginal utility.
1252
 It is important 
that the law be adequately published
1253
 because the citizen is entitled to know the laws 
that are applicable to ‘the practice of his calling’.1254 The text of the Convention is 
published in both hardcopy
1255
 and electronic copy
1256
, which clearly satisfies the 
promulgation requirement. 
In addition, the promulgation of what Fuller labelled as ‘rules and practices governing 
their internal procedures’ has also been undertaken by the Convention. The Secretariat 
of the Biodiversity Convention published the rules of procedures of COP
1257
 and the 
decisions adopted by COP
1258
 concerning the implementation of the obligations under 
the Convention online, where public access is readily available. Moreover, the 
                                               
1251 Goal 1.2, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 12. 
1252 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at  p 49. 
1253 ‘Adequately published’ in this context implies that the promulgation of the law has at least induces 
one man in a hundred takes the pains to inform himself concerning the laws applicable to the practice of 
his calling’. It is said to be adequate also if the law is known by a few, and these few man who ‘take the 
pains’ of informing himself of the law set a pattern to be followed by others, and indirectly influences the 
action of many. The publication of the law is also deemed adequate if the public is able to offer criticisms. 
See Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 51.  
1254 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 51. 
1255 CBD, supra n 12. 
1256 The text of the Convention, and all the subsequent resolutions adopted in furtherance of the objective 
of the Convention are available at the Biodiversity Convention website <http://www.cbd.int/> accessed 
17 November 2012.   
1257
 CBD, ‘Rules of Procedure for Meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’, supra n 1247. 
1258 CBD, ‘Conference of the Parties (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/cop/> accessed 10 August 2012. 
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mechanisms and guidelines for the implementation of the Convention,
1259
 and the 
progress of the implementation
1260
 of the obligation on in situ conservation through the 
establishment of protected areas under Article 8, are traceable online. 
It is apparent that the promulgation criterion for the obligation to conserve biodiversity 
under Article 8, both its external rule and its internal rule, is satisfied. 
6.3.3 Non-Retroactivity 
The principle of non-retroactivity is incorporated in the Biodiversity Convention where 
Article 22 stipulated that the provisions of the Biodiversity Convention ‘shall not affect 
the rights and obligations of any contracting parties deriving from any existing 
international agreement, except where the exercise of those rights and obligations would 
cause a serious damage or threat to biological diversity’. 1261  As a creature of 
international law, the Biodiversity Convention is ‘limited in scope and are predicated 
for its existence and operation on being part of the international law system’.1262 The 
principle of non-retroactivity, codified in the 1969 Vienna Convention and forming part 
of general international law, is intrinsic to the interpretation and application of the 
obligations under the Convention.
1263
 
The non-retroactivity of the provisions of the Biodiversity Convention, especially in the 
decisions and recommendations arrived at for the implementation of the Convention, 
and the guidelines
1264
 that provides the content of the obligation to conserve 
biodiversity are constantly updated and revised subsequent to the assessment and review 
of progress of the implementation of the contracting parties. These revisions do not 
have retrospective effect where previous implementation is not rendered inconsistent 
                                               
1259  For the Programme of Work on Protected Areas, see CBD, ‘Programme of Work’ (undated) 
<http://www.cbd.int/protected/pow/learnmore/intro/> accessed 11 August 2012. For tools and guidelines 
for the conservation of inland waters biodiversity, see CBD, ‘Inland Waters Biodiversity – Tool and 
Guidelines’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/waters/tools.shtml> accessed 11 August 2012.  
1260 For the progress in the global implementation of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas, see 
CBD, ‘Global Implementation’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/protected/implementation/> accessed 11 
August 2012. 
1261 Art 22(1), CBD, supra n 12. 
1262 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at p 280. See Allot, ‘The Concept 
of International Law’, supra n 748, at pp 43 – 44. The author elaborated that ‘They [Treaties] are an 
integral part of a society’s legal self-constituting, its self-ordering through law. Treaties are a sub-
delegation of law-making power. The parties may make law for themselves, their legal capacity to do so 
deriving from international constitutional law, which may set formal and substantial limitations on the 
capacity’. 
1263
 1969 Vienna Convention, supra n 31, Art 28,. 
1264 These guidelines are adopted as the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity and the Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas. 
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with subsequent amendments and revision. The ‘non-retroactivity’ of these revisions 
and amendments is evidenced by the adoption of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 
2011 – 2020, with its Aichi Targets by the COP of the Biodiversity Convention.1265 
Furthermore, the COP urges parties and other Governments to develop national and 
regional targets in accordance with the flexible framework provided by the Strategic 
Plan; review, update and revise as appropriate their national biodiversity strategies and 
action plans; and use the revised and updated national biodiversity strategies and action 
plans as effective instruments for the integration of biodiversity targets into national 
development and poverty reduction policies.
1266
 
This is not contrary to the requirement of non-retroactivity, as previous implementation 
standards and guidelines provide the basis for further actions to be undertaken in the 
facilitation of the Parties’ implementation of their obligation to conserve.1267  
6.3.4 Clarity 
The clarity of law is viewed as the most essential ingredients of legality, where the 
specificity and the need for clarity of law depend on the nature of the problem.
1268
 The 
state of global biodiversity is in a continuous state of decline, where the most rapid 
declines are found in the tropics, in freshwater habitats and marine species utilised by 
humans.
1269
 Efforts have been undertaken to respond to the degradation of biodiversity, 
including the increase in the designation of protected areas.
1270
  
The adoption of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 including the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets
1271
 clarifies the obligation to conserve biodiversity through in situ 
conservation laid down in Article 8 of the Biodiversity Convention. The Strategic Plan 
proposed a flexible framework to address degradation and loss of biodiversity and to 
                                               
1265 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 1, para 1. 
1266 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 2, para 3(b), (c), (d). 
1267  Similar conclusion has been arrived upon regarding the pegging of the UNFCCC’s stabilisation 
commitments to a 1990 reference year. Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, 
supra n 724, at pp 185 – 186.  
1268 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 63. 
1269 Dolors Armenteras and C Max Finlayson (Coordinating Lead Authors) ‘Chapter 5. Biodiversity’ in 
UNEP, Global Environmental Outlook 5 (UNEP, 2012) at p 134 
<http://www.unep.org/geo/pdfs/geo5/GEO5_report_C5.pdf> accessed 11 August 2012 (hereinafter: 
‘GEO 5’). 
1270
 GEO 5, supra n 1269, at p 134.  
1271  Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1210, supra 
n 1215, at p 9. 
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improve the state of biodiversity through multiple entry points. These entry points 
include tackling underlying causes of biodiversity loss; reducing direct pressures on 
biodiversity; safeguarding and restoring biodiversity and ecosystems; ensuring 
continued provision of ecosystem services and their accesses; and enhancing the support 
mechanisms for capacity building.
1272
  Directly pertinent to the obligation to conserve is 
stipulated in Strategic Goal C of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets and the accompanying 
Targets 11 – 13 that aim to improve the status of biodiversity through the safeguard of 
ecosystems, species and genetic diversity. In this respect, the obligation to conserve 
ecosystems aims to achieve a designation of 17% of terrestrial inland water as protected 
areas conserved through ‘effectively and equitably managed, ecologically representative 
and well-connected systems of protected areas and other effective area-based 
conservation measures, and the integration into the wider landscapes and seascapes’.1273 
The Programme of Work on Protected Areas adopted in Decision VII/28 clarifies the 
obligation imposed under Article 8 by providing the actions to be taken in the 
establishment of protected areas.
1274
 It provides procedural guidance in the 
establishment of protected areas, from information collection, designation of areas of 
protection informed by the categorisation of IUCN, the management of the protected 
areas, and the integration of these areas into the overarching ecological networks, 
corridors and/or buffer zones in accordance with the ecosystem approach within a 
stipulated time frame.  
A more refined level of specificity was undertaken for the conservation of inland water 
biodiversity, where a work programme on inland water ecosystems, with a scheduled 
timeframe, was adopted in Decision IV/4.
1275
 The programme of work prescribed 
actions for the assessment of status and trends, and stipulated the development of work 
plan for the SBSTTA on matters relating to, inter alia, the assessment of status and 
trends of inland water biodiversity and their conservation and sustainable use.
1276
 
Several salient features for the conservation of inland water biodiversity are highlighted 
                                               
1272 Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets supra n 1215, at p 7, 
para 10. 
1273 Target 11, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 
1215,  at p 9. 
1274 See Activities (1.1.1) – (1.1.7), Goal 1.1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, 
supra n 1148, at pp 8 – 9. 
1275 Annex I and Annex II of CBD, ‘Decision IV/4. Status and Trends of the Biological Diversity of 
Inland Water Ecosystems and Options for Conservation and Sustainable Use’, supra n 450. 
1276 Annex I of CBD, ‘Decision IV/4. Status and Trends of the Biological Diversity of Inland Water 
Ecosystems and Options for Conservation and Sustainable Use’, supra n 450, at pp 17 – 19, paras 1 – 8. 
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in COP 4 (1998). Several action areas such as the development of integrated land and 
watershed/catchment/basin management plans; the use of appropriate technology the 
transfer of technology; the research on the application of ecosystem approach;  
monitoring and assessment of sites; the evaluation of biodiversity and development of 
measures for its sustainable use; and etc are recommended by the COP to the Parties.
1277
  
The Programme of Work on Inland Water Ecosystems is updated and revised at the 
seventh COP to enhance implementation of the parties at the catchment/watershed/river 
basin level, and highlights Biodiversity Convention’s leadership role in striving for the 
collaboration with other organisations, institutions and convention to streamline and to 
synergise the Convention’s activities to avoid duplications.1278 In order to achieve the 
goal of establishing and maintaining comprehensive, adequate and representative 
systems of protected inland water ecosystems within the framework of integrated 
catchment/watershed/river-basin management, the parties are required to undertake 
several activities. These activities include the provision of examples of protected area 
establishment and management strategies that support the conservation and sustainable 
use of inland water ecosystems; the assessment and identification of priority sites for 
inclusion into the system of protected inland water ecosystems using criteria such as 
sites important for water ecosystem-dependent migratory species as laid out in the 
Ramsar Convention.
1279
 
Apart from that, the Revised Programme of Work prescribes for the development of 
protected area systems that can contribute in a systematic way to the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity and to maintain overall ecosystem function, 
productivity and ‘health’ of each drainage basin.1280 In the attainment of this Goal, the 
parties are encouraged to collaborate with neighbouring parties for the management and 
protection of inland water ecosystems.
1281
 Parties to both the Biodiversity Convention 
and the Ramsar Convention are required to harmonise their activities undertaken in the 
implementation of the Revised Programme of Work with the Ramsar Strategic 
                                               
1277 Supra n 1276, at pp 19 – 22. 
1278 CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 1 para 4. Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water 
Biological Diversity, supra n 1188.  
1279 Activities 1.2.1 – 1.2.3, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 
1188, at p 11. 
1280 Activity 1.2.4, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
11. 
1281 Activity 1.2.5, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
12. 
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Framework.
1282
 This framework remains relevant as concluded in Decision X/28 of the 
tenth COP.
1283
 
The Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biodiversity (Decision VII/4) is 
supplemented by the Programme of Work on Protected Areas (Decision VII/28) that 
provides guidance in the establishment of protected areas in accordance with Article 8. 
Procedural mechanisms, from the identification of sites and their management, to the 
integration of these sites into an integrated global network of national and regional 
systems, are provided in the Programme of Work on Protected Areas adopted in 
Decision VII/28.
1284
 The parties are encouraged to establish suitable time-bound and 
measurable national and regional protected area targets and indicators, and take action 
to establish or expand protected areas, especially under-represented marine and inland 
water ecosystems in national, regional and transboundary systems of inland water 
protected areas. The parties also need to take into consideration the conservation needs 
of migratory species within a certain timeframe.
1285
  
The Programme of Work on Protected Areas, in particularly the specific thematic 
programme on inland waters biodiversity, and the recently adopted Strategic Plan and 
Aichi Targets revised for application to the 2011 – 2020 period, contribute toward the 
clarification of Article 8 paragraphs (a) and (d). The obligation stipulated under the 
provision that commands the parties to conserve biodiversity and the protection of 
ecosystems, natural habitats and the natural surroundings of viable populations of 
species through the establishment of protected areas, can be said to satisfy the clarity 
criterion. The persistent and continuous efforts undertaken by the parties in applying the 
framework, guidelines and technical and/or capacity-building tools available for the 
implementation of Article 8 provide the foundation for further development of relevant 
rules, both procedural and substantive, to facilitate the parties’ implementation of their 
obligation to conserve biodiversity stipulated under Article 8. This will progressively 
develop the substantive and normative clarity of the provision.  
                                               
1282 Activity 1.2.6, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
12. 
1283 CBD, ‘X/28 Inland Waters Biodiversity’, supra n 1209, at pp 1 – 2, para 6.  
1284
 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 8. 
1285 See Activities (1.1.1) – (1.1.7), Goal 1.1, ‘Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, 
supra n 1148, at pp 8 – 9.  
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6.3.5 Non-Contradiction 
The criterion of non-contradiction seeks not the pronouncement of non-law in the face 
of contradictions, but instead, to seek reconciliation through recourse to the context and 
the reciprocal adjustment between the two contradictory laws.
1286
 Similar to the Ramsar 
Convention, there seems to be an apparent contradiction with the desire to conserve 
biodiversity, which is a common concern of humankind, while at the same time, re-
affirming the use of biological resources, albeit in a sustainable manner.
1287
  
The purpose of conservation is to address and resolve the driver of biodiversity loss, and 
notes the fundamental requirement of conservation through in situ conservation of 
ecosystems, natural habitats, and the recovery of viable populations of species in their 
natural surroundings.
1288
 This determination to conserve and sustainably use 
biodiversity led to the conclusion of the Convention where the objectives of the 
Convention are ‘the conservation of biological diversity, the sustainable use of its 
components and the fair and equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the 
utilisation of genetic resources’.1289 
‘Sustainable use’ is defined to mean ‘the use of components of biodiversity in a way 
and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biodiversity, thereby 
maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future 
generations’.1290 It is noteworthy that although sustainable use is defined, there is no 
such definition for ‘conservation’ in Article 2. However, in light of Articles 8 and 9 that 
elaborate steps to be taken in the in situ and ex situ conservation of biodiversity, it can 
be implied that the concept and scope of ‘conservation’ could not be substantively 
defined. Instead, a range of procedural mechanisms is listed out in order to furnish the 
necessary details that amount to the obligation to conserve biodiversity. 
The Preamble is indicative that the preferable method for the conservation of 
biodiversity is the ‘in situ conservation of ecosystems, natural habitats, and the recovery 
of viable populations of species in their natural surroundings’. This preference is 
crystallised in Article 8(a) and (d) where it is stipulated that, ‘the contracting parties 
                                               
1286 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 68 – 69. 
1287 3rd and 5th preambular paragraphs, Preamble, CBD, supra n 12. 
1288
 8
th
 and 10
th
 preambular paragraphs, Preamble, CBD, supra n 12. 
1289 Art 1, CBD, supra n 12. 
1290 Art 2, CBD, supra n 12. 
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shall, as far as possible and as appropriate,  establish a system of protected areas with 
special measures taken for the conservation of biodiversity; and to promote the 
protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of 
species in natural surroundings’.1291  
The contradiction between conservation and sustainable use is reconciled and 
harmonised in the implementation of conservation measures. The reconciliation is 
guided by the flexible framework developed for the period of 2011 – 2020 in the 
Strategic Plan adopted in Decision X/2 by the COP.
1292
 The Strategic Plan endeavours 
to take effective and urgent actions to halt the loss of biodiversity, and to increase 
ecosystem resilience for the continued supply of essential services that sustain human 
well-being.
1293
  
The five Strategic Goals developed to achieve the vision of the Strategic Plan 
demonstrate the reconciliation between conservation and sustainable use through the 
prism of an ecosystem approach, where conservation and use are couched in the 
languages of ecosystem functioning and services provided by its biotic components 
(biodiversity). The conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity both aim to reduce 
biodiversity loss through, inter alia, reducing the direct pressure on biodiversity by 
promoting for sustainable use; and improving the status of biodiversity through the 
safeguarding of ecosystems, species and genetic diversity.
1294
  
The sustainable use of biodiversity under the Strategic Plan implies that the use of 
biodiversity, be it the harvest of fish and invertebrate stocks; or the management of 
agriculture, aquaculture and forestry areas; must be within safe ecological limits that 
avoid over-exploitation and ensure conservation of biodiversity in accordance with the 
                                               
1291 Art 8(a) and (d), Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12. 
1292  Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 1215, 
annexed to CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210.  
1293  Mission, CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 8, para 12. The ultimate goal of the Strategic Plan is to achieve 
the vision of living in harmony with nature by 2050. Living in harmony with nature means ‘biodiversity 
is valued, conserved restored and wisely used’, and ecosystem services are maintained to sustain a healthy 
planet by delivering essential benefits to all people Vision, CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 7, para 11. 
1294 Strategic Goals B and C, CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and 
the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at pp 8 – 9. 
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ecosystem approach.
1295
 This indicates that the obligation for the sustainable use of 
biodiversity is applied in adherence to, and not inconsistent with, the conservation of 
biodiversity to the minimum extent that it is within the safe limits of the ecological 
systems.  
The aim of conservation is expansive where its objective is not just the preservation of 
pristine natural environment, but also the safeguarding of representative systems of 
protected inland water ecosystems,
1296
 ultimately for human well-being and poverty 
alleviation.
1297
 The Revised Programme of Work on Inland Waters Biodiversity 
acknowledged and reconciled the tension between conservation and sustainable use 
where the sustainable use of inland water ecosystems are implicit, or at least not 
impermissible, in the establishment of protected areas and the design of their 
management strategies under Goal 1.2.
1298
  This is strengthened by the fact that the 
systems of protected inland water ecosystems includes all IUCN protected area 
categories, where the Category VI Protected Areas allows the allocation of a proportion 
of the area for the low-level, non-industrial use of sustainable natural resources that is 
mutually beneficial to both conservation and sustainable use.
1299
  
This is clear that within the Convention, although the obligation to conserve and to use 
sustainably seem to be contradictory, reconciliation is struck not only in the treaty 
instrument, but also the instruments that facilitate the implementation of the Convention 
and were subsequently developed by the parties through the COP processes. In light of 
the multiplication of treaty regimes on the environment, the potential conflict of 
biodiversity-related conventions are foreseen and addressed in the Strategic Plan and 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas, and the more specific Revised Programme of 
Work on Inland Water Biodiversity.  
                                               
1295 Targets 5, 6 and 7, Strategic Goal B, CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 
2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 8. 
1296 Objective (a), Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
11. 
1297  Vision, CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 7, para 11. 
1298 Activity 1.2.1, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
11. 
1299 IUCN, ‘Category VI – Protected Area with Sustainable Use of Natural Resources’ (10 September 
2009) <http://www.iucn.org/about/work/programmes/pa/pa_products/wcpa_categories/pa_categoryvi/> 
accessed 12 August 2012. For its application, see Dudley (ed) Guidelines for Applying Protected Area 
Management Categories, supra n 1125, at p 22. 
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The Strategic Plan recounts the importance of partnerships and synergies at both the 
national and international levels in order to ensure that the Convention, through its 
Strategic Plan, contributes not only to its three main objectives but also towards 
sustainable development and to other Millennium Development Goals,
1300
 and proposes 
initiatives that enhance cooperation.
1301
 More specifically, the Parties are required to 
harmonise the work undertaken under the Programme of Work on Inland Water 
Biodiversity with the Ramsar Convention if the Party is party to both Conventions.
1302
 
The collaboration and harmonisation undertaken at the Convention level and the 
contracting party level ensures that contradictions within and beyond the Convention 
are reconciled.  
Despite the possibility of contradictions between the two concepts of conservation and 
sustainable use, and the potential conflicts between the Biodiversity Convention and 
other Conventions, efforts for their reconciliation have been undertaken. Thus, the 
obligation to conserve through establishment of protected areas, and the safeguarding of 
ecosystems and habitats stipulated under Article 8, satisfies the non-contradiction 
criterion.  
6.3.6 Law Not Requiring the Impossible – Reasonableness  
The fine line between law requiring the impossible and law that is not impossible, but is 
extremely difficult is exceptionally true in the current climate of international 
                                               
1300 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at pp 10 – 11, para 17.  
1301 CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 12, para 23. The Programme of Work on Protected Areas adopted in Decision 
VII/28 listed the partnering institutions for its implementation, which paves the way for further 
cooperation and creation of synergy and avoids duplication of work. See Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 6. The attached Appendix gave an indicative list of 
partners and other collaborators for the implementation of this Programme of Work, at p 23. 
1302 Activity 1.2.6, ‘Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at 
p 12. Collaborations for the conservation of inland water biodiversity, especially through the expansion of 
protected areas and ecological networks for inland water biodiversity through designation of coherent and 
comprehensive networks of wetlands areas within river basins for the Ramsar List of Wetlands of 
International Importance are reinforced. CBD, ‘Decision X/28 Inland Waters Biodiversity’, supra n 1209, 
at p 2, para 10(c). See also p 6, paras 35, 36 and 39. The collaboration between the Biodiversity 
Convention and the Ramsar Convention is affirmed where the fifth Joint Work Plan (2011 – 2020 
between the Biodiversity Convention and the Ramsar Convention are adopted in COP 11(2012). See 
CBD, ‘XI/23. Biological Diversity of Inland Water Ecosystems’ Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of 
the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, 8 – 19 October 2012, Hyderabad, India) in CBD, 
‘Advance Unedited Copy of COP-11 Decision’, supra n 1224, at pp 145 and 146, paras 4 and 8.  
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environmental law where provisions are mostly aspirational, bordering on, but not to the 
extent of requiring the impossible.
1303
 
The status and progress of implementation of this obligation provides a good starting 
point for the determination of whether the obligation to conserve biodiversity through 
the establishment of systems of protected areas and the safeguard of inland water 
ecosystems is ‘impossible’. According to the data presented on the overall global 
progress in the implementation of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas as 
reported by the World Database on Protected Areas, 12.9% of terrestrial area, including 
inland waters, is designated as protected areas.
 1304
  
The Ad hoc Working Group on Review and Implementation reported that there is an 
increase of 1,297,578.52 km
2 
in cumulative terrestrial protected area from 2004 to 
2011.
1305
 Forty-nine parties or 23% of the parties had achieved Target 11 of the 
Strategic Plan, which aimed for the designation of at least 17% of terrestrial and inland 
water as protected areas.
1306
 Another 40 Parties are close to achieve this Target where 
between 10 – 16.99% of their terrestrial surface area are protected.1307  
The data used by the Working Group reveals that developing regions are the closest to 
attain the 17% target where 13.3% of their areas were protected in 2010.
1308
 Developed 
regions and land-locked developing countries follow closely with 11.6 and 11.3% 
protected areas respectively. Latin America has over 20.4% of its terrestrial area 
protected in 2010, which surpassed the target set down in Target 11 of the Strategic 
                                               
1303 See Ellis and FitzGerald, ‘The Precautionary Principle in International Law’, supra n 814, at p 790. 
1304 CBD, ‘Global Implementation’ (undated) < http://www.cbd.int/protected/implementation/> accessed 
13 August 2012. The information was based on best available information from over 100 countries. Data 
sources included the 4th national reports, as well as a series of CBD regional workshops, in which 
countries provided detailed status reports on their implementation of the Programme of Work 
1305  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 3, para 11. Figure sourced from UNEP-WCMC, ‘The World Database on Protected Areas’ 
(Cambridge, UK, January 2011). 
1306  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 3, para 11. 
1307  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 3, para 11. 
1308
 CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 3, para 12. 
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Plan.
1309
 The Asian region follows closely with 15.9% in Eastern Asia, and 15.4% in 
Western Asia.
1310
 
Although there has been an incremental expansion in the coverage of protected areas, 
where 23% of the Parties have managed to achieve the target laid out in the Strategic 
Plan, management effectiveness remains a lingering issue where 13% of the assessed 
4,100 protected areas have ‘clearly inadequate’ management. Only 24% of these 
protected areas have in place ‘sound management’ for their protected areas, and the 
other 62% have ‘basic management’. 1311  Despite the gap in the qualitative 
implementation of Target 11, where the lack of effective management remains 
unsatisfactory, preliminary information gathered in the course of a series of regional and 
sub-regional capacity-building workshops suggested that ‘the world community is 
making good progress towards Aichi Biodiversity Target 11’.1312 Some countries have 
even surpassed the global target, which goes a long way to indicate that the obligation 
to conserve biodiversity under Article 8, and the shared understanding to designate at 
least 17% of terrestrial area as a protected area, is not impossible.  
The obligation to conserve, from an interactional perspective, continues to be developed 
and enhanced where after the achievement of the quantitative aspect of the rule, which 
is the attainment of the 17% target, efforts are channelled towards improving the 
management effectiveness of the protected areas, with an increased focus on the 
representativeness and the connectivity of the protected areas.
1313
 Furthermore, as part 
of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas, several tools and initiatives have been 
developed to facilitate and assist the Parties to continue to develop and improve the size 
                                               
1309  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 3, para 12. 
1310  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 3, para 12. 
1311  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at pp 1 – 2, para 4. 
1312  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 2, para 5. 
1313
 CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 2, para 6. 
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and effectiveness of their protected areas network.
1314
 From this respect, the criterion of 
reasonableness is satisfied, whereby as capacity grows, the rule becomes less impossible, 
less aspirational, and less difficult, which draws the rule closer towards the legal-norms 
end of the social norms-legal norms continuum.         
6.3.7 Constancy 
The uncertainty of the impact of climate change leads to a difficulty in maintaining 
constancy in the imposition of commitments.
1315
 The criterion of constancy must 
necessarily be modified in light of the nature of the problem, where adaptation and 
mitigation in response to changes are pivotal to the relevance of the commitments. The 
criterion of constancy is deemed satisfied if the decision-making rules and the law-
making processes are transparent and predictable.
1316
  
For Article 8 that imposes the obligation to conserve through the establishment of 
protected areas that protects ecosystems and natural habitats, the Programme of Work 
on Protected Areas adopted in Decision VII/28 prescribed activities that serve to 
contribute toward the achievement of the three objectives of the Convention.
1317
 These 
activities provide a systematic procedural guidance to assist the parties in their 
observation of their obligation to conserve under the Convention.  
The Programme of Work on Protected Areas proposed for direct actions to be taken for 
the planning, selecting, establishing, strengthening, and managing protected area 
systems and sites.
1318
 The Programme of Work requires, firstly, the establishment and 
strengthening of an integrated system of national and regional protected areas
1319
 that is 
subsequently integrated into broader land- and seascapes via the application of the 
                                               
1314  CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Achieving Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 and Capacity-Building 
Initiatives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas. Note by the Executive Secretary’, supra n 
1224,  at p 2, para 7. 
1315 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 183. 
1316 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 183. 
1317 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 8.  
1318 Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 8.  
1319 Goal 1.1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 8. The Parties 
are required to establish, by 2006, time-bound and measurable national and regional level protected area 
targets and indicators, and take urgent steps to establish or expand protected areas in unfragmented, 
highly irreplaceable natural or highly vulnerable areas; or under-represented marine and inland water 
ecosystems. See Activity 1.1.1 – 1.1.3, and 1.1.6 at pp 8 and 9. Activity 1.1.6 requires the designation of 
protected areas identified through the national or regional gap analysis by 2009 and complete the 
establishment of comprehensive and ecologically representative national and regional systems of 
protected areas by 2010 for terrestrial environments and 2012 for marine environment. 
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ecosystem approach to maintain ecological structure and function.
1320
 The designation 
of protected area systems necessitates the substantial improvement of site-based 
protected area planning and management
1321
 that integrates climate change adaptation 
measures in the planning, management strategies, and the design of protected area 
systems.
1322
  
Programme Element 4 is crucial in the parties’ effort to implement Programme Element 
1 where the continuous management of a protected site and its integration into broader 
land- or seascape framework necessitate the setting of standards, assessment criteria and 
monitoring baselines and methodology.
1323
 It develops the substance for an effective 
management of protected areas that lays out the qualitative aspect of the obligation to 
conserve biodiversity through the establishment of protected areas. The parties are 
required to develop standards and best practices where efficient, long-term monitoring 
of outcomes is implemented.
1324
 The monitoring results provide the input for the 
adaptation and improvement on the management of protected area.
1325
 Viewed in this 
context, the obligation of Article 8 is not constant as the subjects of management are 
constantly modified in response to the results of monitoring, where future management 
actions are outcome-oriented in accordance with the ecosystem approach.
1326
 
                                               
1320 Goal 1.2, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 9 – 11. 
Activity 1.2.4 requires parties to develop tools of ecological connectivity, such as ecological corridors 
that link the protected areas together where necessary or beneficial as determined by national priorities for 
the conservation of biodiversity. Goal 1.3 specifically provides for the establishment and strengthening of 
regional networks, transboundary protected areas and collaboration between neighbouring protected areas 
across national boundaries.  
1321 Goal 1.4, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 11 – 12. The 
plan creates a highly participatory process that involves indigenous and local communities and relevant 
stakeholders as part of site-based planning. Appropriate measurable biodiversity conservation targets for 
sites are identified, drawing upon the criteria laid out in Annex I to the Biodiversity Convention. The site-
planning process must include an analysis of opportunities for the protected area to contribute towards the 
conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity at different scale; as well as the analysis of threats, and 
their solution. See Activity 1.4.1 – 1.4.4, pp 11 – 12.  
1322 Activity 1.4.5, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 12.  
1323 Programme Element 4: Standards, Assessment, and Monitoring, Programme of Work on Protected 
Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 20 – 23. This entails the obligation of parties to – develop  
and adopt minimum standards and best practices for protected area systems (Goal 4.1); evaluate and 
improve the effectiveness of protected areas management (Goal 4.2);  assess and monitor protected area 
and trends (Goal 4.3); and to ensure that scientific knowledge contributes to the establishment and 
effectiveness of protected areas and protected area systems Goal 4.4). 
1324 Activities 4.1.1 an 4.1.2, Goal 4.1, Programme Element 4: Standards, Assessment and Monitoring, 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 20.  
1325 Activity 4.1.3, Goal 4.1, Programme Element 4: Standards, Assessment and Monitoring, ‘Annex. 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas’ in CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, 
supra n 447, at p 20. 
1326 Activity 4.1.3, Goal 4.1, Programme Element 4: Standards, Assessment and Monitoring, Programme 
of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 20. The evaluation of effectiveness of 
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Apart from that, the Programme of Work prescribes supportive mechanisms for the 
equitable sharing of both costs and benefits arising from the establishment and 
management of protected areas,
1327
 where the rights and responsibilities of indigenous 
and local communities and other relevant stakeholders in decision-making are 
accounted for
1328
 through the creation of an enabling environment.
1329
   
The Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biodiversity acknowledged the 
general requirements for the conservation and sustainable use of biodiversity in 
accordance with the ecosystem approach, and the importance of enabling activities and 
monitoring and assessment in the overall management framework.
1330
 Furthermore, it 
provides more specificity on the conservation of inland water biodiversity where in this 
thematic programme, more focus is given to the assessment status, trends and threats to 
the biodiversity of inland waters that advocates a work plan with defined timeframes, 
ways, means and capacity needs for the assessment of extent, distribution and 
characteristics of inland water ecosystems.
1331
  
Corresponding to the Programme of Work on Protected Areas adopted in Decision 
VII/28 for the designation of protected areas, the Revised Programme of Work on 
Inland Water Biodiversity provides the criteria and systems of classification for the 
identification of important inland water biodiversity.
1332
 For this purpose, the parties are 
requested to adopt the Ramsar classification of wetlands as an interim classification 
system and the framework for the initial inventorying of inland water ecosystems.
1333
 
The Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biodiversity furthers the 
conservation objectives under the Programme of Work on Protected Areas where the 
                                                                                                                                         
management; the assessment of status and trends in accordance with scientific knowledge are further 
elaborated under Goals 4.2 – 4.4.   
1327 Goal 2.1, Programme Element 2: Governance, Participation, Equity and Benefit Sharing, Programme 
of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 13. 
1328 Goal 2.2, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 14.  
1329 Programme Element 3: Enabling Environment, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision 
VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 15 – 20. An enabling environment includes the provision of an enabling 
policy, institutional and socio-economic environment for protected areas (Goal 3.1); capacity building for 
the planning, establishment and management of protected areas (Goal 3.2); the application and transfer of 
appropriate technologies for protected areas (Goal 3.3); the guarantee of financial sustainability of 
protected areas (Goal 3.4); and the strengthening of communication, education and public awareness 
(Goal 3.5); at pp 15 – 20.  
1330 CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 2, para 7(a) – (c). For details, see Programme Elements 1 – 3, 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 8 – 31.  
1331 CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 3, paras 15 and 16. 
1332
 CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at pp 5 – 6, paras 27 – 30.  
1333 CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 5, para 27. Further elaboration on the guidelines on existing 
criteria is needed, especially for a set of features. See CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 5, para 29. 
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management of inland water ecosystems through comprehensive, adequate and 
representative systems of protected areas requires the adoption of a basin approach that 
incorporates the ecosystem approach.
1334
 The management of inland water ecosystems 
must take into account guidelines laid out in the Ramsar Convention for Wetlands and 
where appropriate, harmonises the implementation under the Programme of Work with 
Ramsar’s Strategic Framework.1335  
Through the provision of a detailed decision-making processes, from the selection of 
sites for protection to their management, the obligation to conserve under Article 8 is 
deemed to satisfy the criterion of constancy.  
6.3.8 Congruence between Official Action and Declared Rules – the Observation 
of the Rule of Law 
Congruence denotes the consistent application of the law by the officials charged with 
its administration.
1336
 In the Biodiversity Convention, the ‘officials charged with its 
administration’ are the state contracting parties who are party to the Convention. 
Nonetheless, non-party states and non-state actors, despite not being a party to the 
Convention, may still observe the provisions of the Convention, and partake in the 
enterprise of law making in the development of the obligations set forth in the 
Convention.
1337
 The collaborations and cooperation struck between the contracting 
                                               
1334  Objective (a), Goal 1.1, CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 8. An integrated 
watershed/catchment/river basin management strategies are incorporated not only in the conservation and 
sustainable use of inland water ecosystems and transboundary catchments, watersheds and river basins, 
but also in the maintenance, restoration, improvement of the quality and supply of inland water resources 
and other functions and values of inland water ecosystems where adaptive management and mitigation 
responses are an intrinsic component. Objectives (b) and (c), Goal 1.1, CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, 
at p 8. See also Activity 1.2.4, Goal 1.2, CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at p 11.  
1335 Activities 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4, and 1.2.6, Goal 1.2, CBD, Decision VII/4, supra n 158, at pp 11 – 12. 
The recent COP 11 (2012) welcomed the fifth Joint Work Plan (2011 – 2020) between the Biodiversity 
Convention and the Ramsar Convention. See CBD, ‘XI/23. Biological Diversity of Inland Water 
Ecosystems’ (Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, 8 – 19 October 2012, Hyderabad, India) in CBD, ‘Advance Unedited Copy of COP-11 
Decision’, supra n 1224, at p 146, para 8. 
1336 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 81 – 91. See Krisch, ‘Review of Legitimacy and 
Legality in International Law’, supra n 828, at p 206.  
1337  One of the supporting mechanisms proposed to facilitate contracting parties in the implementation of 
their obligation under the Convention was the enhancement of cooperation between various institutions. 
They include programmes, funds, and specialised agencies of the United Nations system as well as 
conventions and other multilateral and bilateral agencies, foundations and non-governmental 
organisations including UNEP, UNDP, the World Bank, FAO and IUCN, and the indigenous and local 
communities. CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi 
Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 12, para 24. Deeper normative activity is promoted where the 
COP is empowered to forge collaborations and cooperation with other conventional bodies in relevant 
matters. See Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Art 23(4)(h). See CBD, ‘The Joint Work Programme 
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parties as the ‘officials charged with its administration’ and the non-party entities1338 
form part of the enterprise of law-making that contribute towards the emergence of legal 
normativity of the obligations crystallised in the Convention, which serve as a yardstick 
for the assessment against the criterion of congruence. Moreover, the concerted hard 
work by all parties in the development of the rules demonstrates the universality of the 
safeguarding of biodiversity as a global concern.
1339
  
According to the Review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 by the Executive Secretary,1340 it is re-affirmed that ‘well-
governed and effectively managed protected areas are a proven method for safeguarding 
both habitats and populations of species and for delivering important ecosystem 
services’.1341 At the global level, some 13% of the world’s terrestrial area is protected 
where the 2011 data from the World Database on Protected Areas revealed that at the 
regional level, 20.4% of Latin America, more than 15% of Eastern and Western Asia, 
                                                                                                                                         
(JWO) between the CBD and the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands (Ramsar, Iran, 1971): Progress with 
Implementation and Development of the 5th JWP (2011 Onwards)’, supra n 1185. For more cooperation 
and partnerships, see CBD, ‘Cooperation and Partnership’ (CBD, undated) 
<http://www.cbd.int/cooperation/artsdecs.shtml> accessed 28 March 2012.  
1338 The phenomenon of the multilateralisation of law-making in the institutionalised setting of MEAs as 
discussed in Section 4.5 of this thesis strengthens the role that non-state actors play in the normative 
development of environmental rules. The Biodiversity Convention allows the participation of non-parties 
to the Convention, such as the United Nations and its specialised agencies, the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, non-party states, and also ‘any other body or agency, whether governmental or non-
governmental qualified in fields relating to conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity’ to be 
involved in the COP as observers. However, this is subject to the condition that such intention to present 
as observer has been submitted to the secretariat, and not objected by not more than one third of the 
parties presented at the COP. Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Art 24(5). Refer to ‘Rules of 
Procedure for Meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
supra n 1247, Rules 6 and 7. See Biodiversity Convention, supra n 12, Art 23(5). For example, COP 10 
(2010) allowed a list of qualified bodies or agencies which has informed the secretariat their intention to 
be represented as observers to be presented at the 10th COP, see CBD, ‘Qualified Bodies or Agencies, 
whether Governmental or Non-Governmental, which have Informed the Secretariat of Their Wish to be 
Represented as Observers at the 10th Meeting of the COP to the CBD’ (19 October 2010) (Tenth Meeting 
of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, 18 – 29 October 
2010) UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/41 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-10/information/cop-10-
inf-41-en.pdf > accessed 28 March 2012. 
1339 See Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 178. See 
The Future We Want, supra n 59, at paras 61, 111, and 197 – 204.  
1340 CBD, ‘Review of Progress in Implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020, 
Including the Establishment of National Targets and the Updating of National Biodiversity Strategies and 
Action Plans’ (20 July 2012) (Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Hyderabad, India, 8 – 19 October 2012) UNEP/CBD/COP/11/12  
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-11/official/cop-11-12-en.pdf> accessed 16 August 2012 
(hereinafter: ‘Review of Progress by Executive Secretary’). 
1341 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 12 para 21. 
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11.8% of Sub-Saharan Africa, 4.9% of Oceania and 4% of Northern Africa are 
protected.
1342
  
Furthermore, the current data for year 2011 revealed that 42 countries have designated 
more than 17% of their territories as protected areas subjected to the Convention, with 
another 65 countries setting aside 5 – 15% of their territories as protected areas.1343  
Two hundred seventy three out of 823 ecoregions have more than 17% of their area 
designated as protected areas.
1344
 Five out of the 14 terrestrial biomes, which are tundra, 
flooded grasslands and savannas, tropical and sub-tropical moist broadleaf forests, 
mangroves and montane grasslands and shrublands, have more than 17% of their area 
under protection.
1345
  
The data reveals that the contracting parties are gradually achieving the shared 
understanding of the conservation of biodiversity through the establishment of protected 
areas as evidenced in the adoption of the 17% target in the Strategic Plan 2011 – 
2020.
1346
 The protected area networks in some developed countries like Australia, 
Finland, Canada, and Germany and some developing countries such as Brazil, Bhutan, 
and Costa Rica are ‘near comprehensive and ecologically representative, covering major 
biomes (forests, pastures, deserts, grasslands, mountains, and wetlands) and includes 
public, private and community protected areas’.1347 The Secretariat is of the opinion that 
‘given the current progress in protected areas, it is likely that the target of at least 17% 
of terrestrial areas protected will be achieved by 2020’.1348  
The assessment of the Executive Secretary as to the progress in the implementation of 
Target 11 intimated the qualitative requirements necessary in the achievement of the 
Target. The qualitative requirements include the completion of a comprehensive 
ecological gap analysis as required under the Convention’s Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas; and the implementation of the outcome of the analysis, including the 
                                               
1342 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 12 para 21. 
1343 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 12 para 21. 
1344 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 12 para 21. 
1345 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 12 para 21. 
1346 Target 11, Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets, supra n 
1215,  at p 9. 
1347 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 24. 
1348 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 26.  
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establishment of new protected areas and/or the extension of existing protected 
areas.
1349
  
On this aspect, the data collected showed that more than 40 countries have satisfied the 
requirement to complete a comprehensive ecological gap analysis as required by the 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas and are in the process of implementing its 
results.
1350
 Attempts have been undertaken to conduct comprehensive gap analyses in 
20 countries,
1351
 which drive the number of countries who put into practice the 
qualitative aspect of the shared understanding achieved on the safeguard of biodiversity 
to 63 parties. This demonstrates the actions undertaken by the contracting parties, as the 
‘officials charged with administration’ that are congruent with the declared rules 
codified in the Convention, where the shared understanding on these rules are 
developed in subsequent COP decisions, including the Strategic Plans adopted in 
Decision X/2.  
Another salient qualitative requirement in the obligation to conserve biodiversity is the 
issue of effectiveness in the management of protected areas. It is in this aspect that 
major gaps occurred where a 2010 global assessment of the effectiveness of the 
management of protected areas revealed that only 62% of protected areas satisfied basic 
effectiveness standards, while 13% of the assessed protected areas have ‘clearly 
inadequate’ management.1352 Moreover, there are gaps in the representativeness in the 
current networks of protected areas, where more emphasis is needed to protect critical 
ecosystems.
1353
 
The note by the Executive Secretary for COP 11 painted an inspiring picture of an 
observation of the rule of law. It demonstrates at least a procedural, quantitative 
congruence between the declared rule of the obligation to conserve biodiversity through 
establishment of protected areas and safeguarding of ecosystems, habitats and natural 
surroundings of viable populations of species under Article 8(a) and (d) of the 
                                               
1349 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 24. 
1350 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 24.  
1351 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 24. 
1352 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 25. 
1353 Under-represented ecosystems include coastal areas, oases, cave systems, karsts, grasslands, rivers 
and river canyons, marshes, tropical coral reefs, sea-grass beds, deepwater cold coral reefs, seamounts, 
tropical forests, peat lands, freshwater ecosystems and coastal wetlands. Review of Progress by Executive 
Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 23. 
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Convention and actions of contracting parties ‘charged with the administration of the 
rule’.  
The world community shared the common aim to make good progress towards the 
achievement of the quantitative component of Target 11 that requires an at least 17% 
designation of terrestrial and inland water ecosystems as protected areas.
1354
 At the level 
of sub-regions, the Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia achieved significant 
progress for nine goals laid out in the Programme of Work on Protected Areas, followed 
by eight goals for the Pacific, two goals for West Africa, and one goal for South, East 
and South East Asia.
1355
 Eighty-six parties, representing almost half of the world’s 
terrestrial area, have proposed protection targets that would amount to a combined 
protected area of 16% of the total terrestrial area of the Earth, which is ‘well on the way 
to achieving the global target of protecting 17% of terrestrial areas’.1356      
The Executive Secretary noted that global data collected on the progress status in the 
implementation of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas, especially in the 
implementation of Programme Element 1 that is most pertinent to the obligation to 
conserve biodiversity, showed that there are significant progress in the establishment 
and strengthening of national and regional systems of protected areas.
1357
 Over 200 
priority actions were identified by countries as part of their national action plans for the 
implementation of the Goal 1.1, in establishing and strengthening national and regional 
systems of protected areas integrated into a global network as a contribution towards 
globally agreed goals.
1358
 
                                               
1354 CBD, ‘Protected Areas: Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement 
of Aichi Biodiversity Target 11’ (Eleventh Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Hyderabad, India 8 – 19 October 2012) UNEP/CBD/COP/11/26 (23 July 2012) at p 
5, para 16 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-11/official/cop-11-26-en.pdf> accessed 16 August 
2012 (hereinafter: ‘Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi 
Biodiversity Target 11’). 
1355 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 3, para 12. In fn 3: Sample size for the sub-regions used in the analysis are 
as follows: Central, South and East Africa, 16; Latin America, 14; Central and Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, 12; West Asia and North Africa, 12; South, East and South East Asia, 10; Pacific, 10; and 
West Africa, 10.  
1356 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 5, para 16. 
1357 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 3, para 10. See Goal 1.1, Programme Element 1, ‘Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 8. 
1358 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 8, para 18. 
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Some progress is noted in the integration of protected areas into broader landscape and 
seascapes and sectors to maintain ecological structure and function. Over 100 actions 
that correspond to Goal 1.2 of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas in achieving 
Target 11 of Strategic Plan are identified by country parties.
1359
 Improvements of 
progress in the effort to integrate protected areas into broader landscapes, seascapes and 
sectors in order to maintain ecological structure and function are attempted through the 
identification of 115 priority actions by 58 countries.
1360
 
For the goal to establish and to strengthen regional networks, transboundary protected 
areas and collaborations between neighbouring protected areas across national 
boundaries, nine out of 15 countries in Central, South and East Africa reported 
significant progress.
1361
 Some parties have identified 13 priority actions in the 
establishment and the strengthening of regional networks, transboundary protected areas 
and collaboration between neighbouring protected areas across national boundaries.
1362
 
The Executive Secretary interprets the status of progress as an opening up of possibility 
to build upon existing cooperation within the sub-regions. The deepening of cooperation 
and collaborations potentially provides greater opportunities for sub-regional 
transboundary protected area projects and to improve on the establishment and the 
strengthening of national and regional systems of protected areas advocated in Goal 1.1 
of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas.
1363
 
Two hundred and seven priority actions identified by countries that correspond to Goal 
1.4 are revealed in the Progress Report stated in the Note by the Executive Secretary.
1364
 
                                               
1359 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at pp 3 and 8, paras 11 and 18. See Goal 1.2, Programme Element 1, Programme 
of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 9. 
1360 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 9, para 19.  
1361 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 4, para 14.   
1362 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 8, para 18.  
1363 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 4, para 14.  Programme Element 1 concerns the direct actions for the 
planning, selecting, establishing, strengthening, and managing protected area systems and sites, see 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at pp 8 – 13. Target 11 aimed to 
designate at least 17% of terrestrial and inland water areas, especially areas of particular importance for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services by 2020, and to have it conserved through effective and equitable 
management measures that in a well-connected systems of protected areas that are integrated into the 
wider landscapes and seascapes. Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets, supra n 1215, at p 9. 
1364 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 8, para 18. Goal 1.4 seeks to substantially improve site-based protected area 
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This Goal forms and important element in achieving Target 11 where the content of the 
planning and management of site-based protected area provides the much-needed 
qualitative aspects of Target 11, which is separated into elements based on key terms.  
The quantitative aspect of the area target of ‘at least 17% of terrestrial and inland water 
areas’  is qualified by phrases such as ‘areas of particular importance for biodiversity 
and ecosystem services’ that can be translated to mean the protection of areas of 
particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services; ‘integrated into wider 
landscapes and seascapes and sectors’; ‘ecologically representative’; ‘effectively 
managed’, ‘equitably managed’; ‘other area-based conservation measures’ and ‘well-
connected systems’. 1365  The status of progress reported by the Executive Secretary 
enumerated the actions identified by countries that correspond to the quantitative and 
qualitative elements of Target 11, the most common priority actions being – 
management effectiveness; protected areas connectivity; area-based conservation 
measures; and ecological representation.
1366
  
In the case of the qualitative element of ‘ecological representativeness’ in Target 11,1367 
it is shown that ‘50% or 414 out of the 823 terrestrial eco-regions meet this target and a 
further 149 eco-regions are close to it with between 5 – 10% of their area under 
protection’.1368 Performance is less satisfactory for terrestrial eco-regions where less 
than 1% of the area is protected, suggesting that efforts towards the proactive 
identification of gaps at the country and area levels in order to resolve the issue are 
                                                                                                                                         
planning and management. See Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, 
at p 11. 
1365 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at pp 9 – 10, para 20.  
1366 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 10, para 21. There are 532 priority actions identified by the contracting 
parties that relate to the implementation of Target 11 of the Aichi Biodiversity Targets. See Progress in 
the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity Target 11, supra 
n 1354, at p 10. There are 73 countries that identified priority actions to improve management 
effectiveness that has an average implementation timeframe of 2013 to 2016. Other priority actions 
relating to protected areas connectivity, area-based conservation measures and ecological representation 
are to be completed within the timeframes ranging from 2015 to 2017. 16 countries identified priority 
actions for increasing the connectivity of protected areas; 23 countries identified area-based conservation 
measures for their designated protected areas; where 27 countries identified priority actions for the 
designation of protected areas that are ecologically representative. 
1367 Target 11 adopted in Decision VII/28, supra n 447, is to have 10% of each of the world’s ecological 
regions effectively conserved. 
1368 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 13, para 33. 
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urgently required.
 1369
 In a 2010 study where 4,151 assessments were undertaken, less 
than 30% of the world’s protected areas have a management plan and only 24% of 
protected areas have sound management in place.
1370
 Thirteen percent of the 4,151 
assessments have clearly inadequate management, whereas 27% of the assessments 
‘recorded basic management with major deficiencies’.1371 
The preliminary information laid out in the Progress Report prepared for COP 11 
indicates that ‘the world community is on track to meet the terrestrial area component of 
Target 11’ and well on their way to reach the global target of protecting 17% of 
terrestrial areas.
1372
 The more capacity-intensive, technically-driven qualitative aspects 
of Target 11, including ecological representativeness, management effectiveness, 
connectivity and integration into wider land- and seascapes, and equitable management 
including other effective area-based conservation, will be continuously developed and 
enhanced in order to achieve Target 11.
1373
 At this juncture, the careful monitoring and 
reporting of these priority actions can contribute toward the assessment of progress of 
the Aichi Biodiversity Target 11 as well as other Aichi Targets.
1374
 
In short, there is substantial congruence between the actions undertaken and practised 
by the contracting parties as the officials in charge of the administration of the rule to 
conserve biodiversity, both quantitatively and to a lesser degree, qualitatively, as 
declared under Article 8. The congruence between the actions undertaken and practised 
by the contracting parties on the rule to conserve biodiversity is continuously developed 
through decisions adopted by the COP. The efforts undertaken by the contracting parties 
in their endeavour to perform actions that are congruent with the declared rule on the 
obligation to conserve biodiversity evidence Article 8’s satisfaction of the eighth 
criterion of internal morality of law. 
                                               
1369 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 13, para 33. 
1370 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 13, para 34. Quoted Fiona Leverington et al, Management Effectiveness 
Evaluation in Protected Areas – A Global Study (2nd edn, University of Queensland, Brisbane Australia, 
2010). 
1371 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 13, para 34. 
1372 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 14, paras 36 and 37. 
1373 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 14, para 37.  
1374 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 11, para 26.  
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The eight criteria of morality provide a structural framework positioned in the overall 
framework of an interactional understanding of law, where shared understandings are 
guided towards the attainment of legality and shape the generation of shared legal 
understanding. Shared legal understandings emerge through the dynamic relationship of 
an interactive process instead of the mere discovery of rules through static sources. 
The obligation to conserve biodiversity through the establishment of protected areas and 
the safeguarding of ecosystems, habitats, and the natural surroundings of viable 
populations of species, are declared in the form of Article 8(a) and (d). As elaborated 
and analysed in the previous sections, this obligation has clearly satisfied the 
requirements imposed by the criteria of generality, promulgation and non-retroactivity. 
The clarity of the obligation and the congruence of practice with the rule will be 
constantly developed when the underlying normative understandings continue to 
flourish through the persistent practice of the enterprise of law making.
1375
 The 
(seemingly) extreme difficulty in the implementation of the requirement of the rule will 
decrease and will appear to be increasingly reasonable when the capacity of the 
contracting parties improves through participatory planning, knowledge management, 
capacity-building, and other supporting mechanisms and enhancement of enabling 
factors that facilitate the implementation of the obligation.
1376
  
Non-contradictions of law have been actively addressed by the Convention where 
internal tensions inherent between conservation and use are reconciled through 
interpretation, whereas external contradictions resulting from the fragmentation of 
international law on the environment are reconciled through collaborative partnerships 
and cooperation that promote linkages and synergies. Due to the nature of biodiversity 
conservation that is highly vulnerable to changes, constancy of law through time is not 
possible, especially when effective management necessitates the employment of 
adaptive management approach. However, the criterion of constancy should be deemed 
satisfied as long as the decision-making rules and the law-making processes are 
transparent and predictable.  
                                               
1375 This obligation is elaborated and developed by the programmes of work on protected areas in various 
thematic areas of implementation and other guidelines and instruments where its implementation was 
guided by the 2011 - 2020 Strategic Plan adopted in Decision X/2, supra n 1215. 
1376 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at pp 14 – 15, para 39. 
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To conclude, the assessment of the obligation to conserve under Article 8(a) and (d) 
against the eight criteria of internal morality of law confirms the position of the 
obligation at the legal end on the normativity continuum that traverses from social 
normativity to legal normativity. 
6.4 A Practice of Legality (Norm Application)   
The shared legal understandings generated through robust interactions and reciprocity 
between lawmakers and subjects, nourished by the implicit rules of the broader 
background understandings, must be maintained through a practice of legality.
1377
 The 
vigour of law is upheld through the constant effort to support it where the law is seen as 
a distinctive interaction performed by ‘a joint enterprise of members that shares 
collective understandings’ – the shared understandings of which direct and rationalise 
the conduct of members in the enterprise. A practice of legality is built up through 
reasoned dialogue (interaction and reasoning through law) and reciprocity (vertical 
congruence) where a broader base of shared legal understandings is developed via 
interactions that adhere to the requirements of legality.
1378
 A practice of legality is said 
to have emerged when the reasoned dialogue of norms created through shared 
understanding is ‘communicated’ and applied through a plurality or a series of actions 
or conduct of mutual engagement that satisfy the criteria of legality. 
In the present research, a practice of legality on the obligation to conserve biodiversity 
is said to have existed when Article 8(a) and (d), and its substantive content achieved 
through the interactional COP processes and continuously developed by implementation 
by state contracting parties, are applied in practices that meet the criteria of legality. For 
this purpose, there is a need to identify whether the conduct of states, undertaken in 
satisfaction of the obligation to conserve, satisfy both the quantitative and qualitative 
elements of the obligation, which forms the substantive content of Article 8(a) and (d) 
as a whole.  
The quantitative element is an obligation of result where Target 11 aimed to increase the 
global terrestrial protected area, which includes inland water ecosystems, to 17%. The 
Programme of Work on Protected Areas and the Revised Programme of Work on Inland 
Water Biodiversity prescribed the necessary procedural mechanisms in achieving the 
                                               
1377 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at pp 80 – 81.  
1378 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 72.  
302 
 
quantitative element of the Target. Apart from that, the obligation to conserve is 
qualified by complementary terms such as ‘areas of particular importance for 
biodiversity and ecosystem services’; ‘integrated into wider landscapes and seascapes 
and sectors’; ‘ecologically representative’; ‘effectively managed’, ‘equitably managed’; 
‘other area-based conservation measures’ and ‘well-connected systems’. 1379  In the 
satisfaction of the qualitative elements, the Convention prescribes and recommends the 
appropriate procedural means in achieving the qualitative elements.  
The membership of the Biodiversity Convention currently stands at 193 contracting 
parties
1380
 with a designation of over 150,000 protected areas covering 756,102 km
2
, 
with 12.9% of the world’s terrestrial surface protected.1381 The state of a practice of 
legality can be studied from the analysis of national reports submitted by contracting 
parties, where the national reports submitted for scrutiny evidence actions undertaken 
by the parties in satisfaction of their obligations under the Convention. A hundred and 
twenty six contracting parties submitted the fourth national reports for COP 10.
1382
 The 
Executive Secretary noted that according to the analysis conducted, ‘nearly all countries 
report on having developed and adopted national biodiversity strategies and action 
plans, where 18% of parties went further to revise their strategies and plans in respond 
to new challenges and guidance from the COP’.1383  
The implementation of national biodiversity strategies and action plans advocated by 
the Convention has promoted substantial activities for the conservation and sustainable 
use of biodiversity. In the progress towards achieving Target 1.1 of the 2010 
Biodiversity Target, the national reports revealed that 58% of the Parties had reported 
that they managed to achieve Target 1.1 of having a protected area that covers at least 
                                               
1379 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at pp 9 – 10, para 20.  
1380 CBD, ‘List of Parties’ (undated) <http://www.cbd.int/convention/parties/list/> accessed 17 August 
2012.  
1381 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 13, para 32. UNEP-WCMC, ‘Biodiversity Indicators Partnership’ (2012) 
<http://www.bipindicators.net/pacoverage> accessed 17 August 2012. 
1382  CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’ (Tenth Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan 18 – 29 October 
2010)  UNEP/CBD/COP/10/INF/2 (22 September 2010) at p 1, para 1 
<http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/cop/cop-10/information/cop-10-inf-02-en.pdf> accessed 17 August 
2012.  The analysis was based on a review of 126 reports received by the middle of July 2010. For the 
162 countries, see Annex I, p 10.  
1383 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 5, para 7.  
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10% or more, of their terrestrial area.
1384
 Interestingly, 66% of the contracting parties 
reported that the ecosystem approach is applied in some manner, either in the 
management of certain type of ecosystems, or in an integrated management across the 
country.
1385
 Most parties (81%) participated in transboundary management of protected 
areas or shared ecosystems or resources where cooperation, is initiated through 
transboundary agreements.
1386
 
Nearly all Parties undertake programmes or projects relating to the monitoring, research 
and/or the creation of a database, although it is conceded that much has to be done on 
the monitoring of implementation of national biodiversity strategies and action plans, 
and the methodology of monitoring.
1387
 Not many contracting parties undertake detailed 
quantitative assessments of the implementation of their National Biodiversity Strategies 
and Action Plans (NBSAP), or the outcomes achieved.
1388
 However, the few 
quantitative assessments revealed that despite the generally low level of implementation 
ranging from 30 – 50 %, the NBSAP is not insignificant where some countries do 
provide cases or success stories in this regard.
1389
 The national reports intimated that 
challenges are encountered in their effort to implement NBSAP, and in the 
implementation of the Convention as a whole,
1390
 particularly for many developing 
countries where financial support for the implementation of NBSAP is clearly 
lacking.
1391
 
                                               
1384 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 5, para 
8(a).  See Annex III, ‘Examples of National Level Actions towards the 2010 Biodiversity Target’, in CBD, 
‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 15. For  the 2010 
Biodiversity Target, on the focal area of the protection of the components of biodiversity, Goal 1 seeks to 
promote the conservation of the biological diversity of ecosystems, habitats and biomes where Target 1.1 
aims to achieve at least 10% of each of the world’s ecological regions effectively conserved. 
1385 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 5, para 
8(e).  
1386 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at pp 5 – 6, 
para 8(o). 
1387 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 6, para 
8(g). 
1388 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 7, para 9. 
contracting parties who undertook assessment of the NBSAP includes Djibouti; France; Kyrgyzstan; 
Togo; Turkmenistan; Namibia; St. Lucia; and Samoa. 
1389 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 7, paras 
10 and 11.  
1390 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 7, para 12.  
The main obstacles include limited financial, technical and human resources and capacities, limited 
information, lack of political will, lack of coordination between ministries, poverty, low level of 
awareness of biodiversity issues, and limited incentives for biodiversity conservation and sustainable use.  
1391 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 8, para 14.  
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The contracting parties of the Strategic Plan noted the substantial progress towards the 
2010 biodiversity targets in Decision X/5 (2010), in particularly the development of 
national biodiversity strategies and action plans, the engagement of stakeholders, and 
the widespread recognition of the 2010 biodiversity target.
1392
 The COP further 
requested the Executive Secretary to prepare an analysis/synthesis of national, regional 
and other actions in order to enable the Working Group on Review of Implementation 
and the COP to assess the contribution of national and regional targets towards the 
global targets.
1393
 The fulfilment of the Aichi Targets are assessed in terms of the 
commitments made by Parties as well as the amount of progress made in reaching the 
Targets, and this is the benchmark on which a practice of legality is measured. 
Reiterating the general review of progress in the implementation of the Strategic Plan 
for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 in the previous section, 1394  the Executive Secretary 
concluded that, given the current progress in the establishment and expansion of 
protected areas, the 17% target by 2020 is likely to be achieved.
1395
 An assessment of 
the application of the shared legal understandings established above entails the 
fulfilment of two components: the quantitative 17% target; and the qualitative aspect, 
the most important being the ecological representativeness of the areas protected, and 
the effectiveness of the management of protected areas.  
The assessment of whether there is a practice of legality of both the qualitative and 
quantitative components of the shared legal understanding developed by the contracting 
parties is conducted through the analysis of the implementation status of the Programme 
of Work on Protected Areas and the achievement of the Aichi Biodiversity Target 
11.
1396
 The Executive Secretary noted that in terms of the quantitative component, the 
proposed terrestrial protected area by 86 parties that would amount to over 16% of their 
combined area being protected is ‘well on the way to achieving the global target of 
                                               
1392 CBD, ‘Decision X/5 Implementation of the Convention  and the Strategic Plan’ (Tenth Meeting of the 
Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, Nagoya, Japan 18 – 29 October 201) 
UNEP/CBD/COP/DEC/X/5 (29 October 2010) at p 1 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/decisions/cop-10/cop-10-
dec-05-en.pdf > accessed 17 August 2012.  
1393 CBD, ‘X/2 The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ , 
supra n 1210, at p 4, para 17(b).  
1394 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340 
1395
 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 26.  
1396 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354.   
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protecting 17% of terrestrial areas’.1397 This indicates the compliance by the contracting 
parties of the shared legal understanding established on the obligation to conserve 
through protected areas, where their commitments are undertaken in practice.
1398
 
In terms of the qualitative aspect of conservation, it has been identified that the global 
quantitative target will be attained, but gaps remain in the representativeness and 
management effectiveness of these protected areas, where particular focus is needed to 
improve representativeness of ecosystems protected, and the effectiveness of 
management.
1399
 The Review of Implementation shows that only 50%, (414 out of the 
823) terrestrial ecoregions meet the target of having 10% of each of the world’s 
ecological regions effectively conserved,
1400
 while less than 30% of the world’s 
protected areas have a management plan, where only 24% of them are sound.
1401
 
These short comings are addressed through the Programme of Work on Protected Areas 
action plans in the contracting parties’ effort to achieve Target 11.1402 In light of the 
progress and challenges faced, the Ad Hoc Working Group on Review of 
Implementation recommends COP 11 to adopt decisions that reaffirm the need for 
enhanced cooperation and support in all aspects, including scientific and technical 
capacity; financial resources; information sharing; and capacity-building among Parties 
for the implementation of the Strategic Plan 2011 – 2020.1403  
                                               
1397 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 5 para 16; and p 14, para 36.  
1398 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 5, para 15. Seventy parties identified quantitative protected area targets 
ranging from 10 – 30 per cent, with 46 parties setting goals at or above the Target 11 terrestrial goal of 17% 
protected coverage. At p 5, para 16, the Executive Secretary stated that the information provided above 
suggests that the world community is aiming to make good progress towards the quantitative components 
of Target 11.  
1399 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 14, para 37. 
1400 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 13, para 33. 
1401 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 13, para 34. 
1402 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at p 14, para 37. The Executive Secretary, at p 3, para 10, noted that three goals, 
namely, Goals 1.1, 3.5 and 3.2, of the Programme of Work on Protected Areas have seen significant 
progress. The Executive Secretary identifies, in p 14, para 39, that the Strategic Goal E of the Strategic 
Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020, supra n 1215, that calls for enhancing implementation through 
participatory planning, knowledge management and capacity-building, including the enhancement of 
cooperation partnerships, are required to facilitate the implementation of the action plans. 
1403
 CBD, ‘Recommendation 4/1 Implementation of the Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and 
Progress towards the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ (Fourth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working 
Group on Review of Implementation of the Convention , Montreal 7 – 11 May 2012) UNEP/CBD/WF-
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It can be concluded that a practice of legality existed for the obligation to conserve 
biodiversity through systems of protected areas declared under Article 8(a) and (d) 
where the enterprise of law-making, i.e. the contracting parties, have been shown to 
undertake practices of legality in the fulfilment of both the qualitative and the 
quantitative requirements of the rule. 
It is demonstrated above that the shared understanding arrived by the contracting parties 
on the obligation to conserve biodiversity is that the obligation is interpreted as 
including, and implemented through, the establishment of protected areas to promote 
protection of ecosystems, habitats and also maintenance of the natural surroundings of 
viable population of species. The system of protected areas is designated to protect and 
safeguard the natural functioning and ecological processes of ecosystems in accordance 
with the ecosystem approach. This initial understanding is codified in Article 8(a) and 
(d) of the Biodiversity Convention.  
In the fulfilment of this obligation, the Vth IUCN World Park Congress recommends 
for the need to establish a global system of coherent ecological network of protected 
areas that are ecologically representative.
1404
 This provides the qualitative dimension to 
the obligation to conserve under Article 8. In order to achieve this aim, the Vth 
Congress recommends the COP to adopt specific targets and timetables for the in situ 
conservation of all globally critically endangered species, and the sites to which these 
critically endangered species are confined.
1405
 
COP 7 had taken up this challenge, and adopted the Programme of Work on Protected 
Areas in its Decision VII/28.
1406
 Its Programme Element 1 prescribed the necessary 
procedures and actions relating to the conservation of biodiversity through the planning, 
selecting, establishing, strengthening, and managing of protected area systems and sites 
within a prescribed timeframe.
1407
 The content of the obligation to conserve through 
protected areas includes firstly, the establishment and the strengthening of national and 
regional systems of protected areas integrated into a global network as a contribution to 
                                                                                                                                         
RI/REC/4/1 (21 June 2012) at pp 2 – 5, para 7 <http://www.cbd.int/doc/recommendations/WGRI-
04/wgri-04-rec-01-en.pdf > accessed 18 August 2012.  
1404 IUCN, ‘Message of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
supra n 1137, at pp 1 and 2. 
1405 IUCN, ‘Message of the Vth IUCN World Parks Congress to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, 
supra n 1137, at p 2. 
1406
 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at paras 6 and 7. 
1407 Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 
8. 
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globally agreed goals.
1408
 Secondly the established protected areas are integrated into 
broader land- and seascapes and sectors so as to main their ecological structure and 
function.
1409
 All these steps undertaken for the conservation of protected areas apply 
similarly to the establishment and strengthening of regional networks and transboundary 
protected areas, where collaboration between neighbouring protected areas across 
national boundaries is needed.
1410
 The obligation to conserve does not end after the 
establishment of protected sites, but includes the substantial improvement of the 
planning and management of site-based protected areas;
1411
 and the prevention and 
mitigation of negative impacts of key threats to protected areas.
1412
 
COP 7 (2004) specifically adopted a Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water 
Biodiversity for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive, adequate and 
representative system of protected inland water ecosystems within the framework of 
integrated catchment/watershed/river-basin management.
1413
 The Revised Programme 
of Work requires the contracting parties to – provide establishment and management 
strategies for protected areas; identify priority sites that are harmonised with criteria 
established under the Ramsar Convention; establish collaboration with neighbouring 
parties in the joint management of transboundary protected inland water ecosystems; 
and to develop, as part of an integrated catchment/watershed/river basin management 
approach, protected area systems that contribute towards the conservation of 
biodiversity, maintenance of overall ecosystem function, productivity and health of each 
drainage basin.
1414
  
The Strategic Plan 2011 – 2020 provides a flexible framework for the implementation 
of the global goal of an improved state of biodiversity, especially Target 11 that aims to 
set aside an effectively and equitably managed areas of protection of at least 17% of 
terrestrial and inland water areas, especially areas of particular importance for 
                                               
1408 Goal 1.1, Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 
1148, at p 8.  
1409 Goal 1.2, Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 
1148, at p 9.  
1410 Goal 1.3, Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 
1148, at p 10.  
1411 Goal 1.4, Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 
1148, at p 11.  
1412 Goal 1.5, Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 
1148, at p 12. 
1413 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11.  
1414 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at pp 11 – 12.  
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biodiversity and ecosystem services that are ecologically representative and well-
connected by 2020.
1415
 The Strategic Plan further develops the substantive normativity 
for the obligation to conserve, namely the quantitative aspect of 17% of terrestrial 
protected areas, including inland waters; and the qualitative aspects of effective 
management and ecological representativeness of the protected areas. These two aspects 
are equally crucial in the satisfaction of the obligation to conserve under Article 8(a) 
and (d).
1416
  
The shared understandings developed by the contracting parties through the COP forum 
are continuously developed by the implementation of parties of the shared 
understandings, of which are periodically scrutinised by the Convention Bodies, such as 
the Ad Hoc Working Group on Review of Implementation and also the COP. Various 
mechanisms are make available by the Convention in order to facilitate the 
implementation by Parties of their obligations that are commonly understood as to their 
content and scope, which are clearly promulgated in the Programmes of Work and 
Strategic Plan adopted by the Decisions of the COP. The continuous hard work of the 
contracting parties in the clarification and observation of the rule of law promulgated in 
the form of Decisions adopted by the COP are deemed a practice of legality. The efforts 
undertaken by the contracting parties in the institutionalised interactional process in the 
development of law propels and pushes the rules attained through this system towards 
the legal end of the social-legal normative continuum as the criteria of legality are 
increasingly satisfied.  
The shared legal understandings undertaken in a practice of legality through an 
institutionalised interactional process of legal development, constitute an emergence of 
a community of practice on the obligation to conserve biodiversity through the 
establishment and management of protected areas codified in Article 8(a) and (d).  This 
is evidenced in the attainment of an almost 13% of the world’s terrestrial area is 
protected as of 2011, where the global target of 17% by 2020 is likely to be 
achieved.
1417
 The contracting parties are relatively steadfast in the undertaking of a 
practice of legality on their obligation to conserve under the Convention as 
                                               
1415 Target 11, ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’, supra n 
1215, at p 9. 
1416 Progress in the Implementation of the Programme of Work and Achievement of Aichi Biodiversity 
Target 11, supra n 1354, at pp 9 – 10, para 20. 
1417 Review of Progress by Executive Secretary, supra n 1340, at p 13, para 26. Refer supra n 1348 and n 
1397.  
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demonstrated through the submission of their Fourth National Reports by 126 Parties 
for review of implementation by the Conventional Bodies.
1418
  The gaps that remain in 
terms of the satisfaction of the qualitative aspects of ecological representativeness and 
effectiveness of management will be addressed gradually as capacity grows. 
6.5 Applicable in the Relations between the Parties 
In the interpretation that incorporates external rules of international law that are relevant, 
it is important to identify the content of the rules that is to be taken into account in the 
interpretative process. It has been established that what is ‘applicable in the relations 
between the parties’ depends on the particular rule of international law. An interactional 
perspective in the analysis of the rule reveals not only the content of the rule, but also 
the ‘applicability’ of the rule on ‘the parties’, as the ‘applicability’ of the rule constitutes 
part of the shared legal understanding arrived at by the parties. The shared legal 
understandings attained through the interactional process by the members engaged in 
the practice of legality determine whether the rules are applicable to them. This 
approach is supported by the context of the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention and the 
writing of eminent scholars that the phrase ‘the parties’ in Article 31(3)(c) does not 
require that the parties to the interpreted treaty must be a party to the external treaty as 
long as the external rule –  
‘can be said to be implicitly accepted or tolerated by all parties to the treaty under 
interpretation in the sense that it can reasonably be considered to express the 
common intentions or understanding of all members as to the meaning of the term 
concerned’.1419 
The meaning that is ‘implicitly accepted or tolerated by all parties that can be 
considered to express common intentions or understandings of all members’ 1420  is 
reflected in the shared understanding of the parties involved in the enterprise of law-
making. The members who participate in the interactional process will be ‘the parties’ 
within the meaning of Article 31(3)(c).  
                                               
1418 CBD, ‘Updated Analysis of Information in the Fourth National Reports’, supra n 1382, at p 1, para 1 
1419
 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at pp 314 – 315. Pauwelyn, Conflict 
of Norms in Public International Law, supra n 100, at pp 257 – 263.  
1420 McLachlan, ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162, at pp 314 – 315. 
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In the context of the 193 contracting parties to the Biodiversity Convention, the rules 
relevant to the preservation of ecosystems of international watercourses are the 
obligation to conserve in situ biodiversity through the establishment of protected areas 
that promotes the protection of ecosystems, habitats, and viable populations of species 
in their natural surroundings as codified in Article 8(a) and (d). The shared legal 
understanding of the contracting parties pertaining to the rules, and undertaken in their 
practice of legality is the achievement of the quantitative and qualitative aspect of their 
obligation to conserve biodiversity through protected areas. The quantitative target is 
the designation of 17% of terrestrial as protected areas, where the qualitative aspect 
imposes that these areas of protection must be ecologically representative and 
effectively managed.  
The procedural mechanisms impose in the Programmes of Work for the implementation 
and achievement of these shared understandings include the need for constant reporting, 
monitoring and assessment; the fulfilment of criteria assigned for the identification and 
assessment of areas of protection; and the need for collaboration with neighbouring 
countries in the case of transboundary protected areas. Apart from the imposition of the 
ecosystem approach in all aspects of identification, designation, and management, the 
Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biodiversity specifically stipulates the 
application of a drainage basin approach in the implementation of the contracting parties’ 
obligation to conserve through the establishment and management of protected inland 
water ecosystems. 
The relevant rules of international law in the form of Article 8(a) and (d) that are 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’, as commonly agreed to be applicable in 
the interpretation of the Article 20 obligation to preserve ecosystems of international 
watercourses by the parties, is not just a general stipulation to conserve. The shared 
understandings by the parties, due to the quasi-universal parties to the Biodiversity 
Convention, are reflected in the subsequent development of this rule in the COP, which 
had been lengthily discussed in the previous sections. The accepted and reasonably 
considered to express the common intentions or understanding of the contracting parties 
as to the content and scope of the obligation to conserve under Article 8(a) and (d) must 
necessarily be both the quantitative and qualitative requirements for the establishment 
of protected areas. This includes the necessary procedural mechanisms provided to 
311 
 
facilitate the parties in achieving the target jointly attained by the contracting parties 
through the interactional process of COP.  
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter undertakes the assessment of Article 8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity 
Convention, identified as relevant to the interpretation of Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention in Chapter Two of this thesis, through the interactional 
framework developed in Chapter Four. The ascertainment of whether these provisions 
satisfy the legality threshold required by Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention through an interactional perspective reveals the shared legal understanding 
of the parties, confirmed in their practice of legality, informs the interpretation of the 
salient phrase of ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’.  
As previously demonstrated in Chapter Five of this thesis in the context of the Ramsar 
Convention, an interactional account of international law, of which Article 8(a) and (d) 
of the Biodiversity Convention is assessed against provides the normative content and 
scope for the interpretation of the obligation to preserve under Article 20. The outcome 
of the analysis as demonstrated in this chapter confirms that Article 8(a) and (d) are 
‘rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’ within the 
definition of Article 31(3)(c), and shall be taken into account together with the context 
in the interpretation of Article 20.  
The next chapter will proceed to develop an architecture in which these rules ‘shall be 
taken into account’, and the condition imposes by ‘the context’ that qualifies the 
incorporation of these relevant rules as identified in Chapters Five and Six into the 
interpretation of Article 20.  
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7 
Chapter 7. Shall Take into Account, Together with the Context – Systemic  
Integration: An Architecture 
Part I: Theory 
7.1 Overview 
This chapter develops a structure for the interpretation of the phrase ‘shall be taken into 
account, together with the context’, which forms the last stage of analysis in the 
framework of operationalisation established for Article 31(3)(c). The Chapter will 
firstly define the term ‘context’ and ‘shall be taken into account’. Secondly, this Chapter 
conducts an analysis of selected cases in the determination of normative weight that is 
given to the external relevant rules in judicial decisions of international court and 
tribunals. Finally, this Chapter establishes the architecture that guides the systemic 
integration of relevant rules permissible under the interpretative mechanism of Article 
31(3)(c) in reference to the methodology employed in these judicial decisions in the 
determination of the normative weight of external rules.    
 It is a key point to note that the normative environment cannot be ignored in the 
interpretation of treaties where the principle of systemic integration should be borne in 
mind.
1421
 The order of the operation of Article 31(3)(c) was briefly referred to by Sands 
where it was mentioned in passing that – ‘it is only after the existence, relevance and 
applicability of a customary norm has been recognised by an adjudicatory body that its 
precise impact upon the interpretation of a treaty comes to be determined in the 
application of Article 31(3)(c)’.1422  
The order enunciated indicated that first the existence of a rule of international law has 
to be established. Second, the rule needs to be relevant to the subject matter of the treaty 
norm being interpreted. Next, it must be determined that the relevant rule of 
international law is applicable in interpretation. Only then can the precise impact be 
determined of ‘shall be taken into account, together with the context’, in other words 
how much normative weight should be given to the ‘relevant rule of international law 
applicable on the parties’.     
                                               
1421 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 211, para 419; p 216, para 430. 
1422 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 102. 
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7.2 ‘Context’ 
Christian Wolff introduces the modern international law doctrine regarding the recourse 
to ‘context’ (‘interpretation in the contexte’1423) in the event of obscurity where it is 
quoted that –  
‘Theologi dicunt, sensum erui ex contextu, si corum quae obscurius dicta sunt, 
sensus inventigatur ex collation cum antecedentibus et consequentibus aut ex locis 
parallelis, siquae in uno loco obscurius dicta videntur, explicantur, per ea, quae 
alio loco conspicue de eadem material dicunter’.1424  
The use of ‘context’ in interpretation is always in relation to conventional language (the 
ordinary meaning), and always the second step in the interpretation process.
1425
 The 
process of interpretation is not just a grammatical exercise. The general rule laid out in 
Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention does not allow an abstract ordinary meaning 
that is divorced from the place which that phrase occupies in the text to be given to a 
phrase.
1426
 It is emphasised that ‘the systematic structure of a treaty is of equal 
importance to the ordinary linguistic meaning of the words used’.1427 
The broad reference to the context as an aid to elucidate the meaning of a treaty term 
provides the basis for a foray into the scope of ‘context’. The meaning of ‘context’ has 
been examined by Lord Hoffman in his judgment in the Kirin-Amgen case.
1428
 He 
enunciated that ‘a judge’s construction could not possibly be described as acontextual. It 
                                               
1423  A phrase coined by Béla Vitányi, ‘Treaty Interpretation in the Legal Theory of Grotius and Its 
Influence on Modern Doctrine’ (1983) 14 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 41 – 67. 
1424  A reference to ‘the context’, encompassing ‘the previous’, ‘the following’, ‘the parallels’, or if 
obscurity still persisted, ‘other materials that address the same subject matter’, are suggested by Wolff, 
recounted by Vitányi, ‘Treaty Interpretation in the Legal Theory of Grotius and Its Influence on Modern 
Doctrine’, supra n 1423, at p 54. The author elaborated that modern doctrine acknowledged the 
particularly effective means to determine the intention of the parties through a recourse to the context, 
especially in a determination of the meaning of a treaty term ‘whose words lend themselves to different 
interpretation’. 
1425 Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties. The Modern International Law as Expressed in the 
1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Springer, 2007) at p 102. 
1426 Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, supra n 663, 
at p 543. 
1427 Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, supra n 663, 
at p 543. 
1428 Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others (Appellants) v Hoechst Marion Roussel Ltd and Others (Respondents). 
Kirin-Amgen Inc and Others (Respondents) v Hoechst Marion Roussel Limited and Others (Appellants) 
(Conjoined Appeals) (21 October 2004) [2004] UKHL 46 
<http://www.bailii.org/uk/cases/UKHL/2004/46.html> accessed 16 April 2012.  
314 
 
was entirely dependent on context and reflected the evidence of how the claim would 
have been understood by men skilled in the art’.1429    
The observation made by Judge Learned Hand that ‘words are chameleons, which 
reflect the colour of their environment’1430 throws doubt on whether a term consisting of 
words may be given an acontextual meaning, or adopt strict compliance with the 
conventional meaning approach in the interpretation of the term. It was decided in the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue case that a ‘corporation’ which was organised only 
to serve as a means of transfer, used once and only for that purpose, and was dissolved 
as soon as it had done so, cannot be a ‘corporation’ within the meaning of that term as 
the Congress were understood to have used it. The Congress must have adopted the 
meaning of ‘corporation’ employed in common speech, that means ‘a jural person 
created to conduct industry, commerce, charity, or some other commonly practised 
activity’.1431 
According to Gardiner, there are two main roles for the references to context in the 
Vienna rules. Firstly, context acts as an immediate qualifier of the ordinary meaning of 
terms used in the treaty, where it aids the selection of the ordinary meaning and avoids 
an overly strict compliance with its literal or conventional meaning. Secondly, it 
identifies the material elements, such as the whole text of the treaty, its preamble and 
any annexes forming the context that need to be taken into account.
1432
   
                                               
1429 Kirin-Amgen, supra n 1428, at para 63. At para 64, His Honour went on further to expound that – ‘No 
one has ever made an acontextual statement. There is always some context to any utterance, however 
meagre. “Acontextual meaning” can refer only to the conventional rules for the use of language, such as 
one finds in a dictionary or grammar. Acontextual meaning refers to a general rule about how words or 
syntax should be used and contextual meaning refer to the fact of what on a specific occasion the 
language was used to mean.’ Lord Hoffman noted that how the phrase ‘an endogenous DNA sequence 
coding for EPO’ should be interpreted depends on ‘whether the person skilled in the art would understand 
the invention as operating at a level of generality which makes it irrelevant whether the DNA which codes 
for EPO is exogenous or not’. It can be inferred that the interpretation of ‘invention’ forms the context in 
the determination of the question of scope encompassed in the phrase of ‘an endogenous DNA sequence 
coding for EPO’ as put forth to the House of Lords. 
1430 Judge Learned Hand in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v National Carbide Corp 167 F 2d 304 at 
306 (US Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit) (31 March 1948) (hereinafter: ‘Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue’).  
1431 Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra n 1430, at p 306. 
1432 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at pp 177 – 178. Gardiner elaborated that ‘if a word 
forms part of a phrase, that is the obvious initial contextual assessment that must be made. The second 
aspects of use of context is in application of the wider definition. This directs the interpreter to look to 
many factors ranging from those that are fairly immediate, such as the wording of surrounding provisions, 
headings of articles and punctuation, to more remote elements such as comparisons with other provisions 
on similar matters or using similar wording, extending to the function of the context as a bridge to the 
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7.2.1 ‘Context’ in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties  
The ‘context’, for the purpose of interpretation of a treaty is defined in Article 31(2). 
The context comprises, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:    
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty1433 which was made between all the parties 
in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; and  
(b) any instrument1434 which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
The Commentary to the Draft Articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention further 
elaborated that these classes of instruments, ‘made in connexion with the conclusion of 
the treaty and its relation to the treaty was accepted in the same manner by the other 
parties’ are recognised to form the context of the treaty.1435 They should be treated as 
                                                                                                                                         
further element in the first paragraph of the general rule, that is “the object and purpose”’. Reiterated infra 
n 1448. 
1433 Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, supra n 663, 
at p 551. The term ‘agreement’ goes beyond the notion of ‘treaty’ and imply the inclusion of unwritten 
consensus although it is common in contemporary treaty practice that these ‘agreements’ assume the form 
of final acts, protocols of signature, understandings, commentaries or explanatory reports agreed upon by 
the drafters of the treaty text and are adopted simultaneously with the text. Such ‘agreement’ might also 
come in the forms of resolutions of an international organisation, or an explicit guidance on the 
interpretation on the interpretation of the treaty. For example, the 1973 Protocol on the Interpretation of 
Art 69 of the European Patent Convention (revised 29 November 2000), adopted simultaneously with the 
Convention <http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/html/epc/2010/e/ma2a.html> accessed 7 May 
2012. See  Explanatory Report adopted by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe when it 
agreed on the text of the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, ETS No 173 
<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/en/Reports/Html/173.htm> accessed 7 May 2012. 
1434 The reference to ‘any instruments made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion of 
the treaty and accepted by all the other parties’ in Art 31(2)(b) can be taken to mean statements made by 
individual parties before the conclusion of the treaty or accompanying their expression of consent to be 
bound. It can also include unilateral interpretative declarations which a state presents at the time the treaty 
is being agreed upon, which ‘regularly share the outer characteristics of reservations to the treaty’. The 
acceptance however, must be proven by the parties asserting that the instruments advanced are accepted 
by the other parties. Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A 
Commentary, supra n 663, at p 552. At pp 550 – 551, the authors stated that the general design of Article 
31, which deals with acts and agreements subsequent to the conclusion of the treaty in Art 31(3) would 
seem to imply that ‘agreement’ and ‘acceptance’ within the meaning of Article 32(2) refer to a consensus 
established in a certain temporal proximity to the process of conclusion. Usually, agreements of this sort 
are made at the occasion of adopting the text of the treaty. Individual parties, when signing or ratifying a 
treaty may very well present unilateral documents and, therefore, require a reaction by the other parties at 
that later date. 
1435 ILC, ‘Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties: Text as Finally Adopted by the Commission on 18 July 
1966 (Reproduced at Para 38 of Document A/6309/Rev 1)’ Doc A/CN.4/190 (1966) II Yearbook of 
International Law Commission 177 – 274, at p 46, para 13 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_190.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012 
(hereinafter: ‘Draft Articles 1966’). The 1964 version [Art 69(2)] reads: ‘The context of the treaty, for the 
purposes of its interpretation, shall be understood as comprising in addition to the treaty, including its 
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part of the context for the purpose of arriving at the ordinary meaning of the terms of 
the treaty, and not merely recourse to resolve an ambiguity or obscurity.
1436
 It is 
apparent that the context of the treaty comprises the agreements or related documents at 
the conclusion of the treaty that  are made by all the parties, or made by one or two of 
the parties, but accepted by all the parties to be in connection with or related to the 
treaty.
1437
 
Pertinent to Article 31(2) is the issue of to what extent the instruments made annexes to 
the treaty form part of the context for the purpose of interpretation, or how much weight 
the elements that count as relevant context should be given in determining the object 
and purpose of a treaty.
1438
 Enshrined in Article 31(2) was the principle of both 
common sense and good faith, where the ordinary meaning of a term is not to be 
                                                                                                                                         
preamble and annexes, any agreement or instrument related to the treaty and reached or drawn up in 
connexion with its conclusion’. ILC, ‘Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of Its 
16th Session, 11 July 1964, Official Records of the General Assembly, 19th Session, Supplement (A/5809)’ 
Doc A/CN.4/173 (1964) II Yearbook of International Law Commission 173 -  227, at p 199 
<http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/reports/english/a_cn4_173.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012 (hereinafter: 
‘Draft Articles 1964). It is also important to note that these documents must be distinguished from mere 
travaux préparatoires. The documents referred to in Art 31(2) forms the context that is part of the general 
rule of interpretation where distinction between them was found in the phrase ‘in connexion with the 
conclusion of the treaty’ that leaves the preparatory stage behind and refers instead to the actual existence 
of consensus on the treaty. Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A 
Commentary, supra n 663, at pp 549 – 550. At p 550, the authors noted that a distinction between 
‘preparation’ and ‘connection’ was drawn by ‘taking objective factors (eg the time taken in making the 
document) and the intention of the actors into account’. 
1436 Draft Articles 1966, supra n 1435, at p 221, para 13. It is reminded that the documents referred to in 
Article 31(2)(a) and (b) are documents that are extrinsic to the treaty, and do not form an integral parts of 
it.  
1437 The ILC elaborated that the preamble and documents specifically made annexes to the treaty forms 
part of a treaty for the purposes of interpretation is ‘too well settled to require comment’. Draft Articles 
1964, supra n 1435, at p 203. However, it is emphasised that whether or not such documents constitutes 
an actual part of the treaty is contingent on the intention of the parties in each individual case. Dörr and 
Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, supra n 663, at p 549. 
The conditions in which extrinsic materials can be taken to form the context of a treaty according to Art 
31(2) are: (1) The object of the document in question must be of a general consensus of all parties; (2) 
That consensus must be borne by all parties; and (3) The material must relate to the substance of the 
treaty, either by specifying or clarifying certain concepts used therein, or limiting its field of application. 
That relation must be one of substance, but it must also be encompassed by the parties’ consensus. The 
ILC commented further that even though these documents may form part of the context, it does not 
necessarily mean that it is an integral part of the treaty. Draft Articles 1966, supra n 1435, at p 221, para 
13. The question of whether the instruments or agreements are an actual part of the treaty was addressed 
in the Ambatielos case where the Court opined that it depends on the intention of the parties in each case 
to decide whether such instruments forms an integral part of the treaty. Ambatielos Case (Jurisdiction) 
(Greece v United Kingdom) (Preliminary Objection) (1 July 1952) (1952) ICJ Reports 28, at p 43 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/15/1965.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. 
1438 George Letsas, ‘Strasbourg’s Interpretive Ethic: Lessons for the International Lawyer’ (2010) 21(3) 
European Journal of International Law 509 – 541, at p 533.  
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determined in abstract but in the context of the treaty’;1439 in which the ‘context’ is 
elaborated.  
7.2.2  ‘Context’ in Judicial Practice 
The ILC emphasised that the context is not just the article or the section of the treaty in 
which the term occurs, but the treaty as a whole.
1440
 The World Court has, on various 
occasions, recourse to the statement of the object and purposes of the treaty, and the 
preamble, which forms part of the context, in the interpretation of a specific provision.  
The Permanent Court of International Justice in the Advisory Opinion on the 
Competence of the International Labour Organisation affirmed that treaty must be read 
in a whole in its context.
1441
 The importance of an interpretation in light of the context 
of the treaty is confirmed in the United States Nationals in Morocco case where the 
Court rejected an interpretation of consular jurisdiction that would imply fundamental 
change in the existing treaty rights.
1442
   
The principle that the ordinary meaning of a term is to be determined not in the abstract 
but in the context of the treaty, in light of its objects and purposes, is affirmed in the 
Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Competence of the General Assembly for the 
Admission of a State to the United Nations.
1443
  The Court found it necessary to state 
                                               
1439 Draft Articles 1964, supra n 1435, at p 202, para 10. Reiterated in Draft Articles 1966, supra n 1435, 
at p 221, para 12. 
1440 Draft Articles 1964, supra n 1435, at p 202.  
1441 The Court enunciated that ‘In considering the question before the Court upon the language of the 
Treaty, it is obvious that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and that its meaning is not to be determined 
merely upon particular phrases which, if detached from the context, may be interpreted in more than one 
sense’. PCIJ, Competence of the International Labour Organisation in Regard to International 
Regulation of the Conditions of Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture (Advisory Opinion) 12 
August 1922  (PCIJ, Series B, Nos 2 and 3) 
<http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1922.08.12_ILC_competence1.htm> accessed 10 April 
2012. 
1442 The Court pronounced that ‘The interpretation of the provisions of the Act [of Algeciras] must take 
into account its purposes, which are set forth in the Preamble … The question therefore is whether the 
establishment or confirmation of such jurisdiction or privileges can be based upon the implied intentions 
of the parties to the Act as indicated by its provisions … Neither the preparatory work nor the Preambles 
gives the least indication of any such intention [to establish consular jurisdiction or to confirm the rights 
or privileges of the regime of Capitulations which were then in existence]’. Case Concerning Rights of 
Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v United States of America) (Judgment of 
28 August 1952) [1952] ICJ Reports 176, at p 197 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/11/1927.pdf> 
accessed 10 April 2012. 
1443 Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations (Advisory Opinion of 3 March 
1950) [1950] ICJ Reports 4 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/9/1883.pdf> accessed 10 April 2012. 
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that ‘the first duty of a tribunal is to endeavour to give effect to provisions of a treaty in 
their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur’.1444  
A similar approach is adopted in the case of Constitution of the Maritime Safety 
Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation.
1445
 The ICJ 
laid down that the meaning for the expression ‘elected’ ‘cannot be determined in 
isolation by recourse to its usual or common meaning and attaching that meaning to the 
word where used in the Article [28(a) of the Convention of 6 March 1948 for the 
Establishment of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organisation]’.1446 
The recognition of a more expansive scope of context generates the effect of extending 
the function of the context as a bridge to the ‘object and purpose’. 1447  Gardiner 
suggested that a wider application of the context necessitates recourse to many factors –  
‘ranging from the fairly immediate, to the wording of surrounding provisions, 
headings of articles and punctuation, to more remote elements such as 
comparisons with other provisions on similar matters or using similar 
working’.1448  
7.2.3 Preamble as Part of Context 
The preamble, which usually comprises a set of recitals that spell out the motivation, 
aims and considerations that underlined the conclusion of the treaty, is specifically 
enshrined in Article 31(2) as an element of context, which recognises its textual and 
teleological significance.
1449
 Textual significance is translated into a role that partly 
influences the selection and modification of the ordinary meaning of terms used.  
                                               
1444  Competence of Assembly Regarding Admission to the United Nations case, supra n 1443, at p 8. The 
Court reiterated the statement of the PCIJ in the case concerning the Polish Postal Service in Danzig that 
pronounced ‘it is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense which 
they would normally have in their context, unless such interpretation would lead to something 
unreasonable or absurd’. Polish Postal Service in Danzig (Advisory Opinion) 16 May 1925, PCIJ Series 
B, No 11, at p 39  
<http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/serie_B/B_11/01_Service_postal_polonais_a_Danzig_Avis_consultatif.pdf> 
accessed 10 April 2012. 
1445  Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organisation (Advisory Opinion of 8 June 1960) [1960] ICJ Reports 150 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/43/2419.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. 
1446 Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organisation, supra n 1445, at p 158. 
1447
 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 178. 
1448 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at pp 177 – 178. 
1449 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 186. 
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The ICJ in the Border and Transborder Armed Actions case took note of the Preamble 
to the revised draft Contadora Act of 7 September 1984 and similar wording of the 
preambular paragraph 35 of the Final Act of 6 June 1986, to clarify that dispute 
settlement procedures adopted under the treaty were not intended to exclude the right of 
recourse to other competent international forums.
1450
 Under certain circumstances, the 
preamble that lays out the object and purpose of the treaty might reject an interpretation 
that is inconsistent with it, as seen in the case of Canada – Patent.1451  
In such instance, the preamble of a treaty plays a significant textual role in the 
interpretation of treaty provision. Although the recitals of the preamble are not a place 
suitable to place obligations, which should normally be in the operative articles of the 
treaty or in annexes, it may impose interpretative commitments where a choice of 
interpretation that runs contrary to its preamble would be excluded.
1452
 By stating the 
object and purpose, a preamble can thus ‘be of both contextual and teleological 
significance’1453 where recourse was had on numerous occasions by international courts 
and tribunals to elucidate the meaning of a particular provision.
1454
  
                                               
1450 Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 
Judgement of 20 December 1988) [1988] ICJ Reports 69, at p 106, para 97 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/74/6591.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. The Preamble stated that ‘The 
Governments of the Republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua … 
Reaffirming without prejudice to the right to resort to competent international forums, their willingness to 
settle their disputes in the framework of the negotiation process sponsored by the Contadora Group …’ 
1451 WTO, Canada – Term of Patent Protection (Report of the Appellate Body) (18 September 2000) 
WT/DS170/AB/R <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/170abr_e.pdf> accessed 17 November 
2012. At p 18, para 59, the AB pronounced that – If the phrase ‘acts which occurred’ were interpreted to 
cover all continuing situations involving patents which were granted before the date of application of the 
TRIPS Agreement for a Member, including such rights as those under Old Act patents, then Article 70.1 
would preclude the application of virtually the whole of the TRIPS Agreement to rights conferred by the 
patents arising from such ‘acts’. This is not consistent with the object and purpose of the TRIPS 
Agreement, as reflected in the preamble of the Agreement. At para 60, the AB went on to conclude that 
Art 70.1 of the TRIPS Agreement cannot be interpreted to exclude existing rights, such as patent rights 
under the Old Act patents, even if such rights arose through acts which occurred before the date of 
application of the TRIPS Agreement for Canada. 
1452 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 186. The author had loosely paraphrased Suy that 
‘the substantive provisions will usually have greater clarity and precision than the preamble; but where 
there is doubt over the meaning of a substantive provision, the preamble may justify a wider interpretation, 
or at least rejection of a restrictive one’. E Suy, ‘Le Préambule’ in E Yakpo and T Boumedra (eds) Liber 
Amicorum Judge Mohammed Bedjaoui (Kluwer, The Hague, 1999) at p 262: ‘De façon générale, le 
dispositive offrira, en raison de sa plus grande précision, plus de claret, de sorte qu’un recours à 
l’interprétation au moyen du prémbule peut en justifier une interpretation extensive – ou au moins 
justifier le rejet d’une interpretation restrictive’. It is suggested that the preamble of a treaty consisting of 
a set of recitals, where it is the usual place where parties would enshrine an explicit statement of its object 
and purpose, may assist the determination of the object and purpose of the treaty. 
1453 Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, supra n 663, 
at p 544. In the Golder case, at p 34, it is apparent how the preamble provides a teleological role in the 
determination of the interpretation of a treaty term. The profound belief in the rule of law by the signatory 
Governments as shown in the context and the object and purpose of the Convention prompted the Court 
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7.2.4 Annexes as Part of Context 
Article 31(2) expressly spells out that annexes form part of the context of a treaty. In the 
Chile – Price Band case, the AB found contextual support in Annex 5 and its 
Attachment to Annex 5, the Guidelines for the Calculation of Tariff Equivalents for the 
Specific Purpose Specified in Paragraphs 6 and 10 of this Annex, of the Agreement on 
Agriculture in the interpretation of the term ‘ordinary custom duties’. The Annex and its 
Attachment contemplates the calculation of ‘tariff equivalents’ in a way that would 
result in ordinary customs duties to be expressed as ad valorem or specific rates.
1455
 
This provides the contextual foundation where the AB held that Members (of the World 
                                                                                                                                         
to interpret that the right of access constitutes an element inherent in the right stated by Art 6(1) of the 
Human Rights Convention. The Court went further and proclaimed that ‘one can scarcely conceive of the 
rule of law without there being a possibility of having access to the courts’. European Court of Human 
Rights, Golder v United Kingdom, Application No 4451/70 (Strasbourg, 21 February 1975) 
<http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-57496> accessed 17 November 2012  
1454 For example, Asylum Case (Columbia v Peru) (Judgment of 20 November 1950) [1950] ICJ Reports 
266 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/7/1849.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. The Court, at p 282, in 
consideration of the meaning of ‘common crimes’ within Art 1(1) of the Havana Convention, referred to 
the object of the Havana Convention as indicated in the preamble. The Convention, as stated in the 
preamble, intended to fix the rules which the signatory States must observe for the granting of asylum in 
their mutual relations and to put an end to the abuses which had arisen in the practice of asylum. 
Sovereignty over Pulau Ligitan and Pulau Sipadan (Indonesia v Malaysia) (Judgment of 17 December 
2002) [2002] ICJ Reports 625 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/102/7698.pdf> accessed 17 November 
2012. The ICJ referred to the wording of the preamble, which were ‘the parties were desirous of defining 
the boundaries between the Netherland possessions in the Island of Borneo and the States in that island 
which are under British protection’ and decided that the Convention did not suggest that the parties 
intended to delimit the boundary between their possessions to the east of the islands of Borneo and 
Sebatik or to attribute sovereignty over any other islands ‘as these islands were little known at that time, 
and were not the subject of any dispute between Great Britain and the Netherlands’, at p 652, para 51.  In 
the Golder case, supra n 1453, at p 12, at para 34, opined that the passage in the preamble that laid out the 
declaration of the Signatory Governments, ‘as Governments of European Countries that are like-minded 
and have a common heritage of political traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law’ to resolve the 
interpretation of ‘to take the first steps for the collective enforcement of certain of the Rights stated in the 
Universal Declaration’. The Court emphasised that the rule of law is one of the features of the common 
spiritual heritage of the member States of the Council of Europe, and it would be a mistake to treat this 
reference in the preamble as a merely ‘more or less rhetorical reference devoid of relevance’ in the 
interpretation of the Convention. Shrimp/Turtle case, supra n 689, at paras 129 and 131. The AB in the 
Shrimp/Turtle case referred to the Preamble to the WTO Agreement to infer that the signatories to the 
WTO Agreement are fully aware of the importance and legitimacy of environmental protection as a goal 
of national and international policy where the objective of sustainable development is acknowledged. The 
AB noted that the perspective embodied in the preamble gave an evolutionary definition to the generic 
term of ‘natural resources’ in Art XX(g). The explicit recognition of the WTO Members of the objective 
of sustainable development in the preamble of the WTO Agreement supports the interpretation of Art 
XX(g) to hold that measures to conserve exhaustible natural resources, whether living or non-living, may 
fall within Art XX(g). In the Chile – Price Band case, supra n 891, the AB made explicit reference to 
Recital 2 of the Preamble that laid out the objective of the Agreement. The AB acknowledged that the 
determination of whether Chile’s price band system is consistent with the Agreement on Agriculture must 
bear in mind the objective of the Agreement as stated in its Preamble. In addition, certain special and 
differential treatment for developing country Members relating to the treatment of agricultural products is 
recognised in the Preamble, although the parties had both conceded that the fact that both are developing 
countries has no relevance in the present dispute. 
1455 Chile – Price Band case, supra n 891, at para 277. 
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Trade Organisation) are not required to refrain from basing their duties on ‘exogenous 
factors’, as long as the ordinary customs duties are to be expressed in the form of ad 
valorem or specific rates, and reversed the Panel’s finding in paragraph 7.52 of the 
Panel Report.
1456
 
7.2.5 Text as Part of Context 
The various aspects of ‘the text’ could be elaborated through the categories of grammar 
and syntax; title, headings, and chapeaux; structure or scheme underlying a provision or 
the treaty as a whole; related and contrasting provisions; or even the punctuation and 
syntax.
1457
  
A distinction between immediate context and the context in the sense of the entire text 
of the treaty is carefully drawn in the La Bretagne arbitration.
1458
 The Tribunal, prior to 
the determination of the scope of the principle of non-discrimination as stipulated in 
Article 6
1459
 needs to examine the content of the term ‘fishery regulations’.1460   
The Tribunal first refers to the immediate context, which is Article 6 itself, of ‘which 
the phrase “fishing regulations” forms part’.1461 The Tribunal identified the parallel 
rules that apply reciprocally to Canadian and French fishing vessels and does not 
refer solely to the internal law of one or another of the Parties in defining the notion 
of ‘fishing regulations’. Therefore, the immediate context of Article 6 prompted the 
Tribunal to adopt a definition of ‘fishing regulations’ that is common to both Parties, 
and involves elements taken from the internal law of each of the two States.
1462
 
                                               
1456 Chile – Price Band case, supra n 891, at para 278. 
1457 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at pp 178 – 189. 
1458 Dispute Concerning Filleting within the Gulf of St Lawrence (‘La Bretagne’) (Canada/French) (1986) 
82 ILR 591. 
1459 Art 6 provides that ‘Canadian fishery regulations shall be applied without discrimination in fact or in 
law to the French fishing vessels’ 
1460 La Bretagne, supra n 1458, at pp 618 – 619, para 37.  
1461 La Bretagne, supra n 1458, at p 620, para 38. Art 6 of the 1972 Agreement between Canada and 
France on Their Mutual Fishing Relations provides that: ‘1. Canadian fishery regulations shall be applied 
without discrimination in fact or in law to the French fishing vessels covered by Articles 3 and 4, 
including regulations concerning the dimensions of vessels authorized to fish less than 12 miles from the 
Atlantic coast of Canada. 2. French fishery regulations shall be applied under the same conditions to the 
Canadian fishing vessels covered by Article 4. 3. Before promulgating new regulations applicable to these 
vessels, the authorities of each of the parties shall give three months prior notice to the authorities of the 
other party.’ 
1462 La Bretagne, supra n 1458, at p 620, para 38. The Tribunal referred to the statement arrived at the ICJ 
in the Barcelona Traction case, at p 37, para 50. The ICJ, at p 211, elaborated that ‘It is to rules generally 
accepted by municipal legal systems .. and not to the municipal law of a particular State’. At para 38, in 
the reference to the immediate context of ‘fishing regulations’, the Tribunal is of the view that the natural 
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Apart from the immediate context in which the meaning of ‘fishing regulations’ is 
ascertained, the Tribunal proceeded to enunciate that the context in terms of the entire 
text of the Agreement should also be applied. In this sense, the Tribunal carefully drew 
out the difference between the immediate context – which is the whole of the Article in 
which the term is found, and the context in the entire treaty. The Tribunal then 
continued to refer to the entire text of the Agreement to confirm that the phrase ‘fishing 
regulations’ is not to be deprived of its ordinary sense, as the entire Agreement relates to 
reciprocal relations between the Parties ‘in fisheries matters’.1463 Hence, the Tribunal 
decided that the authorities of one of the Parties might not use fishing regulations to 
subject the other Party’s vessels to regulations unconnected with the purpose of 
fishing.
1464
 
7.2.5.1 Heading and Title 
Gardiner proposed further guidance in the determination of the ‘wider’ context that is 
not provided under the 1969 Vienna Convention, but still intrinsically essential in the 
determination of ‘context’ as titles or descriptive headings should clearly form part of 
the context for the purposes of interpretation. He commented that the obvious starting 
point for the construction and identification of the scope and ambit of a treaty, or a 
section or provision of a treaty is the title, headings or the chapeaux.
1465
 In addition, The 
WTO used the terminology of ‘chapeau’ to mean the preamble or the preambular 
language of Article XX.
1466
  
                                                                                                                                         
and ordinary sense of ‘fishing regulations’ – consists in designating the legislative or regulatory 
prescriptions contained in the various systems of internal law, which fix the conditions to which all fish-
catching activities are subject and are generally designed to maintain order of fishing grounds as well as 
to protect and preserve resources’. Case Concerning the Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, 
Limited (Belgium v Spain) (Judgment of 5 February 1970) [1970] ICJ Reports 3; (1970) 46 ILR 178 
<http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/50/5387.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. 
1463 La Bretagne, supra n 1458, at pp 620 – 621, para 38.  
1464 La Bretagne, supra n 1458, at p 621, para 39. 
1465 See Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at pp 180 – 181. At p 181, According to Gardiner, 
titles or descriptive headings clearly form part of the context for the purposes of interpretation. Chapeau is 
used mainly to describe ‘the opening words [or the opening clause] of a provision which consists of a set 
of terms’, at pp 158 and 181. Chapeau is not defined in the Vienna Convention. However, the use of this 
terminology to refer to the opening clause is ‘in vogue’, especially in the WTO regime where careful 
treatment of the chapeau of Article XX of the GATT is undertaken in the interpretation and application of 
the provisions that permit exceptions listed in GATT. 
1466  See WTO, ‘XXI. Article XX’ (WTO Analytical Index: GATT 1994) 
<http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/gatt1994_07_e.htm> accessed 21 April 
2012. In Shrimp/Turtle case, supra n 689, at paras 158 – 159, the AB stated that – ‘The chapeau of 
Article XX is, in fact , but one expression of the principle of good faith. This principle, at once a general 
principle of law and a general principle of international law, controls the exercise of rights by states. One 
application of this general principle, the application widely known as the doctrine of abus de droit, 
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As the chapeau relates to the application of the measure in dispute and not the measure 
itself, its relation to the interpretation of the obligations and terms of Article XX 
exceptions is slightly different from the role of title or headings in informing or 
confirming the ordinary meaning of a treaty term as elaborated above. The chapeau 
asserts influence on the extent to which a treaty provision under Article XX is applied 
whereby after ascertaining that the alleged measure falls under the provisions of Article 
XX, the manner in which the measure is applied must be in accordance with the 
conditions stipulated in the chapeau.  
A very good example illustrates the importance of title in providing the necessary 
context for the interpretation of a term can be found in the careful adoption of the title 
of Article 31 of the 1969 Vienna Convention that provides for ‘General Rule of 
Interpretation’.1467 
                                                                                                                                         
prohibits the abusive exercise of a state’s rights and enjoins that whenever the assertion of a right 
“impinges on the field covered by [a] treaty obligation, it must be exercised bona fide, that is to say, 
reasonably”. Having said this, our task here is to interpret the language of the chapeau, seeking addition 
interpretative guidance, as appropriate, from the general principles of international law. The task of 
interpreting and applying the chapeau is, hence, essentially the delicate one of locating and marking out a 
line of equilibrium between the right of a Member to invoke an exception under Art XX and the rights of 
the other Members under varying substantive provisions of the GATT 1994’. Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 159. The importance of the chapeau in the interpretation and application 
of Article XX of the GATT is explicitly stated by the WTO in numerous occasions. In US – Gasoline, 
supra n 118, at pp 20 and 21.  The AB stated that –  'In order that the justifying protection of Art XX may 
be extended to it [Gasoline Rule], the measure at issue must not only come under one or another of the 
particular exceptions – paragraphs (a) to (j) – listed under Art XX; it must also satisfy the requirements 
imposed by the opening clauses of Art XX. The analysis is two-tiered: first, provisional justification by 
reason of characterisation of the measure under Art XX(g); second, further appraisal of the same measure 
under the introductory clauses of Article XX’. At p 21, the AB went on further to state the importance of 
the chapeau in the interpretation of the exceptions under Art XX, and the role it plays on the provisions 
under Art XX, where it is stipulated that – ‘The chapeau, by its express terms addresses, not so much the 
questioned measure or its specific contents as such, but rather the manner in which that measure is 
applied. It is, accordingly, important to underscore that the purpose and object of the introductory clauses 
of Art XX is generally the prevention of “abuse of the exceptions of Art XX”’. The importance of the 
chapeau in the interpretation and application of exceptions allowed under Art XX relates to whether an 
alleged measure that infringe other provisions of the GATT but falls under the exceptions permissible 
under Art XX, are ‘applied in such a manner which would constitute … a disguised restriction on trade’. 
See WTO, United States – Imports of Certain Automotive Spring Assemblies – Report of the Panel 
L/5333 – 30S/107 (26 May 1983) at para 56 
<http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/gattpanels/usspringassemblies.pdf> accessed 21 April 2012. 
1467 Draft Articles 1966, supra n 1435, at pp 219 – 220, para 8. The ILC explicated that – ‘by heading the 
article “General Rule of Interpretation” in the singular and by underlining the connexion between paras 1 
and 2 and again between para 3 and the two previous paragraphs, intended to indicate that the application 
of the means of interpretation in the article would be a single combined operation … because the 
Commission desired to emphasise that the process of interpretation is a unity and that the provisions of 
the article form a single, closely integrated rule. It is shown that the title of the provision in which a term 
is to be interpreted forms part of the context of the interpretation of that term, where recourse should be 
had in an interpretation of a treaty term. At p 223, para 18, it is stated that the title of Art 32 of 
‘Supplementary Means of Interpretation’ in the subsequent provision of the Vienna Convention indicated 
that these supplementary means are applied only in the event that primary rule of interpretation failed to 
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An interesting observation can be made in the case of Oil Platforms where the Court 
decided that ‘commerce’ in Article X(1) is not confined to maritime commerce where 
reference was made to the immediate grammar and syntax of ‘the rest of the Article’,1468 
and the other aspects of a treaty, in the determination of the scope of ‘commerce’. The 
context in which the term ‘commerce’ is embedded included the ‘recital in Article XXII 
of the Treaty that stated that the Treaty (of 1955) relates to trade and commerce, and not 
one restricted purely to maritime commerce.
1469
 The Court went further to impose that 
the entire range of activities provided in the Treaty, such as the stipulations under 
Article IV of the freedom, control and power of companies in the effective conduct of 
their affairs, should be considered.
1470
 
In furtherance of the determination of the scope of ‘commerce’, and whether the ambit 
of the term should be taken in its ordinary sense and its legal meaning, particular 
attention was paid regarding the title of the Treaty of 1955. The title refers not just 
‘Commerce’ but ‘Economic Relations’ besides ‘Amity’ and ‘Consular Rights’ to justify 
that ‘commerce’ in Article X(1) of the Treaty of 1955 also includes commercial 
activities that deals with a wide variety of matters ancillary to trade and commerce.
1471
 
Thus, a title or heading is not only relevant as a point of reference for an interpretation 
of a treaty term, its content will be useful as an aid to interpretation as seen in the case 
of Plama v Bulgaria.
1472
 The Tribunal opined that the Respondent’s contention on a case 
on jurisdictional grounds on the effect of Articles 17(1) and 26 of the Energy Charter 
Treaty.
1473
 The Tribunal was of the view that the express terms of Article 17 refer to a 
                                                                                                                                         
disclose clear or reasonable meaning or to confirm the meaning generated by the application of the 
general rule of interpretation under Art 31. At p 223, para 18, the ILC emphasised that the titling of 
‘supplementary means’ in Art 32 stipulated that the Commission intended for these means to act as an aid 
to interpretation governed by principles under Art 31 in situation whereby application of Art 31 produces 
ambiguity or gives a meaning that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. 
1468 Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v United States of America) (Preliminary 
Objection, Judgment of 12 December 1996) (1996) ICJ Reports 803, at p 817, para 41 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/90/7287.pdf> accessed 17 November 2012. 
1469 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 817, para 41.  
1470 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 817, para 42. 
1471 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at pp 818 – 819, paras 46, 47 and 49. 
1472 Plama v Bulgaria, (Decision on Jurisdiction, 8 February 2005) ICSID Case No ARB/03/24, 
<http://italaw.com/documents/plamavbulgaria.pdf> accessed 17 April 2012. Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 181. At p 45, at para 146, the Arbitration Tribunal was asked to decide 
on the question whether any issue raised under Art 17(1) by Bulgaria can deprive the Tribunal of all 
jurisdiction to decide the merits of the parties’ dispute. 
1473 Plama v Bulgaria, supra n 1472, at p 43, para 141. Art 26 of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) 
provides an almost unprecedented remedy to a covered investor for its claim against a host state, , albeit 
limited to the state’s obligations under Part III of the ECT. The relevant part of Art 26, at p 36, para 121 
provides that – ‘Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party 
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denial of the advantage ‘of this Part’, which refers to the substantive advantages 
conferred upon an investor by Part III of the ECT. This reading is confirmed by the title 
to Article 17, which stated ‘Non-Application of Part III in Certain Circumstances’ 
(original emphasis).
1474
  
Hence, the denial of protection under Article 17, interpreted in good faith and in 
accordance with their ordinary contextual meaning, would only exclude the advantages 
of Part III and would not preclude it exercising jurisdiction under Article 26, Part V of 
the Treaty to determine whether on the facts Article 17 had been properly invoked.
1475
 It 
has been shown in this Tribunal decision that the title of Article 17 has aided in the 
interpretation of Article 17, and confirmed the conclusion arrived at by the Tribunal that 
the denial of advantages is merely limited to advantages accorded under Part III of the 
Treaty, and does not extend to include a denial to invoke Article 26 for the resolution of 
dispute under Article 17(1).
1476
 
7.2.5.2 The structure and scheme underlying the provision and the treaty as a 
whole 
The context of a treaty term includes the structure or scheme underlying a provision or 
the treaty as a whole.
1477
 The reference to ‘structure’ of a provision in a contextual 
reading of a treaty term is illustrated in the WTO case of Canada – Measures Affecting 
                                                                                                                                         
relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an 
obligation of the former under Part III … may choose to submit it for resolution to … international 
arbitration under the ICSID convention’. At p 8, para 22, Art 17 is situated within Part III of the Treaty 
that laid out the obligations undertaken by the Contracting States to accord to the Investments of Investors 
of other Contracting States ‘fair and equitable treatment’ and ‘the most constant protection and security’. 
Art 17 specifically stipulated that – Contracting States reserve the right to deny the advantages of Part III 
(ie the substantive protection for investors under Part III) to a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third 
state own or control that entity and if that entity has no substantial business activities in the Area of the 
Contracting Party in which it is organised. 
1474 Plama v Bulgaria, supra n 1472, at p 45, para 147. 
1475 Plama v Bulgaria, supra n 1472, at pp 45 – 46, paras 147 and 149. The Tribunal elaborated that – 'The  
language is unambiguous [that Art 17 refer to a denial of the advantages of this Part (Part III)]; but it is 
confirmed by the title to Art 17 … [T]he denial applies only to advantages under Part III [and does not 
operate as a denial of all benefits to a covered investor under the Treaty but is expressly limited to a 
denial of the advantages of Part III of the ECT] … It would therefore require a gross manipulation of the 
language to make it refer to Art 26 in Part V of the ECT. Nonetheless, the Tribunal has considered 
whether any such manipulation is permissible in the light of the ECT’s object and purpose'. 
1476 However, if indicated otherwise, the title has limited implication on the context of a treaty, as found 
in the UNFCCC. A note to the title of Art 1 which stated that ‘Titles of articles are included solely to 
assist the reader’, such express limitation might be taken as a specific restraint for its incorporation into 
the context for the interpretation of a particular provision in the treaty. 
1477 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 182. See paras 155 - 156.  
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the Export of Civilian Aircraft.
1478
 The AB, after acknowledging that the guidelines for 
calculating the amount of a subsidy in terms of ‘the benefit to the recipient’ in Article 
14 relates to ‘countervailing measures’, still decided that it constituted relevant context 
for the interpretation of ‘benefit’. The similar context in which ‘benefit’ is used in both 
Articles 14 and 1.1 where Article 14 explicitly referred to Article 1.1 in the calculation 
of ‘benefit’ supports the reading of ‘benefit’ of Article 1.1(b) that ‘benefit’ concerns the 
‘benefit to the recipient’ and not ‘cost to government’, contrary to the contention of 
Canada.
1479
 
The role of the ‘underlying scheme’ of the treaty, as part of the context in ‘buttressing 
an emerging interpretation’ can be shown in the judgment of the House of Lords in R v 
Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex parte Read. The application requires the 
House of Lords to determine whether the Secretary of State had any power, and if so, to 
what extent, to provide for a shorter term to be served or to fix an earlier release date in 
this application for transfer to the United Kingdom under the Repatriation of Prisoners 
                                               
1478 WTO, Canada – Measures Affecting the Export of Civilian Aircraft – Report of the Appellate Body 
(AB-1999-2) (2 August 1999) WT/DS70/AB/R <http://www.worldtradelaw.net/reports/wtoab/canada-
aircraft(ab).pdf> accessed 15 November 2012 (hereinafter: ‘Canada – Aircraft’). The AB, in the 
determination of whether the Panel has erred in the interpretation of ‘benefit’ in Art 1.1(b) of the Subsidy 
and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Agreement by excluding the cost to the government, rejecting 
Annex IV as relevant context, and instead focus the interpretation of ‘benefit’ on the commercial 
benchmarks in Art 14. At p 38, para 151, the AB referred to the provision of Article 1.1 of the SCM 
Agreement in para 152, whereby it stated that, ‘under the heading of ‘Definition of A Subsidy’, Art 1.1 
provides, in relevant part: … [A] subsidy shall be deemed to exist if … (a)(1) there is a financial 
contribution by a government or any public body within the territory of a Member (referred to in this 
Agreement as “government”) … and (b) a benefit is thereby conferred.’ At para 153, the AB started the 
interpretation of the ordinary meaning of ‘benefit’ by looking at the dictionary definition of ‘benefit’, of 
which confirmed the Panel’s statement that ‘the ordinary meaning of “benefit” clearly encompasses some 
form of advantage’. At pp 38 − 39, para 154, The AB goes further to state that – ‘A benefit does not exist 
in the abstract, but must be received and enjoyed by a beneficiary or a recipient … The term ‘benefit’ 
implies that there must be a recipient. This provides textual support for the view that the focus of the 
inquiry under Art 1.1(b) of the SCM Agreement should be on the recipient and not on the granting 
authority. Reference to the ordinary meaning of the word ‘confer’ used in Art 1.1(b) ‘bears this out’. The 
use of the past participle ‘conferred’ in the passive form, in conjunction with the word ‘thereby’ naturally 
calls for an inquiry into what was conferred on the recipient (emphasis original)’. Following from such 
argument, the AB decided that Canada’s contention that ‘cost to government’ is one way of conceiving of 
‘benefit’ is at odds with the ordinary meaning of Art 1.1(b) that focuses on the recipient and to on the 
government providing the financial contribution’. The AB emphasised, at p 39, para 156 that ‘the 
structure of Art 1.1 as a whole confirms our view that Art 1.1(b) is concerned with the “benefit” to the 
recipient and not with the “cost to government”’. The ‘structure’ of Art 1.1, in the definition of ‘subsidy’ 
as meant by the AB consists of two elements: first, the action of the government in making the financial 
contribution; and logically, the second element must necessarily concerns the ‘benefit conferred on the 
recipient by that governmental action’. The structure of Art 1.1 clearly exhibits that ‘subsidy’ is meant to 
be determined from whether an action of contribution is taken by the government, and whether such 
contribution is conferred on the recipient. Nothing in the ‘structure’ hinted that ‘cost incurred to the 
government’ as contended by Canada is relevant to the determination of whether there is a benefit to the 
recipient. The AB held that such a contention by Canada disregards the overall structure of Art 1.1. 
1479 See Canada – Aircraft, supra n 1478, at paras 155 – 156.  
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Act 1984 and the International Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons 
1983.
1480
  The Secretary of State argued that his task is merely to compare the foreign 
sentence against the maximum sentence laid down by Parliament, whereby if the 
foreign sentence is less than the maximum sentence provided by Parliament, he will 
simply provide for the sentence to be served in full.
1481
  
Lord Parker LJ opined that this would produce surprising consequences, where 
following a foreign court’s conviction of two defendants, one with the minimum 
sentence of 12 years and the other, the maximum sentence of 20 years, both sentences 
would be reduced to 10 years of continued enforcement in a transfer of prisoner by 
virtue of the Act of 1984. Lord Parker LJ, on behalf of the Lords, pronounced that it is 
unacceptable for the Lords of the contention that ‘so long as the sentence to be served 
does not exceed that maximum (of 10 years under Section 15(1) of the Forgery and 
Counterfeiting Act 1981 of imprisonment not exceeding 10 years)’.1482 The Lords are 
‘unable to … accept that the parties to the Convention, or Parliament when enacting the 
Act of 1984, intended to produce any such results’.1483  
The House of Lords made reference to the underlying scheme of Article 10, where the 
starting point for Article 10 is always the original sentence.
1484
 The administrating state 
is bound by the continuation of enforcement determined by the sentencing state. 
However, it is qualified by paragraph two (Article 10.2) that the enforcement of such 
sentence, if found incompatible, must be adapted by the administrating state to a 
                                               
1480 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, Ex parte Read [1989] Appeal Cases 1014, at p 1025. 
See pp 1023 – 1025. The Convention provides in Art 9 the procedures the administering state may use in 
the case of a transferred person. It may either continue the enforcement of the original sentence under Art 
10 or it may convert the sentence into a sentence of its own under Art 11. Art 10 concerning the 
continuation of enforcement is the only applicable provision as the United Kingdom has indicated that it 
intends to exclude the conversion procedure under Art 11. Art 10, on continued enforcement, provides 
that – ‘1. In the case of continued enforcement, the administering sate shall be bound by the legal nature 
and duration of the sentence as determined by the sentencing state. 2. If, however, this sentence is by its 
nature or duration incompatible with the law of the administering state, or its law so requires, that state 
may, by a court or administrative order, adapt the sanction to the punishment or measure prescribed by its 
own law for a similar offence. As to its nature, the punishment or measure shall, as far as possible, 
correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be enforced. It shall not aggravate, by its nature or 
duration, the sanction imposed in the sentencing state, nor exceed the maximum prescribed by the law of 
the administering state’. Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (concluded 21 March 1983, 
entered into force 1 July 1985) CETS No 112 
<http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/112.htm> accessed 18 November 2012. Gardiner, 
Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 184. 
1481 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra n 1480, at p 1025. 
1482
 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra n 1480, at p 1026. 
1483 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra n 1480, at p 1025. 
1484 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra n 1480, at p 1021. 
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punishment or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offence, and as far as 
possible correspond with the sentence to be enforced.
1485
  
Hence, the underlying scheme on the continuation of enforcement under Article 10 
played the role in buttressing the interpretation of this provision, especially in the light 
of the contrasting scheme underlying Article 11 that is explicitly excluded by the UK 
government. In the confirmation of this interpretation, reference was made to the 
‘Explanatory Report’, adopted at the time of conclusion of the Convention and thus 
forming part of the context as stipulated under Article 31(2)(a) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention.
1486
 
Similarly, the ICJ, in the case of Navigational and Related Rights illustrated the 
reference to the whole of the treaty in order to infer a necessary consequence or 
implication in the reading of a disputed provision, implicit in the structure of the treaty 
as a whole.
1487
 The ICJ decided that the particular aspect of navigational rights for 
private vessels in order to meet the essential requirements of the population living on 
                                               
1485 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra n 1480, at p 1025.The House of Lords 
interpreted that Art 10.2 clearly shows that ‘the terms of para 1 are qualified by paragraph two which 
confers the power of the administering state to depart from para 1 if the foreign sentence is by its nature 
or duration incompatible with the law of the administering state’. The Lords further elaborated that – If 
there is incompatibility, Art 10 empowers the administering state to ‘adapt the sanction to the punishment 
or measure prescribed by its own law for a similar offence’. It then provides that ‘as to its nature’ the 
adaptation shall so ‘far as possible, correspond with that imposed by the sentence to be enforced’ and is 
not to ‘aggravate, by its nature or duration, the sanction imposed in the sentencing state, nor exceed the 
maximum prescribed by the law of the administering state’. A similar offence prescribed under Section 
15 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981 has a maximum sentence of imprisonment not exceeding 
10 years. And such sentence is ‘to be reserved for the gravest offence’ of which the House of Lords 
opined that the Spanish offence before them ‘was far from the gravest’ that the Secretary of State, by 
fixing the term to be served on a 10 year sentence, has ‘infringed the final prohibition’. The Lords 
emphasised that ‘compatibility’ is not preserved by merely continuing a sentence served that does not 
exceed the maximum sentence imposed in the administering state. It is held that ‘it cannot have been the 
intention of Parliament to have required the Secretary of State to enforce a sentence considered to be 
manifestly excessive by the courts in this country’, let alone a sentence that is considered manifestly 
excessive by the sentencing state.  
1486 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, supra n 1480, at p 1052. See also Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 185. 
1487 See also Dörr and Schmalenbach (eds) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. A Commentary, 
supra n 663, at p 544. The Court in the case of Navigational and Related Rights, supra n 210, at pp 245 
and 246, paras 74 and 77 stated that – ‘[T]here is reason to take into account the provisions of the Treaty 
as a whole, especially those fixing the boundary between the two States, in order to draw, if need be, 
certain necessary implications’. The question raised was whether the navigation of vessels belonging to 
the inhabitants of the villages on the Costa Rican bank of the river in order to meet the basic requirements 
of everyday life was protected by the right of free navigation when it is carried out free of charge. 
Navigational and Related Rights, supra n 210, at p 246, para 77.  
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the river bank in their daily lives, is inferred from the provisions of the Treaty as a 
whole, in particularly from the fixing of the boundary along the river bank.
1488
 
A similar observation of a relevant provision of the treaty that shows an underlying 
structure or scheme that might assist in the interpretation of another treaty term or 
provision is briefly alluded to in the case of Oil Platform. The Court, by its Judgment on 
Preliminary objection noted that the objective of Article I of the 1955 Treaty is ‘to 
throw light on the interpretation of the other Treaty provisions and thus not without 
legal significance for such an interpretation’.1489 The Court in the Judgment on the 
merits of the same case further stated that Article I is relevant in so far that it might 
affect the interpretation or application of the text of Article X(1).
1490
 
7.2.5.3  Related and Contrasting Provisions 
Provisions that are related or contrasting offer necessary insights in the interpretation of 
a treaty provision or its terms, by providing a context for such interpretation.
1491
 The 
Border and Transborder Armed Actions case shows that a related provision that is 
dissimilar in its content can be useful in illustrating the interpretation of a term.
1492
 The 
Court, in the determination of jurisdiction, compared the two contrasted provisions, and 
noted the different mode of how it may be conferred jurisdiction in accordance with the 
Statute, where the two provisions provide for ‘two distinct ways by which access may 
be had to the Court’.1493  
The Court confirmed that Article XXXI relates to cases that the Court can be seised 
directly, whereas Article XXXII confers jurisdiction when parties failed to reach a 
solution although conciliation is resorted to initially. Thus, the two contrasting 
                                               
1488 Navigational and Related Rights, supra n 210, at p 248, para 84.  
1489 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 815, para 31.  
1490 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 178, para 31. 
1491 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at pp 185 − 186. 
1492 Case Concerning Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v Honduras) (Jurisdiction of 
the Court and Admissibility of the Application) Judgment of 20 December 1988, ([1988] ICJ Reports 69. 
At pp 84 and 88, paras 32 and 43, Honduras contended that jurisdiction is based on Article XXXII of the 
Pact of Bogotá, and that Article XXXI and XXXII must be read together. It contended that the Court 
could only be seised under Article XXXI if there had been a prior recourse to conciliation and lack of 
agreement to arbitrate since Article XXXI establishes jurisdiction of the Court and the subsequent Article 
XXXII sets out the prerequisites for the reference of a particular dispute. Article XXXI provides for the 
recognition of the parties of the ICJ’s jurisdiction as compulsory ipso facto in accordance with Article 
36(2) of the Statute of ICJ. Article XXXII provides for the recourse of either of the parties to the 
International Court of Justice in accordance with Article 40 of the Statute of ICJ in the event that the 
conciliation procedure previously established in the Pact or by agreement of the parties does not lead to a 
solution, or parties have not agreed upon an arbitral procedure. 
1493 Border and Transborder Armed Actions, supra n 1450, at pp 88 – 89, at paras 42 – 45.  
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provisions, addressing the same subject matter (jurisdiction), forms part of the context in 
the interpretation, clarification, and confirmation of a treaty provision (jurisdiction of 
court under Article XXXI). This led the Court to conclude that Article XXXI of the Pact 
of Bogotá confers jurisdiction upon the Court to entertain the dispute submitted to it 
regardless of whether there are any declarations of acceptance of compulsory 
jurisdiction by Nicaragua and Honduras; or whether prior conciliation had been initiated. 
7.2.5.4  Punctuation and Syntax 
Considerations of punctuations and syntax are needed in uncovering the essential link 
between the meaning of a single word and its immediate context.
1494
 Together with 
other elements of treaty interpretation, they constitute part of the whole of treaty 
interpretation.
1495
 The pivotal role of punctuation was shown in the Protocol Rectifying 
Discrepancy in the Charter of the International Military Tribunal, where the parties to 
the Charter viewed it desirable to rectify a discrepancy on punctuation found to exist 
between the originals of Article 6(c) of the Charter in the Russian language on the one 
hand, and the originals in the English and French languages on the other.
1496
  
                                               
1494 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 187. 
1495 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 188. 
1496 Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, ‘Charter of the International Military Tribunal’ 
(Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol I, The Avalon Project. Documents in Law, History and Diplomacy 
2008) <http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtconst.asp> accessed 3 May 2012. The original Art 6(c) is quote 
as below: Crimes against humanity: namely, murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation, and other 
inhumane acts committed against any civilian population, before or during the war; or persecutions on 
political, racial or religious grounds in execution of or in connection with any crime within the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal, whether or not in violation of the domestic law of the country where 
perpetrated. The London Agreement of 8 August 1945 drew up between the four Governments was 
executed in triplicate, English, French and Russian, each text having equal authenticity. See Art 7, 
London Agreement of 8 August 1945.  Yale Law School Lillian Goldman Law Library, ‘London 
Agreement of August 8th 1945’ (Nuremberg Trial Proceedings Vol I, The Avalon Project. Documents in 
Law, History and Diplomacy 2008) < http://avalon.law.yale.edu/imt/imtchart.asp> accessed 3 May 2012. 
It was found that in the English and French text, Art 6(c) was found to be divided into two parts by a 
semicolon between ‘war’ and ‘persecutions’ with a semicolon between them. The semicolon is not found 
in the Russian text, which is equally authentic, where instead of a semicolon dividing the paragraph, a 
comma had been placed between the corresponding word for ‘war’ and the corresponding word for ‘or 
persecutions’ in Russian. The Rectifying Protocol declared that the respective parties to the London 
Agreement have duly authorised, and have agreed that Art 6(c) of the Charter in the Russian text is 
correct, and that the meaning and intention of the Agreement and charter require that the said semicolon 
in the English text should be changed to a comma. It is commented that the original English and French 
text that contained the division in Art 6(c) by a semicolon would led to a somewhat absurd results where 
it could be said that the provision applied only to the words after the semicolon, ie to persecutions on 
political, racial, or religious grounds. If the semicolon has effectively separated Art 6(c), it means that the 
crimes of the murder type, committed against any civilian population at any time, are crimes against 
humanity subject to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. See Egon Schwelb, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’ (1946) 23 
British Yearbook of International Law 178 – 226, at pp 192 and 193. The simple grammatical 
interpretation of the original English text would read that the requirement of ‘connection with any crime 
within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal’ and the clarification that ‘violation of the domestic law of the 
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The rectification of the punctuation in the original text of both English and French 
through the conclusion of the Protocol indicated the clear intention of the parties to alter 
the law in a significant manner, where barriers that appeared to exist between the first 
and the second limb of the paragraph by virtue of the semicolon are to be removed.
1497
 
As the texts now stand after the rectification, it is beyond doubt that the requirement 
imposed by ‘in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of 
the Tribunal’ applies to the ‘whole context of the paragraph and constitutes a very 
important restriction on the scope of the concept of crimes against humanity’.1498  
However, it should be kept in perspective that punctuation and syntax proffer assistance, 
and form only part of the whole picture of treaty interpretation.
1499
 
                                                                                                                                         
country where perpetrated’ is irrelevant, only apply to ‘persecutions on political, racial or religious 
grounds’ instead of to both groups of crimes against humanity. See Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra 
n 235, at p 187. 
1497 Egon Schwelb, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, supra n 1496, at p 194. 
1498 Egon Schwelb, ‘Crimes Against Humanity’, supra n 1496, at p 195. At p 194, It is mentioned earlier 
that punctuation and syntax is an aid to interpretation, but they merely forms part of the whole of treaty 
interpretation. In the present case, a comma that is followed by ‘or’ would in normal circumstances 
suffice to divide the paragraph of the original English text into two parts where ‘in execution of or in 
connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal’ would only relate to ‘persecutions and 
not to the crimes of the inhumane type’. It is recognised that the change of semicolon to comma itself 
‘would not bring about a fundamental alteration in the law if regard were not had to the circumstances 
attending this alteration. In consideration of the length the contracting parties went to conclude the 
Protocol in order to rectify the discrepancy in punctuation between the text, the intention of the parties to 
impose a significant implication is unambiguous. In this regard, punctuation and syntax is an important 
part in the context of the treaty provision.  
1499  This is illustrated in the case of Aegean Sea Continental Shelf where the Court found that 
‘grammatical arguments do not appear to the Court to be so compelling as has been suggested’. Greek’s 
grammatical argument hinged upon the interpretation of the words ‘et, notamment’ (in particularly) that 
precede the reference to ‘les différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce’ (disputes relating to 
the territorial status of Greece). It was stated that the reference to ‘disputes relating to the territorial status 
of Greece’ was not intended to ‘designate an autonomous category of disputes additional to the category 
of disputes concerning matters solely within domestic jurisdiction’ but are mentioned merely as ‘a 
particular example of such disputes which it was desired to emphasise’. Greek Government stressed that 
the use of the word notamment, in the majority of which the word is preceded by the word et, but still 
denoted merely a particular instance of a wider genus of category. It is submitted that on the basis of this 
linguistic evidence, it maintained that – ‘the natural, ordinary and current meaning of this expression 
absolutely precluded the Greek reservation from being read as covering disputes regarding territorial 
status in addition to, and quite separately from, disputes regarding matters of domestic jurisdiction’. The 
Court opined that the grammatical interpretation advanced by Greece will lead to a result that is legally 
surprising. Disputes concerning matters of domestic jurisdiction, and disputes relating to territorial status 
are two separate concepts that have always been kept distinct, but if Greece’s advancement is accepted, it 
will lead to an integration of these concepts that deprives the concept of disputes relating to territorial 
status ‘of any significance’. Besides, the Court raised that the grammatical argument advanced by Greece 
overlooks the commas placed both before and after ‘notamment’, where ‘et’ was intended to be a true 
conjunctive that introduced a category of disputes in addition to the one that has already been specified. 
In addition, the meaning attributed to ‘et, notamment’ by Greece is grammatically not the only, albeit 
most frequent use of the expression. Whether it has the meaning attributed to it by Greece depends on the 
context in which those words were used in Greece’s instrument of accession and is not a matter simply of 
their preponderant linguistic usage. The Court emphasised that ‘in any event, the Court cannot base itself 
on a purely grammatical interpretation of the text (Anglo-Iranian Oil Co)’, especially when ‘a number of 
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In summary, the whole of the treaty, including its texts, preamble and annexes; and 
agreements or instruments concluded or accepted by all the parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty, are considered to be forming the ‘context’ for the purpose 
of interpretation. The context, comprising all the stated, and the extent to which the 
parties intended for them to form an integral part of the treaty, enables the interpreter to 
arrive at the ordinary meaning of the terms of the treaty in accordance with Article 31(1) 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
7.3 ‘Shall be Taken into Account’ 
 ‘The obligatory character of Article 31(3)(c) is the same as that of the provision which 
immediately precede (sic) it’,1500 where if the occasion calls for its application, the 
provision must be applied in that particular instance. Sands supported this approach in 
the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) whereby ‘shall be taken into account’ restricts the 
exercise of discretion by the interpreter where he ‘must “take account” of the 
[extraneous] norm’.1501  
The obligatory character of Article 31(3)(c) was confirmed by the Commentary of the 
Draft Articles of the 1969 Vienna Convention. The ILC noted that although elements in 
Article 31(3) are extrinsic to the text, they are ‘all of an obligatory character and by 
their very nature could not be considered to be norms of interpretation in any way 
inferior to those which precede them’.1502 Furthermore, the obligatory nature of ‘shall be 
taken into account’ is reiterated in the elaboration of Article 31(3)(a) [Draft Article 
                                                                                                                                         
considerations of a substantive character point decisively to the conclusion that reservation (b) in fact 
contained two separate and autonomous reservations’. The preceding discussion laid out that grammar 
and syntax are essential in understanding the essential link between the meaning of a single word and its 
immediate context, but it is not the whole of treaty interpretation where sole considerations are given. It 
forms part of treaty interpretation with other elements of interpretation in arriving at a correct 
interpretation. The Court in Aegean Sea indicated that purely grammatical analysis that might produce 
legally surprising result that is contrary to other substantial considerations of the context will not be 
convincing, and has to be ignored. See Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v Turkey)(Judgment on the 
Merits) [1978] ICJ Reports 3, at pp 21, and 22, paras 50, 52, 53, and 54 <http://www.icj-
cij.org/docket/files/62/6245.pdf> accessed 18 November 2012. The ICJ quoted the Anglo-Iranian Co case, 
at p 104. Anglo-Iranian Oil Co Case (United Kingdom v Iran) (Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 22 
July 1952) [1952] ICJ Reports 93 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/16/1997.pdf> accessed 18 
November 2012.  
1500
 Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation, supra n 235, at p 259. 
1501 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 102. 
1502 Draft Articles 1966, supra n 1435, at p 220, para 9. 
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27(3)(a)] where the Commission emphasised that the Article ‘must be read into the 
treaty for purpose of its interpretation’.1503  
However, it is unclear that the obligatory nature stems from the principle of authentic 
interpretation underlying Article 31(3)(a), or from the opening words of ‘shall be taken 
into account’, as a general definition for ‘take into account’ is not available in 
international law. The ordinary meaning of the term indicates a range of possible 
approaches and results. According to the consistent reference by the Commission of 
Article 31(3) as a whole, it should be taken that a logical interpretation will reveal that 
the obligatory nature of ‘taken into account’ is extended to the Article 31(3)(c).  
Sands commented that the ordinary usage of the term suggested that this formulation is 
‘stronger than “take into consideration” but weaker than “apply”’. 1504  Sands 
demonstrates that the right approach in the application of ‘take into account’ is to seek a 
consistent interpretation of the treaty interpreted with general international law (or the 
applicable relevant rules of international law) in order to ‘take into account’. The rule is 
to be applied unless it is shown that the application will undermine the object and 
purpose of the interpreted treaty.
1505
 Wälde adopts a similar approach as to the 
normative weight of ‘shall be taken into account’, where it is emphasised that the rules 
of international law ‘shall be taken into account’ means ‘international law shall only be 
taken into account rather than to be applied’.1506 
A double presumption seems to be intrinsic in the proposed approach, where the 
extraneous treaty is presumed to be consistent with the interpreted treaty, and the treaty 
is presumed to be applied, unless the party that opposes such application succeeds in 
shifting the onus of proof to show why the extraneous rule should not be applied. It is 
argued that the proposed ‘correct approach’ in the interpretation of ‘take into account’ is 
broadly consistent with the approach adopted by many municipal courts where in the 
interpretation of domestic legislation, they will assume that the legislators adopted laws 
that are ‘intended to be consistent with international obligations’.1507  
                                               
1503 Draft Articles 1966, supra n 1435, at p 221, para 14.  
1504 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 103.  
1505 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at pp 103 – 104.  
1506 Wälde, ‘Interpreting Investment Treaties: Experiences and Examples’, supra n 345, at pp 774 – 775.  
1507
 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 105, 
referred to Solomon v Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1967] 2 Queen’s Bench 116 at p 141. The 
Court held that ‘in the interests of international comity, the Customs and Excise Act of 1952 must 
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The approach that assumes consistency between rules, or a presumption of 
compatibility as known in a domestic jurisdiction, provides a guiding element in the 
ascertainment of what is to be considered ‘take into account’. Moreover, an inclination 
towards reading all rules as compatible or consistent with each other endorses the quest 
for coherency in the international legal order that ‘tend to unify rather than 
fragment’.1508 
The question of how widely relevant rules of international law shall be taken into 
account under Article 31(3)(c) is considered and answered in the question of the weight 
to be given to these rules of international law. It is emphasised that the importance of 
these rules ‘does not reside in their overriding character’, where such function is 
reserved to international law of jus cogens character.
1509
 The significance of the need to 
‘take into account’ lies in its performance of a systemic function in the international 
legal order that connects specialised parts not only to each other, but also to universal 
principles.
1510
 Thus, no excessive weight should be given to rules of international law 
extraneous to the treaty interpreted, as it will amount to the precedence of lex generalis 
over lex specialis that will stifle treaty-making.
1511
  
It is observed by the jurisprudence of the international court that the extent to which 
‘take into account’ should be given normative weight in the interpretation of a treaty in 
light of extraneous rules of international law that are relevant by virtue of Article 
31(3)(c) should be decided upon on a case-by-case basis.
1512
 The sentiment that the 
‘strength of the need to “take into account” can only be determined on a case by case 
basis’ was reiterated in a discussion of the possibility of attributing stronger normative 
weight on treaty rules of ‘integral’ character, where obligations erga omnes partes shall 
be taken into account when interpreting a ‘reciprocal’ treaty.1513  
                                                                                                                                         
conform to the European Convention on the valuation of Goods for Customs Purposes’. A presumption of 
compatibility is recognised where the Parliament does not intend to act in breach of the United 
Kingdom’s obligations in international law. See John Howell QC and Shaheed Fatima, ‘Using 
International Law in Domestic Courts’ (Presented by Blackstone Chambers in Association with Liberty 
“Focus on Public Law and Human Rights” 18 November 2005) at paras 16 – 20. 
1508 Sands, ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-fertilization of International Law’, supra n 119, at p 105.  
1509 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 201, para 473.  
1510 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at pp 239 – 240, para 473. 
1511 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 239, para 473. 
1512
 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 240, para 474. 
1513 Christina Voigt, Sustainable Development as A Principle of International Law: Resolving Conflicts 
between Climate Measures and WTO Law (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Netherlands, 2009) at p 282.  
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The need for the balancing of considerations to be taken into account was raised in the 
North Sea cases.
1514
 After stating that there is ‘no legal limit to the considerations that 
the States may take account of for the purpose of making sure that they apply equitable 
procedures’,1515 the ICJ went further to pronounce that –  
‘… it is the balancing-up of all such considerations that will produce this result 
rather than reliance on one to the exclusion of all others. The problem of the 
relative weight to be accorded to different considerations [that was taken into 
account] naturally varies with the circumstances of the case’.1516  
The issue of how other external rules ‘shall be taken into account’ is expounded by 
Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in the Arrest Warrant case. Their Separate 
Opinion stated that ‘“immunity”, or rather “immunity from jurisdiction” is inextricably 
linked to jurisdiction.
1517
 It is not a ‘free-standing topic of international law’ where it is 
desirable and necessary for the Court to state its position on the issue of jurisdiction.
1518
 
In this instance, the external relevant rules of international law on jurisdiction, 
according to the Separate Opinion, are taken into account to the extent that the 
assessment of immunity is found upon a decision on the issue of jurisdiction.
1519
 The 
ILC Study Group on Fragmentation had succinctly restated that –  
                                               
1514 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra n 893, at p 50 para 93.  
1515 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra n 893, at p 50, para 93. 
1516 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra n 893, at p 50, para 93. 
1517 Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant case, supra n 269, 
at p 63, para 3. 
1518 Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant, supra n 269, p 
63 at  para 3. At p 64, para 5, the Judges opined that ICJ will only be able to fulfil its function of resolving 
dispute if the two distinct norms of international law in play (though immunity can arise only if 
jurisdiction exists) are fully appreciated. 
1519 The Judges opined that only when the Court affirmed that the Belgian authorities could legitimately 
have invoked universal jurisdiction in the issuance and circulation of the arrest warrant for a person 
outside the territorial jurisdiction at the moment of the issue of the warrant would the question of whether 
Mr Yerodia is immune from such exercise of jurisdiction would arise. Separate Opinion of Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in Arrest Warrant case, supra n 269, at p 67 at  para 16. Further, the 
Judges, at p 87 at  para 79, opined that caution need to be exercised in the analysis of whether immunities 
under customary international law are due to high State officials ‘[i]n view of the worldwide aversion to 
these crimes, such immunities have to be recognised with restraint, in particularly when there is reason to 
believe that crimes have been committed which have been universally condemned in international 
conventions’. On the existence of two distinct norms that appears to be in competition, a contrary 
conclusion was arrived at by Judge Koroma, see Separate Opinion of Judge Koroma in Arrest Warrant 
case, supra n 269, at p 60, paras 4 and 5. Judge Koroma, at p 79, para 52, argued that universal 
jurisdiction can be invoked in the context of heinous international crimes or crimes against humanity is 
committed. See Robert Jennings and Arthur Watts KCMG QC (eds), Oppenheim’s International Law (9th 
edn, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2008)  at p 998. ‘While there is no general rule of positive 
international law can as yet be asserted which gives to states the right to punish foreign nationals for 
crimes against humanity in the same way as they are, for instance, entitled to punish acts of piracy, there 
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‘International law seeks the accommodation of this value with the fight against 
impunity, and not the triumph of one norm over the other. A state may exercise 
the criminal jurisdiction which it has under international law, but in doing so it is 
subject to other legal obligations, whether they pertain to the non-exercise of 
power in the territory of another State or to the required respect of the law of 
diplomatic relations or, as in the present case, to the procedural immunities of 
State officials’. 1520  
The decisions of the ICJ elaborated above do not specifically address the normative 
weight that ‘shall be taken into account’ for ‘relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relationship between the parties’ for the purpose of interpretation 
provided under Article 31(3)(c). However, it gave an insightful perspective to the 
problem of how much weight to be accorded in considerations (including rules of 
international law) that shall be taken into account, and how such relative weight to be 
accorded differs on a case-by-case basis.  
At this juncture, it seems crucial to determine the relationship between ‘rules of 
international law’ in order to establish the normative weight to be given to rules that are 
to be taken into account. The Institut de Droit International concluded, while 
considering problems arising from a succession of codification conventions on a 
particular subject, that the distinct but also interrelated sources of law – treaty and 
custom – may influence each other as to their respective content and interpretation.1521  
Although there is no a priori hierarchy between the difference sources of law, the norms 
deriving from a treaty will prevail between the parties over norms deriving from 
customary law in the application of international law in the event of conflict.
1522
 The 
ILC Study Group on Fragmentation commented that the rules that shall be ‘taken into 
account’ normally address a situation where the external rules existed at the same level 
of generality with the treaty to be interpreted, and ‘seems to conflict with it or put 
forward considerations that otherwise seem unorthodox in the context’.1523 Customary 
                                                                                                                                         
are clear indications pointing to the gradual evolution of a significant principle of international law to that 
effect.  
1520 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 240, para 474. 
1521 Conclusion 10, Institut de Droit International, ‘Problems Arising from a Succession of Codification 
Conventions on a Particular Subject’ (Lisbonne 1995)  
<http://www.idi-iil.org/idiE/resolutionsE/1995_lis_01_en.pdf> accessed 9 April 2012. 
1522 Conclusion 11, supra n 1521. 
1523 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 196, para 462.  
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international law and general principles of law ‘exist as lex generalis in relation to any 
particular agreements, are fully applicable and often applied alongside particular 
treaties’.1524 
The above sections delve in-depth the normative content and scope of the salient phrase 
‘shall be taken into account, together with the context’ stipulated in Article 31(3)(c) of 
the 1969 Vienna Convention to inform the development of an architecture for the 
operationalisation of the third stage of this framework. In light of the principle of 
systemic integration said to be reflected in Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention, it is sufficiently shown that the phrase ‘shall take into account’ has an 
obligatory nature. If all circumstances necessitating its application are triggered, i.e., 
rules of international law are relevant and applicable in the relations between the parties, 
these rules shall be taken into account. The normative weight to be given to the 
incorporation of these relevant rules in the interpretative process is circumscribed by the 
context of the treaty term or provision.  
The ‘context’ referred to in the present research is the colour of the environment that 
words, like chameleons, change to.
1525
 The 1969 Vienna Convention defined the 
‘context’ to comprise of any agreements made between all the parties; and an 
instrument made by one or more parties, and accepted by other parties that are in 
connection with or related to the conclusion of the treaty. In addition, the text, including 
its preamble and annexes, forms part of the context as well.  
‘A treaty text is not necessarily the same thing as a set of words and sentences’.1526 A 
careful reading of the text requires the careful perusal and construction of the various 
aspects of ‘the text and its preamble’. As noted, the various aspects can be categorised 
to include grammar and syntax; title, headings, and chapeaux; structure or scheme 
underlying a provision or the treaty as a whole; related and contrasting provisions; or 
even the punctuation and syntax. A distinction between immediate context and the 
context in the sense of the entire text of the treaty should also be carefully drawn.
1527
  
Subject to the context, the external rules of international law that satisfied the 
requirements imposed in Article 31(3)(c) shall be taken into account in the 
                                               
1524 Fragmentation Report, supra n 17, at p 196, para 462. 
1525
 Judge Learned Hand in Commissioner of Internal Revenue, supra n 1430.  
1526 Ulf Linderfalk, On the Interpretation of Treaties, at p 103. 
1527 La Bretagne, supra n 1458. 
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interpretation of a treaty term or provision, where the normative weight to be given to 
these rules will depend on the circumstances of each individual case.  
7.4 ‘Shall be Taken into Account, Together with the Context’ – Case Analyses 
The debate between the ICJ judges in the Oil Platform case on the interpretation and the 
application of Article 31(3)(c) provide an insightful perspective in directing how an 
external rule that is relevant, but not explicit in a treaty provision, is to be taken into 
account in accordance with this Article. The Esphahanian case illustrates how an 
external rule of international law is taken into account in the interpretation of the term 
of ‘national’ explicit in the treaty provision. These two cases furnish the foundation 
from which the architecture for the operationalisation of the principle of systemic 
integration enshrined in Article 31(3)(c) is developed. 
7.4.1 The Case of Oil Platforms in the International Court of Justice 
The Court was presented an opportunity to apply Article 31(3)(c) in the interpretation of 
Article XX(1)(d) of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations and Consular Rights 
between Iran and the United Sates. The Court was called upon to determine whether 
Iran’s allegedly neutral commercial shipping during the Iran/Iraq war, and the 
subsequent act of United States of Navy in destroying three Iranian oil platforms in the 
Persian Gulf, were in breach of the Treaty.
1528
  The Court decided that the issue at hand 
is a matter of interpretation of the 1955 Treaty, in particularly Article XX(1)(d) where 
the question is –  
‘[W]hether the parties to the 1955 Treaty, when providing therein that it should 
“not preclude the application of measures … necessary to protect [the] essential 
security interests” of either party, intended that such should be the effect of the 
Treaty even where those measures involved a use of armed force. [I]f so, whether 
they contemplated, or assumed, a limitation that such use would have to comply 
with the conditions laid down by international law’.1529 
                                               
1528 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 173, at para 21. 
1529 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at pp 180 – 181, para 40. Art XX(1)(d) provides that ‘The present Treaty 
shall not preclude the application of measures: … (d) necessary to fulfil the obligations of a High 
Contracting Party for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to 
protect its essential security interests’. 
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The Court in the present case cited the Nicaragua case where it took the view that 
‘action taken in self-defence, individual or collective, might be considered as part of the 
wider category or measures qualified in Article XXI’, the text of which corresponds to 
the text of Article XX of the 1955 Treaty.
1530
 The Court in the Oil Platform case laid out 
that the approach adopted in the Nicaragua  case is consistent with the view that –  
‘when Article XX(1)(d) is invoked to justify actions involving the use of armed 
force, allegedly in self-defence, the interpretation and application of that Article 
will necessarily entail an assessment of the conditions of legitimate self-defence 
under international law’.1531 
The Court held that the jurisdiction conferred to the Court under Article XXI(2) of the 
1955 Treaty
1532
 allows reference to international law
1533
 applicable to the determination 
of whether the action alleged to be justified under the said paragraph was, or was not, an 
unlawful use of force.
1534
 The Court enunciated that it is not consistent with Article I of 
the 1955 Treaty ‘to interpret Article XX(1)(d) to the effect that the “measures” there 
contemplated could include even an unlawful use of force by one party against the 
other’.1535  
Furthermore, Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention requires for interpretation 
to take into account any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. The application of the relevant rules of international law relating to 
the present question forms an integral part of the interpretation entrusted to the Court 
under Article XXI(2). This drove the Court to decide that Article XX(1)(d) was – 
‘not intended to operate wholly independently of the relevant rules of 
international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of being successfully 
                                               
1530 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 182, para 40. 
1531 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 182, para 40. 
1532 Article XXI(2) of the 1955 Treaty provided that ‘Any dispute between the High Contracting Parties as 
to the interpretation or application of the present Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be 
submitted to the International court of Justice, unless the High Contacting Parties agree to settlement by 
some other pacific means’. This provision permits the Court to decide any question of interpretation or 
application of Article XX(1)(d). 
1533
 including the Charter of the United Nations and customary international law 
1534 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at pp 182 – 183, para 42. 
1535 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 182, para 41. 
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invoked, even in the limited context of a claim for breach of the Treaty, in relation 
to an unlawful use of force’.1536 
Thus, in light of the foregoing, the Court was tasked to examine first the application of 
Article XX(1)(d), which involves the principle of the prohibition in international law of 
the use of force, and the qualification to it constituted by the right of self-defence. 
Under the provision, measures taken by party to the Treaty ‘necessary’ for the 
protection of its essential security interest may be justified. However, ‘necessary is not 
purely a question for the subjective judgment of the party’. The question called to be 
answered is whether the measures taken were ‘necessary’ overlaps with the question of 
their validity as acts of self-defence, where criteria of necessity and proportionality must 
be observed.
1537
 In this regard, the details of the attacks by the United States against the 
Iranian platforms may be pertinent to the assessment of the lawfulness of those actions, 
and whether the attacks on two successive occasions each meet the conditions of Article 
XX(1)(d) as interpreted by reference to the relevant rules of international law.
1538
 
The preceding paragraph indicated that the direction of the Court to itself in the 
consideration of the normative weight to be given to ‘shall be taken into account, 
together with the context’ is – the interpretation of the conditions imposed by Article 
XX(1)(d) must be made by reference to the relevant rules of international law in. 
However, it is unclear how such reference is made, and how it dictates the interpretation 
of the conditions of Article XX(1)(d). 
Article XX(1)(d) provides that ‘[t]he present Treaty shall not preclude the application of 
measures … necessary to fulfil the obligations of a High Contracting Party for the 
maintenance or restoration of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its 
essential security interests’. The Court stated in finer detail that the present case 
involved a question of whether the action is ‘necessary’ that arises both as an element of 
international law relating to self-defence, and also on the basis of the actual terms of 
Article XX(1)(d).
1539
  
The United States submitted that the interpretation of Article XX(1)(d) should consider 
that the attacks on the oil platforms were considered in good faith to be necessary in 
                                               
1536 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 182, para 41. 
1537
 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 183, para 43. 
1538 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 184, para 45. 
1539 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 196, para 73.  
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order to protect its essential security interest. They suggested that ‘a measure of 
discretion should be afforded to a party’s good faith application of measure to protect its 
essential security interests’ under this Article.1540 In the present case, international law 
is required to be referred in the interpretation Article XX(1)(d). The Court held that it is 
unnecessary to decide whether the interpretation submitted by United States on Article 
XX(1)(d) on this point is correct ‘since the requirement of international law that 
measures taken avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose is 
strict and objective, leaving no room for any “measure of discretion”’.1541  
Regarding the determination of the legality of the alleged attacks on the Iranian oil 
platforms, the Court reverted directly to the criteria of necessity and proportionality in 
the context of international law on self-defence, in the determination of whether the 
alleged actions are ‘necessary’ without determining the interpretation of Article 
XX(1)(d). It concluded that the actions carried out by United States forces against 
Iranian oil installations on two occasions cannot be justified under Article XX(1)(d). 
Most importantly, the rationale for the decision was that these actions ‘constituted 
recourse to armed force not qualifying, under international law on the question, as acts 
of self-defence, and thus did not fall within the category of measures contemplated, 
upon its correct interpretation, by that provision (Article XX(1)(d)) of the Treaty’.1542 
It can be observed that from the Oil Platforms case, the majority of the Court seems to 
favour the approach that substitutes requirements of Article XX(1)(d) with the test of 
necessity and proportionality in the context of self-defence under international law. 
When the Court identified that the international law on self-defence has been identified 
as relevant rule of international law, and that Article I of the Treaty allowed for the 
reference to this, the relevant international law of self-defence is ‘applied’ as ‘applicable’ 
law in this case. Interestingly, the final reasons for the decision stated at the end of the 
majority judgment was – 
‘The Court finds that the actions of the United States of America against Iranian 
oil platforms on 19 October 1987 and 18 April 1988 cannot be justified as 
measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United States 
of America under Article XX(1)(d) of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic 
                                               
1540
 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 196, para 73. 
1541 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 196, para 73. 
1542 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 199, para 78. 
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Relations and Consular Rights between the United States of America and Iran, as 
interpreted in the light of international law on the use of force’.1543 
The majority of the Court concluded, in reliance of Article 31(3)(c), that violation of 
Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty will be determined according to international law on the 
use of force. The Court held that actions of the United States would be inconsistent with 
Article XX(1)(d) if they are found to be contrary to international law on the use of force. 
It can be deduced from the present case that the normative weight given to the relevant 
rules of international law, which is the rule on self-defence, seems to have the effect of 
substituting or replacing the provision to be interpreted.  
The majority decision in this respect was heavily criticised by Judge Buergenthal in his 
separate opinion because the majority had placed erroneous reliance on international 
law on the use of force in the present dispute. Judge Buergenthal expressed that ‘even if 
one were to accept the Court’s view that it had jurisdiction to make a specific ruling on 
Article XX(1)(d), it would still have to be emphasised that its interpretation of that 
provision in the light of international law on the use of force exceeded its 
jurisdiction’. 1544  In furtherance of this assertion, Judge Buergenthal elaborated that 
although the rule as stated under Article 31(3)(c) is undisputed, ‘it cannot have the 
effect of allowing the Court to take account of the relevant rules of international law 
applicable between the parties that the parties had not submitted to the court’s 
jurisdiction’.1545  
External rules of international law, such as the principles of customary international law 
and ‘whatever other treaties the parties to a dispute before the Court may have 
concluded’ do not become subjected to the Court’s jurisdiction by virtue of Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention. Even though it might found to be relevant ‘in 
the abstract’ to the interpretation of a treaty that the Court has jurisdiction, as such it 
would conflict with the consensual basis of the Court’s jurisdiction that adversely affect 
states’ willingness to accept the Court’s jurisdiction for adjudication of disputes.1546 
Judge Buergenthal further elaborated that unless parties in the dispute had accepted the 
                                               
1543 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, at p 218, para 125(1). 
1544
 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, p 278, para 20.  
1545 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra n 1544, at pp 278 – 279, para 22.  
1546 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra n 1544, at p 279, para 22.  
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Court’s jurisdiction to rely on such relevant rules of international law, the Court will 
still lack the power to ‘rely on such rules’.1547 
Whether a use of force can be justified by a treaty provision, the operative provisions 
should be the treaty provision submitted for the adjudication by the Court, and of which 
the mandate and jurisdiction of the Court is seised. The alleged use of force cannot be 
judged against an external relevant rule of international law, even if it is the United 
Nations Charter, unless agreed by the parties, and conferred jurisdiction on the Court to 
interpret and apply the Charter in a dispute between them.
1548
  
Judge Buergenthal commented that The Court erred in asserting that Article XX(1)(d) 
may be interpreted in light of international law on the use of force or any other 
international law rules with regard to which the United States has not accepted the 
Court’s jurisdiction.1549 It is further stated that it is irrelevant if the external provision 
from the UN Charter in question might also be deemed to be a jus cogens rule.
1550
 The 
critical question posed under Article XX(1)(d) of whether the actions are necessary to 
protect a State’s ‘essential security interests’ may not be answered by the Court ‘in light 
of international law on the use of force’, to which the jurisdiction of the Court has not 
been extended.
1551
 
Judge Higgins shared similar sentiments where it is commented that the court has gone 
beyond what has been decided in the case of Nicaragua in 1986. The Court, Judge 
Higgins insisted, has no jurisdiction to determine in respect of Article XX(1)(d) whether 
a measure is ‘an unlawful use of force’.1552 She enunciated that –  
‘the Judgment slides from that verity [that action taken in self-defence, individual 
or collective, might be considered as part of the wider category of measures 
qualified in Article XXI
1553
 that corresponds to Article XX of the 1955 Treaty in 
                                               
1547 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra n 1544, at p 279, para 23.  
1548 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra n 1544, at p 279, para 23. 
1549 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra n 1544, at p 280, para 24. 
1550 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra n 1544, at p 279, para 23. 
1551 Separate Opinion of Judge Buergenthal, supra n 1544, at p 280, para 25. 
1552 Oil Platforms, supra n 1468, Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, at p 237, para 44. 
1553 See Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States of America) (Judgment on the Merits 27 June 1986) [1986] ICJ Reports 14, at p 117, para 
224 <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/70/6503.pdf> accessed 18 November 2012. The ICJ, in that case, 
decided that ‘action taken in self-defence, individual or collective, might be considered as part of the 
wider category of measures qualified in Article XXI as “necessary to protect” the “essential security 
interests” of a party.’  
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the present case] to the proposition that the Court has in 1986 found that the only 
permitted military action that might justify what otherwise might be a breach of 
an obligation of the Treaty is an exercise of self-defence in response to an armed 
attack’.1554 
Although Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention reflects the common position 
that treaties are to be interpreted by reference to relevant rules, it does not imply that 
such reference incorporates the totality of the substantive international law on the use of 
force beyond the topic provided in the clause, especially without sufficient 
explanation.
1555
 The Court should have paid more attention to the qualifier of ‘context’ 
in Article 31(3)(c) requiring that interpretation of Article XX(1)(d) will be illuminated 
by recalling the type of a treaty Article XX(1)(d) and in light of any other ‘relevant rules’ 
governing Iran-United States relations.
1556
 It is not meant for the incorporation of the 
entire substance of international law on a subject matter not mentioned in the provision. 
The Majority of the Court reformulated the present matter as one of self-defence. The 
justification of defence sought by the parties – whether it is ‘necessary action for the 
protection of essential security interests’ within the terms of Article XX(1)(d) of the 
1955 Treaty, was displaced by an examination of the legality of self-defence under 
general international law. Judge Buergenthal and Judge Higgins both shared similar 
views that the majority has exceeded their jurisdiction in the application of a rule of 
interpretation under the 1969 Vienna Convention by incorporating the UN Charter into 
an ‘interpretation’ of a provision that does not otherwise provide for the subject matter.  
The Separate Opinions of both judges are illuminating in one important aspect – the 
limits of interpretation. An interpretation of a treaty provision, and its treaty terms, does 
not extend to displace the applicable law, or in any way modify or reformulate the 
jurisdiction of the court as mandated by the parties. This point is reiterated by the 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Khasawneh. Judge Khasawneh stated that ‘devoting a 
large part of the Judgment to a discussion of the concept of non-use of force is 
inappropriate and unnecessary for disposing of the case besides the risk this runs of 
going beyond the limits of the Court’s jurisdiction’.1557  
                                               
1554 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, supra n 1552, at p 236, para 42. 
1555
 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, supra n 1552, at p 237, para 46.  
1556 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, supra n 1552, at p 237, para 46. 
1557 Oil Platform, supra n 1468, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Al-Khasawneh, at pp 268 – 269, para 8.  
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Despite the differing opinions as to the normative weight of the relevant rules of 
international law that shall be taken into account in the interpretation, the Oil Platform 
case confirmed the relevance and importance of the interpretation of a treaty in its 
systemic environment and in reference to the general international law. Judge Koroma 
emphasised that Article XX(1)(d) ‘is not intended to operate wholly independently of 
general international law on the use of force so as to be capable of justifying, even in the 
limited context of a claim for breach of the Treaty, the unlawful use of force’.1558  
The Oil Platform case provides a useful insight into the operationalisation of Article 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention, especially concerning the normative weight to 
be given to ‘shall take into account, together with the context’. First, Judge Koroma had 
unequivocally pronounced that ‘Article XX(1)(d) was not intended to operate wholly 
independently of general international law on the use of force, so as to be capable of 
justifying, even in the limited context of a claim for breach of the Treaty, the unlawful 
use of force’.1559 The normative weight of ‘shall be taken into account’ entails that 
general international law relevant on the question is applicable on the question and 
forms part of the interpretation process which is entrusted to the Court to carry out.
1560
  
However, the separate opinions of Judge Buergenthal, Judge Higgins, Judge Al-
Khasawneh, Judge Owada and Judge Kooijmans did not differ on the point that relevant 
rules of international law shall be taken into account in the interpretative process. Their 
separate opinions pointed out two aspects that diverge from the approach adopted by the 
majority – the methodology of the incorporation and the normative weight of the 
relevant rules. There is no question raised as to the relevance of the UN Charter on the 
use of force, and the general international law on self-defence.  
The Separate Opinions suggested, in their respective eloquent ways, that the majority 
should have approached the disputed issues in accordance with the jurisdiction 
                                               
1558 Oil Platform, supra n 1468, Declaration of Judge Koroma, at p 223. Judge Koroma supported the 
approach of the Majority of the Court that a determination of whether an act sought to be justified under 
Article XX(1)(d) has to be assessed against the criteria of the United Nations Charter and general 
international law. 
1559 Declaration of Judge Koroma, supra n 1558, at p 223. 
1560 Declaration of Judge Koroma, supra n 1558, at p 223. The criteria provided under the United Nations 
Charter and general international law on use of force and self defence enabled the Court to reach the 
conclusion that actions carried out against the oil installations by the United Sates were not lawful under 
Article XX(1)(d) of the 1955 Treaty as measures necessary to protect the essential security interests of the 
United States. The actions constituted recourse to armed force does not qualify, under the United Nations 
Charter and general international law, as acts of self-defence and thus, did not fall within the category of 
measures contemplated by Art XX(1)(d) of the 1955 Treaty. 
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submitted by the Court, which is the determination of Article X(1) of the Treaty. The 
determination of whether actions taken by United States are justified under Article 
XX(1)(d) will be undertaken, as a matter of ‘economy of judgment’, if Article X(1) is 
found to be breached.
1561
  
The Court could then proceed to an examination of the provision of Article XX(1)(d), in 
the context of its relevance to Article X(1) to see if this provision, interpreted in light of 
the relevant rules of international law, offered a possible defence for justifying the 
actions of the United States under the Treaty.
1562
 However, if the Court finds it 
necessary based on jurisdictional reasons to get into an examination of the scope and the 
relevance of the rules of general international law relating to the use of force,
1563
 it 
should not form part of the dispositif, which is a decision on the Applicant’s claim.1564  
Considering that the ‘principles of the law of the United Nations as well as customary 
international law (that are of the nature of jus cogens) on the use of force in a context 
and at a time when such a reconfirmation is called for with the greatest urgency’, the 
Court was able, within jurisdictional bounds, to ‘restate the backbone of the Charter law 
on use of force by way of strong, unequivocal obiter dicta’. 1565  In view of the 
jurisdictional limitation posed in the present case, the relevant rules incorporated in the 
interpretation of Article XX(1)(d) shall be taken into account only through the prism of 
the interpretation of Article XX(1)(d) in the context of the Treaty.  
In this case, the ‘context’ is clearly that of an economic and commercial treaty.1566 The 
normative weight to be given to the relevant rules permissible under Article 31(3)(c) is, 
the rules
1567
 shall provide the criteria in which the provision and its terms of the dispute 
treaty (Article XX(1)(d)) are to be assessed against, or to be incorporated in the 
interpretation. However, the incorporation into the provision shall not envisage an 
importation of the entire substance of international law on a topic not mentioned in the 
clause that has the effect of displacing the actual applicable law (Article XX(1)(d)).
1568
  
                                               
1561 Oil Platform, supra n 1468, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, at p 256, para 32. 
1562 Oil Platform, supra n 1468, Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, p 311, para 16. 
1563 Separate Opinion of Judge Owada, supra n 1562, at p 310, para 14. 
1564 Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, supra n 1561, at p 256, para 32. 
1565 Oil Platform, supra n 1468, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, at p 327, para 6. 
1566
 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, supra n 1552, at p 237, para 46.  
1567 United Nations Charter on use of force and the principle of self-defence 
1568 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, supra n 1552, at p 237, para 46.  
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The normative weight to be given to the relevant rules depends on the significance, 
importance and urgency of the matter, the circumstances of which are apparent in the 
present case of the Oil Platforms. The Court could go to the extent of stating that the 
attacks are not found necessary to protect the essential security interests of the United 
States within the meaning of Article XX(1)(d) of the Treaty, as they cannot be justified 
as self defence, and in breach of Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. All the Court could not 
do is to state that in the dispositif of the Judgment.   
The Oil Platform case outlined a coherent architecture for the operationalisation of the 
last limb of Article 31(3)(c), after the identification  of the treaty term and provision of 
the treaty that has to be interpreted, and the relevant rules of international law that 
should be referred. These relevant rules shall be incorporated in the interpretation of 
pivotal terms in the provision, such as ‘necessary’ to protect essential security interests 
of the states provided under Article XX(1)(d). The act of attacks will be judged against 
the criteria provided by the relevant rules that informs the interpretation of Article 
XX(1)(d). However, a determination of whether these attacks are justified will be 
arrived at only through an adjudication of whether the provision of Article XX(1)(d) has 
been satisfied, in the context of the economic and commercial nature of the 1955 Treaty.  
It is clear that an economic and commercial treaty cannot be said to be capable of 
contracting out from general international law on the use of force so as to be capable of 
justifying the unlawful use of force in the limited context of a breach of the Treaty. In a 
situation where the jurisdiction of the Court is restricted, Article 31(3)(c) cannot be used 
in such a way to have the effect of bypassing the restrictive jurisdiction conferred by 
displacing the applicable law through the backdoor of interpretation.  
7.4.2 The Case of Esphahanian’s Claims in the Iran-US Claims Tribunal 
A proceeding in the Iran-Us Claims Tribunal was initiated by Esphahanian for the 
recovery of the face value of the check exchanged from the Rial certificates of deposit 
held by him at Iranians’ Bank, plus interest, and costs of arbitration. Article II(1) of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration provides that ‘an International Arbitral Tribunal (the 
Iran-US Claims Tribunal) is hereby established for the purpose of deciding claims of 
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nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran against the 
United States …’.1569  
The Tribunal was tasked to determine whether Esphahanian’s claim is within its 
jurisdiction as a claim of a national of the United States within the meaning of the 
article.
1570
 A national is defined in Article VII(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration 
to mean a natural person who is a citizen of Iran or the United States.
1571
 The question 
that has arisen was whether it is within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to adjudicate the 
claim initiated by Nasser Esphahanian, a national of both Iran and the United States 
under the respective domestic laws of each country. 
Prior to the determination of Esphahanian’s claim, it is incumbent for the Tribunal to 
determine whether Esphahanian is a ‘national’ within the meaning of Article II(1), and 
whether the claim is a claim by national of the United States against Iran; or a claim of a 
national of Iran against the United States. The pertinent issues to be resolved are the 
nationality of Esphahanian, and whether a person with dual nationality is entitled to 
initiate a claim in the Iran-US Tribunal. Due to the absence of any specific provision in 
the Claims Settlement Declaration on whether dual nationals are permitted to make 
claims before the Tribunal against either Government,
1572
 the Tribunal decided to refer 
to international law of dominant and effective nationality, identified through a variety of 
sources of international law, including convention, jurisprudence of international courts 
and tribunals (precedents) and writings of eminent publicist (legal literature)
1573
 as 
enabled by Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
In the present case, the external rules of international law application in the relations 
between the parties to be taken into account for the interpretation of Article II(1) in 
accordance of Article 31(3)(c) are rules relevant to the determination of the national of 
Esphahanian. The rules are relevant because these rules are capable of clarifying 
whether Esphahanian is a ‘national’, and with which nationality the claim is based on. 
These rules are relevant for the determination of whether Esphahanian’s claim is within 
the jurisdiction of the Iran-US Tribunal, where the Tribunal had recourse to a variety of 
                                               
1569 Iran-US Claims Tribunal, Nasser Esphahanian, Claimant v. Bank Tejarat, Respondent (Case No. 157) 
Chamber Two, 29 March 1983 [2] AWARD NO. 31-157-2 2 Iran-US Claims Tribunal Reports 157. 
1570 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 160. 
1571
 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 160. 
1572 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 161.  
1573 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at pp 161 – 164. 
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sources of international law, including convention, the jurisprudence of international 
courts and tribunals (precedents) and writings of eminent publicists (legal literature).
1574
 
In the present case, the external rules identified were relevant in filling the lacunae in 
light of the absence of the Algiers Claims Settlement Declaration on whether dual 
nationals are permitted to initiate claims in the Tribunal against either Government 
where the Claimant possesses both nationalities.  
First, the Tribunal referred to Articles 4
1575
 and 5
1576
 of 1930 The Hague Convention 
Concerning Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws.
1577
 The 
Tribunal noted that Article 4 of the Hague Convention that prevents provision of 
diplomatic protection of a nation against another nation if such person also possesses 
the nationality of the other state, does not extend to claims-related cases brought by a 
person with dual nationalities, as supported by its negotiation history.
1578
 However, the 
concept of diplomatic protection has been expanded in which the process of 
transformation still continues. Thus, Article 4 has to be interpreted cautiously and in an 
evolutionary manner due to the great changes that have occurred.
1579
  
The Tribunal is of the opinion that the present situation is akin to the circumstances 
posed in Article 5.
 1580
 By construing Articles 4 and 5 together, the Tribunal found that 
it is led to adoption of the notion of effective or dominant nationality in the 
interpretation of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
1581
  For this purpose, Articles 4 and 
5 are considered rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties 
that are relevant for the interpretation of the said Declaration. 
                                               
1574 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at pp 161 – 164. 
1575 Art 4 of The Hague Convention provides that ‘A state may not afford diplomatic protection to one of 
its nationals against a State whose nationality such person also possesses’. 
1576 Art 5 of The Hague Convention provides that ‘Within a third State, a person having more than one 
nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters 
of personal status and of any conventions in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities which any such 
person possesses, recognise exclusively in its territory either the nationality of the country in which he is 
habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the country with which in the circumstances he 
appears to be in fact most closely connected’.  
1577 League of Nations, Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Law (13 
April 1930) League of Nations, Treaty Series, vol 179, p 89, No 4137 
<http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3b00.html> accessed 18 November 2012. 
1578 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 161. A proposal to extend Article 4 to a case where 
dual national, by himself, brings before an international tribunal his own claim against one of the Sates 
whose nationality he possesses was rejected. This means, a distinction has been drawn between 
diplomatic or consular protection and claims-related litigation brought by himself before the international 
tribunal. 
1579
 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 161 
1580 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 162. 
1581 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 162. 
350 
 
The adoption of the notion of effective or dominant nationality is supported by the 
jurisprudence of international courts and tribunals, where the Tribunal found that the 
applicability of the principle of non-responsibility (Article 4) is increasingly limited by 
the principle of effective nationality as expressed by Article 5 of the Hague 
Convention.
1582
 The Tribunal noted that eminent scholars, in recent legal literatures, 
drew the conclusion that the effective or dominant nationality principle has to be read in 
conjunction with the non-responsibility doctrine as laid out in Article 4 of the Hague 
Convention.
1583
 It commented that – 
‘The non-responsibility doctrine has its most common application today not in 
cases of espousal of claims, but in instances of diplomatic or consular protection 
of dual nationals physically present in a State which considers them as its own 
nationals. It is in the latter cases that formal protection will be denied, despite the 
closeness of other factual connections with the would-be protector State’.1584 
After the Tribunal established that the principle of dominant and effective nationality 
is supported by the general structure of the Algiers Declarations and the 
circumstances in which they were concluded,
1585
 the Tribunal concluded that it has 
jurisdiction – 
(a) over claims against Iran by dual Iran-United States nationals when the 
dominant and effective nationality of the claimant is that of the United States; 
and  
                                               
1582 On the issue that the principle of dominant or effective nationality that tempers the principle of non-
responsibility, the Tribunal had referred to –  
(a) The arbitration cases of Miliani Case (Italy and Venezuela) 10 RIAA 58 (France and Venezuela) 
at p 159; Stevenson Case (Great Britain and Venezuela) 9 RIAA at p 385. Esphahanian v Bank 
Tejarat, at p 162; 
(b) PCA, Canevaro Case (Italy and Peru) (1912) Hague Court Reports 284; 
(c) The awards of different Mixed Arbitral Tribunals in Hein Case (Great Britain and Germany) 
(1922) 2 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 71; Barthez de Montfort Case (France and Germany) (1926) 6 Trib. 
Arb. Mixtes 806; Born Case (Serbo-Croato-Slovene Commission) (1926) 6 Trib. Arb. Mixtes 
499; 
(d) Nottebohm Case Second Phase (Liechtenstein v Guatemala) (Judgment of 6 April 1955) [1955) 
ICJ Reports 4; 
(e) Italian-United States Conciliation Commission, Mergé Case (United States v Italy) (1955) 14 
RIAA 236, 247.   
1583
 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 164. 
1584 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 164. 
1585 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 165.  
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(b) over claims against the United States by dual Iran-United States nationals 
when the dominant and effective nationality of the Claimant is that of 
Iran.
1586
 
In the present case, the principle of dominant and effective nationality, deemed relevant 
for the interpretation of Article II(1), laid out the jurisdiction of the Tribunal to decide 
claims of nationals of the United States against Iran and claims of nationals of Iran 
against the United States. Most importantly, it is crucial in the interpretation of the 
nationality of the dual-nationality claimant, which is determinative in the establishment 
of jurisdiction of the Tribunal (author’s own emphasis).  
Based on the juridical facts as presented in the case, the Tribunal came to the conclusion 
that ‘Esphahanian’s dominant and effective nationality at all relevant times had been 
that of the United States’1587 and held that Esphahanian was a national of the United 
States within the meaning of Article II(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration.
1588
 
Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention enables the reference to external rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties, which is the 
principle of dominant and effective nationality in the interpretation and clarification of 
Article II(1) where the content and meaning of whose nationality the claimant belongs 
to, is in question. 
Due to the absence in the Algiers Declarations of provisions for dual nationals, the 
prevailing international law of dominant and effective nationality in the interpretation of 
‘nationality’ in Article II(1) of the Claims Settlement Declaration was taken into 
account in its totality in the interpretation of the term ‘nationals’. The application of this 
principle determines which nationality the claimant belongs to in order to establish the 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal under Article II(1).  
The high normative weight given to the relevant rules of international law taken into 
account was due to the enabling environment provided by the context of the Algiers 
Declarations.
1589
 The Tribunal elaborated that the general structure of the Algiers 
Declarations and the circumstances in which the Declarations were concluded are 
supportive of the application of the principle of dominant and effective nationality. 
                                               
1586 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 166. 
1587
 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 168. 
1588 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 168. 
1589 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at p 165. 
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Three important conclusions were drawn in support of its contention that the Tribunal 
has jurisdiction over dual-state nationals if the dominant and effective nationality of 
claimant is that of either Iran, or the United States.
1590
 
However, it is pertinent to note that, similar to the approach taken by the ICJ in the 
cases analysed above, the Tribunal takes into account the external relevant rule of 
international law in the interpretation of a treaty text or the provision without having the 
external rule replacing the applicable law in question. Jurisdiction of the Tribunal for 
the adjudication of Esphahanian’s claim was not derived from the principle of dominant 
and effective nationality. Its jurisdiction still originates from Article II(1) where the 
applicable law that determines the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is still Article II(1) of the 
Claims Settlement Declaration.  
7.5 Systemic Integration: An Architecture  
The Oil Platform case and the Esphahanian case outline a coherent architecture for the 
operationalisation of the last limb of Article 31(3)(c). In the incorporation of external 
rules in the interpretation of a treaty term or provision, the treaty term and provision of 
the treaty that have to be interpreted must be identified. The rules of international law 
identified need to be relevant for the interpretation of these terms or provisions, and are 
applicable in the relations between the parties before the external rules can be 
incorporated and applied in the interpretative process. 
This approach has been classified as an ‘evolutionary interpretation supported by 
memory’1591 to the extent that it is ‘based on the will of the parties, often expressed in 
the very terms of the treaty, and reflects the common desire of the parties, taking into 
account the circumstances that have since evolved’.1592 The terms of the treaty will be 
the context in which the treaty has to be read, in the midst of the wider general 
international law where circumstances that have since evolved, expressed in the 
development of the rules of international law relevant to the subject matter, shall be 
taken into account.  
                                               
1590 Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, at pp 165 – 166. 
1591 Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: between Memory and Prophecy’, supra n 782, at pp 
126 – 131.  
1592 Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: between Memory and Prophecy’, supra n 782, at p 
126.  
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This link between an evolutionary interpretation, and the supporting memory, as shown 
in the Namibia case, is the clarification of the will of the parties in the process of 
interpretation, where a dynamic and evolutionary interpretation are taken into account 
together with the context, in which the intention of the parties is crystallised. An 
evolutionary interpretation of the concept of ‘sacred trust’ was undertaken because the 
Court, in interpreting the Covenant in reference to the context, came to the conclusion 
that the Parties must have accepted that the concept of ‘sacred trust’ was not ‘static, but 
were by definition evolutionary’. 1593  The Court took it upon itself that a faithful 
discharge of its function imposed that it could not ignore the enrichment of the corpus 
iuris gentium by subsequent developments of law to interpret and apply Article 22 
within the framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of the 
interpretation.
1594
 
This was the approach adopted by the ICJ in the case of Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros where 
the evolving obligation on the parties to maintain the quality of the water of the Danube 
and the protection of nature must take into consideration the current standard of 
environmental protection.
1595
 A link is created between the evolving standards and the 
formulation of  the terms of the treaty of the treaty and its provision where the 
underlying scheme and structure of Articles 15, 19 and 20 accommodate changes that 
enable a dynamic and evolutionary interpretation to be adopted. The intention of the 
parties to allow for an evolutionary interpretation can be deduced from the adoption of a 
generic terms in a treaty ‘of continuing duration’, with the parties ‘necessarily having 
been aware that the meaning of the terms was likely to evolve over time’.1596  
Such an evolutionary interpretation, supported by memory, was intended to mean the 
clarification of the will of the parties, and not the substitution of the will of the parties 
with the interpreter’s own will. 1597  The normative weight for the subsequent 
development of law that ‘shall be taken into account, together with the context’ can be 
said to be reflected in Dupuy’s evolutionary interpretation supported by memory –  
                                               
1593 Namibia case, supra n 277, at p 31, para 53. 
1594 Namibia, supra n 277, at p p31 – 32, para 53. 
1595 Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros, supra n 1, at p 78, para 140. 
1596
 Navigational and Related Rights, supra n 210, at p 243, para 66.  
1597 Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: between Memory and Prophecy’, supra n 782, at p 
130. 
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‘A dynamic interpretation of a treaty where justified by notions and concepts in 
the terms of the treaty from which it may be inferred that the text is open to 
considerations of factual or legal evolution after the conclusion of the treaty’.1598  
Subsequent development in law, through rules of international law relevant to the 
subject matter and applicable in the relations between the parties, shall be taken into 
account to the extent that it is permissible by the context of the treaty being interpreted.  
An operationalisation of ‘shall be taken into account, together with the context’ entails 
that the identified relevant rules of international law are to be incorporated (to the extent 
possible, depending on the context, on a case-by-case basis
1599
) in the interpretation of a 
treaty term of provision. The extent of incorporation excludes a total replacement of the 
treaty provision to be interpreted to the extent that there is no legal reference at all to the 
text of the provision, or all the sight of the text of the interpreted treaty provision is 
lost.
1600
 
The systemic integration of an external rule of international law, identified as ‘relevant’ 
to the treaty term or provision to be interpreted, and ‘applicable in the relations between 
the parties’, is obligatorily incorporated in its interpretation, albeit qualified by the 
context of the treaty term or provision. The immediate context of Article 31(3)(c) 
requires that the external rule assumes an interpretative role, where the fine line between 
interpretation and applicable law is drawn.  
An external rule of international law taken into account in the interpretation of a treaty 
term or provision in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) furnishes the normative content 
for the treaty term or provision. However, the external rule is not applied instead of it. 
This fine distinction determines the normative weight that is to be given to an external 
rule, and illuminates the significance of an interactional understanding of a rule of 
international law. An interactional theory of law compels the identification of the shared 
legal understandings, confirmed in a practice of legality that underpin a rule of law, 
which furnish the normative content upon which an interpretation of a treaty term or 
provision can be undertaken. 
                                               
1598 Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: between Memory and Prophecy’, supra n 782, at p 
131. 
1599
 North Sea Continental Shelf, supra n 893, at p 50, para 93. This is discussed in supra n 1513 - 1516, 
and Section 7.2.5.4 of this thesis. 
1600 Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins, supra n 1552, at p 238, paras 47 and 48. 
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The cautious approach exercised in order to prevent a total displacement of the 
applicable law is only relevant in an adjudicatory setting where jurisdiction of the court 
is determined by the mandate given by the Parties. In the ordinary interpretation of 
treaties by country governments and their foreign affairs ministers or other relevant 
officials, the issue of jurisdiction and applicable law is not of the utmost concern. In an 
administration setting aiming at the implementation of a country’s obligation under 
international law, the interpretation of a rule of international law, uninhibited by 
question of jurisdiction and applicability, should place more importance in the systemic 
integration of rules.  
In this context, the application of Article 31(3)(c) in the interpretation of a treaty 
provision will be able to manifest its fullest potential as an integration tool that 
contributes towards the systemic integration of relevant rules of international law in 
light of the increasingly fragmented international legal order. 
7.6 Conclusion 
This chapter provides the theoretical foundation for the third and final stage of the 
framework of operationalisation developed for Article 31(3)(c). It establishes an 
architecture for the incorporation of relevant external rules of international applicable in 
the relations between the parties in the interpretation of a treaty term or provision in an 
attempt to realise the systemic integration potential expressed in the Article. The 
architecture guides the incorporation process by providing a structured methodology in 
the determination of how much normative weight should be given to the external rules 
in accordance with the stipulations of Article 31(3)(c).  
The extent to which the relevant rules (identified in Chapter Two of this thesis) that are 
applicable in the relations between the parties as presented in Chapters Five and Six are 
incorporated in the interpretation of Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
will be considered through the architecture developed in this chapter.  
The full execution of the analytical framework established for the operationalisation of 
Article 31(3)(c) to enable the systemic integration of rules relevant to the obligation to 
preserve ecosystems of international watercourses will be undertaken in the next chapter 
of this thesis. 
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8 
Chapter 8. Systemic Integration: An Operationalisation 
Part II: Operation 
8.1 Overview 
This chapter will undertake the application of the three-tiered framework of 
operationalisation developed for Article 31(3)(c) through a re-interpretation of the 
salient elements of the Article. Article 31(3)(c) provides that ‘there shall be taken into 
account, together with the context, any relevant rules of international applicable in the 
relations between the parties’. A framework for the operationalisation of this Article has 
been developed in the previous chapters.  
The first tier of the framework of operationalisation is the identification of relevant rules. 
The second tier of the operationalisation looks into the content and scope of the rules of 
international law ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’. For this purpose, the 
research undertakes an analysis of ‘rules of international law’ through an interactional 
perspective in order to reveal the shared legal understanding of the parties undertaken in 
a practice of legality, which indicates the common understanding of the parties, 
including their intentions as to its applicability.  
The interactional understanding of the ascertained rules of international law necessitates 
the identification of ‘the parties’, who are the members of the enterprise of law-making 
who partake in the interactional and reciprocal process of the making of law. 
Subsequently, the ‘common intention’ of the parties as to the applicability of the rules 
of international law will be discovered through the analysis of the rules of international 
law via the prism of an interactional understanding of law. 
The final stage of the operationalisation, after the identification of relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties, is the systemic 
integration of these rules in accordance with the direction stipulated in the Article. This 
is undertaken in the third tier of the framework where the normative weight to be 
accorded to the relevant rules in the interpretative process shall amount to ‘take into 
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account together with the context’ of the interpreted treaty.1601 The obligatory nature of 
‘shall be taken into account’1602 restricts the discretion exercisable by the interpreter.  
The context
1603
 assumes the role of an immediate qualifier of the ordinary meaning of 
terms used in the treaty, and together with the phrase ‘take into account’, the context 
conditions the extent to which the relevant rules of international law should be taken 
into account in the interpretation of a treaty term or provision.
1604
  
The subsequent sections undertake the execution of each stage of the operationalisation 
of the analytical framework developed for Article 31(3)(c) through the interpretation of 
the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses in light of its 
systemic environment presented in Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention and 
Article 8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity Convention. The integration of rules relevant to 
the obligation to preserve via the legal technique of interpretation codified under Article 
31(3)(c) demonstrates the systemic integration potential of this Article.    
8.2 Stage I: Relevant  
An integrated interpretation of Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention 
necessitates taking into account contemporary concerns of the community of nations on 
the preservation of the environment,
1605
 where an analytical framework is proposed in 
this thesis through the operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention. Contemporary concerns of the community of nations on the preservation of 
the environment are found in various MEAs that are conservation-centric. This research 
has identified two most relevant
1606
 Agreements, namely the Biodiversity Convention 
and the Ramsar Convention. 
As illustrated in Chapter Two of this thesis, these rules are relevant as both of them deal 
with or are closely germane to the subject matter
1607
 of the ecosystem and the 
                                               
1601 Refer to Chapter Seven of this thesis on a detailed analysis on the interpretation of the phrase ‘shall 
take into account together with the context’, where the chapter proposes an architecture that guides the 
deliberation process undertaken for the incorporation of relevant external rules in accordance with Art 
31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
1602 Draft Articles 1966, supra n 1435, at p 222, para 18. 
1603 Refer in particularly to Section 7.2 of this thesis.  
1604 Refer to Section 7.3 for a detailed discussion on the normative weight accorded to ‘shall be taken into 
account’. 
1605 Fitzmaurice, Elias, and Merkouris (eds) Treaty Interpretation and the VCLT, supra n 279, at pp 236 – 
237.  
1606
 Refer to Chapter Two for justification of how the two MEAs are relevant for the interpretation of Art 
20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35. 
1607 Refer to Section 2.2 on the threshold developed for the interpretation of ‘relevant’. 
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application of an ecosystem approach in the management of such ecosystems.
1608
 The 
use of the term ‘ecosystems’ in Article 20 indicates the explicit recognition of the 
ecosystem approach where the primary target of the ecosystem approach is the 
maintenance of the ecological integrity, and the safeguarding and protection of the 
ecological structure and functioning of the environment.
1609
 In addition, the preservation 
of freshwater ecosystem in its ‘pristine and unspoilt condition’1610 is one means of such 
protection.
1611
  
Moreover, the Conventions place the onus of the protection of the environment on each 
contracting party, where implementation of the obligations of the Conventions focuses 
firstly on the national boundaries of the parties in strengthening the protected areas, and 
where appropriate, establishes collaboration and cooperation with neighbouring 
countries to protect transboundary ecosystems or protected areas.
1612
 As explained in 
Section 2.3, this is aligned with the structure and punctuation of Article 20, where it 
places the individual obligation on the watercourse states to preserve its ecosystems of 
international watercourses before the obligation on the Watercourses States to establish 
joint effort in the preservation of such ecosystems.   
Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention address the same concern where the 
contracting parties are required to designate suitable wetlands in its territory for 
inclusion in the List of Wetlands of International Importance. The contracting parties 
shall promote the conservation of wetlands and waterfowls through establishment of 
nature reserves on wetlands, where preservation is one of its conservation targets 
regardless of whether these wetlands are included in the List or not.
1613
 
Similarly, Article 8(a) and (d) of the CBD requires the Contracting Parties to establish a 
system of protected areas with special measures taken to conserve biodiversity for the 
protection of ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable populations of 
                                               
1608 Refer to Section 2.1 on the conceptualisation of ‘ecosystems’ and the emergence of the ecosystem 
approach in international policy and international law. Refer in particularly to Section 2.1.4 on the 
application of the ecosystem approach and its normative standard in international law.  
1609 Principle 5, CBD Guidelines, supra n 166, at p 16.  
1610 1994 Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n 44, para 3, p 119 
1611 Refer to Section 1.1.1 for discussion on the obligation to preserve.  
1612 Refer to Section 2.3 on the primary obligation imposes by Art 20 on the obligation to preserve 
ecosystems of international watercourses within national territory. 
1613
 Refer to Chapter Five for an elaboration of the shared legal understanding arrived at by Ramsar 
Convention’s contracting parties on the obligation to conserve, where the conservation objective includes 
the preservation of wetlands. This will be further elaborated in subsequent section of this chapter.  
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species in natural surroundings. Since it has been established that these rules are rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the parties, as both rules are closely 
related and highly germane to the obligation to preserve under Article 20, they shall be 
taken into account in the interpretation of the Article 20 and its terms.  
In this regard, the provisions in the Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity 
Convention are relevant for the interpretation of the obligation to preserve ecosystems 
of international watercourses where the ecosystem approach is developed in depth 
within the treaty body.
1614
 Furthermore, these Conventions provide for the designation 
of areas protected in their pristine and unspoilt condition as a means to achieve the 
protection and safeguarding of ecosystem integrity, especially its structure and 
functioning.
1615
 
The foregoing discussion re-affirmed that these rules are relevant for the interpretation 
of the term ‘preserve’ and ‘ecosystems of international watercourses’, which has been 
extensively developed by the law-making enterprise institutionalised under the 
conventional regime of the Ramsar and Biodiversity Conventions. 
The satisfaction of these rules against the threshold of ‘relevant’ entails the engagement 
of the next stage of operationalisation, which operationalises the salient phrase of ‘rules 
of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’.1616 These ‘rules’ are 
assessed against an interactional framework developed from an understanding of 
international law as an interactional process in the determination of whether these rules 
achieve the legality threshold to be labelled as ‘international law’.1617 More importantly, 
the next stage ascertains the normative content and the scope of these rules, which 
inform the interpretation of ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’. 
                                               
1614 Refer to Section 2.3 of this thesis. 
1615  Refer to Section 2.1.4 of this thesis on the application of the ecosystem approach that aims to 
safeguard and maintain ecosystem integrity, as informed by the concept of ‘ecosystem’. 
1616 A thorough discussion on the prevailing interpretation of scholars of the terms ‘applicable’ and ‘the 
parties’ are addressed in Chapter Three, where this thesis advocates to reconstruct the prevailing 
interpretation and suggests a re-interpretation. 
1617
 Refer to Chapter Four for the theoretical foundation to the interactional framework, and the proposed 
interactional framework in the interpretation and the operationalisation of ‘rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’.  
360 
 
8.3 Stage II: Rules of International Law Applicable in the Relations between 
the Parties 
In the present context, ‘the Parties’ of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention is 
interpreted to include all watercourse state parties to the 1997 Watercourses Convention. 
However, Schwebel’s Third Report alluded to a general reference of the international 
community at large by stating that the preservation of the environment, and in 
particularly the ecosystem of international watercourses, is a licit concern of mankind.
 
1618
 When the Draft Resolution (which is the Convention) was put to vote where all state 
parties, including 103 for the Convention, 27 abstentions and the three against, shared 
the common recognition regarding the obligation of states to preserve ecosystems of 
international watercourses.
1619
 The voting records support the assertion that the parties 
to the 1997 Watercourses Convention shared the common international understanding 
that there is an obligation to preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses. 
The common international consensus to preserve freshwater ecosystems is strengthened 
by the multilateralisation of international law-making, especially in the institutionalised 
law-making of the Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity Convention, as elaborated 
in Chapter Four of this thesis. The interactions between law-makers and the reciprocity 
observed between the law-makers and their subjects, in which states play a dual role at 
the COP level, reinforce the common understanding of the state parties. The quasi-
universal membership of the Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity Convention 
fortifies the common recognition that the preservation of the environment is a licit 
concern of mankind. 
1620
 
Furthermore, the ascertainment of the normative content of the external relevant rules 
under the two concurrent Conventions from an interactional perspective, where in the 
development of rules the Biodiversity Convention refers to the Ramsar Convention on 
matters specific to inland water ecosystems, reveals the close interactions between the 
two treaty regimes in addressing the preservation of freshwater ecosystems.
 1621
   
                                               
1618 Schwebel’s 3rd Report, , supra n 4, at p 123, para 247. 
1619 UNGA, ‘99th Plenary Meeting’, supra n 41. All the parties do not opposed to the wordings or content 
of Art 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35, as it stood at the time of adoption.  
1620 Refer to Section 4.5 of this thesis. 
1621
 On the cross-referencing between the Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity Convention, refer to 
Section 6.3.8 of this thesis. Refer to Section 4.5 of this thesis for the emergence of international consensus 
on a rule of law through cross-referencing between treaty regimes. 
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The prevention against environmental degradation through preservative means is 
created, developed and enriched through multilateral institutions such as the plenary 
organs of environmental treaty regimes known as COP.
1622
 The common understanding 
attained through legal and institutional interactions
1623
 satisfies the legal threshold 
required for the external relevant rules to be considered ‘applicable in the relations 
between the parties’.  
Thus, the shared legal understanding undertaken in a practice of legality by an almost 
universal membership of 163 Contracting Parties in the Ramsar Convention should be 
deemed as to be ‘applicable in the relations of the Parties’ for the interpretation of the 
obligation of Watercourse States to individually, and, where appropriate, jointly, 
preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses. This shared understanding 
arrived at by the Contracting Parties in the COP processes interprets the obligation to 
conserve wetlands to include implementation of all necessary procedural obligations. 
These procedural obligations include the identification and designation of wetlands; the 
assessment of wetlands; the monitoring of wetlands; and the management of 
wetlands,
1624
 in achieving the short-term and long-term target of the Convention to 
designate 2,500 Ramsar sites that are representative of the wetland type of the 
biogeographic region.
1625
  
Similarly, the shared legal understanding undertaken in a practice of legality by the 
quasi universal membership of 193 Contracting Parties in the Biodiversity Convention 
should be deemed ‘applicable in the relations of the Parties’ for the interpretation of the 
obligation of Watercourse States to individually, and, where appropriate, jointly, 
preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses. 
The common intentions or understanding arrived at by the Contracting Parties of their 
obligation to conserve under Article 8(a) and (d) must necessarily be both the 
quantitative and qualitative requirements for the establishment of protected areas. This 
includes the necessary procedural mechanisms, such as the monitoring and reporting 
                                               
1622 Refer to Chapter Five and Six, in particularly Sections 5.2 and 6.2 on the development of shared legal 
understanding on the obligation to preserve within the institutional body of the Ramsar Convention  and 
the Biodiversity Convention. 
1623 Refer to Sections 5.3.8 and 6.3.8 on the role of COP in strengthening international consensus that 
emerges as a consequence of the multilateralisation of international environmental law-making in 
institutionalised treaty regimes. 
1624
 Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at p 11. 
1625 Refer to Section 6.5 of this thesis. 
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procedures, provided to facilitate the Parties in achieving the target jointly attained by 
the Contracting Parties through the interactional process of COP. The qualitative aspect 
of the obligation to conserve is achieved when the targeted areas of protection (which 
are 17% of terrestrial area of which inland water ecosystems form part) are ecologically 
representative and effectively managed protected areas.
1626
  
The implementation of this shared understanding is guided by the Programmes of Work 
on Protected Areas and Inland Water Biodiversity, and the Strategic Plan for 
Biodiversity 2011 – 2020. The Programme of Work imposes the obligation to establish 
and strengthen national and regional systems of protected areas that are integrated 
within a broader landscape, seascape and sectors for the maintenance of their ecological 
structure and function.
1627
 The management of the site-based protected areas must be 
undertaken within the framework of an integrated catchment/watershed/river-basin 
approach.
1628
  
These shared legal understandings are undertaken in a practice of legality implicit to 
Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention; and Article 8(a) and (d) of the 
Biodiversity Convention should be regarded as an expression of common understanding, 
which gives meaning to Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention, especially 
when they reflect the contemporary concerns of the community of nations.
1629
 Hence, 
these rules, both the explicit and the implicit dimensions, are ‘relevant rules of 
international law applicable in the relations between the Parties’. In light of the context 
of Article 20, these relevant rules of international law application in the relations 
between the parties ‘shall be taken into account’. 
The ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties’, 
assessed through an interactional framework that ascertains the implicit dimension of an 
explicit rules and identifies the normative content and the extent of applicability to the 
parties participating in the law-making process, enables the operationalisation of the 
third stage of the analytical framework proposed in this thesis.  
                                               
1626 Refer to Section 6.5 of this thesis. 
1627 Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, from 
p 8 onwards. 
1628
 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11. Refer to 
Section 6.2 of this thesis. 
1629 Refer to Section 3.2.2.1 of this thesis. 
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8.4 Stage III: A Systemic Integration 
Article 20 provides that ‘Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, 
jointly, … preserve the ecosystems of international watercourses’. An interpretation of 
Article 20 in its systemic environment shall take into account, rules of international law 
relevant to it, and applicable in the relations between the parties of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention (namely Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention; and 
Article 8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity Convention) to the extent permissible by its 
context.
1630
 
It is explained that ‘shall take into account’ is obligatory in nature,1631  and if the 
situation that necessitates its invocation is triggered, whereby, these rules are ‘rules of 
international law’, ‘relevant’ and ‘applicable in the relations between the parties’ – they 
shall be taken into account. ‘Taken into account’ for the purpose of interpretation is 
interpreted to mean providing the criteria against which the terms of the provision, 
including ‘individually’, ‘preserve’ and ‘ecosystems’ are to be assessed, and to be 
incorporated in their interpretation.
1632
 Bearing in mind that the systemic integration of 
relevant rules shall be qualified and delimited by the context of the provision, the 
context of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses is 
clarified in the subsequent section. 
8.4.1 The Context 
This section will briefly recount the context of Article 20 addressed in general in 
Section 1.1.1 of this thesis, and in the discussion on ‘relevant’ address in this chapter 
and in Chapter Two of this thesis. The specific adoption of the term ‘preserve’, and the 
careful distinction drawn between protection and preservation, emphasises the intention 
of the Commission to protect the pristine and unspoilt state of freshwater ecosystem 
against harm and damage in order to keep them in their natural state.  
                                               
1630  The architecture for the incorporation of external rules in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) is 
developed in Chapter Seven, in particularly Section 7.5 of this thesis. 
1631
 Refer to Section 7.3 of this thesis. 
1632 The normative weight commanded by the phrase ‘take into account’ is discussed in Section 7.3 of this 
thesis. 
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The obligation to preserve is imposed first and foremost on the state parties to 
implement protection and preservation measures within their own territory,
1633
where 
arguably, environmental damage occurred within the territory of a system state may fall 
under international regulations.  
The Preamble of the 1997 Watercourses Convention express the conviction of the 
framework convention in ensuring the conservation, management and protection of 
international watercourses
1634
 whereby in Chapter IV, it provides for the protection, 
preservation and management aspect of the non-navigational uses of international 
watercourses. The ‘context’ of Article 20, as revealed through a perusal of the text of 
the Convention, indicates that preservation of international watercourses forms part of 
the objective of the Convention, as evidenced in the Preamble.
1635
  
This intention is strengthened by the explicit stipulation in the heading of both Article 
20 and the title of Chapter IV in which Article 20 is located.
1636
 The title of Article 20, 
which is the protection and preservation of ecosystems, and the heading of Part IV of 
‘Protection, Preservation and Management’, provide the context of Article 20 in which 
the ecosystem approach is acknowledged in the interpretation of the obligations to 
protect and preserve, and whereby management-oriented procedures and processes are 
included.
1637
  
                                               
1633 1994 Draft Articles with Commentaries, supra n 44, pp 120 – 121, para 8. Refer to Section 1.1.1on 
the ubiquity of the obligation to preserve the environment. As expounded in the said section, the Special 
Rapporteur implied that there is an emerging normative principle making protection of the environment a 
universal duty. 
1634 5th preambular paragraph, 1997 Watercourses Convention, supra n 35. 
1635 The 5th preambular paragraph stated that ‘The Parties to the present Convention ... Expressing the 
conviction that a framework convention will ensure the utilisation, development, conservation, 
management and protection of international watercourses and the promotion of the optimal and 
sustainable utilisation thereof for present and future generations’. See Section 7.2.3 of this thesis for a 
detailed elaboration of preamble as part of context. 
1636 Gardiner proposed further guidance in the determination of the ‘wider’ context that is not provided 
under the Vienna Convention, but still intrinsically essential in the determination of ‘context’ as titles or 
descriptive headings should clearly form part of the context for the purposes of interpretation. He 
commented that the obvious starting point for the construction and identification of the scope and ambit 
of a treaty, or a section or provision of a treaty is the title, headings or the chapeaux. See Gardiner, Treaty 
Interpretation, supra n 235, at pp 180 – 181. At p 181, According to Gardiner, titles or descriptive 
headings clearly form part of the context for the purposes of interpretation. Chapeau is used mainly to 
describe ‘the opening words [or the opening clause] of a provision which consists of a set of terms’, at pp 
158 and 181.  
1637
 This supports Schwebel’s proposal of a ‘special regime’ for the preservation of the ecosystems of 
international watercourses. See Schwebel 3rd Report, supra n 4, at p 190, para 518, and the discussion at 
supra n 57,. 
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The identification of the context is more specifically dealt with in the next subsections, 
in the recognition of the fine distinction between immediate context and context in the 
entire treaty.
1638
 
8.4.1.1 Immediate Context  
In reference to the discussion on ‘Context’ in Chapter Seven, the underlying structure or 
scheme of a treaty, which might be explicit or implicit, forms part of the context for a 
contextual interpretation of treaty terms or provisions.
1639
 The underlying structure and 
scheme underlying Article 20, and the 1997 Watercourses Convention as a whole, 
support the incorporation of the ecosystem approach. The individual responsibility of 
states to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses is shown through the explicit 
reference to ecosystems, and phrasing the obligation as ‘Watercourse States shall, 
individually and, where appropriate, jointly’.   
In addition, Articles 21 to 24 of the same Chapter IV, that are related, albeit dissimilar 
in their contents, support the application of an ecosystem approach as adopted in article 
20 and the individual duty of watercourse States to preserve ecosystems of international 
watercourses.
1640
  
This is supported by the context as reflected in the punctuation and syntax of Article 20. 
The comma inserted after ‘shall,’; ‘individually and,’; ‘and,’; ‘where appropriate,’; and 
‘jointly,’ emphasises the licit concern of all nations of the obligation to protect and 
preserve of ecosystem of watercourses regardless of its transboundary impacts.  
The grammatical analysis adopted in the argument elaborated above in reference to 
Chapter Seven
1641
 does not produce legally surprising results, nor is it contrary to the 
other substantial considerations of the context. What the punctuation inserted after these 
                                               
1638 Refer to Section 7.2.5 of this thesis on the fine distinction between immediate context and context in 
the entire treaty highlighted in the case of La Bretagne, supra n 1458,  . 
1639 Refer to Section 7.2.5.2 of this thesis. 
1640 An expansive inclusion of territorial area beyond the watercourse system is implicit in Arts 21 to 24. 
For example, Art 21(2) stipulated that 'Watercourse States shall, individually and, where appropriate, 
jointly, prevent, reduce and control the pollution of an international watercourse that may cause 
significant harm to other watercourse States or to their environment’ (Author's own emphasis); Article 22 
where the use of the term ‘ecosystem’ is repeated, despite the dissimilar content of prevention against 
introduction of alien or new species; Art 23, where the interface of watercourses and the marine 
environment, brought into the limelight through the understanding of the interactions between ecosystems 
is acknowledged, supports an expansive interpretation of ecosystems.  
1641 The grammatical analysis are conducted in the analysis of context as presented in the punctuation and 
syntax of the text of the treaty, as explicated in Section 7.2.5.4 of this thesis.  
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terms or phrases did is strengthen the individual obligation of all states to preserve 
ecosystems of international watercourses independent of the trigger of transboundary 
pollution, in reflection of the international consensus that the preservation of 
ecosystems is a licit concern of mankind. 
In summary, the immediate context of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of 
international watercourses, found in the structure and underlying scheme of the 
provision, as supported by its heading and title in Part IV, must be read with the overall 
context, or the context in the sense of the entire text of the treaty.
1642
  
8.4.1.2 Context in the entire treaty 
The overarching pillar governing the regime of the non-navigational uses of 
international watercourses − expressed in Article 5, which is then strengthened by 
Article 7 which confirms its prevailing status as expressly referred to in the Preamble − 
is the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation.
1643
  
The transformation of the obligation to prevent harm set out in Article 7(1) to an 
obligation of result, due to the adjustment of balance between the equitable utilisation 
principle and the prevention against harm principle, amounted to a mitigation of the 
obligation not to cause harm.
1644
 This has direct implications for Article 20 as the 
substantive obligation of ecosystem protection is changed into an obligation of conduct 
to which a standard of due diligence is applied.
1645
  
                                               
1642 Refer to Section 7.2.5 of this thesis on the distinction between the immediate context and the context 
in the entire treaty, carefully distinguished in the La Bretagne arbitration, supra n 1458.  
1643 Salman, ‘The Helsinki Rules, the UN Watercourses Convention and the Berlin Rules: Perspectives on 
International Water Law’, supra n 141. At p 633, the author commented that ‘the prevailing view is that 
the Convention has … subordinated the obligation not to cause significant harm to the principle of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation. This conclusion is based on a close reading of Articles 5, 6 and 7 of 
the Convention’. See Owen McIntyre, ‘Case Law Analysis. Environmental Protection of International 
Rivers’ (1998) 10(1) Journal of Environmental Law 79 – 91. McIntyre noted, at p 87 that ‘that significant 
harm to the environment is a special category of injury that automatically transforms a harmful utilisation 
into an inequitable use of the watercourse’. See also André Nollkaemper, The Legal Regime for 
Transboundary Water Pollution: Between Discretion and Constraint (Martinus Nijhoff/Graham and 
Trotman, Dordrecht, 1993) at pp 68 – 69, and Ximena Fuentes, ‘The Criteria for the Equitable Utilization 
of International Rivers’ (1996) 67(1) British Yearbook of International Law 337 – 412, at pp 408 – 411. 
On the principle of equitable utilisation in general, see Patricia K Wouters, ‘An Assessment of Recent 
Developments in International Watercourse Law through the Prism of the Substantive Rules Governing 
Use Allocation’ (1996) 36(2) Natural Resources Journal 417 – 439.  
1644  Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses. A 
Framework for Sharing, supra n 48, at pp 151 – 152.   
1645
 Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the Law of International Watercourses. A 
Framework for Sharing, supra n 48, at pp 152, 154 and 246. The due diligence standard applied to 
substantive provision of environmental protection is confirmed in the recent Pulp Mills’ case in the 
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The Preamble of the 1997 Watercourses Convention is explicit in stating that the 
conservation, management and protection of international watercourses go towards ‘the 
promotion of the optimal and sustainable utilisation thereof (international watercourses) 
for present and future generations’. Moreover, Article 6(1) of the Convention supports 
the subservience of the obligation to preserve where it provides that the utilisation of an 
international watercourse in an equitable and reasonable manner requires taking into 
account all relevant factors and circumstances. These factors and circumstances include 
– (a) geographic, hydrographic, hydrology, climatic, ecological and other factors of a 
natural character; and (f) conservation, protection, development and economy of use of 
the water resources of the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect.  
The conservation, management and protection of the watercourses, or in particular, the 
preservation of the watercourses, is only one of the factors to be considered in striking 
the balance of an equitable and reasonable utilisation. Although the obligation to 
preserve ecosystems of international watercourses forms part of the substantive 
obligations under the Convention, the satisfaction of this obligation must be in 
accordance with the equitable and reasonable utilisation of the watercourses.
1646
  
An elaborated determination of the context of Article 20, through the perspective of its 
immediate context and the context of its entire treaty, clarifies the condition in which 
the incorporation of external rules in the interpretation of Article 20 can be taken into 
account. The operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) in the interpretation of Article 20, in 
light of the context clarified, will be executed in the next section. 
                                                                                                                                         
interpretation of Art 41 of the 1975 River Uruguay Statute, at p 79, para 197. See also McIntyre, ‘The 
Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of International Water Law’, supra n 83. This is referred to in 
the discussion on the current trend of environmental protection in international water law in Section  1.1.2. 
1646 It has been argued that ecosystem protection is closely related to the equitable utilisation principle 
embodied in Article 5 of the Convention. See Tanzi and Arcari, The United Nations Convention on the 
Law of International Watercourses. A Framework for Sharing, supra n 48, at p 244. The author further 
stated that ‘the equitable utilisation of an international watercourse must be geared towards sustainable 
water management, riparian States cannot fail to address the problem of the ecosystem protection of 
shared watercourses for the purposes of establishing an equitable regime of water utilisation’. At p 245, 
Arcari concluded that under the Convention, ecosystem protection is conceived as inherent in the idea of 
equitable use’. See also Jutta Brunnée and Stephen J Toope, ‘Environmental Security and Freshwater 
Resources: A Case for International Ecosystem Law’, supra n 3, at p 65. 
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8.4.2 Article 31(3) There shall be Taken into Account, Together with the 
Context … (c) Any Relevant Rules of International Law Applicable in the 
Relations between the Parties 
In view of the context presented in the process of integration of rules relevant to the 
preservation of ecosystems of international watercourses in their systemic environment, 
the Oil Platform case 
1647
and the Esphahanian case
1648
 outline a coherent architecture for 
the operationalisation of the last limb of Article 31(3)(c).
1649
 The treaty term and 
provision of the treaty that have to be interpreted must be identified, and only then 
could the rules of international law relevant for the interpretation of these terms or 
provisions be incorporated and applied in the interpretative process.  
Hence, an operationalisation of ‘shall be taken into account, together with the context’ 
entails that the identified relevant rules of international law are to be incorporated (to 
the extent possible, depending on the context, on a case-by-case basis) in the 
interpretation of a treaty term of provision. The extent of incorporation excludes a total 
replacement of the treaty provision to be interpreted, to the extent that there is no legal 
reference at all to the text of the provision, or all the sight of the text of the interpreted 
treaty provision is lost.
1650
  
The subsequent sections will apply this architecture in the determination of the 
normative weight of the phrase ‘shall be taken into account, together with the context’ 
as stipulated in Article 31(3)(c). The shared legal understanding that is implicit to 
Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of Ramsar Convention, and Article 8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity 
Convention, shall be taken into account, together with the context, in the interpretation 
of the obligation to preserve stipulated under Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention. The shared legal understanding does not only provide the normative 
                                               
1647 In the Oil Platform case, supra n 1468, whether the act of attacks are ‘necessary’ will be judged 
against the criteria provided by the relevant rules that informs the interpretation Article XX(1)(d). 
However, a determination of whether these attacks are justified will be arrived at only through an 
adjudication of whether the provision of Article XX(1)(d) has been satisfied, in the context of the 
economic and commercial nature of the 1955 Treaty. Refer to Section 7.4.1 of this thesis. 
1648 In Esphahanian v Bank Tejarat, supra n 1569, the principle of dominant and effective nationality is 
relevant to the interpretation of the term ‘national’ within the meaning of Article VII(1) prior to the 
determination whether the Iran-US Tribunal is seised with the jurisdiction to hear Esphahanian’s claim 
under Article II(1). The principle of dominant and effective nationality serves merely to provide the 
criteria for the determination of whether dual nationals are ‘national’, and if so, which nationality he 
possessed for the adjudication of his claims in the Iran-US Tribunal. Refer to Section 7.4.2 of this thesis. 
1649
 Refer to Sections 7.4 and 7.5 of this thesis. 
1650 Refer to Section 7.5 of this thesis on the normative weight commands by the phrase ‘shall take into 
account, together with the context’ of Art 31 (3)(c). 
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content to these explicit rules of international law, but also indicates the applicability of 
these rules in the relations between the parties. 
The subsequent sections
1651
 reiterate the summarised shared legal understanding 
practised by the parties of the two Conventions, that provides the normative content and 
scope that informs the interpretation of the phrase ‘relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’.  
8.4.2.1 Ramsar Convention  
River basins are the fundamental functional unit for water management, where an 
ecosystems approach is incorporated within the framework of integrated water resources 
management.
1652
 The ecosystem boundary of the river basin is to be designated into 
several types of zonation around the core wetland areas if a buffer zone is not 
incorporated in the designation of the wetland.
1653
 This is important to protect the 
structure and functioning of the wetlands, intrinsic to an ecosystem approach, where the 
water and land-use in the surrounding areas directly affect the ecological character of a 
designation site due to the inter-connected hydrological regime.
1654
 
The shared understanding reached in the Ramsar Convention seeks to maintain or even 
improve the ecological character of a reserve site, where the conservation purpose is to 
ensure sustainability of ecosystem functioning and values to maintain people’s 
livelihood and biodiversity conservation.
1655
 The 2009 Strategic Framework and 
Guidelines were adopted to guide the short-term target set by the Contracting Parties to 
increase Ramsar sites to at least 2,500 sites covering 250 million hectares, including at 
least one suitable representative of each wetland types.
1656
  
                                               
1651 Refer to Chapters Five and Six for an elaborate analysis of the shared legal understanding undertaken 
in a practice of legality that provides the implicit dimension for the interpretation of the phrase 
‘applicable in the relations between the parties’. 
1652  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 19. 
1653  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 53 – 57. 
1654  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 58. 
1655  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at para 60. 
1656
 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, pp 5 and 17, paras 21 
and 65. See Objectives 1 and 2, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 
426, pp 3 – 4, paras 9 – 15.  
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The qualitative component of this requirement is further illustrated in the criteria 
suggested in 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines. The designated sites must be 
representative, rare or unique, of a natural or near-natural wetland type, within the 
appropriate biogeographic region
1657
 where its ecological character plays a substantial 
role in the natural functioning of a major river basin or coastal system;
1658
 or provides 
supportive functions for vulnerable, threatened, or endangered species and ecological 
communities and the maintenance of biodiversity.
1659
 
The management plan plays a central role in the continuous, long-term management 
process that started with minimal requirement and minimal organisation within an 
adaptable and dynamic framework.
1660
 The management plan involves the identification 
and designation of wetlands; the assessment and monitoring of wetlands; and the in situ 
and ex situ management of wetlands where a flexible approach that allows appropriate 
response and adaptation is adopted.
1661
 The 2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines 
adopt the IUCN’s management categorisation method in the designation of wetlands, 
which corresponds to, and complements, the criteria laid out in the 2009 Strategic 
Framework and Guidelines for Ramsar site designation.
1662
  
The implementation of the Convention is further guided by the Ramsar Strategic Plan 
2009 – 2015 adopted by COP 10 in Resolution X.1 where 28 strategies represent ‘a 
general consensus of the most important priorities for most parties’ 1663  in their 
implementation of their obligations under the Convention within a stipulated 
timeframe.
1664
 In particular, Goal 2 of the Strategic Plan seeks to ‘develop and maintain 
an international network of wetlands that are important for the conservation of global 
biological diversity, including waterbird flyways and fish populations and for sustaining 
                                               
1657 Criterion 1, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 17. 
1658 Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 17, para 68.. 
1659 Objective 2, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at pp 3 – 
4.  
1660  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 41 – 44. 
1661  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 44 – 48. The flexible approach adopted in the management of wetlands 
is known as ‘adaptable management, see ‘Part IX. Adaptable Management’ in Ramsar Convention, ‘New 
Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 48 – 
52.  
1662  Para 27(b), ‘Explanatory Note and Guidelines for Completing the Information Sheet on Ramsar 
Wetlands (RIS)’, supra n 426, at pp 60 – 61. 
1663
 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 2, para 7.  
1664 Ramsar Convention, ‘Resolution X.1. The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’,  supra n 981, at para 
6. 
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human life’ through a step-wise approach.1665 The steps recommended start with the 
designation of wetlands; the long-term, continuous and adaptive process of management; 
putting in place an effective management plan; implementation of different conservation 
measures, including zonation; and the review of all existing Ramsar sites to determine 
the effectiveness of management arrangements.
1666
  
The shared understanding arrived at by the Contracting Parties of the Ramsar 
Convention demonstrates the scope and content of Articles 2.1 and 4.1, which are 
relevant for the interpretation of the obligation to preserve under Article 20. The 
incorporation of an ecosystem approach has modified the concept of preservation to 
allow management measures, inherent in the parlance of conservation, to encroach on 
the concept of preservation that seems to imply that human intervention is 
impermissible. Conservation of wetlands via the establishment of natural reserves, 
included or not included in the Ramsar List, is no longer restricted to pure preservation, 
but has allowed for the use of sites to the extent that it does not adversely affect the 
sustainability of ecosystem functioning, or lead to change in its ecological character.
1667
  
The interpretation of Article 20, in light of the development of the obligation to 
conserve wetlands through establishment of Listed or non-Listed sites, must be defined 
to take into account the shared understandings arrived by the Contracting Parties 
evidenced through the framework and guidelines adopted by the COP. The obligation to 
preserve ecosystems of international watercourses must necessarily adopt an integrated 
water resources management approach that strives to maintain and safeguard ecological 
functions and structures in accordance with the Ecosystem Approach within the river 
basin ecosystem boundary. An act of preservation is not said to be satisfied unless the 
Watercourse States have individually undertaken steps to designate ecosystems of 
international watercourses in accordance with the criteria and categorisation methods 
recommended, and implemented all procedural measures necessary for the management, 
monitoring, and assessment of the designated ecosystems.       
                                               
1665 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at p 10. See Strategies 
2.1 – 2.7, Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at pp 10 – 12.  
1666 Ramsar Convention, ‘The Ramsar Strategic Plan 2009 – 2015’, supra n 981, at pp 10 – 12, Strategies 
2.1 – 2.7.  
1667  Ramsar Convention, ‘New Guidelines for Management Planning for Ramsar Sites and Other 
Wetlands’, supra n 921, at paras 60, and 63 – 64.  
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8.4.2.2 Biodiversity Convention 
In the context of the Biodiversity Convention, Article 8(a) and (d) promotes the 
conservation of biodiversity through the establishment of protected areas where special 
measures are undertaken in the geographically defined area to conserve biodiversity, 
and to protect the ecosystems, natural habitats and the maintenance of viable 
populations of species in their natural surroundings. The Programme of Work on 
Protected Areas adopted in Decision VII/28 of COP 7 provides a guideline in the 
implementation of in situ conservation as required under Article 8 of the Convention. It 
recommends direct actions for the planning, selecting, establishing, strengthening, and 
managing of protected area systems and sites.
1668
   
The conservation of biodiversity through protected areas includes the establishment and 
strengthening of national and regional systems of protected areas that are integrated into 
a global network, and the integration of the protected areas into broader land- and 
seascapes and sectors to maintain ecological structure and functioning.
1669
 This includes 
the establishment and strengthening of regional networks, where collaborations between 
neighbouring protected areas are initiated across national boundaries.
1670
 Conservation 
of biodiversity, apart from the designation of protected areas, must necessarily include 
the improvement of site-based protected area planning and management, where highly 
participatory and effective planning processes that incorporate climate change 
adaptation measures, are in place.
1671
 
More specifically for the thematic area of inland water biodiversity, the Revised 
Programme of Work on Inland Water biodiversity emphasised the need of parties to 
adopt an integrated catchment/watershed/river-basin framework in the conservation of 
inland water biodiversity through a comprehensive, adequate and representative system 
of protected areas.
1672
 Due to the natural characteristic of inland waters, harmonisation 
                                               
1668 Programme Element 1, Programme of Work on Protected Areas, Decision VII/28, supra n 1148, at p 
8.  
1669 Goals 1.1 and 1.2, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, 
at pp 8 – 10. 
1670 Goals 1.2.3, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at pp 
10 – 11. Activity 1.2.5, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, 
at p 12. 
1671
 Activities 1.4.1, 1.4.2, 1.4.4, and 1.4.5, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological 
Diversity, supra n 1188, at pp 11 – 12.  
1672 Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at pp 11 – 12.  
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and collaboration with the Ramsar Convention are arrived at in the implementation of 
the obligations under both Conventions.
1673
  
The normative content of Article 8(a) and (d) are further provided by the Strategic Plan 
2011 – 2020. Target 11 aimed to set aside an effectively and equitably managed areas of 
protection of at least 17% of terrestrial and inland water areas, especially areas of 
particular importance for biodiversity and ecosystem services that are ecologically 
representative and well-connected, by 2020.
1674
 The quantitative requirement of a 
designation of 17% of terrestrial area as protected areas is qualified by the qualitative 
requirements of ecological representativeness, and the effectiveness of management 
plan.  
In this context, the obligation to conserve in situ biodiversity through the establishment 
of protected areas under Article 8(a) and (d) involves the designation of inland waters as 
protected areas within an integrated water resources management framework where the 
catchment/watershed/river-basin serves as the ecosystem boundary for such delimitation. 
An integrated and effective management plan must be in place, where the 
implementation of the management process must be harmonised with the Ramsar 
Strategic Framework for the Future Development of the List of Wetlands of 
International Importance. The Programme of Work on Protected Areas adopted in 
Decision VII/28 imposes management planning that is in line with the IUCN 
management categories for protected areas,
1675
 which takes into account the concept of 
ecological connectivity and ecological networks stipulated in the Programme of Work 
on Protected Areas adopted in Decision VII/28.
1676
 
In sum, the obligation to conserve inland water biodiversity through the mechanism of 
protected areas is subject to the quantitative target of at least 17% coverage of terrestrial 
protected areas that are ecologically representative and effectively managed. The 
effective management of these protected areas includes the establishment and 
maintenance of comprehensive, adequate and representative systems of protected inland 
                                               
1673 Activities 1.2.2, 1.2.3, 1.2.4 and 1.2.6, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological 
Diversity, supra n 1188, at pp 11 – 12. 
1674 Target 11, ‘Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity Targets’ annexed 
to CBD, ‘Decision X/2. The Strategic Plan for Biodiversity 2011 – 2020 and the Aichi Biodiversity 
Targets’, supra n 1210, at p 9. 
1675 CBD, ‘Decision VII/28 Protected Areas (Articles 8(a) to (e))’, supra n 447, at pp 1 and 4, paras 3 and 
31. 
1676 Activity 1.2.6, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
12. 
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water ecosystems within the framework of integrated catchment/watershed/river-basin 
management that are harmonised with the implementation of Ramsar Convention.
1677
 
8.4.2.3 Outcome of Operationalisation 
The obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses in light of Article 
8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity Convention, and Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar 
Convention, requires Watercourse States to, individually, establish systems of protected 
areas on inland water ecosystems that are ecologically representative.
1678
 The 
effectiveness of management forms part of the yardstick of the implementation of the 
obligation to preserve, where both Conventions require the establishment of a 
management planning process that is adaptive and effective.  
Due to the recognition of the ecosystem approach in the 1997 Watercourses Convention, 
the development in both Conventions of the implementation of the ecosystem approach 
orientated the preservation motivation towards the safeguarding and protection of 
natural functioning and ecological processes in ecosystems, where the conceptualisation 
of preservation is modified to adopt a more ‘conservation’ perspective. In this respect, 
the management process, including the monitoring and reviewing aspects, forms a 
crucial link in the obligation to preserve. 
The Preamble of the 1997 Watercourses Convention stipulated that the Convention 
intended to ensure, inter alia, the conservation, management and protection of 
international watercourses. In reference to the context, the modification of the scope of 
preservation in light of the understanding of the environment from an ecosystem 
perspective does not seem to be inconsistent with the context of the Convention. 
Although preservation is intended to mean protection of the pristine and unspoilt 
condition of watercourses ecosystems, an interpretation that allows the preservation of 
ecosystems to incorporate conservation concepts, which involve some uses that are not 
inimical to the ecosystem integrity of a pristine site, is not inconsistent with the context 
of the Convention. 
To summarise, the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses in 
Article 20, is interpreted in accordance with Article 31(3)(c) that reflects the principle of 
                                               
1677
 Goal 1.2, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 11. 
1678 Activity 1.2.2, Revised Programme of Work on Inland Water Biological Diversity, supra n 1188, at p 
11; and Objective 1, Ramsar Convention, ‘2009 Strategic Framework and Guidelines’, supra n 426, at p 3. 
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systemic integration. The relevant rules of Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar 
Convention; and Article 8(a) and (d) of the Biodiversity Convention that are applicable 
in the relations between the parties, are taken into account, together with the context of 
the 1997 Watercourses Convention. The content and scope of the obligation to preserve 
must necessarily include both the substantive components of targeted areas of 
designation and coverage of Ramsar Listed sites or areas of inland waters under 
protection, and the procedural mechanisms involved in the implementation of the 
substantive components. In addition, the two Conventions have developed both 
qualitative and quantitative criteria for the satisfaction of the substantive obligation to 
preserve. They include the achievement of a quantified number or percentage of 
targeted area of Ramsar reserve or protected areas; and the attainment of the qualitative 
aspect of ecological representativeness of the area of protection or reserve, and the 
effectiveness of their management.
1679
  
Only when these substantive and procedural aspects, formed by the shared legal 
understandings developed by the two Conventions, are undertaken by the Watercourse 
States, can these States be said to have satisfied their obligation to preserve ecosystems 
of international watercourses under Article 20.
1680
 The procedural aspects of the 
normative content that inform the interpretation of Article 20 are of particular 
importance in light of the imposition of a standard of due diligence in the application of 
Article 20.  
These procedural requirements developed under the Ramsar Convention and the 
Biodiversity Convention establish the threshold for the application of the standard of 
due diligence inherent in Article 20, which is a specific application of the requirement 
contained in Article 5.
1681
 They could be useful in the determination of whether a 
watercourses state has satisfied the obligation of conduct to preserve ecosystems of 
international watercourses under Article 20, as assessed against a standard of due 
diligence. 
In reference to the stipulation of Article 31(3)(c), rules of international law applicable in 
the relations between the parties shall be taken into account together with the context. In 
                                               
1679 These issues are separately discussed in Chapter Five and Six of this thesis.  
1680 This outcome is fully consistent with the ‘special regime’ envisioned by Special Rapporteur Schwebel 
in his conceptualisation of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses under 
Article 20. Refer to discussion in supra n 57. 
1681 This is discussed as part of the context of the entire treaty in Section 8.4.1.2 of this chapter.  
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response to this, it is explained in Section 8.4.1 of this chapter that the conservation, 
management, and protection of watercourses serve to promote the equitable and 
reasonable utilisation of watercourses, which forms the context of Article 20. The 
ecological character and other environmental considerations merely form part of the 
factors and circumstances to be considered in the assessment of whether a non-
navigational use of water is equitable and reasonable. Hence, the relevant rules of 
international law shall be taken into account in the interpretation of the obligation to 
preserve under Article 20 only to the extent that their incorporation does not render the 
non-navigational uses of the international watercourse to cease to be equitable and 
reasonable.
1682
 
Despite the emerging ecosystem approach to the protection of environment, and the 
increasing importance placed on environmental preservation and protection, it is in no 
way meant to acquire an overriding precedence over other factors in the balancing of 
‘equitable and reasonable’ utilisation of water. Therefore, an integration of economic, 
social and environmental needs is the balance strived for under international water law 
in the deliberation of ‘equitable and reasonable utilisation of water’.1683 This approach 
was clearly illustrated in the famous quote of ‘the need to reconcile economic 
development with protection of the environment’ enunciated by the ICJ in the landmark 
decision of the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case.  
However, the multi-faceted development of a rule of international law under the two 
Conventions identified for this research on the conservation and preservation of 
environment, be it the wetland component, or the biodiversity component, is not 
irreconcilably conflicted with the non-navigational uses of a shared watercourse. The 
underpinnings of the safeguard of the ecological structure and functioning of an 
ecosystem and the maintenance of ecosystem integrity, strengthen the treaty regime on 
the non-navigational uses of water resources in ensuring the sustainability of that 
resource for future uses.
1684
  
                                               
1682 This conclusion was alluded to by Tarlock, ‘International Water Law and the Protection of River 
System Ecosystem Integrity’, supra n 320, at p 198. The author commented that ‘the fact remains that the 
protection of a river system’s ecological integrity remains secondary to the promotion of development’. 
1683 See Birnie, Boyle, and Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, supra n 112, at p 560. 
1684 Refer to discussion on equitable and reasonable use in Section 8.4.1.2.  
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8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter illustrates the operationalisation of the analytical framework developed for 
the interpretation of Article 31(3)(c) in light of the principle of systemic integration 
deemed to be expressed in this Article.
1685
 It compiles the outcome of analysis 
undertaken in the three-tiered analysis undertaken in Chapters Two to Seven, in the 
operationalisation of how Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention is to be 
interpreted in its normative environment through the legal technique codified under 
Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
The tiered analysis comprises Chapter Two on the interpretation of ‘relevant’ and the 
identification of rules that are ‘relevant’; and Chapters Three, Four, Five and Six on the 
interpretation of ‘rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties’ as provided by the Ramsar and the Biodiversity Convention. The third tier of 
the analysis is the focal point of the operationalisation of the principle of systemic 
integration where the normative weight of the external rules, as identified in tiers one 
and two, is ascertained in accordance with Article 31(3)(c). This involves the 
application of the interpretation of ‘shall be taken into account, together with the context’ 
and development of the architecture of systemic integration in Chapter Seven, in this 
chapter.  
Chapter Eight presents the final stage of the operationalisation of the systemic 
integration principle from the prism of Article 31(3)(c) for the interpretation of the 
obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses. The essence of the 
operationalisation framework lies in the identification of the context of Article 20, and 
in what way the context conditions and qualifies the incorporation of the identified 
external rules through interpretative means. The overriding character of ‘the context’ in 
Article 31(3)(c) produces the outcome that  despite the increased importance placed on 
the preservation of ecosystems, and the development of these rules in environmental 
treaty regimes, this obligation does not have priority over other uses in the 
ascertainment of whether a non-navigational uses of international watercourses is 
equitable or reasonable.  
                                               
1685 It is recognised that the limitation posed by the interpretative nature of Art 31(3)(c) might not achieve 
a full systemic integration of rules as this would imply going beyond the role of interpretation, as 
evidenced in the debate on interpretation and application in legal scholarship However, this thesis does 
not purport to go into the controversy on the distinction between interpretation and application. See 
Kammerhofer, ‘Systemic Integration, Legal Theory and the ILC’, supra n 104. 
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However, the actual normative weight on the obligation to preserve in light of other 
factors is beyond the scope of this thesis, as there is a need to identify all judicial facts 
that constitute other factors that have to be taken into consideration in the assessment of 
the equitable and reasonable non-navigational uses of international watercourses. In this 
case, further research for the contextualisation of the framework of operationalisation 
proposed in this thesis is needed. This would be a further area for research that explores 
the actual application of this framework in a specific context, where empirical evidence 
and the relevant compendium of relevant rules that are more expansive than this thesis 
can cover, but necessary for the actual application of the framework of 
operationalisation proposed in this thesis, could be undertaken.  
Furthermore, it is important to note that the recognition of procedural mechanisms 
intrinsic to a substantive obligation in the realm of international water law illuminates 
the importance of the interface between international law and domestic law. The onus to 
preserve under Article 20, imposed firstly on an individual state to preserve ecosystems 
of international watercourses independent of transboundary damage; and only secondly, 
on watercourses states to engage in collaborative management of transboundary 
ecosystems; highlights the relevance of integrated water resources management at the 
national level of each watercourse states. The assessment of the implementation of 
Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention against a standard of due diligence
1686
 
necessitates an exploration into the interaction between international law and domestic 
law, where the implementation of the obligation to preserve undertaken at the national 
level is brought into the limelight at the international level. This thesis provides the 
foundation where such exploration could be carried forward in further research.
1687
  
In conclusion, Chapter Eight provides an assemblage of the outcome of analysis 
obtained in Chapters Two to Six and applies these outcome through the architecture 
developed in Chapter Seven for the systemic integration of relevant rules in accordance 
                                               
1686 The procedural mechanisms intrinsic to the satisfaction of the substantive obligation to preserve are 
discussed in Chapters Five and Six. The due diligence standard of responsibility for the implementation 
of the substantive obligation of the preservation of ecosystems of international watercourses is presented 
in the discussion on ‘context’ in Section 8.4.1.2. 
1687 The author made a preliminary exploration of the interface between international law and national law 
in Jing Lee, ‘Multilateral Environmental Agreements − A Catalyst for Interlinkages in River Basin 
Management? A Case Study of Pahang River Basin, Malaysia’ pp 188 − 193, in Janos J Bogardi, Jan 
Leentvaar, and Hans-Peter Nachtnebel (eds) with contributions from Sina Marx and Eva Riedke, River 
Basins and Change (Global Water System Project (GWSP), UNESCO-IHE Institute for Water Education, 
Bonn, 2012).  
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with Article 31(3)(c). The next chapter of this thesis draws a general conclusion for this 
research by recounting the salient aspects discussed in this thesis. 
8.6 A Further Reflection 
Rules of international law that are developed through the law-making activities within 
the institutionalised setting mandated by treaties, and strengthened through an 
interpretation that takes into account its systemic environment, provide the foundation 
on which future cooperation of states is built upon for the resolution of international 
problems.
1688
 This is crucial in light of the increasing importance of treaty as a means of 
developing peaceful cooperation among states
1689
 against the backdrop of the right to 
sovereign equality of states
1690
 ‘to take part in the solution of international questions 
affecting its legitimate interests, including the right to join international organisations 
and to become party to multilateral treaties dealing with or governing matters involving 
interests’.1691  
However, the states’ right to exercise sovereign equality must be asserted within the 
boundaries set up by their duty to ‘comply fully and in good faith with its international 
obligations’. 1692  The failure of a state to observe the shared legal understanding 
concretised in practice in one international forum, in other fora, including the 
negotiation of new treaties, would not be  seen as a satisfaction of its duty to ‘fulfil in 
good faith the obligations assumed by [it] in accordance with the [UN] Charter’1693 as 
proclaimed by the UNGA.  
There is a need to acknowledge the political asymmetries or sensitivities of international 
watercourses that induce persistent unwillingness of states to cooperate without going 
into a determination of whether a state conducts itself in a manner that is in breach of its 
duty to cooperate under the UN Charter.
1694
 It is recognised that rules could be 
                                               
1688 Art 1(3), Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 59 Stat 
1031; TS 993; 3 Bevans 1153 (hereinafter ‘UN Charter’).  
1689 Rosenne, Practice and Methods of International Law, supra n 221, at p 29.  
1690  UNGA, Res 2625 (XXV) ‘Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly 
Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations’ (1883rd 
Plenary Meeting, 24 October 1970) at p 124 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2625(XXV)> accessed 14 February 2013. 
1691 Piet-Hein Houben, ‘Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States’ (1967) 61(3) American Journal of International Law 703 – 736, at p 718. 
1692
 Res 2625 (XXV) supra n 1690, at p 122, para (f) and elaboration at p 124, para (f). 
1693 Res 2625 (XXV) supra n 1690,  at p 124. 
1694 Refer supra n 1688. 
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destroyed through the continuing practice of states and other international actors, 
although the determination of the demise of a rule of law is a matter of 
interpretation.
1695
 However, it would be hard to challenge the emergence of the 
obligation to preserve in international law, as evidenced in the robust development of 
this rule in treaty regimes mandated by MEAs despite allegation of a lack of willingness 
of a watercourse states to cooperate over an international watercourse, because the lack 
of willingness might arise from a different cause of action, and not over its shared 
understanding over the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses. 
Against this background, in the context of the present research, the breach of a state’s 
obligation to preserve could be dealt with under the non-compliance proceeding 
available within the treaty regimes of the identified MEAs, where the shared legal 
understanding over the interpretation and application of the obligation to preserve is 
strengthened within the institutions set out by these MEAs. The shared understanding to 
preserve ecosystems would not be impaired if a state is alleged to have refused to 
cooperate (where non-cooperation might not be the lack of shared understanding of the 
obligation to preserve).
1696
 A failure to cooperate does not vitiate the normative status of 
the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses, unless the non-
cooperation is due to a persistent unwillingness of states to commit to the obligation to 
preserve. 
Instead, the duty of a state to conduct itself in a manner that promotes friendly relations 
and cooperation amongst states, makes it incumbent for the state to fulfil its 
international obligations in good faith, which drives states towards cooperation, in order 
to uphold the rule of law. The crystallisation of the obligation to preserve, developed 
through a systemic integration of the interpretation of this rule, provides the catalyst that 
promotes cooperation. This demonstrates the importance of an integrated approach 
towards treaty interpretation of an obligation to preserve ecosystems of international 
watercourses.  
                                               
1695 Refer to discussions in Section 4.4.2.1. 
1696 It is reminded that ‘shared legal understanding’ practised in a community of practice means the share 
understanding of members of this community as to ‘what they are doing and why’. A thin community of 
international legal practice based in very limited shared understandings that there is a need for law in 
shaping international communication and interaction, can be said to exist. Brunnée and Toope, 
Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 79. The authors elaborated in pp 15 – 16 
that ‘a community of practice is constituted by mutual engagement rather than by shared values or goals’. 
See in general discussion in n 739.  
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The normative environment constructed by the international consensus and emerged 
through participation of states in various multilateralised law-making institutions, 
establishes the platform from which further negotiations are carried out in the spirit of 
peaceful cooperation amongst nation states in accordance with the UN Charter. Apart 
from guiding states’ conduct and behaviour in accordance with the rule of law in their 
friendly relations and cooperation among states,
1697
 these shared legal understandings 
provide a yardstick for the assessment of whether a state undertakes its duty to fulfil the 
obligations assumed by it in good faith.  
In this context, the operationalisation of an interpretative mechanism for the systemic 
integration of rules of international law relevant to the preservation of ecosystems of 
international watercourses strengthens the normativity of the obligation to preserve. The 
cross-referencing between treaty regimes galvanises international consensus of states, 
and imposes a standard for the assessment of good faith fulfilment of states’ 
international obligations. 
Having said that, it is vital to restate that a legal approach merely forms part of the 
solution to problems arising from political asymmetries in international relations. This 
is anticipated in the drafting of the UN Charter where it is provided that, in the event of 
dispute (or an allegation of non-cooperation), the pacific settlement of disputes in 
accordance with Article 33 of the UN Charter imposes on the UN state parties to seek a 
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, 
or to resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own 
choice, failing which, would invoked the authority of the Security Council to call upon 
the parties to settle their dispute by such means. A genuine non-cooperation could be an 
indication of rogue state that is to be dealt with more appropriately under the political 
arm of the UN. 
 
  
                                               
1697 Preamble, Res 2625 (XXV) supra n 1690, at p 122. Also duty to cooperate in Art 1(3), UN Charter 
supra n 1688; Res 2625 (XXV) supra n 1690,  at p 122, para (d), and elaboration at p 123. 
382 
 
9 
Chapter 9. Preservation of Ecosystems of International Watercourses and the 
Integration of Relevant Rules: Reflection and Conclusion  
A WORD is dead  
When it is said,  
  Some say.  
I say it just  
Begins to live        
  That day.
1698
 
‘Language represents the interactional phenomenon par excellence; its forms arise out 
of and live by interaction’.1699 The communication of words involves an initiation of a 
perceptual process of the mind where the direction of words communicated must be in 
the same contextual environment as the reciprocal expectation.
1700
 In the actual practice 
of lifting the ‘more or less vagueness of language’,1701 the respect for the underlying 
systematic structure and the understanding of the social context are important,
1702
 and 
here interpretation occupies a central role.
1703
    
Legal interactions are an essential feature of law precisely because law’s central purpose 
is to ‘open up, maintain, and preserve the integrity of the channels through the barriers 
that separate them’.1704 In many other aspects, law is equated to language in ‘what one 
could call a grammatically “imperfect” sense’. 1705  The mutual adjustment of 
expectations in an interactional and reciprocal process in the purposive enterprise of law 
allows the emergence of shared understanding intended for the governance of 
relationships between the parties.
1706
 The implicit dimension of the legal order is the 
                                               
1698 ‘LXXIX, Part One: Life’ in Emily Dickinson (1830 – 1886) Complete Poems (Little, Brown and 
Company, Boston, 1924; Bartleby.com, 2000) <http://www.bartleby.com/113/1089.html> accessed 24 
August 2012. 
1699 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 227.   
1700 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at pp 227 – 228. 
1701 A phrase lifted out from a quote in Panos Merkouris, ‘Introduction: Interpretation is A Science, is An 
Art, is A Science’, in Fitzmaurice, Elias, and Merkouris (eds) Treaty Interpretation and the VCLT, supra 
n 279, supra n 279, at p 6. 
1702 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 229.  
1703 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 91. The author explained that ‘With all its subtleties, 
the problem of interpretation occupies a sensitive, central position in the internal morality of the law. It 
reveals, as no other problem can, the cooperative nature of the task of maintaining legality.’ 
1704 Fuller, The Morality of Law, supra n 747, at p 186.  
1705
 Marianne Constable, ‘Speaking of the Imperfect: Law, Language and Justice’ (2012) 9 No 
Foundations  58 – 67, at p 59.  
1706 Sartor, ‘The Foundation of Legal Bindingness’, supra n 569, at p 341. 
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shared understanding that, embedded and intertwined with the criteria of legality, 
provides the content and practical force of law.
1707 
 
The interactional relationship is prominent and robust in the realm of international law, 
where rapid expansion of international legal activity is reflected in the diversification of 
functionally specialised but limited rule-complexes (which are also known as ‘regimes’) 
in order to respond to new technical and functional requirements.
1708
  These self-
contained regimes are different in terms of the interpretative theory underlying the 
process of interpretation, and the so-called ‘specific ethos’1709 where preferences and 
orientations are articulated and strengthened through specialisation of regime.
1710
 
Despite the highly specific objectives and the expertise and ethos that are exclusive to 
self-contained regimes, they do not exclude these specialised regimes from general 
international law.  
An evolutionary and dynamic
1711
 interpretation that allows contemporary realities, 
which depart from the circumstances prevailed at the time of the drafting of the 
Convention but prevailing at the time of the interpretation, is necessary within a greater 
framework of the entire legal system where numerous legal and political interactions 
take place.
1712
 This strengthens the necessity to adopt an integrated approach in the 
interpretation of a rule of international law in its systemic environment, apart from the 
reality that any specialised regime undoubtedly receives binding force under general 
international law, and will always be situated in a systemic environment.
1713
   
The role of treaty interpretation that allows an interpretation of a treaty provision in its 
normative environment highlights the significance of the principles of interpretation 
codified under Articles 31 – 33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention,1714 especially in the 
                                               
1707 Postema, A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence, supra n 754, at p 148. Refer to 
Chapter Four of this thesis. 
1708 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at pp 14 and 15.  
1709 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at p 90, para 170.  
1710 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at pp 85 and 247, para 158 and 488. 
1711 See Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: between Memory and Prophecy’, supra n 782.  
1712 Magdalena Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the Court of Human Rights (Oxford 
University Press, Oxford, 2010) at pp 3 – 14. Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros case, supra n 1, Separate Opinion of 
the Vice-President Weeramantry, supra n 277, at p 31, para 53. Dupuy, ‘Evolutionary Interpretation of 
Treaties: between Memory and Prophecy’, supra n 782, at p 132. The issue of inter-temporality is 
discussed in conjunction with the determination of the common intentions of the parties through an 
interactional understanding of international law, especially Section 4.4.1.  
1713 Report of ILC, supra n 96, at p 94, para 179. At p 100, para 129, it is stated that ‘no regime is self-
contained. Even in the case of well-developed regimes, general law has at least two types of function’. 
1714 Refer to Section 1.1 of the thesis, especially supra n 21 and n 22. 
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midst of a situation of fragmentation of international laws that are parallel and 
equivalent to each other.
1715
 Principles of interpretation that are dependent on the 
context
1716
 of the interpreted treaty (as stipulated in Article 31(1), (2) and (3)(a) and (b)), 
are insufficient to resolve the problems of fragmentation.
1717
 This is because the 
functionally-specialised nature of self-contained regimes is rules of international law 
extrinsic to the context of the interpreted treaty. In this respect, the unique character
1718
 
of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention provides a legal mechanism that 
allows the incorporation of parallel, equivalent norms that are in pari materia and 
relevant to the interpretation of a treaty term or provision.
1719
  
Despite the specificity of ethos underlying a specialised regime, as long as there are 
legal interactions undertaken within the confines of the specialised regime that concern 
and impact on the environment and its ecosystems, there will emerge a community of 
practice, no matter how thin the shared understandings are.
1720
 The community of 
practice will ‘cut across state boundaries and mediate between states, individuals, and 
human agency, on one hand, and social structures and systems, on the other’.1721 
Regime specialisation is an insufficient boundary to prevent the interactions of the 
community of practice. It is from the understanding of international law as a 
communication and a type of interaction in the legal language, that a framework for the 
operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) is proposed.
1722
  
An understanding of international law from an interactional perspective where the 
shared legal understandings ‘flourished, deepen and became complex’1723 through the 
                                               
1715 Refer to Section 1.1 of the thesis, especially supra n 14. 
1716 ‘Context’ is as defined in Art 31(2) of the 1969 Vienna Convention.  
1717 Refer to Section 1.6.1 of the thesis. 
1718 Refer to discussion in supra n 246.  
1719 On the interpretation of ‘relevant’ and the identification of relevant rules, refer to Chapter Two, in 
particularly Section 2.2 of this thesis.  
1720 The basic threshold for the emergence of a community of practice includes the ‘[sustenance] of 
mutual relationships (harmonious or not), shared approaches to interaction, shared indicators of 
membership, knowledge of others and their roles in the joint enterprise, shared discourses and shortcuts to 
communication, and common criteria for the appropriateness of actions and outcomes’. Wenger, 
Communities of Practice, supra n 776, at pp 131 – 133.  
1721 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 64. The concept 
of a community of practice is developed in Section 4.4.3.2 of this thesis. 
1722  Report of ILC, supra n 96, at p 213 para 423. The potential of Art 31(3)(c) for the systemic 
integration of relevant rules has been explored by eminent scholars in light of the multiplication of treaty 
regimes and the fragmentation of international law. The ILC recognised the possible contribution of a 
discussion of the actual and potential uses of Art 31(3)(c) to the study of the fragmentation (or 
diversification) of international law. The proposed framework is developed through Chapters Two to 
Seven of this thesis whereby the operationalisation of the framework is undertaken in Chapter Eight. 
1723 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 69. 
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interactional process, provide the content of the ‘relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ that shall be taken into account in the 
interpretative process of a treaty term or provision. It is this shared legal understanding 
that determines whether the rules of international law are applicable in the relations 
between the parties. Their applicability will depend on the collective understanding of 
the enterprise of law-making as to the content and the binding force of these rules.
1724
 
As long as the shared understanding of a collective need for law to shape international 
communication and interaction in a given subject matter is undertaken in mutual 
engagement, and has emerged into a community of practice, an interactional law is said 
to have arisen.
1725
  
The fragmentation of international law on the environment due to the proliferation of 
multilateral environmental treaty regimes has resulted in treaty congestion that affects 
the operational efficiency of these treaties. The difficulties resulting from the 
diversification of international law are real. These difficulties strengthen the assertion 
that even the so-called self-contained regime cannot be operated in a clinical vacuum, 
and be fully contracted out from general international law. A dynamic interpretation that 
incorporates contemporary concerns in the interpretation and subsequent application of 
a rule of international law are exceptionally important in the environmental regime, 
especially in the preservation and conservation of freshwater ecosystems.
1726
  
Freshwater ecosystems could be said to be the most endangered ecosystems in the world, 
and they are facing dramatic decline far greater than most terrestrial ecosystems, despite 
the fact that water biodiversity provides provisioning service and supporting services 
that support all other ecosystem processes that sustain life on earth.
1727
 The scientific 
                                               
1724 This reflects the prevailing view of the scholar as to the possible construction of ‘the parties’ whereby 
the rule of international law must be said to be implicitly accepted or tolerated by all parties to the treaty 
under interpretation ‘in the sense that it can reasonably be considered to express the common intentions or 
understanding of all members as to the meaning of the term concerned’. Pauwelyn, ‘The Role of Public 
International Law in the WTO: How Far Can We Go?’, supra n 264, at p 578. See McLachlan, ‘The 
Principle of Systemic Integration’, supra n 162. This aspect is discussed at length in Section 3.2.2.1 of 
this thesis.  
1725 Brunnée and Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law, supra n 724, at p 79. 
1726 UNGA, ‘Resolution 58/217 International Decade for Action, “Water for Life”, 2005 – 2015’, at p 1 
<http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/58/217> accessed 18 November 2012. The 
GA emphasised that ‘water is critical for sustainable development, including environmental integrity and 
the eradication of poverty and hunger, and is indispensable for human health and well-being’. On the 
need for a holistic approach, refer to Section 1.2 of this thesis. 
1727  David Dudgeon et al, ‘Freshwater Biodiversity: Importance, Threats, Status and Conservation 
Challenges’, supra n 338, at p 164.; and MA, Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Synthesis, supra n 336, 
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community has come to recognise the importance of safeguarding ecosystem integrity 
and the maintenance of evolutionary and ecological processes through in situ 
conservation of an ‘unmodified assemblage of organisms’ within a protected area.1728 It 
has now been widely recognised that protected areas are among the most effective 
means of conserving the biological diversity in situ that forms the natural infrastructure 
of the production of life-sustaining ecosystem services.
1729
 
At the international level, the obligation to preserve freshwater ecosystems is explicitly 
provided in Article 20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention. This Article represents the 
emergence of the obligation to preserve in the field of international water law as 
evidenced in the multiplication of water-specific international instruments.
1730
 Rules of 
international law relevant to the interpretation of Article 20, especially in providing the 
normative content for terms such as ‘ecosystems’ and ‘preserve’, are simultaneously 
found in Articles 2.1 and 4.1 of the Ramsar Convention; and Article 8(a) and (d) of the 
Biodiversity Convention.
1731
  
Both Conventions oblige state contracting parties to designate areas of conservation 
where various measures have to be implemented for the protection of ecological 
integrity, especially the structure and functioning of the ecosystems. It is interesting to 
note that despite the multilateral and international status of the 1997 Watercourses 
Convention, Article 20 strengthens the legal status of the obligation to protect and 
preserve the environment within the national territory of states in accordance with the 
                                                                                                                                         
at p 106. The seriousness of the current scenario on freshwater ecosystems is dealt with in Section 2.1.4 
of this thesis. 
1728  Shelford, ‘The Preservation of Natural Biotic Communities’, supra n 305, Glowka, Burhenne-
Guilmin, and Hugh Synge, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, supra n 431, at pp 240 – 
241. R Edward Grumbine, ‘What is Ecosystem Management?’, supra n 322; and Trouwborst, ‘Ecosystem 
Approach’, supra n 310. The importance of the safeguard and maintenance of ecosystem integrity 
through preservation is discussed in Section 2.1.2 of this thesis. 
1729 UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, ‘Remarks at the High-level Event on Biodiversity’, supra n 
1010. Michael JB Green and James Paine, ‘State of the World’s Protected Areas at the End of the 
Twentieth Century’ (Paper Presented at IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas Symposium on 
“Protected Areas in the 21st Century: From Islands to Networks”, Albany, Australia 24 – 29 November 
1997) <http://oceandocs.org/bitstream/1834/867/1/Green%2c%20M.%20J.%20B1-35.pdf> accessed 24 
August 2012; Published in IUCN, IUCN World Commission on Protected Areas Symposium on 
“Protected Areas in the 21st Century: From Islands to Networks” Albany, Australia, 24 – 29 November 
1997 (IUCN, 1997) p 35 et seq. Refer to Chapter Two of this thesis. 
1730 Refer to Section 1.1 of the thesis, especially supra n 9. 
1731 Refer to Chapter Two for the identification of relevant rules, in particularly Section 2.3 of this thesis. 
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ecosystem approach, and strengthens the relevancy of the state-centric Conventions 
identified for the purpose of this research.
1732
  
The common intentions and the shared understanding of the parties as to its content and 
bindingness, that determines the applicability of the rules of international law from the 
Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity Convention, have been assessed against the 
criteria of legality proposed by Fuller.
1733
 Apart from the determination of whether the 
process and outcome of the development of the rules are intertwined with criteria of 
legality, the assessment of the rules against the eight criteria of internal morality will 
reveal the product of the interactional process in the hard work of law-making in an 
institutionalised community of practice.
1734
  
In the interpretation of the obligation to preserve imposed under Article 20 of the 1997 
Watercourses Convention, a systemic integration of relevant rules of international law 
requires that these rules (the shared legal understanding developed in the interactional 
COP processes of the identified treaty regimes, and undertaken in a practice of legality) 
shall be taken into account, together with the context, in the interpretation of Article 20. 
‘Shall be taken into account’ imposes that an interpretation that takes into account the 
external rule is compulsorily invoked if all conditions stipulated under Article 31(3)(c) 
of the 1969 Vienna Convention are satisfied.
1735
 However, the extent to which these 
rules ‘shall be taken into account’ is qualified, and delimitated in a way, by the context 
of the treaty.
1736
 
The context of Article 20 was discovered through a thorough analysis of text and 
preamble of the 1997 Watercourses Convention.
1737
 It was found that despite the 
intention of the 1997 Watercourses Convention to impose the obligation to preserve the 
ecosystems of international watercourses on watercourses states, this intention must be 
read with the overall context, or the context of the entire text of the treaty. The 
conservation, management and protection of the watercourses, or in particular, the 
preservation of the watercourses, is only one of the factors to be considered in striking 
                                               
1732 This outcome is noted in Chapter Eight of this thesis, in particularly in the discussion of the context of 
Art 20 in Section 8.4.1. 
1733 Refer to Chapters Five and Six, in particularly Sections 5 and 6.5 of this thesis. 
1734 The product is the shared legal understanding undertaken in a practice of legality that indicates the 
common intentions of the parties as to the interpretation of the rule, which is ‘applicable in the relations 
between the parties’. Refer to Sections 5 and 6.5 of this thesis. 
1735
 Refer to Chapter Seven, in particularly Section 7.3 of this thesis. 
1736 Refer to Chapter Seven, in particularly Section 7.2 of this thesis. 
1737 Refer to Chapter Eight, in particularly Section 8.4.1 this thesis. 
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the balance of an equitable and reasonable utilisation. Although the obligation to 
preserve ecosystems of international watercourses forms part of the substantive 
obligations under the Convention, the satisfaction of this obligation must be in 
accordance with the equitable and reasonable utilisation of the watercourses.
1738
 
In this regard, the conclusion drawn in Chapter Eight is that firstly, the content and 
scope of the obligation to preserve ecosystems of international watercourses under 
Article 20 involve both the substantive components of the designation of areas as 
protected areas or Ramsar sites, and the procedural aspects of effective management 
laid out in detail under the two Conventions. Secondly, this obligation is but one factor 
to be taken into consideration in the determination of an equitable and reasonable 
utilisation of watercourses. Although the rules of international law under the two 
Conventions might be binding on the parties under the Convention, in the determination 
and interpretation of their obligation under the 1997 Watercourses Convention, the 
context requires that this obligation must be balanced against other factors, and does not 
a priori enjoy a higher hierarchy in the balancing process.  
The ascertainment of the shared legal understanding implicit to a rule of international 
law through the interactional framework indirectly promotes cooperation in good faith 
between states, especially in the negotiation of new treaties where existing international 
obligations committed in other international law-making fora could serve as the catalyst 
of cooperation. Having said that, the systemic integrative potential realised through the 
operationalisation of Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna Convention proposed in this 
research would have limited application in the face of deep intransigence between 
international watercourse states where occurrences of rupture in the cooperation 
between states are common. In this instance, a purely legal approach would be 
incapable of resolving genuine political conflicts, where these conflicts could be more 
appropriately addressed through other mechanisms provided under the UN Charter.
1739
 
In conclusion, this thesis develops the body of knowledge on the preservation of 
ecosystems of international watercourses through an integrated interpretation of Article 
20 of the 1997 Watercourses Convention in its normative environment, presented in the 
relevant provisions of the Ramsar Convention and the Biodiversity Convention. For this 
                                               
1738 Refer to Chapter Eight, in particularly Section 8.4.2.3 of this thesis. 
1739 Refer to Section 8.6 of the thesis. 
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purpose, the thesis proposes a possible framework for the operationalisation of Article 
31(3)(c) by reconstructing the conceptualisation of rules of international law through an 
interactional perspective in the exploration of the potential contribution of the Article to 
the study of the fragmentation (or diversification) of international law.  
The framework of operationalisation for Article 31(3)(c) of the 1969 Vienna 
Convention as proposed in this thesis, offers one of the many possible perspectives in 
treating the issue of diversification of international law. It provides further 
understanding on both the problematic aspect of the fragmentation and congestion of 
international law and the positive aspect of the expansion of international law that caters 
to functional differentiation and specialised technical needs.  
The analysis of Article 31(3)(c) through the prism of an interactional theory of law gave 
an evolutionary interpretation to ‘rules of international law’. In view of the multilateral 
law-making processes prevalent at the international level, especially in international 
environmental law, and the increasingly robust institutional cooperation and linkages 
amongst multilateral environmental treaty regimes spurred by unprecedented 
advancement in environmental sciences, an interactional determination of ‘rules of 
international law’ encapsulates and explains the contemporary climate of the 
international (environmental) law-making process.  
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